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ENGLISH SUMMARY 
The thesis explores the Europeanization of the two far right transnational coalitions 
Fortress Europe and Generation Identity during the ‘refugee crisis’ (2015-2017). 
While a growing literature has considered progressive extra-parliamentary actors’ 
mobilization around EU-related policy issues, there is a lack of research on the 
Europeanization of Eurosceptic and far right mobilizations. With the rise of the far 
right in the last two-three decades, not least within the European Parliament, we need 
to learn more about their European mobilization and cooperation, especially at the 
extra-parliamentary level. The far right transnational networking has a long history, 
but there is limited knowledge of: 1) their transnational strategies, 2) the coordination 
of contention, and 3) the development of shared conceptions of ‘Europe’. These 
aspects are fundamental to consider, as the far right’s transnational alignment may 
lead to a stronger European far right public sphere, in opposition to the one envisioned 
by the EU. 
The thesis thus investigates ‘How and why did the European far right extra-
parliamentary actors in Fortress Europe and Generation Identity Europeanize 
their contention during the 2015-2017 ’refugee crisis’?’ 
The main theoretical framework consists of Europeanization, social movement, and 
far right literature, and focuses on collective action and network Europeanization, 
while also including their frames. The model for analysis expects that a group’s 
political and discursive opportunity structures and its material and symbolic resources 
(independent variables) influence its Europeanization strategy (dependent variable), 
both in terms of networks and collective action. 
The study is a case study of the national members of the two transnational coalitions 
Generation Identity and Fortress Europe that differ highly in their compositions, 
aims, and worldview alignments. Generation Identity (GI) was created in 2012 by the 
French Identitarian Bloc, and currently consists of around 12 New Right national 
groupuscules. Conversely, Fortress Europe consists of 12 members, including both 
parties and extra-parliamentary groups that unite around their aversions towards Islam 
and the EU. The coalition was initiated in the autumn of 2015, and organized a few 
transnational protests in 2016, where after it largely dissolved. The case study both 
compares the two coalitions with each other, but also includes a within case study of 
the national groups and their different trajectories during the ‘crisis’. The thesis uses 
three methods: protest event analysis (to analyze their collective action), frame 
analysis (to analyze the groups’ collective action and collective identity frames), and 
a method akin to process tracing (for analyzing the groups’ coalition building). The 
data mainly consists of primary sources retrieved from the groups’ respective websites 
and Facebook-pages in the years 2015-2017. Additionally, eight key informant 
interviews with FE and GI leaders and spokespersons have been conducted. The 
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secondary sources consist of background and contextual data gathered from scholarly 
literature, government reports, newspaper articles, anti-racist organizations, and 
expert interviews with scholars studying the groups. 
The key findings are as follows: 
Europeanization of Collective Action: 
 The Europeanization of collective action for far right groups only involves 
European targets, participants, and events to a limited degree. Instead, most 
mobilization takes place at the domestic level, frequently in the form of 
‘domestication’ (i.e. the direct targeting of domestic decision-makers on an 
issue where the EU is either the source or indirect target). 
 The roles of the political opportunity structures (POS), the discursive 
opportunity structures (DOS), and the material and symbolic resources are 
significant for an extra-parliamentary actor’s Europeanization. 
 Despite mobilizing with the same main collective action frames, the groups’ 
domestic protest forms and issue foci differ, depending on their POS and DOS, 
just as ongoing domestic debates and the domestic far right’s focus points 
influence the groups’ domestic mobilization. 
 Confirmation of the role of national far right parties as indicative for the 
frequency and success of a Western European far right extra-parliamentary 
actors’ domestic mobilization (hydraulic relationship). 
 The Western and Eastern European groups use different mobilization strategies 
around EU-related policies, due to their different antagonist constructions.  
Europeanization of Networks: 
 The far right transnational mobilization potential is strong due to the ability of 
(some, but not all) far right actors to bridge ideological disagreements around 
anti-Islam positions. 
 The far right organizes in ‘transnational movements’ at the European level. 
They mobilize in the transnational space; yet, do not approach the EU directly. 
Instead, they focus on the mobilization of support from the domestic public. 
 Experienced leaders and ‘movement intellectuals’ are important for far right 
coalition survival due to their ability to create inter-group unity at the ideational 
and strategical levels. 
 Social media is important for far right communication, networking, support 
mobilization, and for transnational organization and coordination. 
 The far right constructs transnational collective identities around the need for 
nationalists (or patriotists) to heroically defend Europe as a means to safeguard 
the European civilization, and thus the various nation-states, despite facing 
strong opposition (i.e. they construct their identity around victimhood and 
battle frames). 
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DANSK RESUME 
Afhandlingen undersøger europæiseringen af de to højreradikale transnationale 
koalitioner Fortress Europe (Fæstning Europa) og Generation Identity (Generation 
Identitet) under 'flygtningekrisen' (2015-2017). Mens en voksende litteratur har 
undersøgt progressive ekstra-parlamentariske aktørers mobilisering omkring EU-
relaterede politiske spørgsmål, er der mangel på forskning i europæiseringen af 
euroskeptiske og højreradikale mobiliseringer. Med den politiske fremgang for det 
ydre højre i de sidste to til tre årtier, ikke mindst i Europa-Parlamentet, har vi brug for 
at lære mere om deres europæiske mobilisering og samarbejde, især på det 
udenomsparlamentariske niveau. Højreradikale transnationale netværk har en lang 
historie, men der er begrænset viden om: 1) deres transnationale strategier, 2) deres 
mobiliseringskoordination, og 3) deres udvikling af fælles forestillinger om 'Europa'. 
Det er fundamentalt at overveje disse aspekter, da de højreradikales transnationale 
ensretning kan føre til en stærkere europæisk højreradikal offentlig sfære, som står i 
modsætning til den, som EU repræsenterer. 
Afhandlingen undersøger således 'Hvordan og hvorfor europæiserede de 
europæiske højreradikale udenomsparlamentariske aktører i Fortress Europe 
og Generation Identity deres mobilisering under' flygtningekrisen 2015-2017'?' 
Den teoretiske ramme er hovedsageligt bygget op omkring europæiserings-, social 
bevægelses- og højrefløjslitteraturen. Den fokuserer på europæiseringen af kollektiv 
handling og netværk, mens den også inkluderer rammeanalyse. Analysemodellen 
forventer at en gruppes politiske og diskursive mulighedsstrukturer, samt dens 
materielle og symbolske ressourcer (de uafhængige variabler) påvirker gruppens 
europæiseringsstrategi (den afhængige variabel) med hensyn til både netværk og 
kollektiv handling. 
Afhandlingen er et casestudie af de nationale medlemmer af de to transnationale 
koalitioner Generation Identity og Fortress Europe, der er meget forskellige i deres 
kompositioner, mål, og verdenssynstilpasninger. Generation Identity (GI) blev 
oprettet i 2012 af den franske Bloc Identitaire (Identitære Blok) og består i øjeblikket 
af omkring 12 nationale nye højre grupper. Fortress Europe (FE) består af 12 grupper, 
herunder både partier og udenomsparlamentariske grupper, der samarbejder omkring 
deres modvilje mod Islam og EU. Koalitionen blev indledt i efteråret 2015 og 
organiserede et par transnationale protester i 2016, hvorefter den stort set blev opløst. 
Casestudiet sammenligner de to koalitioner med hinanden men inkluderer også et 
inden-for-casestudie af de nationale grupper og deres forskellige forløb under 'krisen'. 
Afhandlingen benytter tre hovedmetoder: Protestbegivenhedsanalyse (til at analysere 
deres kollektive handlinger), rammeanalyse (til at analysere gruppernes kollektive 
handlingsrammer og kollektive identitetsrammer) og en metode, der minder om 
proces-sporing (til at analysere gruppernes koalitionsopbygning). Dataet består 
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hovedsageligt af primære kilder hentet fra gruppernes respektive hjemmesider og 
Facebooksider i årene 2015-2017. Derudover er der gennemført otte interviews med 
nøgleinformanter bestående af FE- og GI-ledere og talspersoner. De sekundære kilder 
består af baggrundsinformation og kontekstuelt data indsamlet fra videnskabelig 
litteratur, regeringsrapporter, avisartikler, antiracistiske organisationer og 
ekspertsamtaler med forskere, der studerer grupperne. 
Hovedresultaterne er som følger: 
Europæisering af kollektiv handling 
 Højreradikale gruppers europæisering af kollektiv handling involverer kun 
europæiske protestmål, deltagere og begivenheder i et begrænset omfang. I 
stedet foregår det meste af mobiliseringen på nationalt plan, ofte i form af 
'domesticering' (dvs. det direkte mål er de nationale beslutningstagere, selv om 
EU enten er kilden til problemet eller det indirekte mål for protesten). 
 Understregning af betydningen af de politiske mulighedsstrukturer (POS), de 
diskursive mulighedsstrukturer (DOS) samt de materielle og symbolske 
ressourcer for en udenomsparlamentarisk aktørs europæisering. 
 På trods af at de mobiliserer med de samme primære kollektive 
handlingsrammer, er gruppernes nationale protestformer og emnefokus 
forskellige, afhængigt af de politiske og diskursive mulighedsstrukturer, 
ligesom at løbende nationale debatter og den nationale højrefløjs fokuspunkter 
påvirker gruppernes nationale mobilisering. 
 Bekræftelse af de nationale højreradikale partiers rolle som vejledende for 
hyppigheden og succesen for en vesteuropæisk udenomsparlamentarisk 
højreradikal aktørs nationale mobilisering (hydraulisk forhold). 
 På grund af deres forskellige antagonistkonstruktioner benytter de vest- og 
østeuropæiske grupper sig af forskellige mobiliseringsstrategier omkring EU-
relaterede problematikker. 
Europæisering af netværk 
 Det højreradikale transnationale mobiliseringspotentiale er stærkt på grund af 
evnen hos (nogle, men ikke alle) højreradikale aktører til at bygge bro over 
ideologiske uoverensstemmelser omkring anti-islamiske holdninger. 
 Det ydre højre organiserer sig hovedsageligt i 'transnationale bevægelser' på 
europæisk plan. De er aktive i det transnationale rum, men de prøver ikke at 
skaffe sig direkte adgang til EU. I stedet fokuserer de på mobilisering af støtte 
fra den nationale offentlighed. 
 Understregning af betydningen af erfarne ledere og 'bevægelsesintellektuelle' 
for højreradikale koalitioners overlevelse på grund af deres evne til at skabe en 
enhed mellem grupperne på det idémæssige og strategiske niveau. 
11 
 Understregning af de sociale mediers vigtighed for højreradikales 
kommunikation, netværk, støttemobilisering samt for deres transnationale 
organisering og koordinering. 
 Højreradikale konstruerer transnationale kollektive identiteter omkring 
behovet for, at nationalister (eller patriotister) heroisk forsvarer Europa som et 
middel til at beskytte den europæiske civilisation og dermed de forskellige 
nationalstater, på trods af at de møder stærk modstand (dvs. de konstruerer 
identiteten omkring offerstatus- og kamprammer). 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Due to the EU’s increasing supranational influence on, and power over, the national 
legislative frameworks, numerous scholars have explored the effects of the European 
integration process on the various political entities in the EU Member States (MS) 
through the theoretical lens of ‘Europeanization’1. A vast array of analyses and 
theoretical nuancing have ensued, and as new approaches towards analysing the 
phenomenon developed, so have the number of conceptualizations. As 
‘Europeanization’ is a “complex and multiform phenomenon” (Almeida 2010: 238), 
it is hard to give an encompassing definition of the term. Yet, in short, 
Europeanization measures the EU’s (possible) impact on the EU MS’ political 
systems and actors (della Porta & Caiani 2009: 10). At the more general level, della 
Porta (2009) defines Europeanization as the “processes of resistance, transformation, 
and adaptation to EU policies and norms in member states” (2009: 1).  
The signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 brought EU policies and institutions 
much closer to the European population, due to the increase in the EU’s judicial and 
political competences (Graziano & Vink 2012: 36). At the same time, the new Treaty 
also meant that the European Union increasingly became a political space of 
contention for social movements and other collective actors, as they began turning 
their claims towards the European polity2. Hence, research started exploring how the 
challengers maneuver the EU’s multi-level governance structure (della Porta 2007), 
and its particular rules and norms (see e.g. della Porta & Caiani 2009; Monforte 2014). 
The various mobilizing actors thus need to appropriate their strategies and policy 
outputs according to this particular setting, if they wish to gain influence in the 
decision-making process, be it at the national or EU-level. In other words, social 
movement Europeanization analyses explore “whether, how, and with what 
consequences Europeans mobilize to make claims against policies made in their 
names” (Imig & Tarrow 2001a: 7).  
  
                                                          
1 The explorations of Europeanization range from the domestic institutional levels (such as MS’ 
legislative systems, governments (see e.g. Goetz & Meyer-Sahling 2008), or party systems (see 
e.g. Mair 2000)) to a more actor-based approach. The latter involves political parties (see e.g. 
Ladrech 2002; 2010), civil societal organizations (see e.g. Salgado 2014), interest groups (see 
e.g. Eising 2008; Dür & Mateo 2014), and social movements (see e.g. della Porta & Caiani 
2009; McCauley 2011; Caiani & Graziano 2018). 
2 These mobilizations have for example surrounded specific EU-policies, such as agriculture, 
fishery, the environment, or migration. Yet, they have also focused on issues related to the EU 
polity, like the austerity crisis of 2008 (Bourne & Chatzopoulou 2015), referendum campaigns 
(e.g. the ‘Brexit’ vote in 2016, the Dutch and French referendums in 2005, etc.) (see e.g. 
FitzGibbon 2011), and the anti-TTIP campaign in 2016 (see e.g. Caiani & Graziano 2018). 
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Bourne and Chatzopoulou (2015) argue that social movement Europeanisation 
“occurs when movements collaborate, or make horizontal communicative linkages 
with movements in other countries, contest authorities beyond the state, frame issues 
as European and claim an European identity” (2015: 34). Hence, scholars expect that 
collective actors will begin changing their strategies by both targeting and involving 
actors from the EU-level and other EU member states (Ibid.). In other words, the EU 
arena offers new possible protest targets, but also a shared space of contention for 
collective actors from across the EU member states (Monforte 2014). 
Currently, we know a lot about the different varieties of left-wing bottom-up 
Europeanization, both with regards to the actors’ strategies, frame shifts, and 
transnational collaborative relations in response to the new opportunities offered by 
the European polity setting (see e.g. della Porta & Caiani 2009; Monforte 2014; Parks 
2015; Bourne & Chatzopoulou 2015). Yet, while this literature is continuously 
expanding (see e.g. Caiani & Graziano 2018), so far, there has not been much 
exploration of the Europeanization of far right extra-parliamentary3 mobilization (for 
partial exceptions, see e.g. Caiani & Kröll 2015; Denes 2012). While the 
conceptualization of the ‘far right’ is highly contested, scholars broadly agree upon 
several defining features, namely that they adhere to nationalism, authoritarianism, 
and are against immigration. More elaborately, Fielitz and Laloire (2016) 
conceptualise far right actors as subscribing to a “notion of inequality among human 
beings, combining the supremacy of a particular nation, ‘race’ or ‘civilization’ with 
ambitions for an authoritarian transformation of values and styles of government” 
(2016: 16). This will act as the temporary definition throughout the introductory 
section (a further conceptualization of the ‘far right’ follows in Chapter 4)4. 
Just as it has been relevant to explore the changing configurations of left-wing extra-
parliamentary mobilization due to the EU, in order to get a better understanding of the 
Union’s effect on European civil society, so it is relevant to explore the changes for 
far right mobilization. Considering the topic of far right Europeanization more 
generally, there is nothing indicating that far-right actors do not Europeanize their 
contention to the same degree as the left (albeit most likely not in the same manner). 
For one, many “movements on the right” strongly criticize the EU, as they “feel that 
national identities are under threat, not only as a result of loss of national sovereignty, 
but also due to EU policies that foster immigration and cultural pluralism and 
                                                          
3 Due to the plethora of different far right organizations active outside of party politics, I 
conglomerately define these groups as ‘extra-parliamentary’ (for a similar use of the term, see 
e.g. Caiani et al. 2012). 
4 In the subsequent overview of the existing literature, the text will refer to other terms used to 
define specific types of far right actors, if and when necessary. For instance, further below, I 
refer to a finding by Kriesi (2005) about the ‘populist right’. This wording was not changed to 
the ‘far right’ as the two concepts do not refer to exactly the same group of actors. 
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integration” (Flesher Fominaya 2014: 4). Yet, aside from the far right parties’ 
Europeanization (through e.g. EP-participation and deliberation) (see e.g. Brack & 
Startin 2015; Brack 2014; Almeida 2010), and more general European far right 
transnational cooperation (see e.g. Hafez 2014; Zúquete 2015), we do not actually 
know a lot about the Europeanization process of far right actors in terms of protest 
politics (Hutter 2014a)5. Thus, the following thesis sets out to explore how and why 
far-right extra-parliamentary actors Europeanize their mobilization, with a focus on 
their collective action, networks, and frames.  
 IDENTIFYING THE RESEARCH GAPS 
EUROSCEPTIC EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY ACTORS AND THE EU 
Even though many left-wing groups are pro-EU, certain groups mobilize around 
issues, or hold views on Europe and European integration that conflict with the EU 
decision-makers’ political visions for the continent. The most commonly explored 
instance of such sentiments relates to the groups’ transnational discussions about, and 
calls for, an ‘alternative Europe’ (see e.g. della Porta & Caiani 2007; 2009; Agustín 
2017). This critique mainly targets the “design of the European institutions, as well as 
the EU’s policy choices,” and is voiced by both local, national, and transnational 
actors (della Porta 2006: 1; See also FitzGibbon et al. 2016).  
Della Porta and Caiani (2009) refer to these actors as Critical Europeanists, as they 
advocate for alternative policies, yet still call for more EU competences in a given 
area. Hence, they “do not call […] for a return to the nation state, but for a process of 
Europeanisation from below” (della Porta 2006: 16). Yet, we also find the 
Eurosceptics among the critics. These actors “want to limit European competences 
and are critical of the EU’s specific policies” (Ibid: 16; See also Andretta & Caiani 
2005), and often argue against the idea of an ‘Ever closer Union’. Most previous 
research on Eurosceptic social movements or protest groups has either focused on 
these actors in their own, national settings (see e.g. FitzGibbon 2011; Usherwood 
2013) or considered the Europeanization of transnational progressive mobilizations 
(see della Porta & Caiani 2009; Bourne & Chatzopoulou 2015; Monforte 2014; 
Agustín 2017). Moreover, there is a tendency in the literature to focus on the 
mobilizations that, while being critical, still largely agree with the EU’s general raison 
d’être, thereby omitting the actors who oppose the international organization and its 
raison d’être. These actors often belong to the European far right, a group of actors 
                                                          
5 Dieter Rucht defines protest politics as “usually denot[ing] the deliberate and public use of 
protest by groups or organizations (but rarely individuals) that seek to influence a political 
decision or process, which they perceive as having negative consequences for themselves, 
another group or society as whole” (as cited in Hutter 2014a: 27). 
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that “represents an important reservoir of contestation against the European polity” 
(Almeida 2010: 250),6 but whose contestation is still somewhat underexplored. 
While the French debate around the EU Constitution in 2005 has been identified as 
one of the first times left-wing Eurosceptics mobilized (see e.g. FitzGibbon & Leruth 
2016), the far right was “provided little to no opportunities” to mobilize on this issue 
compared to the EP-elections of 2004 (Minkenberg & Perrineau 2007). However, 
more recently, both at the Dutch referendum on the ‘Ukraine-European Union 
Association Agreement’ in 20167 and the referendum on the British EU-exit (the so-
called Brexit)8, far right non- and institutional actors were very vocal, and to some 
extent determining for the negative end-results of the votes. Similarly, the 2018 
debates about the ratification of the UN’s ‘Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and 
Regular Migration’ was also strongly contested by the far right across Europe, and 
several member states abandoned the agreement, including Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, Poland, and Austria (Gatti 2018). 
The far right thus increasingly challenges the EU institutions and their ethos, thereby 
also opposing the EU and its role as one of the main European decision-making 
polities. Combined with the EU’s more or less self-created various crises within the 
last decade (financial, legitimacy, and migrant crisis, to name a few), a strong 
Eurosceptic far right presents itself as an “inconvenient solidarity” for proponents of 
the EU (Caiani & Pavan 2017). Its various “alliance structures […] oppose and distort 
current efforts towards transnational democratisation, particularly at the European 
level” (Ibid: 147) thereby endangering the project of an ‘Ever Closer Union’ as set out 
in the Treaty of Rome in 1957. It is thus of high relevance to consider if, how, and 
when European far right extra-parliamentary actors mobilize against, or around, EU 
policies, to better understand the (potential) challenge posed by such actors.  
                                                          
6 Historically, numerous far right parties were actually pro-EU. As late as 1993, for instance, 
Front National still argued that there should be “‘a coherent political project’ that comprised 
foreign and defence policy, common immigration controls, a common currency and a common 
European border agency” (McGowan 2012: 671). Yet, together with other political activists, 
the far right increasingly began problematizing the political output of the EU after the 
introduction of the Maastricht Treaty (see e.g. Usherwood 2013). 
7 The initial campaign to collect the required signatures for the referendum was organised by 
GeenPeil, a cooperation between the blog GeenStijl (Literal translation: No Style), the hard 
Eurosceptic Burgercomité EU (Citizens Committee EU) organization, and the then far right 
think tank (now party) Forum voor Democratie (Forum for Democracy) (Teffer 2016).  
8 Particularly the far right hard Eurosceptic UK Independence Party (UKIP) campaigned 
strongly for a ‘leave’, and its political group in the EP, the EPDD, co-financed some of the 
Leave.EU and Grassroots Out campaigns’ events and activities (FitzGibbon & Leruth 2016). 
Moreover, ‘immigration’ was a major topic of the referendum campaign, and UKIP underlined 
the need to “take back control of our borders” (see e.g. UKIP poster in Stewart & Mason 2016). 
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FAR RIGHT EUROPEANIZATION OF PROTESTS, NETWORKS, AND 
IDENTITIES  
Since the early 1990s, immigration has become one of the most salient topics of 
political contention at the civil societal level, mainly due to the role of the ‘populist 
right’ (Kriesi 2015: 8). Based on protest event data, Hutter and Kriesi (2013) show 
that while cultural liberalism was the main reason for protests up until the 1990-2000s, 
by 2013, immigration was in the lead. Hence, even though these protests include both 
pro- and anti-immigration events, the general right-wing turn in European politics 
means that far-right extra-parliamentary actors have opportune possibilities to voice 
their concerns as the political “climate” has become “less repressive” (Mudde 2017a: 
609). Moreover, the left-wing’s lacking ability to agree on a common future direction 
provides further opportunities for far right gains (Halikiopoulou in Sheehy 2017). 
Within the last decades, an approachment has occurred between the political parties 
and the extra-parliamentary far right, both due to issue-congruence, but also because 
they at times form broad coalitions (Ruzza 2017). Yet, even though “[s]treet politics 
have become a more integral part of the broader [populist radical right] movement” 
(Mudde 2017a: 609), far right protest politics is still under-explored (for exceptions 
see e.g. Ruzza 2017; Caiani et al. 2012; Castelli Gattinara 2018; Fielitz & Laloire 
2016). Most social movement researchers instead tend to focus on left-libertarian 
collective actors and have “been slow to address the ‘bad side’ of social movement 
activism” (Caiani et al. 2012: 3). This ‘bad side’ is continuously expanding and 
changing its expression forms across Europe (see e.g. Fielitz & Laloire 2016; 
Berntzen 2018a), creating its own specific identities, organizational set-ups, political 
viewpoints, activities, repertoires, aims, and spaces for contention.  
The extra-parliamentary actors not only count protest groups, but also online media 
platforms, subcultural groupuscules,  vigilante groups, football hooligans, think tanks, 
publishing houses, etcetera (see e.g. Veugelers & Menard 2018 for an overview). 
These various organizations can be used by the far right actors to establish strong 
social roots, linking the cultural with the political (Ruzza 2017) but also to influence 
the general population through protest actions (see e.g. Caiani et al. 2012). Yet, while 
the far right institutional actors, i.e. the parties, are experiencing a surge in electoral 
gains in most European countries (see e.g. BBC 2019b), far-right extra-parliamentary 
mobilizations still face many obstacles and much hostility in several European 
countries. This includes both their protests (in the shape of e.g the police not 
permitting the demonstration, counter-demonstrations, threats from anti-fascist 
activists, plus the reputational costs for the participants), their more general political 
opportunities, and the organization of events (like hotels or conference centres 
refusing to host the gathering (see e.g. Berntzen et al. 2017)). Yet, in recent years, new 
far right expression forms challenge these suppressive attempts, making it even more 
relevant to explore the extra-parliamentary far right level further, to gain a deeper 
understanding of its current articulation. 
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Hence, there is a more general lack of explorations of far right activism; both in terms 
of the national and transnational level, and with the employment of social movement 
theories (see e.g. Caiani et al. 2012). Concerning their approach and protest actions 
towards the EU and more general European level, it is of great interest to explore how 
(and whether) these actors strategize to gain more influence on this particular 
decision-making polity, either through national or transnational avenues. This is 
relevant in order to gain a deeper understanding of the mobilization patterns and 
strengths and weaknesses of far right extra-parliamentary contention. Moreover, the 
anticipated varied strategies by the far right actors across the member states can also 
shed more light on the (continued) relevance of the national context in terms of far 
right mobilization. 
Returning to a consideration of the far right’s views on ‘Europe’ and the EU, many 
actors contest the EU’s policy output (if not the entire institution), yet, at the same 
time, they also frequently refer to the need to uphold European unity. As Bar-On 
(2011) states, “the stances of most of the extreme right-wing political parties within 
the European Union have become identical: support for pan European unity, and 
rejection of the contemporary ‘technocratic’ EU” (2011: 208). This has puzzled many 
scholars, as this seemingly infers a departure from their nationalist ideologies, which 
usually involves a discursive attempt to distinguish their own nation-state from all 
others. Thus, while it seems rather logical that left-wing movements and parties look 
for international allies (due to their internationalist outlook), from a purely ideological 
viewpoint, it appears as an “implicit contradiction” that far right actors should 
cooperate transnationally (Caiani 2014: 15; see also Minkenberg & Perrineau 2007). 
While some scholars contend that researchers tend to “inflate” the ideological 
alliances and networks amongst the European far right parties (see Mudde 2017b), 
others have demonstrated their rather close relations to actors abroad (see e.g. Zúquete 
2015; Hafez 2014). Therefore, there is a need for more research that explores the 
transnational links between the different European far right actors, in order to evaluate 
their commitment to a (potentially) shared agenda. 
One must keep in mind, however, that this transnational networking by far is nothing 
new. Conceptualising ‘transnational’ movements as consisting of groups that retain 
their rooting “in national political contexts, which they transcend in order to 
collaborate with other nationally rooted groups and organizations to form 
transnational networks” (Flesher Fominaya 2014:40), far right transnational 
interaction in fact has a long trajectory. One can at least trace it back to the European 
interwar period, where especially the fascist organizations attempted to create closer 
European ties and shared European visions of society (see e.g. Camus & Lebourg 
2017; Mammone 2014; Schlembach 2011). This neo-fascist ‘radical Europeanism’ is 
still expressed today, and visible through: 
27 
[…] increasing networking attempts on organisational levels that 
contradict the exclusive juxtaposition of nationalism and internationalism. 
It is certainly the case that both far right political parties and the militant 
neo-Nazi scenes are building European connections not solely on the basis 
of co-operation but with reference to a perceived common ‘destiny’. 
(Schlembach 2011: 1332) 
The far right thus also refers to a common ‘European identity’, albeit of a very 
different, and much more exclusionary, sort than the left-wing mobilizations. 
Thus, increasingly, and especially since the turn of the century, the far right has begun 
defending a society that “transcends the nation-state (for example, the focus of 
‘native’ Europeans)” (Zúquete 2015: 81). The ‘us’, many current far right actors wish 
to protect, refers to a culturally and ethnically homogenous European civilization, 
whose culture is perceived threatened by the Muslim ‘other’ particularly (Hirsch-
Hoefler & Mudde 2013). According to Berntzen (2018), the far right has undergone 
an anti-Islamic turn, involving two processes: the pre-existing far right actors have re-
oriented their attention, and the whole scene has expanded, due to the rise of new 
initiatives and mobilizations (particularly at the extra-parliamentary level). Moreover, 
since the early 2000s, several far-right actors have begun cooperating transnationally 
around the topic of anti-Islam (Zúquete 2015; Hafez 2014; Meleagrou-Hitchens & 
Brun 2013). This has led to the formation of e.g. the Counter-Jihad Movement (mainly 
active online, and includes U.S. actors), which also included transnational networks, 
such as Stop the Islamization of Europe and the European Defence League. Their 
coalition-building frequently takes place around anti-Islam (see e.g. Zúquete 2015), 
and Hafez (2014) argues that Islamophobia has become “the cornerstone for building 
pan-European right-wing unity” (2014: 496). Presently, one can thus observe “an 
emergent anti-Muslim Europeanism” (Denes 2012: 289; see also Berntzen 2019), 
which aims to “assure the survival of a wider, cross-border, trans-state community” 
(Zúquete 2015: 81). 
Yet, while these ideological links have been explored rather thoroughly, we still do 
not know much about the actors’ transnational street mobilization endeavours, 
particularly in relation to the EU. This is somewhat puzzling, especially in light of the 
growing awareness of their (historical) transnational ambitions (see e.g. Schlembach 
2011; Camus & Lebourg 2017), and the very apparent transnational links between 
many of the groups. Moreover, while there is knowledge of these various cross-actor 
and -national connections, the insights on the ways they utilize these transnational 
extra-parliamentary contacts across Europe to further their cause is largely missing. 
Similarly, while coalition dynamics have received extensive coverage in terms of left-
wing mobilization, right-wing coalitions “have been the subject of surprisingly few 
studies of coalition dynamics. Research has yet to explore the extent to which their 
formation and longevity is influenced by factors similar to those shaping progressive 
coalitions” (Van Dyke & Amos 2017: 11). Literature on the far right thus mainly 
considers the EU-critique of single actors or organizations and not as part of 
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transnational mobilizations, while the transnational relations of extra-parliamentary 
far right actors has been considered without a specific research focus, i.e. without 
attention to their actual strategical goals, nor identity constructions as part of a 
transnational group. 
This becomes even more pertinent to explore further, when considering the current 
‘convergence’ of the Western and Eastern European far right. In the far right literature, 
there has been a tendency to see the two sides of the continent as distinct far right 
spaces, most likely because of the very different developments of the two scenes (see 
e.g. Kopecky & Mudde 2003; Pytlas 2018; Minkenberg 2018). However, within the 
last two decades, there has been an increase in attempts to bridge the two geographical 
areas, both in terms of drawing far right comparisons, and of including both ‘scenes’ 
in one framework (e.g. Minkenberg (2015) and his typology of the far right). Yet, so 
far, there has not been much focus on the transnational connections between the two 
parts of the continent, besides from some brief mentions (e.g. Merkl 2004 on the 
German neo-Nazis and their use of the Czech Republic as mail-delivery place; Mareš 
2006 on the Hungarian extreme right and their transnational connections more 
broadly). This lack in research is not particularly surprising, considering the various 
antipathies and animosities that exist between distinct Eastern and Western European 
far right actors, such as e.g. the Polish and German far right (due to the WWII legacy) 
(see e.g. Jajecznik 2015). 
However, recent research has shown that the actors cooperate, or at least network, 
around anti-Islam; both online (Berntzen 2019) and offline (see e.g. Hafez 2014). The 
role of technological developments for the far right, particularly the evolution of social 
media, has already garnered rather extensive scholarly attention (see e.g. Caiani & 
Parenti 2013; Berntzen 2018a). There is no doubt that this online space has furthered 
the various groups’ mobilizations, by spreading, or diffusing, far right initiatives 
abroad. This has, for instance, been visible in the spread of various new far right group 
formations to Eastern Europe, such as e.g. the Autonomous Nationalists (see Mareš 
2012) and the English Defence League (see e.g. HopeNotHate n.d.d.; Hafez 2018). 
These transnational links require further scholarly attention, especially considering 
the broadening of anti-Islamic discourses to Eastern Europe. This is, in fact, a research 
topic, which has not amassed much scholarly attention in general, despite the virulent 
nature of Islamophobic expressions in this part of Europe (see e.g. Narkowicz & 
Pędziwiatr 2016; Hafez 2018). Its spread through networks with Western European 
actors is thus worth exploring closer, as these alignments of political views may have 
repercussions on EU policy-making, for instance in the European Parliament. 
Hence, as Zúquete (2015) more broadly states, there is a “lack of systematic research 
on the agents, dynamics, and networks of this nationalist international” (2015: 370). 
We already know that the far right cooperates to a high extent transnationally (see e.g. 
Zúquete 2015; Berntzen 2018a; Caiani & Kröll 2015), however, we still do not know 
very much about the exact process of this cooperation, including its triggers, 
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mechanisms, and incentives. Obtaining more knowledge on this aspect of far right 
mobilization can aid the understanding of the more general strength of the far right in 
Europe. As argued by Durham and Power (2010), “learning with whom they seek 
alliances; when and why these alliances work; or, as is more common, when and why 
they fail, helps us to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the Right” (2010: 5).  
Certain research on civil societal Europeanisation has considered the extent to which 
these various European actors develop ‘European identities’ through their cooperation 
(see e.g. della Porta & Caiani 2009). Through the voicing of opposition to the EU, the 
far right in a sense constitute a ‘counter-public’ (Fraser 1993; Agustín 2017), going 
up against the ethos and raison d’être of the EU and its supranational decision-making 
powers, while at the same time propagating illiberal policy proposals. Yet, most of 
the analyses of the potential formation of European identities fail to take into account 
that these identities might not support closer European ties in terms of political 
integration and ‘ever closer Union’, nor lead to a European citizenry that necessarily 
agrees with the ethos of the EU. Denes (2012) has already rightly pointed this out 
concerning the far right through his examination of the Stop the Islamization of 
Europe network. He argues that European ties also may start appearing amongst actors 
that stand for “illiberal exclusions, vitriolic EU scepticisms, and fierce chauvinisms” 
(2012: 290). This closely relates to Imig and Tarrow’s (2001a) argument that “Instead 
of producing a common collective identity, contention over Europe's future may 
actually be creating or crystallizing diverse identities around the opportunities and 
costs of the integration process” (2001: 22), including by actors that promote ‘bad 
civil societal’ values (Chambers & Kopstein 2001).  
This becomes particularly relevant to explore when considering the democratic 
challenge posed by the far right, and the illiberal measures they advocate, particularly 
towards third-country immigrants. Not only would these actors’ success likely lead to 
a re-nationalization of European politics, but also to an even stronger ‘fortification’ 
of, but also within, Europe (Geddes 2000), as the freedom of movement right could 
be at risk, while a sort of ‘exclusionary Europeanism’ could rise in its stead (Risse 
2015). It becomes even more important to explore, when considering the rise in anti-
immigration sentiments across the continent, which has made hostility towards 
migration an “electorally popular diffuse interest” at the national level (Geddes 2000: 
4). Moreover, the left-wing moves towards a more ‘Social Europe’ would most likely 
be curtailed, if the far right continues its advances, both at the extra-parliamentary and 
institutional level. In this sense, the question of the far right’s closer cross-border 
relations around an opposition to the EU and its policies has a strong normative 
relevance, posing fundamental questions about European democracy and the 
maintenance of the EU in its current form. 
The following thesis thus sets out to explore the far right’s transnational relations 
further, including how and whether the transnational cooperation evolves around the 
EU institutions, and the extent to which the different groups develop a shared 
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collective identity at the transnational level. The period of the so-called ‘refugee 
crisis’9 (2015-2017) provides a good test case for this exploration, as will be further 
explained below. 
 RESEARCH QUESTION AND AIMS 
It is the aim with the thesis to answer the following research question:  
How and why did the European far right extra-parliamentary actors Fortress 
Europe and Generation Identity Europeanize their contention during the 2015-
2017 ’refugee crisis’? 
In order to begin filling the above outlined research gaps, the thesis sets out to explore 
the various Europeanization paths and forms of the European far right at the extra-
parliamentary level, i.e. in terms of protest politics (Hutter 2014a). As it is the aim to 
focus on the more strategical side of their contention, the research considers the meso-
level of the various organizations, rather than e.g. the microlevel, which often involves 
the subjective accounts of individual activists (such as e.g. done by della Porta & 
Caiani 2009). It is thus the aim to explore how the leaders and spokespeople 
rationalize and justify their groups’ European endeavours, plus which strategies they 
make use of in order to attain their goals. This entails the acquirement of more 
knowledge about the groups’ protest repertoires, resources, and strategies, plus their 
(pan-)European networking and cooperation, and whether and how these activities 
take place in or around the European institutions, plus the effect it has on the actors’ 
collective identities. In order to explore these facets, the study will draw on social 
movement and Europeanization theories, plus the scholarly output about the far right.  
One of the main theoretical approaches employed to examine social movements’ and 
other extra-parliamentary actors’ Europeanization paths is the role of political 
opportunities (see e.g. Caiani & Graziano 2018; Marks & McAdam 1996; Imig & 
Tarrow 2001a; della Porta & Caiani 2009). Scholars use the approach to analyse the 
opportunities for mobilization in terms of the ‘open-’ or ‘closedness’ of the domestic 
and EU political systems (Kriesi 2004), in order to explain the groups’ choices in 
terms of mobilization. With time, scholars have also begun emphasising the 
significance of discursive openings at both the political and public levels, which 
influence the mobilizing frames’ resonances (McCammon 2013). This study also 
employs the political and discursive opportunity structure approaches (POS and 
DOS), which both work from the assumption that a national extra-parliamentary 
                                                          
9 The term ‘refugee crisis’ (also referred to as ‘migrant crisis’) is highly contested. In this thesis, 
it refers to the European ‘crisis’ that erupted in the summer of 2015, where the arrival of an 
unprecedented number of refugees led to “an administrative melt‐down in several European 
countries and a breakdown of the European asylum registration system as a whole” (Gerhards 
et al. 2018: 23). 
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group will choose its Europeanization path based on an evaluation of the best 
decision-making body to approach for achieving claim success, or at least resonance 
(Kriesi 2004). At the same time, many scholars also agree upon the importance of 
resources for extra-parliamentary actors, in terms of successful mobilization (see e.g. 
McCarthy & Zald 1977). These resources can be of various sizes and types, and there 
is much scholarly debate about what exactly constitutes a resource (see e.g. McCauley 
2011). Yet, financial, human, organizational, and structural resources are frequently 
mentioned as being amongst the most important, just as cultural, political, and 
informational resources all have been found to be conducive to a social movement’s 
progress (see e.g. Bandy & Smith 2005). The level of resources also matter highly in 
terms of a group’s Europeanization strategy. Research has thus found that particularly 
an extra-parliamentary group’s symbolic and material resources influence its options 
for gaining access to the EU-powerholders (see e.g. della Porta & Caiani 2009).  
Hence, these two aspects (POS/DOS and resource mobilization) are expected to act 
as independent variables, which influence the groups’ distinct mobilization strategies 
in terms of Europeanization (dependent variable), both in terms of networking and 
collective action (Monforte 2014). Due to the rather varied domestic POS and DOS 
across the European continent, the analysis should also shed more light on the cross-
contextual responses to the refugee crisis, and how and why the distinct groups 
decided to instigate cooperation with actors from abroad.  
As stated above, we already know that there is a lot of transnational cooperation and 
networking taking place on the far right (see e.g. Berntzen 2018a; Caiani & Kröll 
2015). Yet, it is no easy task to sample the most appropriate research objects to 
examine such developments. The far right political spectrum consists of a multitude 
of different actors, both in terms of ideology and organizational forms (see e.g. Fielitz 
& Laloire 2016; Minkenberg 2018), making it hard to explore the entirety of the actors 
in one study. However, as we still do not know much about the transnationalization 
process as such, i.e. the rationales and steps involved in the initiation of transnational 
cooperation, plus how it develops over time, from the outset, I decided to focus the 
research on already established transnational far right coalitions. I have thus decided 
to delimit the focus of the investigation on the national groups that participated in two 
transnational coalitions,10 which were both highly active in the ‘refugee crisis’ period, 
namely Fortress Europe (FE) and Generation Identity (GI). Fortress Europe is a 
coalition consisting of both European political parties and protest groups with various 
                                                          
10 Based on social movement literature, I define a transnational coalition as a more or less 
densely connected and means-oriented alliance between nationally based groups and actors 
(who may derive from both the non- and institutional level), who pool (certain) resources, in 
order to target a shared opponent at the transnational level. Besides from the instrumentality 
of the cooperation, they do not necessarily share any closer identity-based affinities (see 
Chapter 3 for conceptualization). 
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political viewpoints (rather akin to the Counter-Jihad Movement (CJM)11), while 
Generation Identity is a coalition of similar-minded groupuscules (Griffin 2003), 
which used the French Géneration Identitaire (created in 2012) as their blueprint for 
contention. This choice of sample is a rather unorthodox approach in terms of the 
existing Europeanization literature. Most of the research either focuses more broadly 
on the Europeanization of national protests in general (Imig & Tarrow 2001a; 
Chabanet 2011; Uba & Uggla 2011) or on national case studies (e.g. Rucht 2002 
(Germany); Císař & Vráblíková 2010 (Czech Republic); Andretta & Caiani 2005 
(Italy); della Porta & Caiani 2006 (Italy)). Some do compare a number of EU MS (e.g. 
Reising 1999 (Germany, France, and Belgium); della Porta & Caiani 2009 (6 MS); 
Monforte 2014 (France and Germany)), yet, so far, only a few have ventured to focus 
the research around an already established transnational coalition. In fact, della Porta 
and Caiani’s (2009) research on the Global Social Forum, and Agustín’s (2017) article 
on Diem25 and PlanB practically stand alone in this endeavour. With this choice, I 
thus wish to propose a more innovative framework that considers far right 
transnational networking in depth, while still maintaining a focus on the national 
context, in order to deduce the role of the domestic context for far right 
Europeanization and collective action more generally.  
One could argue that to obtain a better understanding of the far right in its complexity, 
it would be more beneficial to consider the far right actors in one to two national 
settings, in order to deduce the different Europeanization paths, depending on the type 
of organization and its resources (such as e.g. Monforte (2014) has done). Yet, as it is 
the pre-defined aim to consider how exactly the far right networking takes place 
amongst the different national actors, plus to explore their forms and rationales for 
transnational collective action, I deemed this approach to be the most suitable. 
Focusing on the organizational meso-level, it is thus the aim to consider how the 
organizers and/or leaders of the groups making up the two coalitions (GI and FE) 
rationalize their participation in the transnational coalitions, and the activities pursued 
in order to maintain the cooperation. At the same time, this case selection also makes 
it possible to consider (certain of) the groups in their domestic settings, and explore 
their collective action strategies, and reasons for setting up and/or joining the 
coalitions. As a delimitation, I have decided to focus solely on the collective action of 
the extra-parliamentary groups that make up the two coalitions (for more on this 
choice, see Ch. 2). 
As mentioned above, far right collective action is a rather understudied research area, 
including explorations of the protest actions at the European level, both surrounding 
the EU, but also more general transnational collective action on the far right (for 
exceptions, see e.g. Hutter 2014a; Zúquete 2015). To begin closing these research 
                                                          
11 The CJM included both protest groups, single activists, political associations, and political 
parties (such as Vlaams Belang and the Sweden Democrats), which found common ground in 
their anti-Islam stances (see e.g. Berntzen 2018a; Meleagrou-Hitchens & Brun 2013 for more). 
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gaps, this thesis wishes to both explore the action repertoires and strategies of the 
different groups more broadly, and to investigate the ways in which they (potentially) 
include the EU in their protests, either by targeting the institutions, protesting about 
EU-policy related issues, or approaching the institutions in other ways. This is done 
by both analysing all the extra-parliamentary groups’ actions together, and their 
various mobilization paths and strategies, but also by focusing in on some of the 
different groups’ national contexts and their (potential) influence on the groups’ 
Europeanization of collective action. The analysis will thus examine the groups’ 
political and discursive opportunities at both the domestic and European level, 
together with particularly their material resources, as a means to explain the chosen 
strategies. This also entails a study of the role attributed to the EU by the different 
groups, in order to understand the groups’ manoeuvring in the 2015-2017 period, and 
the rationale behind their strategies, which may, or may not, involve contention 
directed at the EU. Moreover, by choosing two transnational coalitions from the 
outset, we already know that Europeanization of networks has taken place. Yet, in 
order to investigate the extent of this collaboration further in terms of street 
mobilization, the research will explore the scope of the participants at each protest 
event, in order to deduce the extent of the cooperation. All of these aspects will be 
considered through a protest event analysis (see e.g. Hutter 2014b), based on data 
drawn from the national groups’ own sources, to ensure as encompassing a data set as 
possible.  
The networking-section of the thesis will particularly draw on (transnational) 
coalition-building theories, both developed in relation to the EU-level 
(Europeanization literature), but also deriving from the broader social movement 
coalition literature (involving scholars such as Van Dyke (2003); Levi & Murphy 
2006; Tarrow 2005; etc.). These theoretical findings are employed to develop a 
conceptual framework, which guides the analysis of the groups’ networking 
endeavours, both in terms of the initiation, maintenance, and (possible) survival of the 
coalition. It is expected that the groups will begin coalescing, when they deem that 
the political and discursive opportunities are open at either the EU- or the European 
level as such. Moreover, the framework also relies on theoretical expectations drawn 
from scholarship on the far right, particularly concerning the initiation of the 
coalitions, and the groups’ deliberations in terms of joining forces with actors from 
abroad. This is not only due to possible respectability and legitimacy concerns (Ahrne 
et al. 2005), but also due to the differences and feuds between certain Eastern and 
Western European far right nationalists (e.g. the Czech and Polish far right, and their 
animosities towards Germany). In a similar vein, it is also the aim to continue the 
work of Berntzen (2018) and examine the extent to which the ‘refugee crisis’ led to a 
further bridging of the Western and Eastern European far right, also at the offline 
level. 
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The framing perspective has been a prominent feature of several more recent 
explorations of social movement Europeanization (see e.g. Monforte 2014; della Porta 
& Caiani 2009), and it is also included in this thesis. However, unlike the 
aforementioned works, it is not the direct aim here to explore the effect of 
Europeanization on a movement’s frames (i.e. if said frames change due to the new 
political realities brought by the EU, for instance due to the change in the target of 
mobilization (see e.g. Monforte 2014 for such an approach)). Instead, the study 
employs frame analysis for two main purposes. On the one hand, to investigate the 
issues around which the various groups instigate collective action (as a means to 
explain the group’s Europeanization strategies in terms of collective action). On the 
other, to explore the extent to which the groups that make up the two respective 
transnational coalitions develop ‘Europeanized’ and shared collective identities.  
Hence, the analysis includes an exploration of the distinct national groups’ political 
viewpoints and alignment of identities with their European counterparts in relation to 
their transnational cooperation. This entails the exploration of the groups’ collective 
action frames and collective identity frames (Snow & Benford 1988; Benford & Snow 
2000). The collective action frames involve a collective actor’s diagnosis (what is the 
problem and who is to blame), prognosis (how it should be solved), and motivational 
frames (why should one act). In order to examine whether the coalition-members 
develop joint transnational collective identities, the research considers their (potential) 
creation of a joint, European, protagonist ‘us,’ which must act united against the 
antagonist ‘them’. This will be done by exploring how the distinct groups construct 
protagonist identities to define themselves and their supporters, and the juxtaposed 
internal and external antagonists, who are blamed for the perceived problems (see e.g. 
Weiβ 2017).  
APPROACH TO THE STUDY  
The theoretical framework briefly outlined above draws on insights developed from 
both structuralist (political process theory), rationalist (resource mobilization), and 
culturalist (frame analysis) research approaches. Ascribing to the consideration that 
“Social problems are not objectively given, but socially constructed” (Hjelmar 1996: 
170), the study is placed within a constructivist framework, which integrates the 
structural and rational theories, as these are considered to interact with each other (see 
e.g. Oliver et al. 2003). I thus place myself as a social constructivist, yet, also drawing 
upon rationalist and structuralist approaches.  
In alignment with most social movement Europeanization theories, this study 
considers both political opportunities and resource mobilization as vital for 
understanding a group’s mobilization options and potential strategies. This infers that 
the research objects are believed to act based on (more or less) rational decision-
making capacities. Yet, while “the constraints of structure and the problems of 
organizing” in terms of resources are vital to take into consideration (Oliver et al. 
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2003: 226), the actors’ reasoning for mobilizing is also very much founded on their 
subjective perception of reality, or ‘what is out there’. They thus act based on their 
subjective readings of politics, and are strongly impacted by ideas and perceptions, 
plus the context in which they are situated (in terms of both time, place, and persons).  
Hence, the research acknowledges the subjectivity of the individual movement leaders 
and entrepreneurs, which infer that these actors may pursue other options than the 
theoretically expected, dependent on their own deliberations. It is thus presumed that 
other factors guide the actors, aside from structures and rationality. For instance, as 
also argued in the Theoretical Framework further below, in certain situations, the 
leaders may not perceive the available openings in the system, and thus do not act 
upon them. Moreover, following the example of Poletta and Jasper (2001), extra-
parliamentary groups’ identities are also doted much importance, especially in terms 
of their frames and rationales behind their protest actions, which also partly explains 
why certain actors mobilize despite closed opportunities. These identities may 
influence the actors’ chosen action repertoires and tactics, and thus infer different 
trajectories than what POS and DOS might expect. In the words of Oliver and her 
colleagues (2003): 
[M]ovements not only develop rational and strategic actions, they 
continuously draw from cultural memories and repertoires, from values 
and moral principles to redefine situations, events, and relations in ways 
that would legitimate action, sanction inaction, gain bystanders' sympathy, 
reduce governments' ability to use social control resources, and attract 
media attention to reach distant publics. (2003: 226) 
It thus becomes a matter of deducing how the actors perceive their realities, including 
the consequences of their actions. For one, the actors’ perceptions of the EU as a 
political construct may influence their strategies towards the institutions. Moreover, 
“social institutions” such as the EU, are “not just constraining behaviour, but also 
affecting the identities, interests, and preferences of actors” (Risse 2018: 128). 
Simultaneously, the various (trans)national ideas, identities, and structures affect each 
activist’s mindset through different forms of internalization (Olsen as cited in Bache 
2003), and this also infers that the groups and actors construct their own visions of 
‘Europe’ and ‘European cooperation,’ based on their perceptions of reality. Hence, it 
is important to keep the actors’ ‘frames of reference’ in mind throughout (Eyerman & 
Jamison as cited in Hjelmar 1996). Such ‘frames of reference’ can for instance be 
analysed through ‘Frame analysis’ (Snow & Benford 1988), an approach, which is 
frequently employed by social movement scholars as a means to deduce a group’s 
meaning attribution. Movements’ frames thus affect and mediate their resources and 
opportunities (Oliver et al. 2003). 
In order to gain a better understanding of the groups’ worldviews, mobilization 
claims, and transnational strategies, there is thus need for extensive amounts of data 
from several types of sources. This research mainly relies on primary sources, 
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including accounts about the coalition-building and collective action from the extra-
parliamentary groups themselves, both retrieved from their written data and from 
semi-structured interviews. This will be explained further in the Methodological 
Framework. 
After having accounted for the research question and analytical approach to the 
research objects, the following section will shortly outline the occurrences during the 
‘refugee crisis,’ and explain why this is a good period to investigate the potential for 
far right Europeanization.  
 THE ‘REFUGEE CRISIS’: OPPORTUNE PERIOD FOR FAR 
RIGHT EUROPEANIZATION? 
The European ‘refugee crisis’ involved refugees crossing the EU’s external border, 
and their distribution across the EU once they arrived to an EU MS. It thus quickly 
became a pan-European policy issue (for an overview, see BBC 2018). During the 
‘crisis’, the EU MS were incapable of finding a common stance, and instead, “the 
influx of refugees […] turned nation against nation and exposed the institutional 
shortcomings of the union’s structure to address questions like external and internal 
security” (Yardley 2016). The European Commission initially tried to maintain a more 
humanitarian policy towards the refugees, just as Germany’s Chancellor, Angela 
Merkel, advocated for a welcoming approach. Yet, several EU member state 
governments instead wished to restrict the numbers of refugees admitted into their 
country, plus strengthen the overall immigration legislation. This led to rather 
polarized perceptions of the right solution to the crisis. As Harteveld and colleagues 
(2017) argue, “Many citizens, commentators and political parties, irrespective of their 
ideology, seemed to blame the EU for the refugee crisis” (2017: 157), either due to its 
lacking response to aid people in need (mainly left-wing actors) or because it did not 
do enough to close the external and internal EU borders (mainly the right). 
European Context in the 2000s: EU and Europe in Crisis 
However, in order to truly understand the ‘refugee crisis’ and the national(ist) 
responses throughout Europe, one needs to consider it in its political and historical 
context. Here, particularly four critical junctures12 (i.e. major political crises or 
turning points with lasting policy effect) are worth mentioning, namely the terrorist 
attack in New York on September 11, 2001, the economic crisis of 2008, the EU’s 
crisis of legitimacy, and the 2014 EP-elections. 
                                                          
12 In the macro-political sense of the word, a ‘critical juncture’ refers to a moment of deep 
change, involving “(1) a major episode of institutional innovation, (2) occurring in distinct 
ways, (3) and generating an enduring legacy” (Collier & Munck 2017: 2).  
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Starting with 9/11, 2001, the Jihadist terrorist attack on the Twin Towers in New York 
City provided a crucial ‘moral shock’ (see e.g. Monahan 2010)13. The attacks led to 
growing public concern about Muslim immigration, just as the issue received high 
media coverage, making anti-Muslim discourses an electorally strong political 
position. During the following two decades, the ‘West’ has witnessed a gradual 
mainstreaming of the far right claims about Islam (see e.g. Kallis 2013), and various 
governments have tightened the immigration legislation and the monitoring of 
Muslim environments (see e.g. Renton 2015). The far right has thus obtained 
increased political space to voice their claims, inferring a simultaneous moderation of 
the employed frames and action repertoires by certain actors (consider e.g. the rise of 
the non-violent PEGIDA movement in Germany) (Vorländer et al. 2018). While the 
Islamist terrorist attacks had become rather sporadic (but not less volatile) in the years 
since 9/11, ISIS’ proclamation of the caliphate in 2014 (BBC 2014) led to a string of 
Jihadi terrorist attacks across Western Europe in the 2015-2017 period.  
The financial crisis erupted in 2008, and led to a Eurozone debt crisis in 2010, which 
entailed the bailout of Greece, Ireland, Spain, Cyprus, and Portugal (Walker 2018). 
The political climate in Europe soured, as the member states fought about how to 
solve the crisis and what to do next with the Euro-cooperation (see e.g. Hewitt 2012). 
These conflicts only aided the far right in terms of exhibiting the problems regarding 
supranational governance and economic unity between such diverse countries and 
displayed a divided EU-leadership in terms of the best solutions (Ibid.). Yet, while 
this development meant better opportunities for far right policy influence at the 
national levels, at the EU-level, the institutions became increasingly inward-looking 
and closed off for civil societal access of any political colour (see e.g. della Porta & 
Parks 2018).  
Moreover, since the economic crisis (i.e. from around 2010 onwards), the EU has 
faced a strong level of public distrust in its institutions (European Commission 2017). 
In the decades preceding the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, European integration was 
mainly considered an elite-driven process, where the population largely acted with a 
‘permissive/tacit consensus’ towards its policy output (i.e. the decisions were either 
simply passively approved, or at least not contested) (Hooghe & Marks as cited in 
della Porta 2006). Yet, while deeper integration was accepted acquiescently in the 
1980s, by the 1990s, the public, including scholars, started questioning the EU’s 
democratic legitimacy (Imig & Tarrow 2001a: 7; see also della Porta & Caiani 2009). 
This criticism only became even more vocal in the aftermath of the Euro, the 
                                                          
13 The concept of ‘moral shocks’ was introduced by Jasper, and refers to an occasion, “when an 
event or situation raises such a sense of outrage in people that they become inclined toward 
political action, even in the absence of a network of contact” (as cited in Jasper & Poulsen 1995: 
498). This could for instance be due to “suddenly imposed grievances,” such as was the attack 
on 9/11 (Walsh as cited in Ibid: 498; see also Monahan 2010). 
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Constitutional, and the Lisbon Treaty agreements, which were adopted without much 
consultation with the national citizens14. This disquiet further developed during the 
financial crisis, leading to plummeting levels of support for the Union (see European 
Commission 2017). The sudden rise in public Euroscepticism across Europe had 
never been so intense, and it led to a gradual politicization of ‘Europe’ and the 
‘European Union’ (see e.g. Risse 2015). 
By 2014, the various EU-related crises, plus a fervent debate in some Western 
European EU member states about Eastern European mobile workers’ access to their 
welfare benefits (so-called ‘welfare tourism’) (see e.g. Sørensen 2014), the EP-
elections showed a remarkable rise in votes for the far right (Halikiopoulou & 
Vasilopoulou 2014). Moreover, similar results were visible at the national levels. 
Parties such as the Danish People’s Party, the French Front National and the Dutch 
Freedom Party made strong gains in their countries’ national elections15. 
All these crises combined meant that the mid-2010s became an opportune moment for 
the far right extra-parliamentary actors to ‘gather the forces’ and mobilize with the 
overarching goal of curbing third-country, especially Muslim, immigration, while also 
criticizing the EU’s supranational powers. Hence, unsurprisingly, the so-called 
‘refugee crisis’ led to a strong right-wing mobilization. While progressive and 
cosmopolitan activists created pan-European pro-refugee movements (such as 
Refugees Welcome), so have more regressive and protectionist movements become 
exceedingly vocal on the right, leading to a rise in anti-immigration street protests of 
various natures (Mudde 2017a). With the arrival of thousands of asylum seekers from 
2015 onwards, huge anti-immigration demonstrations were organised both by 
political parties and protest groups in several EU member states, with varying degrees 
of success (see e.g. Hafez 2018). In the words of Cas Mudde, the ‘refugee crisis’ 
provided a ‘perfect storm’ for the populist radical right parties. It contained “the 
refugee crisis, which went together with the nativism. The terrorism attacks, which go 
together with the authoritarianism. And the European crisis goes together with the 
populism” (as cited in Beauchamp 2016). It thus provided fertile grounds for actors 
calling for the retraction of EU competences, and a return of sovereignty to the nation 
states (i.e. negative Europeanization (Dehousse 2013)). 
  
                                                          
14 It was, for instance, only Ireland, which decided to hold a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty 
in 2008. It led to a majority vote for ‘No’ (see e.g. FitzGibbon 2011), yet, after minor 
concessions, the Treaty was ratified in Ireland as well. 
15 The explanations for these strong electoral gains to the European far right observable across 
the continent are very diverse, depending on the scholarly perspective taken. Goodwin and 
Eatwell (2018), for instance, explain it through 4 historic shifts (or the four D’s): Destruction 
of historical identities and way of life; De-alignment between the traditional parties and the 
electorate; Distrust in politics and politicians; and (relative) Deprivation (2018). 
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This was also the case in Eastern and Central Europe, despite the relatively small 
Muslim population compared to Western Europe (e.g. 0.1% Muslims in Poland, 
Czech Republic, and Slovakia) (Minkenberg 2018: 16). Yet, several political parties 
already voiced anti-Islam sentiments prior to the ‘refugee crisis’, just as public opinion 
on the topic was very similar to that of Western Europe (Ibid.). As the ‘crisis’ unrolled, 
especially the governments of the Visegrad countries began expressing very strong 
sentiments against Muslim immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers. 
The period of the European ‘refugee crisis’ (2015-2017) is thus considered an 
opportune moment to investigate far right collective actors’ Europeanization process, 
due to its pan-European policy dimension and the debates regarding the delegation of 
the refugees and immigrants amongst the EU member states, plus the reinforcement 
of the EU’s external borders and the (potential) re-establishment of the national ones. 
These factors infer that the scope of the issues of immigration and asylum became 
‘European’, and that the EU MS were required to come up with common solutions, 
leading to possible opportunities for far right mobilization at the EU-level to attempt 
to change the policy-outcome. Hence, the period is chosen due to the expectation that 
if far right extra-parliamentary groups Europeanize their contention, then this is the 
most likely period for them to do so. 
 THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis consists of ten chapters. Chapter 2 consists of the methodological 
framework. It explains the research design, which consists of a collective case study 
of the two transnational coalitions. Their Europeanization will be analysed with the 
help of protest event analysis, a moderated version of process tracing, and frame 
analysis. The chapter also outlines the data collection, which mainly consists of 
primary sources gathered from the distinct groups’ websites, Facebook pages, and 
through semi-structured interviews, plus secondary sources in the shape of newspaper 
articles, anti-racist groups’ reports, and expert interviews with scholars of far right 
politics. Chapter 3 explains the theoretical framework, which guides the analysis of 
the far right extra-parliamentary actors’ Europeanization paths. It mainly consists of 
social movement, far right, and Europeanization theories, and focuses on the 
metalevel of political organization, i.e. the distinct groups’ leaders and spokespersons 
and their collective action and network strategies.  
In order to situate the two cases within the far right spectrum, Chapter 4 
conceptualizes the term ‘far right,’ and explains which European actors, this study 
considers as belonging to that particular group. The ‘far right’ will be divided into two 
sub-categories, namely the ‘radical’ and the ‘extreme’ right, which again will be 
further divided into the ‘Populist right’, ‘Anti-Islam’, and ‘New right’, plus ‘(Neo-) 
Fascist’ and ‘(Neo-)Nazi’ groups. The final part of the chapter places the investigated 
groups in their respective categories, together with other European groups that 
exemplify the distinct categories. 
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The ensuing analysis starts out with a consideration of the likely Europeanization 
strategies for the extra-parliamentary national groups taking part in the two 
transnational coalitions GI and FE, based on certain of their organizational and 
ideational facets (Chapter 5). The chapter outlines the groups’ material and symbolic 
resources, and includes an exploration of their protest tactics, argumentation style, and 
political viewpoints, illuminated through an analysis of their main collective action 
frames. The chapter concludes with a discussion that aligns the findings with existing 
Europeanization literature, in order to determine the actors’ most plausible 
Europeanization paths. 
The remaining four chapters are divided into two sections, which focus on the 
Europeanization of collective action and networks respectively. Section 1 involves 
Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 and consists of an exploration of the groups’ collective 
action during the ‘refugee crisis’ (i.e. the 2015-2017 period). The section begins with 
an introduction that ‘sets the political scene’ in the period, by outlining the EU and 
the EU MS’ decisions (or lack thereof) and conflicts during the ‘crisis’, and the 
(potential) political and discursive opportunities that ensued. Moreover, as the 
analyses in Chapters 6 and 7 also focus in on the collective action of six distinct 
groups,16 which are based in Germany, the Netherlands, France, and the Czech 
Republic, the introduction will also shortly outline the POS and DOS for the extra-
parliamentary far right in these countries, before beginning the actual analyses. 
Chapters 6 and 7 consist of analyses of the protest events carried out by the 
participating extra-parliamentary groups in GI (Chapter 6) and FE (Chapter 7). These 
chapters mainly draw on the method of protest event analysis (see e.g. Hutter 2014b). 
At the same time, the groups’ blame attributions in their respective protest actions will 
be deduced with the help of frame analysis, in order to gain a better understanding of 
their particular mobilization aims. Both chapters are outlined accordingly: The first 
part compares the groups’ action forms and frequencies in the 2015-2017 period; the 
second focuses on the groups’ various Europeanization paths and strategies; and the 
third considers the three selected groups and their domestic contexts. Finally, the 
chapters sum up the findings and explain the groups’ Europeanization strategies. 
Section 2 includes Chapter 8 and Chapter 9. It considers the transnational 
networking between the various GI and FE groups by analysing their coalition-
building endeavours and the developments of their cooperation. The section begins 
with a brief introduction, which recaptures the main aspects from the theoretical 
framework. The chapters are again divided according to the coalitions (Chapter 8 for 
GI and Chapter 9 for FE). They both consider how the distinct groups initiated, 
maintained, and (potentially) sustained their cooperation, both through various 
diffusion processes and coalition-building activities, such as resource pooling, 
transnational communication, joint social and protest events, plus their more general 
                                                          
16 PEGIDA Germany, PEGIDA Netherlands, and Blok against Islam for FE, and GI France, GI 
Germany, and GI Czech Republic for GI (see more about this selection in Chapter 3). 
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strategic deliberations about the aims of the coalition. Moreover, the chapters also 
explores the two coalitions’ (potential) development of shared collective identity 
frames, as such joint perceptions can aid the survival of a coalition.   
Finally, Chapter 10 consists of the conclusion. It sums up the findings, draws 
comparisons between the two cases, and broadens out the discussion to the general 
findings regarding social movement Europeanization, and the European far right.  
Table 1.1: Thesis Structure. 
Section/Chapter Title 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 Methodological Framework 
Chapter 3 Theoretical Framework 
Chapter 4 Introducing the ‘Far Right’ 
Chapter 5 
Generation Identity and Fortress Europe: Resources 
and Likely Europeanization Strategy 
Section 1 (Chapter 6+7) 
Europeanization of Collective Action: Protest Event 
Analysis 
Section 2 (Chapter 8+9) 
Europeanization of Networks: Coalition-Building 
Analysis 
Chapter 10 Conclusion and Discussion of Findings 
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CHAPTER 2. METHODOLOGICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
The thesis analyses the Europeanization of the far right during the ‘refugee crisis.’ In 
order to do so, I utilise a multiple case study research design, which explores the two 
transnational coalitions Fortress Europe (FE) and Generation Identity (GI), and the 
national groups that make up these two coalitions. The study mainly draws on 
Europeanization theories, which will be outlined in Chapter 3. This chapter outlines 
the methodological framework, and explains the methods required to analyse the 
Europeanization of the national far right groups’ networks, collective action, and 
collective identities, and the strategic deliberations involved in these processes, 
including the role of the domestic and European contexts. The analysis takes an actor-
based approach, and explores the meso-level of contention, i.e. it focuses on the 
organizational leadership and their deliberations and frame constructions within a 
specific, and ever-changing, context. By taking this very context-sensitive approach 
to the research (both in terms of geographical setting and time), my scholarly 
contribution is not so much to say anything general about how transnational far right 
coalitions work, but rather how these two specific coalitions worked in the European 
context. At the same time, it will permit me to say something more specific about far 
right Europeanization, and the research thus aims at furthering the understanding of 
the various processes and events involved in far right Europeanization. 
The actor-focused and context-specific approach signifies that the research focuses on 
the role of people, situations, and events and their mutual influences, placing it firmly 
within qualitative approaches (Maxwell 2013). In order to deduce the groups’ frames, 
protest events, and networking strategies, the research employs mixed methods, 
namely frame analysis and protest event analysis. The data consists of a variety of 
different sources. The primary data was collected from both on- and offline sources, 
and consists of the national groups’ Facebook ‘pages’, their websites, and semi-
structured interviews with key informants from the groups. The secondary data 
instead consists of newspaper sources, reports by anti-racist organizations, scholarly 
analyses of the groups, and expert interviews with scholars of the far right. The 
following chapter further explains the decisions regarding the research design, 
methods, and data collection.  
 RESEARCH DESIGN: CASE STUDY 
In order to explore the Europeanization of the far right at the extra-parliamentary, 
protest political level, and to obtain as deep an understanding as possible of the 
phenomenon, I have decided to base the research around two transnational far right 
coalitions, which consist of national groups from across Europe. I selected the two 
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most fitting cases after a thorough investigation of the European far right extra-
parliamentary scene in the period under investigation (i.e. 2015-2017). The 
participating groups in both coalitions 1) are considered part of the far right (see e.g. 
Fielitz & Laloire 2016), 2) mobilized rather strongly through various protest actions 
during the so-called ‘refugee crisis,’ and 3) contain groups from both Western, 
Central, and Eastern Europe. The following section further introduces the ‘case study 
approach,’ and explains how the approach is applied in this study. 
Qualitative Case Studies: What is a ‘Case Study’? 
In the words of Creswell (2013), a case study “explores a real-life, contemporary 
bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded systems (cases) over time, through 
detailed, indepth data collection involving multiple sources of information […] and 
reports a case description and case themes” (2013: 97). A case study is thus an 
unobtrusive and context-sensitive approach to social science (Yin 2003). Miles and 
Huberman similarly define the unit of analysis, i.e. the ‘case,’ as “a phenomenon of 
some sort occurring in a bounded context” (as cited in Baxter & Jack 2008: 545). 
Hence, in qualitative research, particularly the emphasis on context is important, as 
an occurrence may not appear or act in the same way in Setting B as it did in Setting 
A. This is especially important here as the research considers numerous national 
political, social, and historical settings. One must therefore account for, and 
understand, the domestic contexts, as their particular natures are likely to affect the 
outcome for the various groups under exploration.  
Instrumental Collective Case Study  
The research focuses on two cases, making it a collective case study (Stake 1994). 
The cases are instrumental, as they are chosen in order to gain more insight into a 
given phenomenon (Ibid.), i.e. the Europeanization of the far right. Hence, as Grandy 
(2010) explains, in instrumental case studies, the study focus tends to “be known in 
advance and designed around established theory or methods” (2010: 474).  
One frequently employs case studies as a means to test or create theories (Yin 2003). 
This is also the partial goal of this thesis, namely, to explore the explanatory power of 
(transnational) social movement and Europeanization theories on far right 
mobilizations. It is also often the purpose of collective case studies to compare the 
differences and similarities between the researched cases. This is not the explicit aim 
of this thesis, due to their great heterogeneity in terms of both organizational set-up, 
timing of coalition-building, membership base, and actor types (see Case Selection 
below). Yet, at the same time, they do have certain overlapping features, which make 
a comparison possible (such as their worldviews, resources, collective identity frames, 
collective action strategies, and protest repertoires). Hence, they neither fit into the 
framework of ‘most similar’ nor ‘most different’ cases (Yin 2003).  
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The limited number of cases makes it impossible to draw firm and general conclusions 
about the developments and outcomes of far right transnational coalitions. This also 
relates to the importance of the given context at the time of exploration, as the 
particular occurrences of events are expected to shape the actions taken by the actors 
under exploration (Maxwell 2013), thereby making it hard to transfer the findings to 
other (similar) cases. In this sense, the case exploration period also forms part of the 
‘case’, as the ‘refugee crisis’ period was intentionally chosen, due to the expectation 
of Europeanization taking place. Moreover, their distinct natures of having developed 
during a particular European crisis and context of general EU malaise more generally 
(see Chapter 1) of course also infers limitations to their generalizability. Hence, it is 
thus the partial aim to “elucidate local processes, meanings, and contextual influences 
in particular settings or cases” (Ibid: 99, emphasis added). Such a context-specific 
approach entails a lacking ability to produce generalizable findings. This makes 
Grandy (2010) argue that instead of aiming towards this goal, one should instead work 
towards achieving richness, in order to be able to use the established knowledge to 
develop further theoretical propositions. The research thus aims to identify certain 
patterns and themes, which can be employed at a later stage to both compare with 
other cases (in order to explore its transferability), and to build theory. 
Hence, this first step in terms of exploring far right Europeanization can be employed 
by future research as a starting point for further investigation of the far-right extra-
parliamentary scene and its relationship to Europe and the EU. At the same time, the 
provision of an understanding of how the groups justify and negotiate coalition-work 
and protest actions both at the national and transnational level gives stronger insights 
into European far right mobilization more generally. This especially relates to the 
groups’ arguments for transnational coalition building, their protest targeting, and 
their transnational protest strategies (for instance, in terms of avoiding repression).  
Selecting the Cases 
The sampling strategy for the cases was purposive (Maxwell 2013), as I deliberatively 
chose the two coalitions in order to obtain the most relevant information in relation to 
my research questions and ambitions with the study. The two far right transnational 
coalitions were first and foremost chosen based on their adherence to the same 
overarching mobilisation, namely against non-European (mainly Muslim) immigrants 
and their descendants. Other criteria included their high protest activity levels in the 
period of investigation (2015-2017), their geographical scopes (including both 
Northern, Western, Southern, and Eastern European members), and the varieties of 
organizations, protest strategies, and coalition goals. This, of course, has certain 
implications for the findings, as the fact that I chose the groups based on the 
knowledge of their cooperation, means that I exclude actors, which do not partake in 
such transnational networking activities, and thus, undergo a different path of 
Europeanization, or do not Europeanize at all.  
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With all these deliberations in mind, the choice has fallen on the two transnational far 
right coalitions Generation Identity (GI) and Fortress Europe (FE).   
Case 1: Generation Identity (GI): A Coalition of Identitarian Groupuscules17 
Generation Identity derives from the French groupuscule Identitarian Bloc (Bloc 
Identitaire). In 2012, it created the youth division Génération Identitaire (GI France). 
After GI France’s first public protest on the roof of a mosque in Poitiers in October 
2012 (Génération Identitaire 2012), several Generation Identity groups started 
appearing across Europe, both at the local and national level. Today, there are 12 
official national GI groups across the continent (plus two in the U.S. and Canada) (see 
e.g. HopeNotHate n.d.c). A growing literature focuses on particularly the German and 
Austrian groups (see e.g. Bruns et al. 2017; Goetz et al. 2017; Ajanovic et al. 2016), 
but also the French (Zúquete 2018), and Czech groups (Dlouhý 2016a; 2016b) have 
received scholarly attention. Yet, there is hardly any literature on the movement as a 
transnational phenomenon (see Zúquete 2018 for a partial exception).  
Table 2.1: List of national GI groups in Europe 
GI National Groups Country Founded (and joined 
GI coalition) 
Génération Identitaire  France 2012  
Identitäre Bewegung Österreich Austria 2012 
Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland Germany 2012 (formally 2014) 
Generazione Identitaria Italy 2012 
Identitäre Bewegung Schweiz Switzerland 2013 
Generace Identity Czech Republic 2013 
Generacija Identitete Slovenia 2014 
Identitás Generáció Hungary 2014 (Website 2016) 
Ruch Tożsamościowy Polska Poland 2017 
Generation Identity UK & Ireland UK & Ireland 2017 
Generation Identitær Denmark 2017 
Generatie Identiteit18 Belgium 2017 
As a matter of simplicity, and to avoid confusion, in the thesis, I will refer to all of the 
national GI groups as ‘GI country name’, i.e. ‘GI France’ or ‘GI Czech Republic’. 
                                                          
17 French researchers tend to define both BI and GI as ‘groupuscules’. Griffin (2003) defines 
the groupuscular right as “a non-hierarchical, leaderless and centreless (or rather polycentric) 
movement with fluid boundaries and constantly changing components” (2003: 30). The 
autonomous actors making up these groups tend to act as a counter-culture against liberalism. 
18 The Belgian group shares its name with the Dutch branch of the GI network. Yet, as the 
Dutch activists do not share the same ‘corporate identity’ as the other GI groups listed, this 
particular group has not been included in the case study.  
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Case 2: Fortress Europe: A Coalition of Protest Groups and Political Parties 
In January 2016, 12 European extra-parliamentary actors and political parties signed 
the so-called Prague Declaration, and set up the Fortress Europe (FE) coalition. FE 
was initiated by a protest movement, PEGIDA Germany (PEGIDA Deutschland), and 
the Czech alliance between the political party Dawn (Úsvit) and the protest group 
Block against Islam (Bloc proti Islamú). Except for PEGIDA Germany, all the groups 
had rather small electoral and/or protest support and membership levels at the time. 
Several studies have considered the rationale, ideology, and participant demography 
of PEGIDA Germany and the Dresden protests (see e.g. Rippl et al. 2016; Daphi et al. 
2015; Dostal 2015; Druxes 2016; Vorländer et al. 2018). Yet, the FE-coalition has 
hardly received any scholarly attention so far, except for some brief explorations in 
studies focusing on PEGIDA Germany (see e.g. Vorländer et al. 2018) or the Czech 
IVČRN (see e.g. Prokupkova 2018b).   
Table 2.2: List of national FE-groups. 
(Official) FE members Country Type of Actor Joining FE19 
PEGIDA Deutschland Germany Protest group 23.1.2016 
Blok proti Islamú (BPI) Czech Republic Protest group 23.1.2016 
PEGIDA Österreich Austria Protest group 23.1.2016 
PEGIDA Nederlands Netherlands Protest group 23.1.2016 
PEGIDA Bulgaria20  Bulgaria Protest group 23.1.2016 
Úsvit Czech Republic Political party  23.1.2016 
NGO ISIS/ Eesti 
Konservatiivne 
Rahvaerakond (EKRE) 21 
Estonia Blog / Political 
party 
23.1.2016 
Lega Nord Italy Political party 23.1.2016 
Ruch Narodowy Poland Political party 23.1.2016 
Odvaha  Slovakia Political party 23.1.2016 
PEGIDA UK UK Protest group 24.1.2016 
For Frihed Denmark Protest group 24.1.2016 
    
  
                                                          
19 Based on the date of signing the Prague Declaration. 
20 It was very difficult to find any data on PEGIDA Bulgaria, besides from its Facebook page. 
All, I could deduce, was that it organized a protest in January 2015 (HopeNotHate n.d.a.), and 
based on the lacking information, I decided to not include the group in Chapter 7, which 
considers the collective action of the extra-parliamentary FE-groups.  
21 Georg Kirsberg and Maria Kaljuste set up NGO ISIS, or NGO International Stop 
Islam/Immigration Society, in August 2015, in response to the ‘refugee crisis’. Kaljuste was 
also a member of EKRE, and through her participation in Fortress Europe, both NGO ISIS and 
EKRE was represented and participated in FE-related events. 
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Later Accessions 
Respeto Spain Political party 16.5.2016 
Identity Ireland Ireland  Political party 16.5.2016 
Résistance Républicaine France Political blog 16.5.2016 
Riposte Laïque France Political blog 16.5.2016 
SIEL France Political party  16.5.2016 
Nacionalinis Interesas Lithuania Political 
association  
16.5.2016 
Cases with Embedded Cases: Transnational Coalition Units with National Subunits   
When exploring the Europeanization of extra-parliamentary far right actors, it is also 
the aim to consider the individual national groups making up the transnational 
coalitions, in order to get a more holistic understanding of the Europeanization 
process. Case study research also allows for such an approach by permitting the 
consideration of embedded subunits within a given case (Yin 2003). In this study, the 
subunits consist of the national groups making up the two coalitions (i.e. PEGIDA 
Germany is a subunit of Fortress Europe, while GI Germany is a subunit of 
Generation Identity). These subunits can be explored by either analysing the data 
separately within each subunit (a ‘within case analysis’), between the subunits 
(‘between case analysis’), or across the subunits (‘cross-case analysis’).  
In order to limit the sample of embedded cases, I have chosen a sampling logic, which 
focuses on those GI and FE groups, which I could identify as being an active part of 
the offline coalition (i.e. not GI groups that only have an online presence, or groups 
that participated in the FE-meetings, but did not sign the Prague Declaration). For the 
Generation Identity coalition, it is frequently only GI France, GI Austria, GI Germany 
and GI Italy, which are mentioned as members of the European GI ‘movement’. 
However, I decided to expand this selection to other GI groups, which I quickly 
discovered to have both adopted the GI-logo and raison d’être, plus cooperated with 
the four groups in the explored period. I thus collected data for GI France, GI Italy, 
GI Austria, GI Germany, GI Czech Republic, GI Slovenia, GI Hungary, and GI 
Poland. For Fortress Europe, I focused on the main coalition partners that took part 
in the January and/or May 2016 meetings in the Czech Republic (see above for full 
list of actors). This involves 12 groups in January and 6 in May. I only included the 
main organizations plus groups that were relatively straightforward to identify (unlike 
e.g. PEGIDA Bulgaria, the Finnish participants, plus smaller parties mentioned in 
various sources). 
The analysis of the coalition groups’ collective action developments in the 2015-2017 
period would ideally entail an exploration of all of the national groups for which I 
have collected data. Yet, due to various constraining factors, the analysis has certain 
limitations. For one, because of the focus on the Europeanization of extra-
parliamentary far right actors, plus the rather limited importance of the political 
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parties in terms of setting up and coordinating the activities of the FE-coalition (see 
Ch. 9), I have decided to discard a closer analysis of the parties’ Europeanization 
processes in terms of protest politics. This infers that the parties will not be included 
in Chapter 5, which introduces the distinct groups making up the two coalitions, and 
their protest activities are not included in the ‘Collective Action’ chapter (Chapter 
7)22. Yet, as they were members on equal footing with most of the extra-parliamentary 
groups in the FE-coalition, they are included in this analysis (Chapter 9). Chapter 5 
will therefore introduce all of the extra-parliamentary GI and FE groups, and account 
for their material and symbolic resources, their views on the EU, and protest 
repertoires. Chapters 8-9 will analyse the coalition-building process, focusing on the 
main drivers of the coalitions (the movement entrepreneurs/leaders and most actively 
involved national groups), but it will also draw on the other groups when relevant.  
Chapters 6-7, on the other hand, consider the Europeanization of the national groups’ 
collective action, and as will be outlined in the Theoretical Framework, this requires 
a close examination of the domestic historical, political, societal, and economic 
contexts, which vary greatly across Europe (see e.g Klandermans & Mayer 2006; 
Caiani et al. 2012). Hence, aside from an analysis of all the extra-parliamentary 
groups’ protest forms, tactics, issues and Europeanization paths in the 2015-2017 
period, both chapters also include a closer examination of certain of the groups’ 
national contexts. In order to fulfil the criteria for conducting a case study (in depth 
and context-sensitivity), I have thus assessed that a narrow case-selection (small n) is 
required. I chose the selected groups based on their roles in the GI and FE coalitions, 
and with an eye on the comparative aspect of Eastern versus Western European 
groups, i.e. they were selected based on their protest intensity and geography. This 
entailed that I chose GI France, GI Germany, and GI Czech Republic from the GI 
coalition. Hence, even though GI Austria arguably has a greater role in the coalition 
than GI Czech Republic, I decided to focus on the Czech group, in order to increase 
the geographical scope of the analysis. Moreover, as I chose PEGIDA Germany, BPI, 
and PEGIDA Netherlands for FE, due to their importance in the coalition and protest 
intensity, choosing a Czech GI-pendant to BPI also means that I can compare the cases 
within the (German and Czech) national settings23. These six groups will thus be in 
focus in Chapters 6-7, while I will also analyse the other groups’ protest data, albeit 
without the same close contextual analysis.  
  
                                                          
22 There are certain exceptions to this though, especially Dawn, which formed an electoral 
alliance with BPI in a part of the 2015-2017 period.  
23 I could also have chosen GI Austria and PEGIDA Austria for the comparative purposes, yet 
as Ajanovic and colleagues (2016) have already explored the different mobilization potentials 
for these two groups, I decided against this choice. 
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In summary, the thesis consists of the following subunit analyses:   
Table 2.3: Sub-unit case study analyses. 
Chapters Type of case 
analysis 
National groups involved 
Chapter 5 
(Introducing the  
groups) 
Case and within case 
analysis 
All extra-parliamentary groups 
(i.e. the political parties involved 
in Fortress Europe are not 
included here) 
Section 1 
Ch. 6 and 7 
(Collective action) 
Within, between, and 
cross-case analysis  
All extra-parliamentary groups, 
but contextual analysis only for 
certain groups (For GI: GI 
France, GI Germany, and GI 
Czech Republic; For FE: 
PEGIDA Germany, BPI/Dawn), 
and PEGIDA Netherlands   
Section 2  
Ch. 8 and 9 
(Transnational 
coalition-building) 
Between and cross-
case analysis 
All groups (including political 
parties), but focus on the main 
coalition drivers. (For GI: GI 
France, GI Austria, and GI 
Germany; For FE: PEGIDA 
Germany, BPI/Dawn, Tommy 
Robinson (PEGIDA UK)) and 
Edwin Wagensveld (PEGIDA 
Netherlands)  
Binding the Cases: Period, Place, and Activity of Investigation 
In order to answer the research question satisfactorily, and without derailments, I have 
bound the cases according to time period and protest action issues. The research 
focuses on the European far right mobilization during the ‘refugee crisis’, which had 
its height in the period 2015-2017. The main period of investigation is thus 2015 to 
2017 (i.e. from January 1, 2015 to December 31, 2017). The period of investigation 
of the collective action remains 2015-2017 (Chapters 6-7). Yet, in order to account 
more fully for the coalitions’ emergences and the coalition-building processes, I need 
to draw on earlier developments. The preceding period thus needs to be extended 
concerning Chapters 8-9. While FE’s coalition was initiated in October 2015, and 
thus, within the 2015-2017 period, some of the national GI groups began cooperating 
in late 2012 already. Hence, I will cover a wider period (2012-2017) in order to 
explore the coalition-building process in its entirety for Generation Identity.  
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Protest Activity Delimitations 
Due to the great combined number of organizations involved in the research, I will 
only focus on the national groups and their data output, i.e. not regional GI, BPI, or 
PEGIDA chapters, etcetera. However, when these groups’ activities are mentioned by 
the main national groups, they will be drawn into the overarching analysed data (e.g. 
when GI Germany mentions a protest event or other activity by a regional GI group, 
this will be used as part of the data set as well). Due to this decision, I have also 
included a figure in the analysis, which shows the regional dispersion of GI’s protest 
events across the European groups. This, however, is not the case for the local ‘-
GIDAs’ in Germany, as they all act more independently of PEGIDA Germany. 
Moreover, as the research explicitly focuses on GI and FE as two transnational 
coalitions, I only focus on the individual groups’ transnational activities with other FE 
or GI member groups. Nevertheless, in order to explain certain strategical decisions 
made by the given groups, there will be sporadic mentions of other transnational 
connections, such as e.g. creations of transnational coalitions aside from GI or FE, 
cooperation with other European actors, etcetera. One example of this could be the 
Polish National Movement’s (Ruch Narodowy) cooperation with the Hungarian 
extreme right party Jobbik (Jajecznik 2015).   
 METHODS OF ANALYSIS: MIXED METHODS APPROACH 
The research utilises mixed methods. I employ both frame analysis and protest event 
analysis as explicit research methods, while I draw on the main analytical features and 
data collection tools from process tracing to analyse the transnational coalitions, 
albeit in a somewhat moderated form. Employing such varied methods permits me to 
consider the research subjects’ Europeanization paths from different angles, and with 
different foci. This should ensure a more encompassing and in depth examination of 
their transnationalization endeavours. 
I employ protest event analysis (PEA) to analyse the national groups’ collective 
action, both domestically and at the transnational level. Protest event analysis elicits 
data from qualitative sources, in order to conduct a quantitative analysis (Hutter 
2014b). For this study’s purposes, it is the intention with the PEA to deduce the extent 
to which the various scopes of the collective actions ‘Europeanized’ in the 2015-2017 
period, together with the intensity of the mobilization in the various national settings. 
The frame analysis approach is utilised as a means to unravel the groups’ key 
collective action frames, and their (potential) construction of ‘Europeanized’ 
collective identities. The approach is a recurring feature throughout the thesis’ 
chapters. In the first chapter of the analysis, which introduces the two coalitions (i.e. 
Chapter 5), I use the approach to analyse the various national extra-parliamentary 
groups’ key collective action frames, in order to introduce the groups’ main 
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arguments, and to deduce their issue focus and expression styles, i.e. parts of their 
symbolic resources. In the collective action chapters (i.e. Chapters 6 and 7), frame 
analysis is used to analyse the groups’ blame attributions as expressed in their protests 
during the ‘refugee crisis,’ in order to further explore their expression forms, and to 
deduce their rationales for mobilization. Finally, in the coalition-building chapters 
(i.e. Chapters 8-9), I employ the approach to analyse the extent to which the groups’ 
leaders and spokespersons construct joint transnational collective identity frames.  
The analysis of the two transnational coalitions will be based on a method somewhat 
akin to process tracing, yet, without the approach’s rigid consideration of ‘causality’, 
‘mechanisms,’ and ‘outcomes’ (see e.g. Beach 2016). It is the aim to analyse the 
development of the coalitions over time, plus whether and how the national groups 
ensured that the coalition survived. This entails a consideration of both how and why 
the different actors acted as they did in the given situation. This will be answered by 
considering their situational contexts (Maxwell 2013), and the strategic considerations 
related to their political aims. This requires a qualitative analysis that considers the 
meaning making of the actors (Ibid.), based on the leaders’ intentions, perceptions, 
and perspectives (deduced based on primary sources), plus a more general analysis of 
the political context at the time. 
The following three sections will introduce the methods further and explain how I 
employ them in the study.  
PROTEST EVENT ANALYSIS 
The study of protests has a long history within social movement research, and over 
time, protest event analysis (PEA) has become a research method or technique in its 
own right (Hutter 2014b). A PEA consists of several steps, including the collection of 
qualitative data, which can be converted into graphs and figures that display the 
development of protest events over time with the use of statistical tools (Ibid.). This 
allows a researcher to consider a certain collective actor’s participation levels, targets, 
and levels of counter-mobilisation during a given time period. With time, the surge in 
research has led to numerous explorations of protest activities, frequently employing 
a cross-national comparative framework (e.g. Caiani et al. 2012; Andretta & Caiani 
2005; see Hutter 2014b for more examples). Several scholars exploring the 
Europeanization of particular campaigns and movements have also employed protest 
event analysis for their research (see e.g. Bourne & Chatzopoulou 2015; Parks 2015; 
Caiani & Graziano 2018)24. These scholars are particularly interested in the scope of 
the protest target(s), participants, events, and issues, just as is the research interest in 
this study (see the Theoretical Framework for more on this).  
                                                          
24 Alternatively, scholars have also employed political claims analysis for the analysis of 
Europeanization (see e.g. della Porta & Caiani 2009; Andretta & Caiani 2005). 
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PEA is an unobtrusive research method, which is carried out similarly to a content 
analysis. One most commonly applies it in order to “assess the amount and features 
of protests across various geographical areas […] over time” (Hutter 2014b: 335). 
PEA’s systematic process of analysis aims at making it easier to handle unstructured 
and large bulks of data. Usually, it involves the schematic property quantification of 
a large number of protest events. This infers that the researcher(s) look(s) through data 
systematically, in order to collect, summarize, map, analyse, and interpret the data on 
the required, and pre-defined, parameters (Koopmans & Rucht 2002). These 
parameters, or properties, may involve the “frequency, timing and duration, location, 
claims, size, forms, carriers, and targets, as well as immediate consequences and 
reactions (e.g. police intervention, damage, counterprotests)” of protests (Ibid: 231).  
Defining the Unit of Analysis: What is a ‘Protest Event’?  
The unit of analysis is the protest event as such. ‘Protests’ are defined as tools 
consisting of “messages directed to political adversaries, sympathizers, decision 
makers, and the wider public,” which either appeal to, or threaten, these adversaries 
and decision-makers (Koopmans & Rucht 2002: 231). It can be rather difficult to 
delimit the particular types of ‘protest events’ included in a given study. Prior protest 
event analyses have focused on a variety of protest repertoires, particularly those 
pertaining to public claims making (e.g. petitions, demonstrations, strikes, etc.). Far 
right organizations tend to employ a broad range of protest repertoires (see e.g. Caiani 
et al. 2012; Castelli Gattinara 2018), largely depending on their non- or institutional 
position and their type of organization (see e.g. Caiani et al. 2012). These activities 
range from participation in elections, organization of petitions, hosting of 
demonstrations, organisation of conferences, violent attacks on political adversaries, 
etcetera.  
Protest Event Analysis of the Fortress Europe and Generation Identity Groups  
The present study is mainly interested in the extra-parliamentary activities of the 
different groups, i.e. their participation in protest politics (Hutter 2014a). It utilizes 
Giugni’s (2004) definition of a ‘protest event’ as an “action by a social movement that 
attempts to influence the political decisions and/or sensitize the public opinion” (2004: 
241). This definition is deliberatively very broad, permitting for the collection of 
protests with various forms, issues, and targets, as the partial goal is to learn more 
about far right collective action more broadly.  
Employing a similar classification system as Caiani and colleagues (2012) in their 
exploration of extreme right protest forms, the following types of actions are included 
in the gathered data set: 
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 Conventional (such as open letters, lobbying, and press releases),  
 Demonstrative (like rallies, petitions and banner-drops),  
 Confrontational (such as sit-ins, blockades, and building occupations), and   
 Violent (both symbolic, such as flag desecration or defamatory language, and 
physical, such as attacks on political opponents or their belongings).  
Moreover, besides the protest events, I also included two other types of data in the 
initial Excel data sheet, namely:  
 ‘Expressive events’: (Transnational or cross-border) meetings, conferences 
and (social) gatherings25.  
 ‘Organizational events’: Organizational changes for the specific groups, such 
as new leadership, election results, etc.  
I included the ‘Expressive events’ to get a better understanding of, and overview over, 
the groups’ transnational activities, besides the form of transnational collective action. 
I mainly used these events for the analysis of the transnational coalitions, which is 
why I did not include expressive events only involving domestic activists. 
Additionally, to assess the obstacles to far right Europeanization in relation to 
resources, repression levels, and cooperative problems, I also found it important to 
include (ac)counts of planned events, which did not occur. (Please consult the Protest 
Event Codebook in Appendix B for more information about the Protest event dataset). 
Data for Identifying Events: The Distinct Groups’ Own Sources 
As many PEA studies concentrate on country-case studies, and thus, not on specific, 
pre-identified organizations, as is the case here, most protest event analyses use 
newspapers as their sources (see e.g. Hutter 2014b). This is not surprising, seeing as 
“the printed media are one of the most important areas of public claim-making, and 
[…] most actors, will, at one stage or another, try to make their views public” (della 
Porta & Caiani 2009: 30). Scholars thus conduct a (usually computerized) newspaper 
search on a restricted number of country cases, a specific issue or time span, and 
usually search for one to three days of the week in a specified period (for examples, 
see Rucht 2002; Imig & Tarrow 2001b; Caiani et al. 2012). Police reports are another 
commonly employed source for studies of far right contention (see e.g. Koopmans & 
Olzak 2004). 
                                                          
25 Other scholars often include some of the events in this category in their PEA dataset (see e.g. 
Caiani et al. 2012; Caiani & Borri 2013). Yet, as I do not place events such as meetings, social 
gatherings, and conferences under the ‘Collective Action’ heading for the purposes of this 
research, I decided to place ‘(Historical) commemorations’ and other similar protest action 
types under ‘Demonstrative actions’. The meetings, social events, training sessions, etcetera 
were gathered under ‘Expressive events’. 
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This study, however, does not rely on newspaper data, but instead uses the primary 
sources from the groups themselves. This choice has several reasons. For one, 
research has found that newspapers suffer from several shortcomings, when it comes 
to protest event information. There is often an inherent ‘selection bias’ (Hutter 2014b), 
as newspapers tend to prevalently report about big and/or violent demonstrations and 
events, plus to focus on mobilization issues that fit into the ‘media issue attention 
cycle’ at the time (Bourne & Chatzopoulou 2015; see also Koopmans & Rucht 2002). 
This infers that newspapers do not account for all events that have taken place, 
especially not the ones in smaller places, nor with a limited number of participants 
(such as e.g. GI’s local banner drops). Moreover, the media also do not necessarily 
inform very thoroughly about the actual aims with the given event, the participating 
actors, nor the targets. Additionally, the journalists may also report false information 
about the given event (for various reasons), also referred to as ‘description biases’ 
(Hutter 2014b). 
As it is the aim to get as thorough an overview of the level and type of protest events 
as possible, plus the groups’ own accounts in order to note the groups’ intentions with 
the events, I instead chose to use protest event information produced by the specific 
groups, in the form of activist-based internet data (see Almeida & Lichbach 2003)26. 
This provides more exact information about the rationale for the event, and as Hanna 
argues: “Instead of only getting data from mobilization events that the press considers 
newsworthy, we can receive reports from activists in real time” (cited in Mosca 2014: 
400). Almeida and Lichbach (2003) made a similar finding in a comparison between 
activist-based and media data, where they found activist-based data to be “less 
positively influenced by the intensity properties of protest events” and, highly relevant 
to this study, the activists reported about a higher number of transnational protest 
events than did the media. Moreover, as I focus on a pre-defined list of actors, I 
deemed this approach the most feasible in terms of obtaining the exact data sought. 
I thus ended up with a rather similar approach as Monforte (2014), who relied on the 
analysed associations’ websites, mailing lists, and other internal literature to identify 
the events for analysis. Yet, as I do not have access to their mailing lists and internal 
organizational data, I instead mainly made use of the groups’ webpages, backed up 
by the gathered Facebook data, to identify their various events (See more about the 
utilised sources in the section ‘Online Sources’ below). Using primary sources from 
the research objects themselves thus provided me with first-hand accounts of both the 
time leading up to the given event (such as the invited and anticipated participants, 
the protest issues, the (potential) organizational problems involved), live accounts of 
the event, and its aftermath.  
                                                          
26  Van Dyke (2003) took a similar approach, when she analyzed student events, identified in 
various campus papers. 
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Limitations of Using Primary Sources for Protest Event Data 
Just as searches in newspapers have certain limitations, so does this approach. For 
instance, one cannot see the event in its national context as is possible in (most) media 
accounts (e.g. in relation to other far-right actors, counter-mobilizations, or other 
political actors’ reactions to the events). Moreover, just as newspapers express a 
certain level of description bias (Hutter 2014b), so do the actors themselves, especially 
in terms of the actual size of the protest, the level of counter-protesters, plus responses 
from state authorities. Hence, a group may refer to ‘a peaceful protest’, for example, 
which was, in fact, violent, or a ‘huge crowd’, which only amounted to 50 people in 
reality, etcetera. In order to counter these biases, plus to fill the gaps for groups, where 
it was either not possible to find primary data,27 where data was missing for a period 
(for instance due to website changes)28, or where the websites and Facebook data was 
not sufficiently exhaustive29, in certain instances I also relied on secondary sources. 
This was both collected from national newspapers and reports made by national anti-
Fascist and –racist associations (see more in the section on Secondary Sources below).  
Table 2.4: Information collected in the protest event dataset. 
Date of the event Date (plus specifying in the ‘Event information’ box, if 
it is e.g. on a national holiday, in response to a terrorist 
attack, before or after an important political decision by 
the government or the EU, etc.) 
Place of the event City and country 
Group involved National FE or GI group or actor hosting/taking part in 
the event 
Other actors involved All actors mentioned as taking part in the event 
(national or foreign activists or groups, etc.) 
Host of event  Only if the given group is not a FE or GI group 
Size (if specified) (Approximate) Participant numbers 
Counter-protest  
(if mentioned) 
Numbers and type of opposition (e.g. violence, 
blockade, counter-demonstration, etc.) 
Scope of participants National/cross-border (i.e. from neighbouring country)/ 
European  
Issue of event E.g. ‘Anti-immigration,’ ‘Anti-Islamization,’ ‘Anti-
EU,’ ‘Anti-refugee quotas,’ ‘Suppression,’ etc. 
Scope of issue National or European 
                                                          
27 Such as e.g. PEGIDA UK, which website was closed down prior to the data collection. 
28 This was for example the case for PEGIDA Netherlands. 
29 Yet, particularly in the case of PEGIDA Germany, it was very difficult to find data about all 
its protests. Its regular protest frequency meant that the media stopped reporting about each 
demonstration after a certain period, just as the group itself did not report about all of its weekly 
demonstrations. This explains some of the missing data in the analysis in Chapter 7. 
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Scope of target  
(if specified) 
Such as national and/or European political decision-
makers, CSOs, minority groups, etc.) 
Blame attribution Same type of actors as directly above 
Event information and 
Content of speeches  
More elaborate information about the event 
 
For more information about the Protest Event Analysis, please consult Appendix B 
for the PEA Codebook. 
METHOD FOR TRACING COALITION-BUILDING PROCESSES 
It is the aim of the coalition-building analysis to explore how the two coalitions 
Generation Identity and Fortress Europe were created, what the national groups do 
and/or did to maintain them, and whether these coalitions survived or not. The 
theoretical framework is based on a synthesis of existing literature on (mainly left-
wing) trans- and national social movement coalitions, and the factors found to be key 
for the further development of a coalition, both in terms of degree of cooperation (the 
closeness of the relationships) and the coalition’s durability over time. Hence, while 
the framework, in a sense, outlines the expected facets of a coalition-building process, 
the identified factors are not necessarily determinant for its further development. One 
can thus not define them as rigidly as process tracing’s ‘mechanisms’, which are 
conceptualised as the causal link between a dependent variable and its outcome, 
usually with the aim of testing or creating theories (see e.g. Beach 2016; Checkel 
2005).  
Instead of this more positivist approach to the research, which “fundamentally” is “at 
odds with more interpretative epistemologies” (Checkel  2005: 5), I suggest a more 
exploratory approach, which utilises the identified factors as guiding for the analysis, 
i.e. without any assumption of causality. As an example, a coalition may continue 
existing, even though the groups do not develop solidaristic ties towards each other, 
do not communicate frequently, or do not establish shared norms and rules for the 
cooperation. Moreover, other factors may also influence the development of the 
coalition, such as more subjective deliberations by the various movement 
entrepreneurs, just as they may have very diverse underlying rationales for the 
transnational cooperation. One can better explore such perceptional influences 
without a too-rigid analytical framework in terms of causality. Hence, as prior 
research has shown (see e.g. McCammon & Moon 2015; Van Dyke & McCammon 
2010), the exact ‘activities’ involved in transnational coalition-building is likely to 
vary from case to case, depending on the actors involved, and the degree of 
commitment between the actors. Moreover, as argued by Van Dyke and Amos (2017), 
unlike left-wing coalitions, we still do not know much about the actual factors 
influencing coalition-work on the right. 
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Hence, as the application of social movement coalition literature to far right groups 
and actors is still a rather unexplored territory, I have decided to use the same factors 
for the analysis of the ‘outcome’ of the two coalitions, or at least their statuses at the 
end of the year 2017. For instance, a seeming ‘end’ of a coalition may only be 
periodic, as it may be revived, if the circumstances call for renewed action. I therefore 
wish to provide an analysis that both entails a more descriptive account of the 
occurrences leading to the establishment of the coalition and its further developments, 
while drawing on the theories where appropriate. By employing a qualitative 
approach, I am also more flexible in terms of redirecting the research focus, if this is 
deemed required due to unanticipated findings, entailing the opportunity “to pursue 
new discoveries and relationships” (Maxwell 2013: 30). Aside from providing a better 
understanding of the given case, this should also make it possible to use the analytical 
findings to further refine, or elaborate upon, the already established theories, by 
adding findings about far right groups.  
Sources for Analysing the Transnational Coalitions 
Even though I am not utilizing process tracing (PT) as my research method, I still 
draw on the approach as a pragmatic tool to determine the required data for the 
analysis. Process tracing requires an extensive amount of data, mainly of a qualitative 
nature, usually collected in the form of evidence proxies (instead of personal 
observations), such as documents, interviews, historical accounts, and newspaper 
articles (Checkel 2005). Another key objective of process tracing is to ensure that one 
has accounted for all possible alternative explanations or interpretations of a given 
finding (Beach 2016; Checkel 2005), thereby limiting the potential for wrong 
deductions, and thus, the provision of incorrect findings. This is important to keep in 
mind, when analysing the underlying rationales of the decisions and outcomes of the 
coalitions, again due to the difficulty of obtaining substantial and substantiated data. 
It is therefore not sufficient to have a lot of empirical data if it derives from sources 
that are questionable in terms of reliability and potential biases, just as all available 
sources should be explored (Beach 2016). This, however, produces something of an 
issue in terms of exploring the far right from the ‘outside’, as not all primary data is 
accessible for people that are not part of the groups. It of course poses certain 
questions as to the reliability of the research findings, when key sources (such as 
meeting minutes, internal communication documents, etc.) are either inaccessible or 
untrustworthy and/or biased (e.g. interview data with key informants, see more 
below). Yet, there are certain measures, which one can take to prevent such an 
occurrence, for instance, through triangulation of the data, e.g. by ensuring that the 
interview data is ‘backed up’ by either other respondents and/or less subjective 
sources. Moreover, another means to ensure the validity of the findings is by including 
all identified data, i.e. also the evidence that potentially speaks against my own 
interpretations or preconceptions, thereby avoiding the fallacy of researcher bias or 
subjectivity.  
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Employing the framework, which will be further explained in Chapter 3, the following 
table outlines the various theoretical findings with the evidence required to consider. 
Table 2.5: Identifying evidence for the factors involved in coalition building. 
Theoretical Factors Dimensions to Consider 
Coalition Initiation  
POS/DOS at time Open/closed domestic and European 
political opportunities 
Establishing links between groups 
(Existing network and/or Movement  
Entrepreneurship) 
Recruitment process, (prior) contacts 
between the groups 
Value homophily/shared views Political views of the groups 
Respectability deliberations Perception of the role of the groups in 
their domestic settings (e.g. considered 
ideologically ‘extreme’) 
Diffusion Adaption of other coalition-member’s   
frames, organizational set-ups, protest 
repertoires, etc. 
Coalition Maintenance  
Shared activities (to foster in-group 
unity) 
Type of activities (collective action, 
meetings, conferences, etc), rationales 
for, and perceptions of, participation 
Resource mobilization (role of groups) Actors financing joint activities, leading 
groups in the given coalitions, other 
groups’ contributions 
Creation of a European Collective 
identity (?)  
Use of similar collective identity frames 
(constructions of protagonist/antagonist 
identities) 
Shared goals with coalition / Overlaps 
in expectations 
Statements about the coalition 
cooperation, contextual information 
(does the group for instance cooperate 
with other European far right actors?) 
Coalition Survival/End  
Rules of membership Membership proscriptions, invited 
participants, potential exclusions of 
groups  
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Ideological divergences Disparate views on certain crucial 
issues 
Leadership quarrels (Potential) conflicts and fights between 
the coalition leaders 
National contextual changes  National elections leading to new 
power-holders, stronger repressive 
measures by the state, etc. 
Evidencing Transnational Diffusion Processes 
As will be further elaborated upon in the theoretical framework (see Chapter 3), it is 
likely that certain diffusion processes take place between the different groups of the 
coalitions, which may make them become more homogenous as a group of actors. As 
the exact ‘diffusion process’ is rather difficult to trace empirically (compared to e.g. 
the establishments of contacts between the various groups), it requires some further 
explanations in terms of the methods employed.  
It is expected that parts of the national groups’ transnationalization processes (both in 
terms of coalition-building and collective action) take part through various types of 
diffusion mechanisms, both before, during, and after they instigate closer cooperative 
relations with actors from abroad. With this, I do not wish to argue that diffusion is 
the main mechanism involved in the transnationalization of contention, but that it may 
be a key component of both the transnationalization of collective action and coalitions. 
This is, in fact, already known to have played a vital role in terms of the creation of 
the various Generation Identity (GI) and PEGIDA groups, as GI France and PEGIDA 
Germany provided the blueprint for the entire organizational set-ups of the other 
European groups, including the main frames and symbols (see e.g. Berntzen & 
Weisskircher 2016; Bruns et al. 2017). However, it is not so clear what relationship 
there was, and potentially currently is, between the groups that make up the various 
national GI and PEGIDA groups, and how this may relate to their creations. 
Depending on the level of involvement of the transmitting group in the receiving 
groups’ composition, activities, and etcetera, it can reveal a lot about the different 
roles of the groups in the respective coalitions. 
Yet, while it is rather easy to show that a diffusion process has taken place, it is much 
trickier to demonstrate empirically how such diffusion occurred. It thus necessitates 
a strong operationalization, in order to unravel which exact form of diffusion has taken 
place (for instance, whether it was through emulation or learning) (Van Hauwaert 
2014b). This means that the ‘before’ and ‘after’ of a specific diffusion process must 
be established, and one must confirm what was in the given place prior to diffusion 
(i.e. what changed, why, and how?). In the analysis, I am particularly considering the 
(potential) diffusion of organizational set-ups, frames, and protest tactics.  
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Organizational Set-Up 
While it is often rather self-evident and easily observable that a transnational diffusion 
process of the entire organizational set-up has taken place, due to for instance the 
adoption of the name of the transmitter (e.g. PEGIDA Austria adapting PEGIDA 
Germany’s name to its national setting), it is harder to unravel the more cognitive or 
strategic rationales behind this adoption. Hence, it is often much easier to demonstrate 
that a diffusion process has taken place, rather than exactly why or how. Therefore, 
when identifying the empirical data, I will look for data that conveys information 
about the (potential) relationship between the transmitter and adopter prior to the 
adoption of the organizational set-up in order to deduce whether it took place through 
emulation or learning. For instance, if I find proof that PEGIDA Austria’s initiator 
was in contact with PEGIDA Germany’s Orga-team prior to setting up the Austrian 
offshoot, this is a rather strong indicator of diffusion through direct channels, most 
likely through learning. Conversely, if such connections cannot be evidenced, and the 
initiator, for example, stated that he heard about PEGIDA Germany in the news and 
then decided to set up an Austrian branch, then this indicates emulation through 
indirect channels. Moreover, in order to answer why the adoption took place, I will 
look for statements from the adopting actors, explaining why they chose to utilize 
another group’s name and action repertoire in their own national setting. I will also 
utilize statements by national far right experts, who can provide more insights on the 
national far right scene, and thus, potentially explicate the contextual reasoning behind 
such a transnational diffusion process.  
Collective Action Frames and Campaign Issues 
It is extremely difficult to estimate whether the diffusion of frames and campaign 
issues take place through direct or indirect channels of diffusion. This is especially 
the case, when diffusion is related to major events, such as a terrorist attack in a 
European city, ‘Brexit,’ the EU’s refugee quota proposal, etcetera, which might have 
led to similar responses across Europe, without in- or direct exchanges between the 
actors. Thus, diffusion of frames will only be considered in the analysis when it can 
be proven that this is due to the in/direct influence of a transmitter. For example, this 
could be the diffusion of a particular concept from group A to group B or the 
instigation of a similarly worded protest campaign as group A by group B. Such 
processes can be traced through the protest event data set and/or the interviews with 
the key actors from the groups. Adaptions of frames and campaigns often either occur 
between actors, who are “spatially or culturally relevant” to each other (proximal 
diffusion), and/or are in hierarchical relationships, where the leading organization 
‘trickles down’ its frames and issues to the hierarchically lower organizations or actors 
(Soule 2004: 295). In this way, the occurrence of such diffusion can also give good 
indications as to the (potential) hierarchy in the given transnational coalition, 
particularly if it is frequently the same group, which is emulated. 
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Protest Tactics  
Concerning protest tactics, it is slightly easier to deduce the occurrence of a diffusion 
process, especially when it comes to the more creative and/or innovative types of 
protest repertoires. Here, I will search for the following indicators in order to identify 
diffusion: explicit statements about drawing inspiration from another European actor; 
sharing of another actor’s events on the group’s website or Facebook page and later 
carrying out the same tactic, and interview data about protest events and 
communication between the groups. 
The establishment of all of these various types of diffusion across the European 
borders will help me to argue more convincingly about the groups’ Europeanization 
process aside from the mobilization related to the EU. Hence, it can reveal more about 
the similarities of the groups, plus (potentially) indicate if there are groups who act as 
‘role models’ for the other groups, i.e. groups the others want to learn from and/or 
emulate. The diffusion aspect of the research is thus not a main feature of the analysis, 
but rather aids in gaining a deeper understanding of the relationship between the 
various groups in the coalitions. It thus acts as a (potential) mechanism in the groups’ 
coalition building and collective action endeavours. 
FRAME ANALYSIS  
With the onset of the ‘cultural turn’ in social movement studies, frame analysis 
became a prevalent means to consider social movement actors and their cognitive 
‘views of the world’ (Snow & Benford 1988; Benford & Snow 2000). The approach, 
which can be considered a sub-variant of discourse theory (Lindekilde 2014), has also 
frequently been employed in relation to research on the Europeanization of social 
movements. This is mainly because it is an apt method to consider actors’ statements 
both over time and in comparison to other actors (e.g. looking for similarities and 
differences in their viewpoints and argumentation styles). A growing number of 
studies have thus employed frame analysis as a means to consider extra-parliamentary 
actors’ Europeanization paths (see e.g. della Porta & Caiani 2009; Parks 2015; 
Monforte 2014; Bourne & Chatzopoulou 2015). This most commonly infers the 
exploration of the degree to which the organizations’ claims obtain a ‘European 
dimension,’ both in regard to the issue and target of mobilization, but also their own 
(portrayed) identity (see e.g. Monforte 2014; della Porta & Caiani 2009). Concerning 
the EU institutions, scholars have employed the method to explore the (potential) 
ways national organizations’ distinct frames change, once they direct their political 
activities toward the EU-level30, and/or join European coalitions (see e.g. Monforte 
2014; Salgado 2014; Parks 2015), plus their perceptions of the EU as a political entity 
(see e.g. della Porta & Caiani 2009). Moreover, recent far-right scholarship also 
                                                          
30 Researchers have, for instance, focused on how and whether the given groups “use frames 
that resonate with EU policy-making” (Monforte 2014; see also Parks 2015; Salgado 2014). 
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encourages more research employing frame analysis as a research method (see e.g. 
Pytlas 2018). The following section explains the ‘frame’ concept and outlines how the 
method is employed in the analysis.  
What is a ‘Frame Analysis’? 
The frame analytical approach draws attention to the role of ideas and images, and the 
organizations’ construction and expression of their ‘dominant worldviews’ (Caiani & 
della Porta 2018: 338; see also Gamson 1992). They do so by highlighting and 
conveying particular claims (Entman 1993), somewhat akin to the framing of a picture 
(Lindekilde 2014). Frame analysis is a constructionist approach, which considers the 
role of perceptions of movement activists (see e.g. della Porta & Caiani 2009), and 
scholars have employed it to consider the cognitive mechanisms behind a given 
political organization’s or activist’s demands and references on a specific issue 
(Caiani et al. 2012). The frames are thus often constructed around the group’s given 
“ideas, cultures and ideologies,” which are combined with “certain situations or 
empirical phenomena,” in order to construct a reality through which to understand the 
world (Lindekilde 2014: 196). This process is also referred to as ‘frame articulation’ 
(Snow 2004). Despite its constructionist foundations, Snow & Benford (1988) refer 
to framing as a strategic, and thus, causal, action, deliberatively employed by the 
movement entrepreneurs (or the ‘signifying agents’) to garner activist and bystander 
support, i.e. getting people “from the balcony to the barricades” (Benford & Snow 
2000: 615). The leaders, then, interpret the group’s grievances, and construct and 
define its strategies, goals, and mobilizing frames, with the ultimate goal of obtaining 
consensus (Snow & Benford 1988). However, as Lindekilde (2014) argues, “the 
relationship between ideas, social structures, and action is not one of determinism, but 
rather one of contingency,” and the activists all partake in various processes of 
interpretation, again highly dependent on the context (Lindekilde 2014: 203). 
Employment of Frame Analysis in the Thesis 
The analysis of the groups’ collective action frames (CAF) involves an exploration of 
the frames employed to mobilize consensus (the diagnostic and prognostic frames) 
and action (motivational frames) (Snow & Benford 1988). The study investigates the 
groups’ collective action frames in order to deduce the extra-parliamentary FE and GI 
groups’ mobilizing frames and political agendas, and whether and how these are likely 
to align with the EU’s institutional framework (based on prior Europeanization 
findings, see e.g. della Porta & Caiani 2009). 
Hence, it is not the aim to look at the evolution of the groups’ frames over time, and 
their potential Europeanization. Instead, the analysis will analyse the various groups’ 
main collective action frames for three separate purposes. For one, to introduce the 
groups and their worldviews, and explain their likely Europeanization strategies on 
this basis (Chapter 5). As the research focuses on the mobilization during the ‘refugee 
METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
63 
crisis’, this section particularly explores their main CAFs around (Muslim) 
immigrants and asylum seekers. Moreover, the CAFs are also employed to analyse 
the groups’ blame attributions and targets during their protest actions (Chapters 6 and 
7), just it is used to explore whether the groups joined the transnational coalition based 
on shared worldviews (Chapters 8 and 9).  
The transnational coalition chapters consider whether the national groups’ movement 
entrepreneurs establish Europeanized collective identity frames. Hence, while certain 
scholars have studied Europeanization’s effect on the ‘issue frames’ of the given 
groups (see e.g. Monforte 2014), the focus in this thesis is instead placed on the effects 
on the ‘we’, i.e. the (potential) creation of a shared European collective identity 
together with the coalition-partners (see Theoretical Framework). It will thus consider 
whether the groups develop shared definitions of a European ‘us’. Della Porta and 
Caiani (2009) argue that, “As an imagined community, Europe represents different 
things for different actors, whose positions on Europe are linked to various themes, 
placing Europe within specific systems of values or ideologies” (2009: 23). It is these 
particular perceptions of ‘Europe’, and what it means to be ‘European’ that are 
relevant to unravel in regard to the research objects, in order to gain a more profound 
understanding of the rationales and strategies behind the (trans)national mobilisation 
and use of frames. In fact, these various frames do not necessarily develop through 
intergroup interaction, but may also arise from diffusion processes, which do not 
necessarily involve face-to-face encounters. Hence, in certain instances, the 
transnationalization of the collective identity frames (i.e. the construction of shared 
antagonists and protagonists) occur prior to the more substantial networking taking 
place due to the overlaps in ideological viewpoints, etcetera. Such occurrences are 
also worth examining further, as this reveals a lot about their more ideational 
rationales for transnationalization. Moreover, the analysis will also explore how the 
groups justify, rationalise, and perceive the transnational cooperation, i.e. the 
Europeanization of the prognostic and motivational frames. In other words, it 
considers how and why the groups develop a perceived need to cooperate with other, 
European actors in order to combat a shared problem. Here, the role of ongoing 
European and national events and developments become particularly important, as 
these may provide opportunities, which the actors can attempt to pursue. 
The Sources for Frame Analysis and its Coding 
Frame analysis is most commonly conducted on data retrieved from the explored 
actors’ own sources, such as manifestos, newsletters, speeches at protests and 
meetings, online ‘About us’ sections, etcetera. As the sample needs to be 
representative to the greatest possible extent to increase the external validity, it usually 
requires a rather large bulk of data (Lindekilde 2014). As will be explained further 
below, for the purposes outlined above, I have chosen to rely on website data, 
statements at protest events, manifestos, press releases, and Facebook posts. 
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In terms of coding, frame analysis is an open-coding method, which has its 
foundations in content analysis (Lindekilde 2014). As will be further elaborated upon 
below, the collected data will be coded in NVivo according to several pre-established 
coding categories.   
 DATA COLLECTION: TRIANGULATION 
Process tracing, frame analysis, and protest event analysis are all research methods 
that are highly reliant on extensive empirical data from various types of sources 
(Checkel 2005; Lindekilde 2014; Hutter 2014b). At the more general level, a too high 
reliance on only one type of data is likely to lead to biased and one-sided findings. In 
order to accommodate these challenges, the study employs a variety of different data 
types, sources, and collection methods, allowing for the obtainment of multiple 
perspectives on the events and occurrences (Yin 2003). This ‘data-triangulation’ has 
become one of the most frequently employed data collection strategies, both by 
scholars conducting case studies (see e.g. Baxter & Jack 2008) and social movement 
research (see e.g. Ayoub et al. 2014). The triangulation approach implies the 
exploration of a given issue through several lenses, shedding light on numerous facets 
and aspects of the phenomenon (Baxter & Jack 2008). It also infers that one ‘checks’ 
whether the different methods employed end up at the same conclusions, thereby 
increasing the validity of the claims by reducing the “risk of chance associations and 
systematic biases” (Maxwell 2013: 245). 
Similar to Monforte (2014), this study aims to observe far-right organizations ‘from 
the inside’, i.e. to focus on their organization, deliberations, and actions at the national 
and European level based on their internal documents and accounts of events. This, 
however, is not quite possible here, as I am not able to gain unrestricted access to the 
data. Hence, when approaching the far right groups involved in the study, I anticipated 
a high degree of opposition or suspicion towards me, due to my role as a university 
researcher, and thus, representative of ‘the left-wing establishment’. I thus did not 
expect that such access would be granted, especially not if I wished to publish the 
research afterwards. These deliberations made me refrain from requesting access to 
confidential documents, such as meeting reports and internal communications. This 
decision, of course, leads to some challenges, especially in terms of analysing the 
relationship and interactions between the various groups in the coalitions. Yet, there 
is an attempt to bridge this gap through an extensive data collection of other types of 
sources, explained further in the following paragraphs.   
In order to ensure complementarity of the sources, I employ both primary and 
secondary sources. I retrieved the primary data from the organizations making up the 
two coalitions (through semi-structured interviews with key informants and the 
groups’ websites and Facebook posts). Certain social movement researchers warn 
against too heavy a reliance on publicly available sources from the activists 
themselves. As Schedler (2015) argues: 
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While these may provide information on the public image of groups and 
organizations, it is critical to ask to what extent this data material allows a 
correct interpretation of the ideology of individual activists or even the 
goals of groups, or whether there are serious distinctions […] between the 
public facade and the internal reality […]. The action-guiding motives and 
strategies can be quite different. (2015: 289, author’s translation) 
Instead, Schedler (2015) continues, one should collect biographical data at the 
individual member level. Yet, as the explicit aim with this research is to explore how 
the groups Europeanize their contention, i.e. not the individual activists and their 
perceptions and interests, I discarded this approach. Yet, while I deem the gathered 
data crucial in order to understand the distinct groups’ Europeanization strategies and 
processes, it is also likely to be one-sided and may portray a given situation in a biased 
way without revealing much about the actual deliberations of the given movement 
leaders. Hence, in order to evaluate the ‘correctness’ of the claims, I will also gather 
data from secondary sources, which I will use to either support and/or disprove the 
primary sources (especially regarding repression, counter-demos, and protest 
actions)31. The secondary sources are collected from media outlets and the far right 
groups’ adversaries and observers (newspaper articles, reports by anti-racist 
organisations, and the state), and scholars of the far right (expert interviews and prior 
research on the groups). Particularly the interviews with experts on the various 
national far right scenes should ensure more rigidity concerning the national cases and 
the actors’ opportunities at the European institutional level (see Interview section). 
The data thus consists of both observational and interview data, i.e. un- and obtrusive 
data respectively. Hence, the research objects themselves have a voice, and can 
provide insider knowledge of events and decisions through the interviews. Yet, at the 
same time, they “cannot react to or distort the research process; for instance, by 
intentionally or unintentionally misrepresenting the unfolding of events” (Beyers et 
al. 2014: 175). As there is a danger of this misrepresentation occurring, the 
unobtrusive data will be the carrying part of the investigation, while the interviews 
with organisation leaders (the ‘key informants’) will provide supporting information 
about the general strategical deliberations and employment of frames and protest 
repertoires for the different organizations.  
ONLINE DATA 
The focus of the analysis is on the two coalitions’ offline Europeanization, i.e. their 
coalition building and collective action, and their (potential) development of a 
transnational collective identity during this process. Yet, apart from the protest events 
                                                          
31 A very good example of this approach being necessary is the big differences in the description 
of GI’s ‘Defend Europe’ mission in the summer of 2017, where GI portrayed it as a successful 
event, while the media and scholars were much more critical (see e.g. Oppenheim 2017). 
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and various gatherings and social events themselves, a lot of the groups’ interaction 
with their followers and (potential) members takes place online. As Mosca (2014) 
argues, “As we tend to focus on mobilization phenomena that are constructed both 
online and offline, it is crucial to access both fields where participants act. This means 
that in order to provide robustness to our findings, data need to be triangulated” (2014: 
413). Hence, together with the interviews, the primary sources consist of online data, 
gathered from the different groups’ websites and social media pages.  
Online Data for Offline Mobilization 
As research has demonstrated, online communication plays a substantial role in far 
right communication, organisation, and mobilisation (see e.g. Caiani & Parenti 2013). 
The technological advancements in regard to IT and telecommunications has thus led 
to a change in the way social movements (Edwards 2014), and particularly far right 
subcultural actors, mobilize (see e.g. Caiani & Kröll 2015; Caiani & Parenti 2013). In 
this way, the “internet facilitates and supports (traditional) offline collective action in 
terms of organization, mobilization and transnationalization and, on the other hand, 
creates new modes of collective action” (Van Laer & Van Aelst 2010: 1147)32. Hence, 
the internet is used for mobilization, but has also more broadly changed the logic and 
organizational forms behind the protest activities and the organizations as such 
(Mosca 2014; see also Bennett & Segerberg 2012; Chadwick 2007 for more). 
The far right actors have thus obtained much better communication channels, making 
it simpler to disseminate their viewpoints more ‘freely’ and unobtrusively due to the 
difficulties national legal authorities face in terms of curbing far-right groups’ online 
activities (Weidinger 2016). The border-crossing nature of the internet also infers that 
the groups can reach wider audiences and contact like-minded actors abroad. Online 
communication is thus one of the clearest expressions and simplest ways of crossing 
state borders. Internet access has, for instance, made demonstrations more 
transnational in the sense that it is easier to invite foreign groups to join protests but 
also in terms of organizing European protest campaigns (della Porta & Tarrow 2005). 
In this way, social media has broadened the scope for transnational networking, aside 
from the usually nationally based group interactions. 
Moreover, the online communication also permits the actors quick means for making 
statements to the public, before the media intercepts (Stieglitz & Dang-Xuan as cited 
in Caton et al. 2015). Thus, apart from the need to mobilize participants and skills for 
their groups, collective actors must also have a well-functioning communications 
infrastructure, in order to coordinate the efforts, network, and mobilise supporters, 
                                                          
32 These new kinds of collective action involve e-mail bombings, hacking of websites, etc., but 
also the development of online versions of already existing protest tactics and strategies, such 
as online petitions and virtual sit-ins, plus new forms of alternative media (Van Laer & Van 
Aelst 2010: 1147; Flesher Fominaya 2014: 38).  
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both at the initiation of protests, but also to uphold the group on a daily basis. Political 
participation and coordination have thus largely moved to the online setting.  
From a research perspective, the online data can therefore provide concrete, easily 
accessible, unchangeable, and detailed information about collective actors and their 
activities, and is therefore beneficial for studying protest events and extra-
parliamentary groups (Almeida & Lichbach 2003; Mosca 2014). The heavy utilisation 
of online communication especially by far right actors offers a good opportunity for 
researchers to carry out unobtrusive research. Hence, in this thesis, the internet is 
utilised as a source of information about the coalition in its entirety and the groups as 
such. The data is approached as documentation of protest actions and means of 
communication between the distinct groups. In this way, the gathered Facebook posts 
and websites of the groups will “be accessed in order to collect information on their 
history, claims, organization, actions, and other characteristics” (Mosca 2014: 397).  
Most European political actors, and especially of a far right persuasion, have a website 
and are present on at least one social media platform (unless prohibited by the 
authorities). The vast majority of the far right actors included in this study have either 
a Twitter or a Facebook account, or, as is the case for most, both. Due to the scope of 
Facebook, I have decided to focus on this site for my data collection. In the following, 
the benefits of using websites and Facebook data as primary sources will be outlined. 
Website Data and Problems Related to Using Webpages as a Source 
An organizational website typically provides:  
 Self-presentation of the organization (unobstructed self-portrayal)  
 Event calendar and planning, plus coordination 
 News section about upcoming and past events 
 Links to other, similar-minded, organizations 
For this thesis, the website data will be employed to deduce the main frames of the 
different groups and to identify their protest events (see above). 
Aside from the clear advantages of using website data as material for analysis, there 
are some rather grave disadvantages, particularly when one is researching a 
phenomenon over a longer period. For one, the organisations tend to renew the 
websites after a certain period of availability, and/or remove older posts from the 
pages. In this study, this has particularly been a problem concerning the cases of GI 
France, GI Austria, and GI Germany, plus Lega Nord, PEGIDA Netherlands and 
PEGIDA Germany. While one can retrieve much of the older data through the 
WebArchive and its WayBack Machine (https://archive.org/web/), one can still not 
obtain all data produced since the groups’ creation (Mosca 2014). This is partly what 
motivated me to retrieve Facebook data as additional data. 
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Social Media Data: Facebook 
Social media is one of the most utilised communication methods in the world. The 
term refers to “web-based and mobile-based Internet applications that allow the 
creation, access and exchange of user-generated content that is ubiquitously 
accessible” (Kaplan and Haenlein as cited in Batrinca & Treleaven 2015). Facebook 
is one of the largest platforms, and while Twitter also has a large following, its 
keystroke-restrictions and forward-facing data retrieval makes it less apt for use for 
this study’s purposes (Caton et al. 2015: 2). Today, more than 2 billion people are 
members of Facebook, making it the largest public social media in the world (Statista 
2019a). Due to the breadth of Facebook’s scope and its position as the dominant global 
online social network (Wilson et al. 2012), political activists quickly realized the 
benefits of this media. They now use it “for protest coordination and the dissemination 
of injustice frames and demands,” making it “a crucial area of transnational social 
movement diffusion” (Flesher Fominaya 2014: 46).  
This is also the case for far right groups, which frequently employ it as a mobilising 
media (see e.g. Berntzen 2018a). Just to give one example from the research subjects, 
in June 2016, PEGIDA Germany’s Facebook page counted 204,270 ‘likes’ (Baldauf 
et al. 2016),33 and in the 2015-2016 period, the group posted an average of 12 posts 
per day, mainly consisting of pictures and links. The most popular posts were photos 
or videos from the last demonstration (Ibid.).  
Additionally, members use the site to account for, and promote, the group’s various 
events (with pictures, (live) videos, etc.), and to spread news stories about relevant 
topics, which speak to the ideological viewpoints of the group itself. In this way, this 
relatively new communication channel (created in 2005) provides opportunities for 
both “processes of opinion formation/expression and for citizen mobilization, not only 
online but also funnelled into actual forms of protest and action” (Barisione & Ceron 
2017: 78). One can therefore consider it a type of “ongoing database of social activity 
with information being added in real time,” like a form of movement diary (Wilson et 
al. 2012: 214). Hence, for a researcher, Facebook posts from a collective actor can 
give insights on its: views on societal issues (framing), protest events, transnational 
interactions, recruitment strategy, etc. For this study’s purposes, the focus is on the 
groups’ protest event data (i.e. mentions of protest activities) and transnational 
relations with other actors (including re-posting of posts and shared events).  
  
                                                          
33 The protest group was also active on Twitter and VK, and in the same month (i.e. June 2016), 
it had around 3,700 followers on each of the platforms. By November 20, 2018, PEGIDA 
Germany’s ‘Likes’ count had fallen to 57,517.  
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Process of Facebook Data Extraction 
For the Facebook data scraping, I have utilized the Netvizz application (Rieder 2013). 
At the time of writing34, one can access several types of information regarding the 
pages, such as the contents of the ‘Post’, its ‘Comments’ and ‘Likes’, plus of course 
the date of the entries. For all the groups, it is only the given group, which has 
permission to post on the ‘Wall’ (except in the case of the ‘Fortress Europe’ page). As 
the sole purpose here is to explore the ‘Posts’ on the group wall (and not the 
‘Comments’ by the users), I carried out a simple extraction for each group, as far back 
in time as posts were retrievable (see figures on the table below). I retrieved data for 
the period ending on December 19, 2017 (date of data retrieval for most of the groups, 
and after Facebook’s closure of GI’s Facebook accounts in May 2018, I could no 
longer access this data online). I first retrieved the first 999 posts possible (maximum 
of posts possible to retrieve at once). Then, I continued moving backwards in the date 
intervals in the NetVizz app’s search function, until no more posts could be retrieved 
(i.e. first search: 999 posts; Second search: end date of these 999 posts and one year 
further back (e.g. 14.5.2017 to 14.5.2016) and so on). This data extraction gave me 
the following data sets for the different groups making up GI and FE: 
Table 2.6: Number of retrieved Facebook posts and period of retrieval.  
GENERATION IDENTITY 
GI Group35 Posts Period of Retrieval 
GI France 3,096 Aug 2012 – Dec 2017 
GI Austria 1,728 Oct 2012 – Dec 2017 
GI Germany 2,679 Apr 2013 – Dec 2017 
GI Italy 2,527 Oct 2012 – Dec 2017 
GI Czech Republic 291 Aug 2016 – Dec 2017 
GI Hungary 419 Sept 2016 – Dec 2017 
  
                                                          
34 Facebook introduced new regulations, which might inhibit the use of the NetVizz application 
in the future (1.10.2018). 
35 GI Slovenia’s Facebook account was closed at the time of extraction. 
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FORTRESS EUROPE 
FE Group Posts Period of Retrieval 
PEGIDA Germany 
(‘Pegida Dresden’) 
1,698 Dec 2014 – Dec 2017 
IVČRN (‘IVČRN 
Brno36) 
1,550 Nov 2014 - Dec 2017 
BA Islamization 
(‘Blok Proti Islamici 
– Pilsen’)37 
998 July 2016 – Dec 2017 
PEGIDA Austria 1,775 Dec 2014 – Dec 2017 
PEGIDA 
Netherlands 
Not possible to retrieve 
PEGIDA UK No longer accessible at time of retrieval 
For Freedom 392 Mar 2015 – Dec 2017 
Dawn 2,396 
April 2013 – June 
2017  
NGO ISIS No Facebook account 
EKRE 1,973 April 2014 – Dec 2017 
Lega Nord 
Not possible to retrieve old posts (new 
Facebook page for Italian elections 2018) 
National Movement 492 
Dec 2016 – Dec 2017 
(no earlier posts due to 
page-closure) 
Courage No longer accessible at time of retrieval 
Fortress Europe 1,552 Jan 2016 – Dec 2017 
Festung Europa 158 May 2016 – Nov 2017 
                                                          
36 Biggest IVČRN group accessible at the time of data extraction. 
37 BPI no longer had a main Facebook-group at the time of the data extraction. I thus chose the 
largest available BPI group. 
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As some of these Facebook ‘Pages’ have been closed down, I have decided to solely 
refer to the Facebook posts in the text, and not add them to the bibliography. If one 
wishes to see the specific post data, please contact me. 
Problems Retrieving Facebook Posts 
There were several problems related to this data extraction. For one, some of the 
Facebook pages or groups were private, i.e. I had to request becoming a member of 
the group in order to gain access. I decided against this strategy out of two main 
considerations. On the one hand, I did not expect them to grant me access, if I was 
open about being a researcher. On the other, out of an ethical consideration, I did not 
wish to join in a covert way, not disclosing my research aim. This inferred that I could 
not gain access to e.g. Fortress Europe’s internal organization group. Moreover, in 
some cases, it was not possible to retrieve the Facebook data. It was thus only possible 
to retrieve about 20 posts from GI Czech Republic and PEGIDA Netherlands’ pages.  
A more general problem with both the websites and the Facebook pages relates to the 
contentious nature of the actors making up the two coalitions. It happened on several 
occasions, and for the majority of the groups, that either their websites or Facebook 
pages were ‘blocked’ or closed down altogether by either Facebook or the public 
authorities (for more about these procedures, see e.g. Graham-Harrison 2019). This 
infers some limitations to the data collection, as it leads to certain gaps in the material. 
However, by combining the website data with the posts retrieved from Facebook and 
newspaper searches, it should still be a rather complete final dataset. 
Access Rights for Facebook: Public vs. Private Profiles and Contents 
There is also a need to account for certain ethical considerations, when utilising social 
media data. In terms of confidentiality and potential breaches of privacy, I have only 
retrieved data from public ‘Pages’ and ‘Groups’, and not the private profiles of any of 
these actors. This means that while I have included Tommy Robinson’s (PEGIDA 
UK) and Maria Kaljuste’s (NGO ISIS and EKRE) public pages (‘Maria from Estonia’), 
which they use for public purposes in their roles as political activists, I did not retrieve 
the available data set from Edwin Wagensveld’s (PEGIDA Netherlands) private 
profile, for instance. Moreover, I did not retrieve the ‘Comments’ for any of the posts, 
both due to the size of the data (very large datasets), the lacking necessity of it to 
answer my research questions, and because of privacy-related issues (despite not 
being able to see the name of the commenter in the dataset). 
Search Strategy for the Online Data 
Some of the websites and Facebook pages contained a lot of data that was not required 
for my exact research purposes (on the websites, this was especially the case 
concerning the ‘News’ section, which mainly consisted of news stories about 
immigrants, refugees, Muslims, and political adversaries). This included the diffusion 
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of news articles and blog entries from other far right actors, such as Breitbart, Robert 
Spencer (from the American alt-right), etc. This was especially the case for the Czech 
websites (IVČRN, BPI, and to some extent also Dawn) and the French Résistance 
Républicaine and Riposte Laïque. This type of information sharing is important for 
the extra-parliamentary actors in this study, and relevant for understanding their 
worldviews. Yet, as this study does not focus on the online dissemination of 
information, this particular research does not considered this aspect further. Moreover, 
especially the parties have other key issues, such as economic policy and social 
welfare, for example, requiring a search strategy. Hence, due to the great diversity in 
the organization types and the groups’ websites, in some cases it was difficult to 
retrieve data corresponding with that found on the other groups’ pages. Yet, the data 
collection strategy was the same for all groups, and from the outset, I knew I needed 
data on protest events, the national political setting (including allies and adversaries), 
the groups’ transnational connections, their views on the EU and European identity, 
their conception of ‘us,’ and of ‘immigrants’ and ‘Islam’. 
For the websites, I thus first gathered the data from the ‘About Us’ or ‘Who we are’ 
sections (organizational self-presentation), the ‘Political Program’ and/or ‘Manifesto’ 
(mainly for the parties), and the ‘Events Calendar’ (data on protest events and 
meetings). Where available, I also gathered ‘Press releases,’ ‘Calls,’ ‘Petitions,’ and 
internal literature, such as ‘Annual Reports’. The ‘News’ and ‘Blog’ data was also 
retrieved, but for some of the actors, the broad scope of these sections and the type of 
data (mainly news articles) inferred a more focused search strategy, only gathering 
relevant articles. Certain political parties (Dawn; EKRE; National Movement) had a 
huge blog-output, and I thus focused on posts containing information on: ideology 
(such as election manifestos and political programs), transnational relations with other 
actors; and organisational issues (such as changes in leadership, etc.). A similar 
procedure was carried out on the blog of Tatjana Festerling (PEGIDA Germany and 
spokesperson of Fortress Europe), which I went through manually, and only retrieved 
the posts related to the topics outlined above, plus her participation in protest actions.   
For the Facebook posts, I manually searched for protest keywords and transnational 
connections (mentions of other members of either GI or FE)38. The latter part could 
involve the sharing of other groups’ posts (via links, reposts, videos and texts, e.g. 
about (upcoming) protest events, or joint, transnational encounters). In relation to 
Fortress Europe, the coalition (or rather Maria Kaljuste from EKRE) also created a 
shared Facebook page for the actors, simply called ‘Fortress Europe’, just as a German 
equivalent was set up (‘Festung Europa’). The data from these two platforms was also 
retrieved, in the same manner as explained above.  
                                                          
38 Special thank you to Associate Professor Elena Pavan from the Institute of Humanities and 
Social Sciences at the Scuola Normale Superiore in Florence, Italy, for the suggestion to search 
through the posts in this way. 
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Archiving the Online Data 
I archived the online data “in order to have a stable object to study and refer to when 
the analysis is to be documented” (Brügger as cited in Mosca 2014: 399). I have taken 
screen shots of the (accessible) Facebook posts, which were stored in a Word 
document. However, I carried out the Facebook analysis of the GI posts just before 
Facebook removed all of the coalition’s Facebook pages in June 2018, and 
unfortunately, I did not back up all the written posts with a screenshot of the actual 
message at the time, thus losing the image content. Luckily, most of the protest events 
for the period 2015-2017 could be retrieved from other GI-related websites (such as 
Novopress for GI France, and the Identitäre Blog for GI Germany and GI Austria). 
Having learned from this, I ensured to take both screenshots of the given pages, and 
to archive the remaining online content, in order to have evidence of the whole 
message and images.  
Language Restrictions: Using Google Translate for Data Translation 
In terms of language limitations, I am able to read Danish, German, English, Spanish, 
and French without problems, and Swedish and Norwegian to a somewhat more 
limited extent. For the other languages (more specifically Czech, Slovenian, Estonian, 
Hungarian, Polish, Italian, Dutch, Lithuanian, and Slovakian), I have relied on Google 
Translate. Whilst this poses some questions in regard to reliability (see below), I 
reason, similarly as Berntzen (2018), that the current advances made by Google in 
terms of its translation function implies that it can be considered sufficiently reliable. 
As Turovsky (2016) argues, the change to neural machine translation in 2016 infers 
that the page now:  
[…] translates whole sentences at a time, rather than just piece by piece. It 
uses this broader context to help it figure out the most relevant translation, 
which it then rearranges and adjusts to be more like a human speaking with 
proper grammar. Since it’s easier to understand each sentence, translated 
paragraphs and articles are a lot smoother and easier to read. (Turovsky 
2016) 
Nevertheless, I am of course aware that the translation service is far from perfect, 
which several of the translations also demonstrate, for example, regarding party 
names, etcetera. In order to ensure that direct citations are correct, and where I was in 
strong doubt about the contents, particularly when conducting the frame analysis, I 
have consulted a native speaker of the given language.  
Coding the Primary Sources: Manual Coding in NVivo 
As my research involves various uses of the data (both the need to identify protest 
events, the groups’ frames, plus their transnational cooperation in the coalitions), I 
first carried out a broad manual coding of the websites. Several scholars rely on a 
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‘formalized’ or ‘automated’ web content analysis; also called Computer Assisted 
Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) (see e.g. Caiani & Kröll 2015 and 
their analysis of 336 right-wing websites). This approach is less time-consuming and 
allows for the obtainment of word-clusters and overviews of the frames produced by 
the analysed object(s) without having to read the documents oneself. While this is an 
excellent approach, particularly concerning time management, I instead opted for the 
manual version, both due to the different aspects I needed covered, plus my research 
objects’ great language variety, which inferred a strong reliance on Google Translate 
as the initial translation device. I thus also wanted to read the texts to ensure that 
potential errors of translation were spotted39.  
Frame Analysis Codebook based on Theoretical Framework and Far Right Literature 
I employed the computer software NVivo for the coding of the collective action and 
collective identity frames. I first imported Word-format files for each group, 
containing the data collected on the groups’ websites. Then I established several 
‘Nodes’ with analytical categories that were relevant for my research based on 
Europeanization theory and far right worldviews (see Table 2.7 below). The coding 
was in this sense closed and pre-determined at the outset (deductive).  
As it was a partial aim with the frame analysis to determine the collective action 
frames around the groups’ key mobilizing issues, I created the categories ‘Views on 
Islam and Muslims’ and ‘Views on immigrants and refugees,’ as I knew that many of 
the groups’ protests involved these topics. When coding, I included both the groups’ 
voicing of diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames to the appropriate category. 
Similarly, I coded the groups’ collective identity frames by considering their views 
on ‘National identity’ and ‘European identity,’ while also paying attention to the ways 
the groups’ constructed the ‘us’ vis-à-vis particularly the external ‘others’. Moreover, 
when the groups discussed their transnational relations with other far right actors, such 
mentions were coded to the ‘Transnational far right cooperation’ category, and certain 
of these frames also related to the construction of transnational unity around both the 
internal and external ‘others’ (e.g. the expression of solidarity frames in the face of 
domestic suppression). 
Furthermore, as the study concentrates on the groups’ relations to, and inclusion of, 
the EU in their mobilization, the coding category ‘View on the EU’ was also included, 
in order to deduce what type of relationship the groups were seeking with the EU 
institutions. From the outset, it was the expectation that the relationship would be 
conflictual, but it was important to deduce the degree of this opposition (e.g. soft or 
hard Euroscepticism (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2004)). Moreover, I also wanted to 
                                                          
39 A complete translation check would require that I am fluent in all of the languages involved, 
which I am not. However, certain translation mistakes are very easy to recognize due to the 
semantic mistakes, which makes some translated sentences incomprehensible.  
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explore the relationship between the groups from Eastern and Western Europe 
respectively, plus their perceptions of the two parts of the continent (if they made such 
a distinction). I thus also included the coding category ‘Eastern and Western Europe,’ 
to deduce how the groups framed the two parts of the continent (e.g. in an oppositional 
or harmonious relationship). 
Finally, when I initiated the coding phase, I quickly noticed a discrepancy in the FE 
groups’ framing of Russia, and I thus included ‘View on Russia’ as a category, in 
order to be able to explore these oppositional views further. Hence, I created the 
following ‘Nodes’ or categories, around which the initial coding phase took place, 
namely statements related to the following: 
Table 2.7: NVivo Nodes and descriptions for the coding of primary sources. 
Node Description Used in Thesis40 
Self-presentation Descriptions of the groups’ 
history, founding story, aims, 
and strategies. 
Chapters 5 and 8-9 
Islam and Muslims Collective action frames (i.e. 
diagnostic, prognostic, and 
motivational frames) related to 
the religion and its role in 
Europe. 
Chapter 5 
Immigrants and 
refugees  
Collective action frames 
related to the reception and 
integration of immigrants 
and/or refugees 
Chapter 5 
National identity Collective identity frames 
related to the group’s 
conception of its nation state, 
its citizens, and its role in 
Europe and the world 
Chapters 8-9 
European identity (Potential) Collective identity 
frames related to the group’s 
conception of Europe and  
Europeans (and how this 
(potentially) aligns with the 
group’s ‘us’ construction) 
Chapters 8-9 
                                                          
40 The various coded frames were utilized throughout the thesis. Yet, there were certain 
chapters, which utilized the findings more extensively. They are the ones provided here. 
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Transnational far right 
cooperation 
Mentions of links to actors 
abroad, and reasons for the 
transnational cooperation. 
Chapters 8-9 
View on the EU Stance on the EU as a political 
institution, its policy output, 
and the role for the EU 
member states 
Chapter 5 
Eastern and Western 
Europe 
(Potential) similarities and 
differences mentioned 
Chapters 8-9 
Russia  Statements voicing support or 
criticism of Russia  
Chapters 8-9 
During the initial coding phase, I simultaneously looked out for mentions of protest 
events, which I added to either the GI or FE ‘Protest Event Table’ in Excel (see 
Appendix B for more on this). I also extracted all the mentions of cooperation with 
other members of the group’s transnational coalition (i.e. either GI or FE). These were 
coded according to the type of contact (e.g. conference, meeting, informal networking, 
etc.), and I coded statements about the coalition as such. After having read and coded 
all the documents, I printed out the node data and manually coded a second time, 
looking out for similarities and differences between the frames of the different groups.     
Keyword Searches in Facebook Post Data 
I retrieved the Facebook data after initiating the website coding. The data was 
presented in an Excel sheet, which I searched through with pre-defined keywords to 
help me identify the protest events (e.g. protest tactic, such as ‘demonstration’, ‘press 
release’, etcetera, or time of an event, like ‘Monday’ or ‘evening’), just as I searched 
for mentions of any of the other groups participating in the transnational coalitions. I 
then added new mentions of protest events to the already created Excel-table.  
INTERVIEWS WITH KEY INFORMANTS 
Aside from the online primary sources, I also carried out semi-structured interviews 
with some of the leaders and spokespersons of the organizations making up GI and 
FE. As observational data has several limitations in terms of getting the ‘full picture’ 
of given research objects, “interviews are a necessary, sometimes even crucial, 
complement to the analysis of publicly available sources for research on political 
mobilization, strategies and influence” (Beyers et al. 2014: 175). Interviews are thus 
particularly useful in order to obtain information directly from the source, gain a better 
understanding of the perceptions and viewpoints of the given actors, clarify potential 
misunderstandings, and to identify observational data, one might have missed (Beyers 
et al. 2014; Blee & Taylor 2002). 
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I thus deemed it necessary to ask the actors themselves for their thoughts on, and 
rationales for, transnational cooperation, plus their views on the EU and European 
identity. This was in order to “capture a broader picture on [their] visions of and 
strategies towards Europe” (Koopmans 2004 as cited in della Porta & Caiani 2009: 
32), and to fully grasp the deliberations behind their activities (Blee & Taylor 2002: 
92). Thus, in addition to the online material and the secondary sources, I have also 
conducted nine semi-structured interviews with leaders and spokespersons of national 
GI and FE groups.  
While structured interviews are useful for systematic comparative purposes, as it 
ensures homogeneity in the responses (Blee & Taylor 2002), semi-structured 
interviews were deemed the best interview technique in this case. Unlike structured 
interviews, it offers more flexibility for the researcher, as one has the opportunity to 
pose clarifying or follow-up questions, if something is not understood or needs further 
elaboration. While still relying on an interview guide, the researcher can delve further 
into issues deemed important, and obtain a “greater breadth and depth of information” 
by scrutinizing the meaning behind given statements (Blee & Taylor 2002: 92). 
Interviews with Key Informants (Spokespersons or Leaders of National Groups) 
As my analytical focus is placed on the meso-level, I decided to focus on the leading 
members of the organizations for the interviews, just as other Europeanization 
scholars have done (see e.g. Monforte 2014; Parks 2015). It was the aim of the 
interviews to obtain better knowledge of the group’s strategic deliberations and 
rationales for coalition-building, and I therefore chose so-called ‘key informants’ from 
the given organizations, who I “asked to serve as an expert to inform the researcher 
about various aspects of the movement” (Blee & Taylor 2002: 106). This type of 
interview is in many ways akin to so-called ‘elite interviews’ (see e.g. Beyers et al. 
2014 for more). This meant that the respondent had to have knowledge about the more 
organisational aspects of the group, both in terms of protest strategies, transnational 
relations, and alliance commitments (Johansson 1997). As these are most likely to be 
best known to the leading actors of the given parties and extra-parliamentary 
organizations, I decided only to contact the leaders and/or spokespersons of the 
groups.  
(Far Right) Political Actors as Interview Subjects: Reliability and Validity Issues 
One must take certain considerations under advisement before and after having 
conducted interviews with political actors, especially when they represent a more 
contentious political standpoint and actor type, such as does the far right. Due to both 
the subjectivity and strategical deliberations of political actors (of any political 
persuasion), there is no guarantee that one will obtain an objective account of events 
and strategies. Moreover, the respondent is highly unlikely to feel obliged to ‘tell the 
truth,’ and might even attempt to derail the interviewer, if the interview turns too 
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intrusive (Alvesson 2011). This is even more important to keep in mind, when wanting 
to explore the given actors’ strategies and collaboration partners, issues which, in and 
of themselves, can be considered contentious, secret, and leave the groups exposed. 
Hence, as with all interview subjects, one has to be cautious regarding the 
interpretation, validity, and reliability of the respondents’ answers (Maxwell 2013).  
Unlike the exhaustive access frequently given to scholars, who research left-wing 
actors (consider e.g. Monforte’s (2014) access to pro-migrant organizations’ internal 
documents), from the outset, I expected only to be permitted surface access to the 
groups’ strategic deliberations and plans. Moreover, due to the rise in media outlets 
and the therefrom-ensuing publicity bestowed upon political actors in general, the 
given ‘Interview society’ infers that many political actors obtain training in ‘doing 
interviews’ (Alvesson 2011). This is very much a matter of the level of 
professionalism of the given organization, yet, it can generally be expected that they 
have been taught how to divest from or avoid a topic, they do not wish to discuss. 
Additionally, actors with controversial societal viewpoints may express themselves in 
a more restricted fashion because they wish to ‘keep up the appearances’ of 
respectability. Hence, it is necessary to reflect on the respondent’s own interest in the 
interview and his or her objective for participating. Alvesson (2011) uses the term 
‘impression management,’ in the sense that the respondent considers the interview a 
promotional activity, where they get to present and justify their own account of events. 
Beyers and colleagues (2014) similarly discuss the occurrence of ‘expansiveness bias’ 
where smaller actors make themselves appear more prominent than they are and vice 
versa regarding higher-status actors. 
During the interviews, this infers that the researcher must be cautious not to influence 
the respondent’s answers by posing leading questions, and be prepared to get different 
answers than expected. Moreover, in the analytical phase after the interview, one must 
also be cautious not to take all of the responses for granted, or as representing the 
‘truth’. It is thus vital to carry out a source critique, especially concerning the context 
and timing of the interview. The respondent might give only temporary, context-
specific statements (e.g. in a period of repression or success for the actor, period of 
high/low mobilization, etc.), inferring that if I interviewed them at a later or earlier 
point in time, the answers might be different. It is also important to consider the time 
lag between the interview and the topic of the questions (e.g. their coalition-building 
process), as the respondent might misrepresent the situation for strategic reasons 
(Beyers et al. 2014). In addition, due to their controversial viewpoints and their roles 
as politically engaged extra-parliamentary actors, the groups’ leaders may want to 
distort the truth somewhat to make their alliance sound more substantial than it 
actually is. This was the case during some of the interviews with actors from both 
coalitions, and such replies have to be evaluated based on the information retrieved 
from other sources. 
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Participant Selection, Interview Requests, and Problems Obtaining Interviews 
I selected the respondents based on their leadership of a participating member 
organization of either Generation Identity or Fortress Europe. It was my main aim to 
obtain interviews with the leading organizations of the coalitions, i.e. GI France, GI 
Austria, GI Italy and GI Germany for Generation Identity, and Tatiana Festerling (ex-
PEGIDA Germany), a Dawn or BPI representative, Maria Kaljuste (from EKRE and 
NGO ISIS), and Tommy Robinson (PEGIDA UK) for Fortress Europe. Yet, I strived 
to get as many positive replies to my request as possible. 
Before sending out the interview requests, I first carried out a more general search on 
the different groups to obtain information about their organizational set-up, activities, 
and views on the EU. Unfortunately, I did not have access to any gatekeepers, who 
could have helped me in gaining access to the respondents. During the interview 
rounds, I did get some suggestions from the respondents to forward me to other groups 
I was interested in, but unfortunately, these invitations never materialized. 
The Formulation of the Interview Request  
In alignment with the general academic standard, I opted for an honest and 
professional approach to the formulation of the interview request, explaining the aim 
and context of my research, my own name and academic status, plus the reason for 
choosing the particular respondent for the interview (Beyers et al. 2014). I briefly 
outlined my research focus, where I referred to my research objects as ‘anti-Islam 
movements, parties, and political associations’, and I made it explicit that I wished to 
discuss their views on the EU as a political organisation and their transnational 
relations with other far right actors. Hence, I attempted to be as transparent as possible, 
without giving too much information away about the specific interview contents. 
The initial round of interview requests was sent out via e-mail in the summer of 2017, 
where I obtained four positive replies that led to actual interviews (see Table below). 
In the winter of 2017, I then sent out another round of e-mails, receiving positive 
responses from Dawn in the Czech Republic, and later, two further positive replies 
from the same country, whereof only one materialized into an interview. Finally, in 
the autumn of 2018, I made the final round of requests, receiving three positive replies.      
In total, I contacted 12 spokespersons or leaders of other groups, who did not wish to 
discuss the given subject, did not have the required time at their disposal, or simply 
did not respond to my request.  
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Table 2.8: Overview of key informant replies to interview requests. 
Generation Identity Fortress Europe 
Positive Reply41 
Interview 
conducted 
Positive Reply 
Interview 
conducted 
Daniel Fiβ (GI 
Germany) 
July 2017 Edwin Wagensveld 
(PEGIDA Netherlands 
and FE) 
August 2017 
Lorenzo Fiato (GI 
Italy) 
August 2017 Tania Groth (For 
Freedom (DK))  
October 2017 
Adam Berčík (GI 
Czech Republic) 
March 2018 Marek Černoch (Dawn 
(CZ))  
January 2018 
Aurelija Aniulyte 
(GI Denmark)  
October 2018 Pierre Cassen (Riposte 
Laïque (F))  
October 2018 
  Ingrid Carlqvist 
(Dispatch 
International (S))42 
October 2018 
NEGATIVE/NO REPLY NEGATIVE/NO REPLY 
GI Austria (Never replied to my 
request. Other scholars have also failed 
in obtaining interviews (see e.g. 
Ajanovic et al. 2016)) 
Tatjana Festerling (PEGIDA 
Germany and Fortress Europe) 
(Strongly rejected the interview request 
in August 2017 after having seen some 
of the interview questions) 
GI France (Never replied to request) Maria Kaljuste (NGO ISIS and 
EKRE) (She asked to answer the 
questions per e-mail in August 2017. I 
sent her the questions, but never heard 
back from her again) 
                                                          
41 They all gave their consent to have their names published as the respondents. 
42 Ingrid Carlqvist was not a formal member of Fortress Europe, yet, she participated in several 
demonstrations organized by FE-members, and her prior role in the Counter-Jihad Movement 
made her a highly relevant interview respondent in order to understand the anti-Islam 
mobilization over time. 
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GI Hungary (Never replied to request) Tommy Robinson (PEGIDA UK) (He 
replied to my first e-mail in December 
2017, but then never responded again) 
GI Slovenia (Never replied to request) Anne Marie Waters (PEGIDA UK) 
(She replied to my e-mail in Spring 
2017, but never arranged further) 
 Jana Volfová (Blok Against Islam) 
(Arranged interview with her in Spring 
2018, but when I arrived in Prague, she 
never responded with the actual place 
for the interview) 
 Lutz Bachmann (PEGIDA Germany) 
(No reply, most likely due to his distrust 
in the media and the ‘establishment’ (he 
generally does not give interviews 
(Vorländer et al. 2018)) 
 National Movement (Never replied) 
 Vincenzo Sofo (Northern League) 
(Never replied) 
Negative Replies 
Even though many scholars argue that far-right actors are very keen to talk about their 
organizations and goals, previous research on far-right movements and parties has 
also demonstrated the difficulty of obtaining an interview with this type of actor (see 
e.g. Caiani & Kröll 2015; Caiani 2014 (positive response rate below 40%)). This is 
particularly difficult without any gatekeepers, who can provide access to a given 
movement. Moreover, the topic of the interview might dissuade certain actors from 
participating, especially if it relates to their movement strategies and cooperative ties 
with similar-minded actors. Other scholars have struggled to obtain this sort of 
information in the past. In relation to EP interest groups, Beyers and colleagues (2014) 
state that “In particular, it is extremely difficult to obtain data on coalition building, 
coalition leadership, the intensity of collaboration and exchanges within coalitions” 
(2014: 176).  
As Table 2.8 shows, most of the negative responses amounted to a non-response to 
the e-mail with the interview request. However, two times, a respondent was 
dissuaded after I gave more information about the interview contents, per request by 
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the respondent. Particularly the response by one of the two is very telling about the 
mindset and worldview of certain of the explored actors, as the person stated that:  
Western universities are a nursery and breeding ground of left-wing 
extremism and completely twisted, fascist ideologies. With the members 
of the ‘Refugee filter bubble,’ rational, logical discussions are no longer 
possible, too great are the ideological blindness, the indoctrination and 
dependency, which were bred by financial contributions and perks by our 
politicians. So I decided to change my mind and will not be available to 
you for the interview. I do not support the activities of these universities, 
and I will not give you any insight into our internal networks and 
strategies. (Author’s translation)  
This response is telling, considering the current environment, where many people, 
including most mainstream media, meet extra-parliamentary far right actors with 
hostility, just as several far right activists themselves are strongly suspicious of 
representatives of the liberal elite (see e.g. Vorländer et al. 2018). Moreover, the 
lacking responses from especially the political parties can also be considered as part 
of the more general reluctance of political actors to assist in research projects, 
particularly when there is no apparent gain for them by participating. 
Use of the Interview Data in the Analysis 
Despite the limited response rate, which means that the interview data in no way is 
representative for all of the organizations and the coalitions as such, I have still opted 
for including the material in the thesis. For one, it provides first-hand knowledge and 
more subjective accounts about the organizations, their strategies, and European 
ambitions; thereby increasing the validity of arguing anything in relation to these 
issues. This is especially the case for the answers provided in relation to the groups’ 
rationales for, and problems related to, the transnational European extra-parliamentary 
cooperation, plus their thoughts on the EU and direct targeting of the EU institutions. 
Moreover, from the perspective of gaining organizational insights into the GI- and 
FE-participants more generally, it also very clearly demonstrated the different 
training/levels of professionalization of the two groups’ actors. The GI respondents 
appear well-trained in media relations, while the FE members were much more direct 
in their statements, not paying too much attention to the actual information revealed 
or how ‘radical’ they came across to the interviewer. 
Nevertheless, while the interviews provided good data on the rationales, motives, and 
aims behind the different organisations’ strategies, it would still infer a ‘key informant 
bias’ to solely rely on these respondents as providing ‘typical’ answers for all of the 
groups in the coalitions (Pelto & Pelto as cited in Maxwell 2013: 99). One should thus 
consider the interviews as a sort of ‘secondary’ source for this research, backing up 
the findings from the supplementary data.  
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Interview Guide 
The interview guide was carefully prepared, and was based on a thorough background 
search on the respondents and their organizations, both from the collected primary 
sources, but also other publicly available sources, such as media reports, as questions 
formulated based on this form of data may improve the interview quality (Beyers et 
al. 2014). Moreover, the order of the questions also received careful consideration, 
especially in terms of how best to obtain rapport and get the respondents to talk about 
the most vital questions (i.e. the ones I could not obtain information about through the 
unobtrusive sources). From the outset, I expected it to be a difficult task to get the 
respondents to talk about their cooperation with other far right actors, both at home 
and abroad. This was not only because of the expected mistrust towards me as a 
scholar, but also the generally contentious nature of these groups, plus the high level 
of focus on their activities, especially by media and left-wing activists. This made it a 
bit of a tricky task to formulate questions that did not appear too intrusive, or as if I 
was ‘snooping around’43. The rejection to participate by one respondent, whom I had 
sent some of the questions in advance, further accentuated the need for caution.  
My approach to the actual interview was to first pose some more general questions 
about the respondent’s own organization, in order to get them talking, and to try to 
build up some rapport before asking the more ‘controversial’ questions. Hence, in this 
way, I very much followed the formula proposed by Blee and Taylor (2002) of seeing 
the interview as “a guided conversation” with the aim of “elicit[ing] specific kinds of 
information” (2002: 92). Therefore, I formulated the questions in a more 
‘conversational’ style, while still “conveying the sense that the interviewer is both 
professional and neutral” (Beyers et al. 2014: 180). 
Topical Division of the Interview Guide 
Each Interview Guide consisted of the same five broad sections with group-specific 
questions where applicable. Hence, the interview guides were appropriated to the 
respondent and the group s/he was representing, especially concerning their 
transnational ties, the actor type (party vs. extra-parliamentary actor), and national 
context. Yet, the main topics of the questions remained the same throughout:  
 Introductory remarks about the research aim and focus, the question 
topics, and use of data (Oral consent of the use of the data for research 
purposes, agreement on either naming the person by full name or 
anonymously, and information about the storage of the data) 
                                                          
43 In fact, one of the interview respondents decided to record the interview as well, because the 
person was worried that I might be a member of Antifa.  
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 Ideology and protest repertoires (their inspiration for their viewpoints, the 
goal of their organization, their specific type of protest repertoire, views on 
their country’s handling of the refugee crisis)  
 View on Europe and the EU (visions for European cooperation, view on 
the EU’s handling of the ‘refugee crisis’, interaction with EU actors and 
institutions (thoughts on protesting at the EU institutions, approaching 
MEPs, and taking claims to the EU)) 
 Transnational cooperation (reasons for joining the coalition, cooperating 
with other European actors, participating in demonstrations abroad, and/or 
hosting demonstrations with foreign speakers)  
 Domestic actors and allies (view on national political parties) 
The questions thus focused on both the groups’ strategic manoeuvring in the national 
and European political arenas, and their perceptions about Europe and the ‘others’. In 
most of the interviews, the order of the questions differed somewhat from the written 
order. This was especially the case, when the respondent started providing responses 
to questions that were planned to be asked at a later point in the interview. 
Especially the questions about transnational cooperation were highly important, as it 
was difficult to obtain much exact information from other sources, particularly 
regarding the planning and conduct of meetings and communicative means between 
the groups participating in the different coalitions. While I specifically inquired into 
the constitutive Fortress Europe meetings in January and May 2016, and Generation 
Identity’s Defend Europe mission in 2017 (for more on these events, see Chapters 6 
and 7), I also posed general questions about the reasons for the groups’ participation 
in transnational collective action and networks. This inclusion of both specific and 
general questions was also based on my insecurity in regard to how much I could 
expect the respondents to convey during the interview, especially because these 
transnational links could be deemed as sensitive information to convey to a researcher. 
I thus attempted to bridge the two approaches and continued to ask questions that were 
more specific to those respondents who had been open to such questions during the 
interview and more general questions in the opposite case (Maxwell 2013).  
Pilot Testing the Interview Guide 
After first discussing the interview guide with my supervisor, I carried out three initial 
interviews with other far right actors, i.e. respondents “as much like (my) planned 
interviewees as possible” (Maxwell 2013: 101). I did this in order to ensure that the 
questions were clearly enough formulated, to get an idea of which type of answers to 
expect, and to make revisions accordingly. These interviews were with the extreme 
right Party of the Danes (Danskernes Parti), the transnational political association 
Women against Islamization (which is led by Anke Van dermeersch from Vlaams 
Belang), and Petr Mach, an MEP for the Czech Party of Free Citizens (Strana 
svobodných občanů). 
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Conducting the Interviews 
Of the nine interviews, five were carried out face-to-face (one of these by another 
person than me), while the remaining four were conducted via Skype. I carried out 
three interviews in Copenhagen (with GI Denmark, For Freedom, and Ingrid 
Carlqvist). The remaining two took place in the Czech Republic, one by me and a 
translator (with GI Czech Republic), and one by a Czech research assistant (with a 
Dawn representative), as I did not have the ability to go there myself at the time that 
suited the respondent.  
Setting aside my own personal political convictions, my approach to the interview 
was to “work with the respondent as a partner in the production of useful material” 
(Weiss as cited in Maxwell 2013: 91). I thus attempted not to react too strongly to 
statements with which I did not agree, and instead uphold a more ‘objective’ 
demeanour throughout. This generally did not pose a very big problem for me, as most 
of the questions were not of a ‘controversial’ nature in terms of expressing e.g. racist 
or otherwise offensive statements, yet, there were, of course, exceptions throughout.  
Notwithstanding the interview setting (whether Skype or face-to-face), it was 
surprisingly easy to gain rapport with the respondents, whose organization was a 
member of, or liaised to, Fortress Europe, as all of the five respondents were very 
open, and not scared of speaking freely, also in terms of making radical or extreme 
remarks. Oppositely, all of the respondents from Generation Identity were much more 
cautious, and did not express themselves in radical terms, nor reveal much about their 
strategies. In general, the GI members had a much more professional approach to the 
interview situation, and it quickly became apparent that this was a discipline they had 
been schooled to master (something which correlates with the focus on this issue by 
Les Identitaires, particularly in their Summer Universities) (for more on this, see 
Chapter 8). One clear indication of this professionalism was the fact that they 
frequently responded rather evasively, but they also gave different answers from each 
other to certain questions I posed, especially regarding their networking activities. As 
Beyers and colleagues (2014) argue, “variation in how actors view a particular case 
can be informative” (2014: 178), and this indicates that I had to be particularly 
cautious using these answers for my analysis.  
Skype Interviews as Interview Format: Gaining Rapport (?) 
I employed Skype as the interview ‘setting’ for four of the interviews, both due to 
time and financial constraints. It is a somewhat controversial scholarly question 
whether or not Skype interviews are an appropriate interview setting, especially when 
it comes to the question of gaining trust and rapport (see e.g. Deakin & Wakefield 
2013 for a discussion). In general, to gain rapport, or at least “to motivate and convince 
the respondents to cooperate,” is often one of the hardest things to obtain in any 
interview setting (Beyers et al. 2014: 184). Yet, for Skype, this is even more the case. 
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Rowley has argued that for “telephone and Skype interviews […] something of the 
rapport and richness of the interaction may be lost” (Rowley as cited in Lo Iacono et 
al. 2016: 10). However, as stated above, the interview setting did not seem to influence 
the responses in a noticeable way. 
Language Limitations  
Just as the collection of online data caused some problems in terms of language, so 
did the interviews. While I conducted the interviews with the Danish respondents in 
Danish (my mother tongue), I gave the other respondents the option of either speaking 
their native language (with a translator) or English. The spokespersons from GI Italy 
and GI Germany plus Ingrid Carlqvist opted for speaking English. The remaining 
interview subjects opted for their mother tongues, or in the case of Wagensveld from 
PEGIDA Netherlands, German, a language I speak proficiently well to conduct the 
interview myself, albeit not as good as English. I utilised a simultaneous translator for 
the interviews with Riposte Laïque and GI Czech Republic, while solely a native 
Czech speaker carried out the Czech interview with Dawn. Due to the more limited 
knowledge of the research field by this interviewer, the follow-up questions lacked 
from the Dawn interview, which to some extent affected its quality.  
While the language limitations did cause a few issues in terms of the quality of the 
interviews, overall, it was not a major problem, also not in terms of the utility of the 
responses for my research purposes. 
Coding the Interview Transcripts  
The interviews were conducted at various points in the years 2017-2018 (see 
Interview Overview on Table 2.8), i.e. at the same time as the online data-extraction 
and coding took place. For the interviews, I took the following steps upon receiving a 
positive reply to an interview request: I first created an individualised interview guide, 
appropriated to the given group, leader, and country context. Then I conducted the 
interview and transcribed it afterwards. This was followed by the actual analytical 
procedures, where I first read through the transcript, while simultaneously marking 
useful passages, plus noting down analytical points to be made based on the interview 
statements and the outlined theoretical framework (see Chapter 3). I then coded these 
analytical points according to the topics, they considered, such as ‘collective action’, 
‘transnational cooperation’, ‘view on Europe’, ‘view on the EU’, and etcetera. In the 
final step, the quotes were added to the analysis.  
SECONDARY SOURCES   
The secondary sources were mainly collected to obtain more information about the 
national political, socetial, economic, historical, and demographic contexts, 
background information about the far right mobilizations under exploration, plus to 
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gather additional data about some of the protest events (especially when the primary 
data was limited). The data is thus mainly required in order to cross-check and 
interpret the evidence obtained through both the interviews, but particularly the 
website and Facebook data, and in this way ensure the reliability of the conclusions 
drawn on their basis (Beyers et al. 2014).  
The data consists of two distinct types, namely expert interviews and written sources. 
The experts contacted consist of researchers, who have studied some of the national 
far right groups, while the document material is in the form of:  
 Newspaper articles (from both mainstream and far right sources) 
 Reports by anti-racism and anti-Fascist actors 
 Governmental reports  
 Scholarly literature on the distinct groups 
News Articles (From Newspapers, Online Media Portals, and Blogs)  
The inclusion of newspaper articles is mainly for background purposes in relation to 
the actors’ larger protest events (number of participants, counter-demonstrations, 
etcetera), and the political context in which they take place. Due to the, at times, local 
nature of certain events or actors, it was deemed impractical, if not to say impossible, 
to only focus on one to two national newspapers from each country. Instead, Google 
searches were employed in order to find valid sources, including both mainstream 
newspapers (like The Guardian and Der Standard) and far-right media outlets (such 
as Breitbart, Compact!, NovoPress, PI-News, etcetera) and blogs (such as Gates of 
Vienna). While one could argue that using far right media outlets infers bias, the 
accounts of far right protest actions and gatherings was usually much more focused 
on the protest organizers’ reasons for the protest, while mainstream media tended to 
mainly describe the protest setting, such as the size of the counter-protest, the 
(potential) level of violence, police arrests, etcetera. The more loosely based search 
method of course has implications for the replicability of this research, just as one can 
discuss the validity and reliability of these sources. Yet, it was deemed the most 
suitable approach in order to develop as detailed a data set as possible.    
Reports by Anti-Racist and -Fascist NGOs and CSOs 
The use of this type of data is a rather contested issue. It is far from all researchers 
who find these reports reliable, due to the inherent antagonist relationship between 
NGOs and CSOs advocating against racism and fascism and far right anti-Islam and 
–immigration actors. Yet, these reports are rather valuable in terms of gaining 
background information about the members of the groups (and their political 
pathways), the groups’ consolidation periods, the counter-mobilization, etcetera, 
which was used as supplementary data for the analysis.  
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Several of these organizations also produce annual reports, which include data on 
protests by the studied actors. I have used data from the Dutch group Kafka, which 
reported on PEGIDA Netherlands and the Dutch Defence League in the period under 
investigation, just as Willem Wagenaar from the Anne Frank Foundation has written 
several annual reports on the Dutch far right scene. These accounts were very useful, 
due to the problems retrieving data on PEGIDA Netherlands’ protest events from the 
group’s own published data. Other examples include the Polish Never Again!44, the 
Danish Redox, the Austrian Documentation Centre of Austrian Resistance (DOEW), 
the British HopeNotHate, German Antifa reports, and Expo from Sweden. Moreover, 
the annual ‘European Islamophobia Report’45 published since 2015 by the Turkish 
think-tank the Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA) and 
edited by Enes Bayraklı and Farid Hafez, was also used to a more limited extent. 
Governmental and State Agency Reports 
Moreover, I also retrieved reports from governmental agencies in Germany, Austria, 
and the Czech Republic, for similar purposes as the ones outlined above. This involves 
the German and Austrian Federal Offices for the Protection of the Constitution 
(Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz) (regional and national reports on the groups under 
observation, i.e. data on GI Austria, PEGIDA Austria, plus GI Germany and PEGIDA 
Germany). Moreover, the Czech Ministry of the Interior’s annual reports on right-
wing extremism in the Czech Republic was also utilized (it includes data on BPI, 
IVČRN, Dawn, and GI Czech Republic).  
Scholarly Literature on the Distinct Groups 
Finally, I have also made use of available scholarly literature on the groups. There is 
a great difference in the amount of research on the different organizations. While 
PEGIDA Germany, PEGIDA UK, Tommy Robinson, GI France, GI Austria, and GI 
Germany have received a lot of scholarly attention since around 2014, most of the 
other actors have not been so extensively covered. 
Expert Interviews with Far Right Scholars 
I have carried out several expert interviews throughout the research period in order to 
heighten the reliability of my conclusions. This was mainly due to the importance of 
the various national contexts in order to understand the actions and frames of the 
national groups, both in terms of (geo-)political and historical contexts, political 
opportunities, etcetera, which inferred a deep knowledge about the domestic settings. 
                                                          
44 Rafał Pankowski, who has written rather extensively on the Polish far right (see e.g. 
Pankowski & Kormak 2013), directs the research. 
45 The report consists of European country-reports from 33 states, written by scholars and 
observers from the given countries.  
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Moreover, the expert interviews were also used as a means to learn more about the 
distinct groups’ views on the transnational coalitions and their transnational links with 
fellow far right actors more generally (e.g. the Polish National Movement and its 
relationship to Jobbik versus the other groups in Fortress Europe).  
These interviews were either conducted in writing (via e-mail), through Skype, or 
face-to-face, and mainly considered the political context and position of the given 
group in the national political system (for instance, the rise of EKRE in Estonia in the 
period under investigation), plus their transnational relations. I also conducted two 
expert interviews with scholars, who have researched the EU-institutional setting 
(Ruzza and de Bruycker) and who both confirmed my assumption that far-right extra-
parliamentary actors would have very limited access to any of the EU-institutions, and 
thus, were highly unlikely to Europeanize their contention through these settings. 
Table 2.9: List of expert interviews with scholars studying the European far right. 
Expert Country Topics discussed 
Iskander de Bruycker 
Assistant Profesor 
Maastricht University, 
the Netherlands 
EU-level The European Parliament and far 
right access to the institutions 
Carlo Ruzza  
Professor 
University of Trento, 
Italy  
Italy, EU-level Lega, the far right, and the EU 
Pietro Castelli Gattinara 
Assistant Professor 
University of Oslo, 
Norway 
Italy Generazione Identitaria and the 
Italian far right scene 
Alena Kluknevská 
Researcher  
Masaryk University, 
Czech Republic 
Czech Republic BPI and Dawn 
Vendula Prokupkova, 
PhD Fellow 
Charles University in 
Prague  
Czech Republic 
Czech Republic PEGIDA Germany, Dawn, 
IVČRN, and BPI 
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Miloš Dlouhý  
Researcher 
University of 
Economics Prague, 
Czech Republic 
Czech Republic GI Czech Republic 
Ralf Melzer 
Researcher 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung  
Germany 
Germany German far right scene (PEGIDA 
Germany and GI Germany, plus 
transnational relations) 
Bernhard Weidinger 
Researcher 
Documentation Centre 
of Austrian Resistance, 
DÖW, Austria 
Austria Austrian far right scene and GI 
Austria (and relation to German 
far right) 
Étienne Pingaud  
Post-doc  
EHESS-Ecole des 
hautes études en 
sciences sociales, 
France 
France Bloc Identitaire and Riposte 
Laïque 
Konrad Jajecznik 
Independent researcher 
Poland 
Poland National Movement (Ruch 
Narodowy) and Polish far right 
Andres Kasekamp 
Professor  
University of Toronto 
Canada 
Estonia EKRE, NGO ISIS and the 
Estonian far right 
Louis Wierenga  
PhD fellow  
University of Tartu 
Estonia 
Estonia Generation Identity, Fortress 
Europe, Kaljuste, and Kirsberg 
Jasper Muis 
Assistant professor 
Vrije Universiteit 
Amsterdam  
The Netherlands 
The Netherlands PEGIDA Netherlands and Dutch 
far right scene 
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These interviews all provided me with more in depth knowledge about the different 
contexts of far right agitation. They were particularly beneficial in terms of obtaining 
the ‘larger picture’ of the role and position of the groups in their respective national 
settings, plus their historical focus points and transnational relations. For instance, it 
was only through the interview with Jasper Muis that I got a more thorough 
understanding of the Dutch context and the limited role of the extra-parliamentary far 
right actors in this particular setting, plus the composition of the scene. Moreover, 
these interviews were also used in order to either de- or confirm my findings up until 
that stage about the role of the transnational relations for the different actors and the 
POS and DOS in the different national contexts.   
Secondary Data Sources for Eliciting the Political and Discursive Opportunities 
As the later Theoretical Framework will explain further, the political and discursive 
opportunities and the degrees of openness at the EU and domestic levels are expected 
to play a central role in terms of a distinct group’s Europeanization strategy. In order 
to elicit whether the EU and domestic political systems and discursive opportunities 
are ‘open’ or ‘closed’ for the far right actors, I needed information on the EU and the 
MS’ institutional and societal settings. The political opportunities at the EU-level 
consider the different European institutions and the access opportunities for civil 
societal organizations, both in terms of lobbying and protest actions. I identified these 
opportunities based on prior research (particularly Caiani & Graziano 2018; della 
Porta & Caiani 2009), plus expert interviews with scholars, who have studied the EU-
level and civil societal organizations (CSOs) (Carlo Ruzza and Iskander de Bruycker).  
The POS at the domestic level consider aspects such as whether the states are strong 
or weak, the access opportunities for extra-parliamentary actors to the decision-
makers, the far right’s elite allies, the levels of repression (de- or certification), the 
strength of the national far right party, plus the relationship to a given country’s 
(potential) authoritarian past (see Chapter 3). I deduced this information through the 
expert interviews, plus in country reports on the far right, both from official (state 
authorities) and public sources (such as journal articles and other types of research 
reports). The discursive opportunities focus on the (changing) attitudes on refugees 
and third-country immigration of the media, public opinion, and the mainstream 
parties. These were established through existing analyses of the media’s portrayal of 
the migrants before and during the 2015-2017 period, from Eurobarometer and other 
public opinion polls, and from newspaper articles and scholarly research, which 
considered the (changing) opinions of the mainstream parties.  
In summary, the data collection has provided me with a rich data set consisting of 
long-term (online) observation and extensive interviews, providing me with detailed 
and varied sources that give a rather full and revealing picture of what is going on. 
Nevertheless, in many important ways, my research remains a ‘comparison at a 
distance’ (Hassenteufel as cited in Salgado 2014), referring to “comparative studies 
EUROPEANIZATION OF THE FAR RIGHT 
92
 
based exclusively on secondary literature, Internet websites and data that are not 
directly collected from the field by the researcher” (Ibid: 11). I did not carry out 
explicit fieldwork, and I rely on website data and secondary literature. However, by 
conducting (a small number of) interviews with movement leaders and expert 
interviews with researchers from across Europe, I aim to diminish the ‘distance’ in 
terms of context knowledge.  
 LIMITATIONS  
Meso-Level Focus, Excluding Micro-Level Accounts 
As I consider the transnational cooperation of numerous European far-right groups 
from across the continent, I had to delimit the data collected for each group, in order 
to make the research feasible and possible to conduct. Hence, whilst it would arguably 
be more convincing to include individual activists’ accounts of the transnational 
cooperation and views on Europe, in terms of exploring the cognitive aspects of 
Europeanization, plus the extent to which the groups truly transnationalize, (see e.g. 
della Porta & Caiani 2009), this is not this study’s research strategy. This decision 
was both based on the extensive breadth of the research in terms of countries and 
organizations involved, but mainly because the relevance and priority in terms of 
answering the research question was placed elsewhere.  
In a similar vein, I could also have carried out an overt or covert participant 
observation of either one of the national groups or the transnational coalition as such 
(by joining meetings, etc.). While on the one hand, this could have given me more in 
depth information about specific situations and events, on the other, it would also have 
inferred a different, and narrower, research question. Additionally, I also object to the 
covert approach from an ethical perspective. Hence, as I wanted to include as many 
European groups as possible, and a more transnational perspective, I decided against 
such approaches, and instead placed the focus on the meso-level of the organizations. 
Another limitation consists of the extent to which I analysed the online relations 
between the groups. While an online network analysis could have added valuable 
information to the analysis of the groups’ transnational coalitions, I decided not to 
include it in the analysis, as it is not within the scope of the Europeanization theories 
into which I wished to write this study. However, more analytical work on the role of 
the online profiles and websites for the transnational relations could have given more 
encompassing knowledge about the networking between the different groups.  
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REFLECTIONS ON BIAS AND OBJECTIVITY  
Following Blee’s (2002) example from her research on the Ku Klux Klan, I also briefly 
wish to discuss and “acknowledge the myriad ways” my “personal li[fe] and emotions 
are intertwined with who, what, and how” I study (2003: 22). Scholars studying the 
far right frequently do not discuss this aspect of the research. I find this quite 
problematic, as it may both have certain repercussions on the objectivity of the 
researcher and thus, the study, just as it might be beneficial for other scholars to read, 
in order to be somewhat prepared for the research endeavour and/or to read about 
other’s (potentially similar) experiences.  
Most scholars I have met, who study the far right are (or at least appear to be) of a 
different political persuasion than their research objects. This is also the case for 
myself, as I politically am considerably more to the left on the political spectrum. 
From the outset of this research, I very consciously worked towards obeying the 
demands for scholarly objectivity and neutrality, despite my disagreement with the 
groups’ statements and actions. This is an approach, I believe I have maintained 
throughout in my writing, despite struggling with the material on a more 
psychological/emotional level. For one, during some of the interviews, it was rather 
difficult not to react negatively upon some of the statements from the interview 
respondents. Yet, seeing as it was not my goal to confront them regarding their 
viewpoints, which I knew from the outset that I would disagree with, it became my 
strategy to simply ‘let it slide’, and move on to other topics. 
Moreover, during the frame coding process, where for a longer period, I was 
constantly reading the gathered primary sources, I found myself going through various 
‘waves’ of confusion and emotional distress. I both found myself angry and repulsed 
by the statements and disillusioned by society and the right-wing turn, but I was also 
at times not able to see clearly through the frames, and developed a sort of ‘sporadic 
paranoia’, due to their emotional appeals. This was particularly the case when 
constantly being exposed to the groups’ framing of the ‘terrorist threat’ posed by 
Muslim Jihadists and the very explicit images of sites targeted by said actors. 
Combined with media articles with a negative spin on migrants, plus my ‘following’ 
of far right Facebook groups and comments sections, this was a very difficult period 
of the research. In fact, I am even struggling to write these words because the 
emotional effect was quite frightening. However, it taught me a lot about how ‘echo 
chambers’ work, and in this sense provided a kind of ‘intel’ on the mechanisms 
involved, while at the same time teaching me a lot about how best to study the research 
objects.  
In terms of research strategies to ‘escape the bubble,’ I decided to code the data in 
smaller doses/sections, and generally refrain from solely reading far right sources 
and/or negative statements about immigrants and refugees. Moreover, it also helped a 
lot to discuss the emotional effects with fellow social movement scholars and friends.  
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CHAPTER 3. THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
Having now outlined the methodological framework in the preceding chapter, the 
following explains the theoretical framework, which guides the analysis of how the 
national groups and actors making up the two transnational coalitions Fortress Europe 
and Generation Identity have Europeanized their mobilizations. The analysis 
considers the individual extra-parliamentary groups’ developments over time, from 
their mobilization in their respective national settings to their involvement in a 
transnational network, plus their protest strategies in the same period. The theoretical 
framework focuses on their Europeanization. This includes the strategic and 
organizational deliberations involved in terms of: gaining influence and/or resonance 
at the national and/or European level (largely depending on the perceived political and 
discursive opportunities and their material and symbolic resources); the creation and 
maintenance of coalitions at the transnational level; and the groups’ (potential) 
construction of European collective identities.  
With the growing scholarly attention to the Europeanization of social movements and 
civil societal organizations (CSOs) (see e.g. Imig & Tarrow 2000; 2001a; Rucht 2002; 
della Porta & Caiani 2009), the knowledge of extra-parliamentary actors’ strategies at 
the EU level has vastly improved. Initially, social movement scholars assumed that 
protests targeted at the EU would mirror those directed at the national government. 
This was based on Tilly’s assertion that the nation-state historically has been, and 
continues to be, the main target for collective actors (see e.g. della Porta & Caiani 
2009). Hence, just as “national challengers” went up against the “national polity,” 
European challengers were “expected to emerge at the EU level” (Ibid: 13) acting 
independently from the national activists. Yet, so della Porta and Caiani’s (2009) 
argument continued, the reality appears to be slightly more complex, as the domestic 
actors are likely to wish to take advantage of all the multi-level opportunities offered 
them. Tarrow (1998), in fact, showed this several years earlier, where he, besides from 
establishing that the targeting of domestic authorities for domestic issues is still the 
prevalent means of protesting for national activists, also found that many collective 
actors develop other strategies to gain influence, both at the domestic and European 
level (Tarrow 1998; see also Hutter 2014a). Hence, over time, extra-parliamentary 
actors, such as social movements and CSOs, have developed multiple variegated 
strategies in their endeavour to navigate the multi-level polity, to a large extent 
dependent on their material and symbolic resources (della Porta & Caiani 2009; 
Monforte 2014).  
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Tarrow’s (1998) findings led to the development of a social movement 
Europeanization framework, which involves four distinct paths (Tarrow 2005). The 
first two relate to the national actors’ protest strategies, and their choices to either 1) 
domesticate the protest (i.e. take the European issues to the national level) or 2) 
externalize their contention (take the domestic issues to the European authorities, 
either through insider or outsider strategies) (Ibid.). Moreover, collective actors may 
also start networking with actors from other European countries, leading to 3) 
coalition building, and finally, the organization of 4) transnational protests of various 
forms (Ibid.). This framework was adopted and moderated by della Porta and Caiani 
(2009), who also explored the multi-level features of the EU. Their framework was 
based on assumptions about the actors’ material and symbolic resources, plus their 
political opportunities, making it possible to largely anticipate their strategies at the 
European level. Again adopting and adapting this model, in his exploration of French 
and German pro-asylum extra-parliamentary groups, Monforte (2014) argued that for 
contentious actors, the Europeanization process is “made up of three decisive (and 
intrinsically linked) stages, or steps” (2014: 24), namely the Europeanization of: 1) 
networks; 2) perceptions (or frames); and 3) collective action. This entails the 
expectation that actors undergoing Europeanization will construct:  
1) Border-crossing linkages with other like-minded actors;  
2) A common perception of the EU being a required target for their actions;  
3) Common collective actions towards the different power holders (Ibid.).  
Monforte’s (2014) three points will form the basis for the structure of the main part 
of the theoretical framework. Hence, drawing on predominantly social movement 
literature and considering Europeanization from a bottom-up perspective46, the 
framework is built up around the assumption that the national groups’ political and 
discursive opportunities at both the domestic, transnational, and EU level are 
determinate for their strategic choices. These opportunities thus play a vital role in 
explaining the groups’ Europeanization trajectories, in terms of both their 
development of “relationships with other domestic, European and transnational actors 
and arenas” (Bourne & Chatzopoulou 2015: 46), plus their more general protest 
activities. More particularly, the thesis will explain how the far right groups together 
(attempt to) construct a shared European space of anti-immigration and -Islam 
mobilization. At the same time, the thesis explores the role of the EU, especially the 
extent to which it is targeted by the far right groups, and how and whether they frame 
and instrumentalize it as an antagonistic construct around which to mobilize.  
                                                          
46 While the top-down perspective considers the “impact of EU integration on the domestic 
level,” often by considering the effect of EU policy frameworks on the EU MS, a bottom-up 
perspective instead has its starting point at the domestic level. It considers “actors, ideas, rules 
and styles and how they change through time” (Lynggaard as cited in Bourne & Chatzopoulou 
2015: 46), particularly with a focus on the role of the EU in that regard. 
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Overview of the Theoretical Framework Chapter 
The following sections will further elaborate on the various theoretical components 
of the Europeanization framework, starting with the political and discursive 
opportunity structures, which are important contextual features that help explain the 
various national groups’ mobilization strategies. These varied opportunities are 
predominantly nationally contingent and are, in many cases, determinate for a group’s 
mobilization success, or at least its options for manoeuvring (see e.g. Kriesi 2004). 
Moreover, prior research has also demonstrated that a groups’ material and symbolic 
resources influence its strategic options, both domestically (see e.g. Edwards & 
Gilham 2013), and regarding EU-level mobilization (see e.g. della Porta & Caiani 
2009). In short, resource mobilization theory postulates that the more resources a 
social movement can muster or mobilize, the better options for initiating and 
maintaining a mobilization, plus recruiting activists (see e.g. McCarthy & Zald 1977). 
In terms of Europeanization, prior research has also shown that it is mainly resource-
strong extra-parliamentary groups and actors, which approach the EU institutions (see 
e.g. della Porta & Caiani 2009), making it a prerequisite for certain Europeanization 
strategies. In this way, the POS and DOS plus material and symbolic resources act as 
the independent variables that influence the Europeanization paths (i.e. the dependent 
variables) of the domestic groups.  
The ensuing section closely relates to these opportunities, as it considers the 
theoretical output on far right mobilization more broadly, plus the expectations 
regarding ‘Europeanized’ mobilization and protest strategies. This section introduces 
the various Europeanization paths and strategies available for extra-parliamentary 
actors (see e.g. Tarrow 2005), and it explains which types of actors are most likely to 
pursue which path, and the role of material and symbolic resources in this regard. 
Moreover, the section also explains how the scopes of the targets, participants, events, 
and issues can be employed to deduce a given actor’s type of collective action 
Europeanization. The section is followed by an outline of the literature that will be 
utilised to explore the Europeanization of networks. It considers the actors’ strategic 
deliberations before and during the setting up of a transnational coalition with other 
European actors. The section largely draws on social movement (transnational) 
coalition theories. Finally, the last section introduces the concept of ‘frames’, and two 
of the main social movement research variants, namely ‘collective action frames’ and 
‘collective identity frames’ (see e.g. Snow & Benford 1988; Benford & Snow 2000). 
Collective action frames will be employed to explore the domestic groups’ initial 
perceptions and argumentation style (as part of their symbolic resources), which can 
partly explain their likely/expected Europeanization paths (see Chapter 5), plus the 
groups’ viewpoints in comparison with their coalition-partners, in order to evaluate 
their value homophily (see Chapters 8-9). Hence, unlike certain other studies of social 
movement Europeanization (see e.g. Monforte 2014; della Porta & Caiani 2009), the 
interest here is not so much in exploring the development of the frames depending on 
the political level addressed (i.e. whether the framing of claims change if/when a 
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collective actor targets the EU or other European actors). Instead, frame analysis is 
rather used as a means to establish the mobilizing frames of the various groups, as 
part of the exploration of their Europeanization strategies in terms of both collective 
action and coalition building. The ‘collective identity frames’ will consider the 
(potential) construction of a European collective identity between the coalition 
partners, by exploring whether and how the different leaders and movement 
entrepreneurs (attempt to) develop a sense of solidarity and unity across the European 
borders. In this way, the Europeanization of frames closely relates to the actors’ 
transnational networking.  
The final section combines all three Europeanization components (framing, collective 
action, and networking) in one overarching theoretical framework, which will guide 
the ensuing analysis. As already briefly alluded to, this framework holds the POS and 
DOS, and the material and symbolic resources as determinate for a national groups’ 
Europeanization strategy, both in terms of collective action and coalition building. It 
is thus the availability of certain (perceived) opportunities and resources, which is 
expected to proscribe a collective actor’s strategic choices.  
 POLITICAL AND DISCURSIVE OPPORTUNITIES 
Social movement scholars have developed a framework to explain “the emergence 
and course” of collective actors’ mobilization, while at the same time “embedding 
internal processes such as identity-building and issue-framing in the context in which 
they occur” (Milan 2013:15). This political opportunities framework considers the 
likely form and targets of a political actor’s mobilization activities and can help 
explain a given organization’s interaction with the decision-making level (Kriesi 
2004). The approach is most frequently employed to analyse extra-parliamentary 
actors’ interaction with the decision-makers, but scholars have also used it to analyse 
political parties’ opportunities (see e.g. Rydgren 2005).  
According to the political process model, which was introduced by McAdam in 1982, 
a political actor’s actions are contingent on its foundation (especially its mobilizing 
structures), its organization, available resources, and political and discursive 
opportunities. Without delving into all of these components here, as these are not the 
focus of the research, the following section instead concentrates on the framework’s 
key component, political opportunity structures (POS). Moreover, it also introduces 
the discursive opportunity structures (DOS), which were added subsequently by other 
scholars. POS’ main tenet is that the degree of open- or closedness of the political 
system is decisive for a given extra-parliamentary actor’s chances of emergence and 
political influence. The degree is thus expected to affect “people’s expectations for 
success or failure” (Tarrow 1998: 77), and it thereby influences the organization and 
mobilization form of contention.  
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Defining ‘Political Opportunity Structures’ (POS) 
Peter Eisinger developed the political opportunities theory in the 1970s during his 
examination of protests in various American cities. He found that their form and extent 
were highly context-dependent (Meyer 2004). Kitschelt later similarly deduced that 
“political opportunity structures influence the choice of protest strategies and the 
impact of social movements on their environments” (as cited in Kriesi 2004: 3). The 
actors are thus argued to strategically pursue certain actions based on a cost and 
benefits analysis of the ‘means’ (resources) and ‘ends’ (goals) of such mobilization 
(Ibid.), plus the expected responses by the targeted authorities (either policy changes 
towards, or away from, movement goals, a mix of the two, or no response at all).  
The POS approach thus considers the (possible) openings in the political system, 
which the given actors can pursue in order to attain their goals. Most scholars agree 
that open(ing) channels of institutional access are conducive to ensuing protests, 
expressed in a moderate form (Kriesi 2004; see also Koopmans & Kriesi 1995). 
Conversely, more closed opportunities lead to more radical expressions of contention 
(McAdam 1996; Caiani et al. 2012). In his study, Eisinger, in fact, found that protests 
usually took place in settings with mixed opportunities (i.e. there was a curvilinear 
relationship between protests and opportunities), as a very open system already was 
on its way to reform, while a very closed setting would not permit mobilization (as 
cited in Kriesi 2004). 
Over time, scholars have outlined a whole range of facilitating and debilitating factors 
for actors’ political opportunities. In short, the political opportunities include 
“institutional and cultural variables as well as the structure of party competition” 
(Minkenberg 2015: 10). Yet, there is an on-going debate as to which exact factors 
must be included in order to evaluate the political opportunities for a given extra-
parliamentary actor, particularly those of a far right persuasion. On the one hand, there 
are the more stable factors. They include:  
 The political system and whether it is open or closed concerning access to 
the decision-making entities (e.g. regarding electoral thresholds, 
de/centralization, power configurations (separation of powers), 
majoritarian/consensus democracies, etcetera) (Kriesi 2004). As a rule of 
thumb, the stronger the state, the less likely that mobilization will be 
successful.   
 
 The levels of state repression (McAdam 1996). Depending on the domestic 
context and the type of collective actor and action, one can either expect the 
authorities to facilitate (through resources or moral support), not respond at 
all, or repress (through sanctions) the given collective action (Kriesi 2004). 
The levels of state repression are highly relevant to consider, when analysing 
far right contentious actors, as research shows that they are determining for 
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the composition and expression of far right activism in a given country (see 
e.g. Koopmans et al. 2005; Klandermans & Mayer 2006; Caiani et al. 2012; 
Caiani & Borri 2013). The repressive means can, for instance, include legal 
provisions against certain political organizations and expressions of racism 
and/or xenophobia, but also the inclusion or exclusion (stigmatisation) of far 
right groups in political deliberations (Caiani & della Porta 2018).  
 
 Dealings with an authoritarian past. Research into the POS for far right 
actors across Europe and the U.S. has revealed that cultural aspects related 
to the national historical context play an important role in terms of the 
strategies and action repertoires employed by the far right in said country 
(see e.g. Caiani et al. 2012; Klandermans & Mayer 2006). This particularly 
involves countries with an authoritarian past, e.g. experiences with Fascism 
or Nazism. In these cases, it is particularly relevant to consider the country’s 
(non-)dealing with these ideologies and adherents post-WWII, and how this 
affects the reception of far right claims in the given country today47 (see e.g. 
Klandermans & Mayer 2006; Mudde 2007).  
On the other hand, there are also more dynamic (i.e. less stable and possibly changing) 
factors, which have shown to be important for far right mobilization. They include: 
 The views of (potential) allies and opponents. The relationship between 
the given group and its allies and adversaries is highly important in relation 
to its chances of success. Such allies are particularly important in terms of 
(potential) repression, especially if the allies are influential in the decision-
making process (Caiani & della Porta 2018). Hence, researchers have found 
that particularly the political leaning of a state’s governing party is either 
conducive or dissuasive for certain political expression types, as it has a key 
position in terms of instigating state repression (Ibid.). Other types of allies 
considered determinant for social movements more generally include 
“policymakers, public authorities, parties, interest groups, the media, related 
movements,” etcetera. (Kriesi 2004: 5). For far right actors, particularly the 
attitudes of institutional actors, such as moderate right-wing parties are 
important for the (potential) mobilization. They can either ‘certify’ the given 
group’s viewpoints, and thereby add legitimacy to the cause, or ‘decertify’ 
the group, either explicitly (by proscribing it, or its activities), or implicitly 
(by ignoring it and its statements) (see also Gupta 2008: 65). These alliance 
                                                          
47 Some of the most prominent examples in this regard involve Germany and Italy, which were 
both under authoritarian dictatorships during WWII, but whose national treatment of these 
actors in the aftermath have differed greatly. In Germany, there is a rather broad societal 
consensus around the stigmatisation of (neo-)Nazis and racist expressions (Caiani et al. 2012), 
while in Italy, nostalgic expressions for the fascist past are still voiced at the political level 
(Chiarini 2013).  
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structures are likely to change after elections, where new contenders 
(potentially) gain seats and governmental positions, and thus, change the 
available political opportunities (Kriesi 2004).  
 
 Allies at the extra-parliamentary level: The far right groups may also look 
for allies in the domestic subcultural milieu. A strong social network with 
other domestic extra-parliamentary actors has been found to play a vital role 
for the groups’ organization and mobilization potential, especially 
concerning recruitment purposes (Caiani & della Porta 2018; see also 
Berntzen & Weisskircher 2016). Moreover, the ‘certification’ of the given 
group by (other) domestic far right subcultural actors, such as hooligans, 
student association members, etcetera (Ibid.) is also crucial in order to keep 
hostility and competition at bay. Conversely, the strength of an actor’s 
opponents, such as the public authorities or other actors, who may carry out 
suppressive acts (including counter-movements), can become decisive for 
the outcome of said actor’s mobilization (Kriesi 2004).    
All of these factors in various ways influence the deliberations and mobilization 
strategies of collective actors, depending on their goals and ambitions. Moreover, as 
the following section will show, the electoral gains of far right parties also influence 
the mobilization of Western European far right extra-parliamentary actors.  
The Western vs. Eastern European Interplay between Far Right Non- and Institutional 
Actors  
In the Western European context, far right scholarship has shown that the political 
opportunities affect which far right actors are most prominent in a given country, both 
in terms of their organization type and ideological proclivity (see e.g. Minkenberg 
2015). Koopmans and colleagues (2005) has argued that a strong far right party in a 
given country would act as an inhibition for far right subgroups, as the space for 
manoeuvring already was occupied, and the party would thereby ‘crowd out’ the 
subcultural actors. This theory has been corroborated by Hutter (2014a), and as 
Minkenberg (2018) convincingly argues, it still holds true for the Western European 
far right scene, where strong radical right (i.e. ethno-centrist, not fascist) parties 
prohibit strong street mobilisation and vice versa, if no strong party is present (2018: 
9). In this sense, “the availability of sufficient ‘political space’ predicts a strong radical 
right party, but at the same time a weak social movement” (Caiani 2017: 7), which 
also tends to utilize a more moderate action repertoire (Koopmans et al. 2005). On the 
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other hand, a closed political space will lead to radicalization48, both at the party and 
extra-parliamentary level. This was, for instance, exemplified in Sweden, Germany, 
and the UK in 2014. The (most successful) far right parties (at the time) all belonged 
to the more extreme right (Sweden Democrats, the German National Democratic 
Party (NPD), and the British National Party (BNP)) and were acting alongside a very 
active extra-parliamentary extreme right scene (Minkenberg 2015; see also Caiani et 
al. 2012). Conversely, the strong electoral position of the Danish People’s Party in 
Denmark entails a rather insignificant and moderate far right subcultural scene 
(Holmsted Larsen as cited in Ejsing 2017).  
The situation in Eastern Europe is very different. The German scholar Michael 
Minkenberg has written rather extensively on the subject of Eastern versus Western 
European far right mobilization. Some of his latest texts explore the various political 
opportunities in the two parts of Europe, where he explains that the relationship 
between parties and extra-parliamentary actors are rather different in Eastern Europe 
(Minkenberg 2015). While in a Western European country, the relationship between 
the strength of a party and a movement tends to be ‘hydraulic’ (i.e. strong/weak or 
vice versa), in Eastern Europe, they are usually equally strong (he uses the example 
of Jobbik and the Hungarian Guard in Hungary) (Minkenberg 2015). Furthermore, 
due to the configurations of the political system, the two types of actors can co-exist, 
and even cooperate, without any political repercussions, and the parties are more 
prone to see this cooperation as beneficial rather than a problem (Minkenberg 2018). 
The Western European radical right parties, on the other hand, are more hesitant to 
cooperate with far right movements due to the extra-parliamentary far right actors’ 
“extremism and uncontrollability”, which “more often than not” becomes “a liability 
rather than a resource” (Minkenberg 2018: 15).  
Hence, from this, one can deduce two expectations. For one, in Western European 
countries with a strong far right party, the extra-parliamentary far right actors will 
have difficulties attracting high numbers and acting forcefully, and they are unlikely 
to obtain an alliance with the given party. In Eastern Europe, on the other hand, the 
two types of organizations can have equally strong roles in their domestic settings, 
potentially mobilizing together. 
  
                                                          
48 In the literature, Daphi and Anderl (2016) argue that this ‘radicalization’ of contention is 
usually equated with the employment of violence. Yet, as they point out, this does not 
necessarily have to be the case. Instead, they define ‘radicalization’ as “a considerable move on 
a continuum from conventional towards more disruptive tactics, not necessarily including 
violence” (2016: 3). 
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Criticisms of the Political Opportunity Approach 
The political opportunity approach has received much criticism over the years, mainly 
due to the plethora of different interpretations of what constitutes an ‘opportunity,’ 
which “reduces its heuristic and theoretical values” (Kriesi 2004: 2; see also Gamson 
& Meyer 1996 for a critique). Yet, scholars have also criticized its focus on structural 
factors rather than e.g. movement identity (see e.g. Goodwin & Jasper 1999). 
Subcultural, and thus, more ‘identity-based’, far right actors are, for example, argued 
to be neither focused nor dependent on these political and discursive opportunities to 
a high extent when mobilising due to their more general ambitions of changing society 
rather than specific policies (Goodwin & Jasper 1999). As Kriesi (2004) states, “Such 
movements will have a greater degree of autonomy from the political context and thus 
be less adequately explained” by the political process approach (2004: 7). Hence, even 
though these political opportunities might exist (be ‘open’), this does not 
automatically entail that a given actor mobilizes, just as closed opportunities do not 
necessarily dissuade all contentious actors from mobilizing. Yet, despite the rather 
profound criticism of the approach, there are certain factors, which most research on 
far right extra-parliamentary actors has found to be determining for their mobilization 
and its outcome. This involves the levels of repression, de- and legitimisation by the 
elites, the reception by the subcultural milieu, and their countries’ dealings with the 
authoritarian past (Caiani & della Porta 2018; Klandermans & Mayer 2006). 
Defining Discursive Opportunity Structures 
In a similar vein of critique as the ones cited above, the POS approach implicitly 
expects that the given actor must first be aware of, and believe in the opportunities, in 
order to exploit them (Elster as cited in Kriesi 2004). Yet, in their study of extreme 
right violence in Germany, Koopmans and Olzak (2004) argued that “Most people, 
including most activists, are not full-time political analysts who closely follow and 
gather independent information on what is going on in the corridors of power, and 
who have an intimate knowledge of the institutional intricacies of the political system” 
(2004: 201). They instead gather much of their knowledge from the media and 
consider the (possible) societal reception of their actions before and during the 
instigation of protest actions (Ibid.). In order to accommodate for these eventualities 
of non-consideration of the political opportunities, plus to consider the role of 
discourses for mobilization, the framework also includes Discursive Opportunity 
Structures as an explanatory factor for the groups’ mobilization. 
Koopmans and Statham (1999a) introduced the ‘discursive opportunity structure’ 
(DOS) concept, which, in short, refers to opportunities that “determine what kind of 
ideas become visible for the public, resonate with public opinion and are held to be 
‘legitimate’ by the audience” (Kriesi 2004: 229; for a literature review on the concept, 
see McCammon 2013). The concept synthesises framing and POS and brings in more 
cultural elements to the exploration of opportunities (McCammon 2013). Koopmans 
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and Olzak (2004) define these discursive opportunities as “the aspects of the public 
discourse that determine a message’s chances of diffusion in the public sphere” (2004: 
202). They are determined by examining “the political conditions under which 
specific discourse become imaginable” (Koopmans & Duyvendak as cited in Bröer & 
Duyvendak 2009: 338). 
Similar to the POS, it can be quite hard to pin down both the definition and inclusion 
of factors for the exploration of DOS (see e.g. McCammon 2013). Yet, the discursive 
opportunities can help ‘foresee’ or predict the political and societal reception of the 
given collective actors’ employment of specific frames. Scholars have identified 
mainstream parties, the media, and public opinion as particularly important in terms 
of the particular public discourses to which the given frames need to speak. The 
following section will briefly outline why this is the case. 
 Mainstream parties: The discourses of the mainstream parties, and more 
generally, the national political elites, strongly influence whether or not a 
collective actor will mobilize successfully (Koopmans & Statham 2010). In 
terms of far right mobilization, Koopmans and colleagues (2005) found that 
the mainstream parties’ policy positions “on issues pertaining to immigration 
and ethnic relations” is “a crucial determinant” of far right success, as the far 
right claims relate to those made by the other parties in a competitive 
institutional setting (2005: 182). Moreover, prior research conducted by 
Koopmans (1996) also revealed that when the political elite discussed 
migrants and asylum seekers as a social problem, racist attacks tended to rise, 
due to the opening of discursive opportunities. 
 
 Media: As it is from the media, that most people draw their political 
knowledge and therefrom opinions, the media is one of the key sites for the 
development of main discourses within a given society’s public arena 
(Koopmans & Olzak 2004). It is thus important for a collective actor to 
‘speak to’ this discourse in order to gain wider visibility and resonance 
(McCammon 2013). Moreover, Koopmans and Olzak (2004) also emphasize 
the role of editors and journalists in terms of giving ‘visibility’ to a given 
public message. Hence, by e.g. placing a news story on the front page, plus 
continuously focusing on a specific issue, these actors play a great role in 
determining the topics of discussion amongst their readerships, and thus, the 
diffusion of the message at the public level (Ibid.). 
 
 Public opinion: While collective actors often mainly address political 
institutions, they also speak to public opinion foremost in order to attract 
attention to their cause (i.e. visibility), but also to foster a broader appeal of 
their claims by attempting to gain resonance. ‘Resonance’ refers to the 
provocation of “reactions from other actors in the public sphere,” inferring a 
communicative impact of the claims, thus leading to their societal spread 
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through various responses (Koopmans & Olzak 2004: 204). It is particularly 
beneficial if these responses are affirmative or positive (i.e. consonant), yet, 
even a negative reception of the message is better than no response at all as 
it at least brings the topic into the public sphere (Ibid.). Hence, the ability of 
a given actor to speak to the “widespread beliefs and core values” within 
society is likely to further said actor’s resonance gains (McCammon 2013: 
1). Similarly, Rydgren (2005) argued that the diffusion of xenophobic 
worldviews at the societal level prescribes far right success, thus showing the 
potential in speaking to the public’s societal worries and concerns. 
A frame’s resonance can thus be based on the frame’s alignment with both the “pre‐
existing ideational elements” of said society (McCammon 2013: 1), but also the 
current saliency of a specific topic in the domestic discourse. In their exploration of 
the far right in five European countries, Giugni and colleagues (2005), for instance, 
considered the countries’ history of migration and migrants’ citizenship rights as 
determinant for the current far right scenes and their claims. In their analysis of the 
anti-TTIP campaign in six European countries, Caiani and Graziano (2018) 
considered the present views on the deal as expressed by the governing parties, public 
opinion, and the media. In this way, certain scholars utilize the concept as a less stable 
factor, and consider shifts in these discursive opportunities over time, and how this 
may permit collective actors to gain resonance, and thus, success (see e.g. 
McCammon et al. 2007 as cited in McCammon 2013; Koopmans & Olzak 2004; 
Kasekamp et al. 2018; Caiani & Graziano 2018). This is also mainly how the concept 
will be employed for this thesis’ purposes, as it is the aim to consider the (potential) 
mobilization changes during the ‘refugee crisis,’ a period that both contained domestic 
and European differences of opinion, both at the political and public opinion level. 
This implies that the analysis will pay particular attention to the discourses and 
viewpoints of mainstream parties, the media, and public opinion on the given policy 
issue, and their potential changes over the three-year period under exploration. 
In order to analyse the role of the political and discursive opportunities, Koopmans 
and Statham (1999a) have devised a typology of a collective actor’s likely 
mobilization outcome. They expect that if both the POS and DOS are closed, the actor 
will obtain no support from, nor gain access to, the decision-makers. Where the DOS 
are open, but the POS are closed, the political elite is likely to take over the less 
contentious ideas, while excluding and/or repressing the claimant, which instead can 
“exert some influence on the public discourse” (1999a: 247). In the reverse situation, 
i.e. where the POS are open, but the DOS closed, the challenger will most likely be 
co-opted, but without necessarily achieving much in terms of policy changes. Finally, 
where both the POS and DOS are open, the challenger will be met with a full response, 
i.e. both access and concessions (1999: 248).  
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The political and discursive opportunities thus heavily influence the available 
strategical options for a collective actor, and in this way, act as an independent 
variable influencing the national group’s path of Europeanization (the dependent 
variable). This infers that the POS and DOS (may) affect the actors’ chosen collective 
action strategies, networks, and frames, even though, as already argued above, these 
actors may not always opt for the objectively apparent political or discursive 
opportunity (Poletta & Jasper 2001). The following sections will outline these three 
aspects, and consider them in a Europeanization perspective, with a focus on the 
influence of the political and discursive opportunities. Moreover, as explained above, 
a group’s material and symbolic resources are another key factor in terms of the 
group’s Europeanization (see e.g. della Porta & Caiani 2009). This aspect is also 
envisioned to play a crucial role in terms of the actors’ Europeanization strategies, 
particularly regarding the collective action Europeanization, but also in terms of the 
transnational coalition-membership. The resources’ roles will be introduced further 
below, but should also be considered an independent variable affecting the groups’ 
Europeanization. 
 EUROPEANIZATION OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: STRATEGIES 
AND PATHS 
In terms of collective action, Imig and Tarrow (2001a) hypothesised that the 
development of Europe into a polity would “sooner or later” infer that “ordinary 
citizens will turn their claims and their forms of contentious politics beyond their 
borders and toward this new level of governance” (2001a: 7-8). Europeanization 
theory thus expects that with the increased EU-level policy competences, collective 
actors would begin moving away from the purely domestic focus, and instead start 
both targeting the EU institutions with policy demands and constructing 
‘Europeanized’ identities (Caiani & Graziano 2018: 1032). Hence, the prior nation-
state focus of movements was expected to also appear at the EU-level, where 
European actors would start targeting the European polity, just as was the case at the 
national level, where national actors targeted the national decision-makers (della 
Porta & Caiani 2009). This expectation has to some extent been substantiated by 
empirical research, which has shown that while the nation-state still plays a strong 
role in terms of social movement claims-making, these actors are also increasingly 
turning towards the EU-level (Ibid.). The actors thus often employ multi-level 
strategies in an attempt to exploit the opportunities for ‘crossed influence’ at several 
political decision-making levels (see e.g. della Porta & Caiani 2009; Caiani & 
Graziano 2018). 
Europeanization theory thus posits that the shifting level of decision-making (i.e. from 
the national to the EU-level) will lead national extra-parliamentary collective actors 
to target the new level of decision-making (Tarrow 1998). It considers whether and 
how collective actors change and moderate their protest strategies both as a reaction 
to, and in order to accommodate, the European integration process. This infers that it 
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is Europeanization analyses’ overarching aim to understand collective actors’ 
mobilization strategies in the multilevel political setting and to consider the European 
continent as “a movement space on its own terms” (Bourne & Chatzopoulou 2015: 
35). Concerning this particular study, it is the main aim of the collective action 
analysis to explore how and whether far right collective actors make use of the 
mobilization opportunities at the transnational and/or EU-level. This is done by 
analysing European far right collective action in a period where one of the far right’s 
key mobilizing issues (i.e. third-country immigration) was discussed in pan-European 
terms, i.e. during the ‘refugee crisis’. 
In order to develop an analytical framework to analyse such effects, the following 
theoretical framework draws on the scholarly literature on social movement collective 
action Europeanization. The literature posits that the collective actors’ 
Europeanization strategies largely depend on the different groups’ available POS and 
DOS, together with their symbolic and material resources (see e.g. della Porta & 
Caiani 2009). The section thus outlines the expected forms of Europeanization by first 
explaining the various Europeanization paths possible in terms of the scopes of protest 
targets, issues, participants, and events (Ibid.). These findings will be utilised to 
analyse the groups’ forms of Europeanization, which may either involve 
‘domestication,’ ‘externalization,’ or ‘transnational contention,’ either in the form of 
‘transnational pressure’ or ‘supranationalization’ (these concepts will be explained 
further below). 
The initial section will first briefly consider prior findings regarding far right extra-
parliamentary actors’ protest repertoires more broadly and their protest strategies, in 
order to further underline the relevance of employing social movement 
Europeanization theories on this particular type of actors. This is followed by an 
outline of the theoretical expectations regarding the forms of Europeanization of 
contention, drawn from social movement Europeanization literature.  
Far Right Protest Repertoires: Protests as Policy-Expression and as Intra-Group 
Unifier 
Protests play an important role for many extra-parliamentary political actors (mainly 
social movements) as they offer a possibility to exert direct political pressure on 
adversaries, and attract attention to a cause through the public display of discontent, 
(potentially) leading to media exposure. This is also the case for several European 
radical and extreme right extra-parliamentary actors. Yet, until the early 2010s, the 
dominant research focus on far right mobilization tended to be placed on the extreme 
right’s violent action repertoires49. However, in 2012, Caiani and colleagues (2012) 
                                                          
49 This has led to several studies on anti-immigrant/minority and anti-left violent mobilization 
(e.g. Merkl 2004; Schlembach 2011), but also football hooligans across Europe, who often 
belong to the extreme right (see e.g. Garland & Rowe 2001). 
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conducted a more encompassing protest event analysis of various American, Italian, 
and German groups’ activities, based on newspaper sources. The analysis revealed 
that the groups make use of a highly varied portfolio of action repertoires, depending 
on both the type of group but also the available opportunity structures in the given 
countries.  
According to Tilly, the ‘repertoire of contention’ refers to “[t]he whole set of means 
(a group) has for making claims of different kinds on different individuals or groups” 
(as cited in della Porta 2013b: 1). Similar to left-wing movements, the far right 
repertoires involve both policy contestation and symbolic actions. They range from 
conventional (such as lobbyism), to demonstrative (like demonstrations and petitions), 
confrontational (e.g. building occupations), and violent actions (such as attacks on 
political opponents). Moreover, the groups also frequently organize expressive events 
(such as concerts,50 conferences, and other cultural initiatives), in order to foster and 
sustain intra-group cohesion by providing meeting places and a social life to the actors 
(see e.g. Caiani et al. 2012; Caiani 2017; Merkl 2004; Simi & Futrell 2010).  
Research has also demonstrated that the organizational characteristics of a given far 
right group are important factors in terms of its strategic action repertoire. The more 
institutional format, the more moderate actions, and the more flexible structures, the 
more controversial types of actions (Koopmans et al. 2005: 187). Similarly, Caiani 
and Borri (2013) found that subcultural youth groups employed the most violent 
repertoires, while parties and political movements tend to employ more expressive, 
conventional, and demonstrative strategies. Moreover, the repertoires are also to a 
high extent dependent on the societal context and resonance (see e.g. Klare & Sturm 
2016 for the German context), plus the state and judicial regulations for 
mobilization51. Hence, in many senses, the far right mobilizes in rather similar ways 
as do other extra-parliamentary contentious actors. This infers that they can be 
analysed through a similar social movement lens (see e.g. Caiani et al. 2012), also in 
terms of Europeanization. 
                                                          
50 These types of activities particularly relate to the U.S. White Power movement and European 
neo-Nazi Skinheads (Merkl 2004), but also to neo-Fascists, such as Bloc Identitaire and 
CasaPound (see e.g. Froio & Castelli Gattinara 2015). 
51 One has to keep in mind that due to the contentious nature of their protest events, many far 
right activists are likely to remain behind the screen rather than participate in street protests. 
These so-called ‘keyboard warriors’ (Busher 2016) thus find a sort of ‘safety behind the screen’, 
in the sense that they can relatively freely express their political sentiments as they are in a 
group of similarly minded actors but avoid the criticism and potential repression and 
stigmatization attempts faced on the streets. 
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DEGREES OF EUROPEANIZATION: ISSUE, TARGET, PARTICIPANT, 
AND EVENT SCOPES 
Europeanization theory argues that domestic collective actors have several protest 
strategies available to them in the multi-level polity, depending on their political and 
discursive opportunities and their resources (see e.g. della Porta & Caiani 2009). 
Hence, depending on these variables, on the one hand, there will be ‘non-
Europeanized’ domestic actors, solely active on domestic issues with domestic scopes 
(i.e. ‘domestic protests’) (Bourne & Chatzopoulou 2015). Yet, on the other, there will 
be some actors, who Europeanize their contention by protesting around European 
issues, targeting European decision-makers with fellow, European contenders. Such 
cases indicate that the EU has supranationalized as a polity (Caiani & Graziano 2018). 
In order to consider both the variation in national groups’ degrees of Europeanization, 
and to analyse their Europeanization paths, prior Europeanization studies have 
focused on four aspects of the actions, namely the scope of the protest targets, issues, 
participants, and events (see e.g. Bourne & Chatzopoulou 2015; Caiani & Graziano 
2018). The extent to which these various scopes are ‘European’ and/or ‘transnational’ 
gives a good indication about the various groups’ degrees and forms of 
Europeanization (see e.g. Caiani & Graziano 2018). 
Scope of Issues 
The ‘issue scope’ is a crucial aspect for collective actors’ Europeanization paths. It 
considers whether the given groups’ protest issue involves a problem that requires a 
‘domestic’ or ‘European’ policy solution. Scholars exploring collective action have 
had difficulties to both define and determine the ‘issue scope,’ due to the intertwined 
nature of many domestic and European policy issues, making it hard to distinguish 
between an issue’s breadth (see e.g. Bourne & Chatzopoulou 2015; Hutter 2014a). As 
Hutter (2014a) states, one can only establish “a very crude measure, because most 
problems or goals can result from internationalization processes” (2014a: 178).   
This study draws on Bourne and Chatzopoulou’s (2015) approach, and considers an 
issue scope as ‘domestic,’ if it can be “specifically linked to a domestic decision or a 
domestic political arena,” ‘European’ if it relates to the European or EU political 
arena, or a “combination of both,” if both levels are involved (2015: 50). Even though 
Hutter (2014a) distinguishes between ‘local,’ ‘domestic,’ and ‘transnational’ issue 
scopes, his conceptualization is still rather similar. He exemplifies it by looking at 
migration policies, stating that issues related to the entry of foreigners to a country are 
‘transnational’ problems (i.e. ‘European’), while issues related to the integration of 
the immigrants are ‘domestic’ in scope (Hutter 2014a), including, for example, the 
housing of refugees. This implies that if a demonstration for instance both involves 
demands around the immi- and integration of third country immigrants and refugees, 
it involves a combination of European and national issue scopes. 
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Hence, even though the ‘refugee crisis’ largely involved discussions at the EU-level 
about the entry of the refugees to the different EU MS (for instance during the ‘quota’ 
debates), i.e. it had a ‘European’ scope, the domestic mobilization could also relate to 
the integration of said refugees, i.e. have a ‘domestic’ scope. In such cases, i.e. where 
the issue surrounds a ‘domestic’ policy topic, there is no expectation that the given 
group will Europeanize its contention, as it will want to take the claims to the 
appropriate level of decision-making, i.e. the nation-state (Tarrow 1998). This is why 
the issue scope is rather indicative for a collective actors’ (potential) mobilization 
strategy in terms of Europeanization (see Table 3.1 below). 
Scope of Targets  
As argued above, it is expected that the shifting level of decision-making (i.e. from 
the national to the EU-level) will infer that protests increasingly will target the EU 
with demands for political change (Tarrow 1998). Hence, Europeanization works 
from the assumption that protest organisers voicing political demands have a 
predefined target, or addressee, in mind when organising a demonstration or other 
protest event, depending on the political entity, they consider most apt to approach for 
attaining their goals. When the given group perceives a foreign or international actor 
to be most approachable, the targeting is expected to shift accordingly. 
Europeanization research thus frequently focuses on whether protest “targets are 
principally domestic authorities, European authorities (including EU institutions and 
state authorities abroad), or both” (Bourne & Chatzopolou 2015: 39; see also Caiani 
& Graziano 2018).  
The exploration of the context-specific situation surrounding the ‘refugee crisis’ is 
expected to lead to the illumination of very different national responses by the 
different actors under investigation, not least the extent to which they target the EU in 
their mobilization. In terms of the different EU institutions and their roles regarding 
EU migration policy, then besides the European Commission and the European 
Parliament, the European Council is also an influential decision-making power as it 
sets the strategic priorities for the EU (Monforte 2014). As the institution consists of 
the EU MS’ ministers, it can be influenced on the national level, via pressures on the 
national governments. This entails that the various national extra-parliamentary far 
right actors have various available protest strategies available, depending on the 
specific EU institution they (potentially) target. 
At the same time, collective actors may also target other European actors besides the 
EU. For instance, they may problematize the actions of, and thus target, other EU 
member states, especially if these have an impact on the collective actor’s own nation-
state. This was, for example, seen during the anti-austerity protests in Greece where 
numerous groups targeted Germany (Van Gent et al. 2013: 153; see also Bourne & 
Chatzopoulou 2015). Similarly, politicians from other EU MS may also be presented 
as part of the solution to a given problem (Monforte 2014). 
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Scope of Participants 
In order to explore the breadth of the European protest arenas, Europeanization 
literature also focuses on the extent to which “movement actors take action 
predominantly alongside fellow domestic actors, fellow European actors or both” 
(Bourne & Chatzopoulou 2015: 39). While some studies have focused on the 
composition of the hosting organization(s) (i.e. the specific claim maker), and whether 
it/they consist(s) of domestic or transnational actors, or both (e.g. the domestic 
branches of transnational organizations, such as Amnesty International) (Ibid.), this 
study looks at the configuration of the protest participants at the various domestically 
organised demonstrations. This choice is based on the desire to more closely examine 
the extent of the transnationalization of the far right, including in the crowd, as such 
protest participation also can be conducive to the development of European identities 
(see e.g. Bourne & Chatzopoulou 2015; della Porta & Caiani 2009).  
Research by scholars such as Schlembach (2011) shows that particularly the extreme 
right scene, especially neo-Nazis, fairly frequently have joint each other’s protest 
events abroad, especially around commemorative events, like the birthdays of 
historical figures, such as Hitler or Himmler. Prior research has also shown that 
activists from EDL and its European network frequently joined each other’s 
demonstrations, organized more or less European demonstrations in a particular 
European MS (e.g. the 2011 European Defence League demonstration in Aarhus, 
Denmark (Meleagrou-Hitchens & Brun 2013)) or participated as speakers at rallies 
abroad (Ibid.). Yet, despite this evident European cooperation at the street level, there 
has hardly been any research conducted that explores why the groups wish to partake 
in events abroad, plus the extent to which such border-crossing exchanges take place 
(see e.g. Schlembach 2011 for an exception). Hence, this study considers the 
composition of the crowd and/or the invited speakers and whether these actors are 
domestic, cross-border (i.e. from neighbouring countries), or European. 
Scope of Events 
The ‘event scope’ “refers to the geographical and/or political scope of the substantive 
mobilisation of the event” (Caiani & Graziano 2018: 1051). In Caiani and Graziano’s 
(2018) framework, these actions both include protests staged at the EU-institutions, 
or simultaneously in several EU MS. The latter draws on Imig and Tarrow’s (2000; 
2001a) framework on ‘transnational contention,’ which refers to protests involving 
transnational actors, who go up against the EU (or other supra- or transnational actors) 
“in response to EU policies” (2000: 86f).  
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These ‘ideal-types’52 involve two types of mobilization, which both are included in 
this study, namely: 
 Cooperative transnationalism: Various national actors carry out parallel, 
“in cooperative but recognizably separate acts” in their domestic settings 
against a shared target or antagonist (like the ones included by Caiani & 
Graziano 2018)  
 Collective transnationalism: A larger protest action in one particular 
setting, which involves transnational participation towards a shared 
European target. 
These ‘transnational protests’ can take many different forms, ranging from a network 
of actors carrying out single-day coordinated protest events in each partaking actors’ 
domestic setting, to longer-lasting campaigns against European actors (della Porta and 
Tarrow 2005; Monforte 2014). Hence, their scopes may differ both in terms of 
geography, politics, and duration, but they can all be considered ‘European’ protest 
events (Caiani & Graziano 2018).  
The inclusion of ‘event scopes’ to the Europeanization framework not only sheds 
more light on the role of the European space of contention, but several scholars also 
allude to the effects of protests for the collective identity formation amongst the 
activists, also at the transnational level (della Porta 2006; della Porta & Caiani 2009; 
Tarrow 2005)53. Hence, these joint protest actions may help foster a stronger sense of 
solidarity between the participating groups54.  
                                                          
52 ‘International conflict’ is deliberately left out of this overview, as the targeting of 
“competitors from other nations” is an unlikely strategy for collective actors that do not pursue 
economic goals (unlike e.g. farmers and fishermen who have carried out these types of protests 
in the past in order to ensure their fishing and farming rights) (Imig & Tarrow 2000: 87). 
53 As such, protest participation “generates bonds between activists and builds up a shared 
history and memories that can sustain movements even in periods of low activity or abeyance” 
(Flesher Fominaya 2010: 46). The closer bonds are created via protest actions, which 
‘eventfulness’ has “cognitive, affective and relational impacts” on the participants in question, 
including far right groups (Caiani et al. 2012: 12; see also Busher 2016; Simi & Futrell 2010). 
54 Moreover, there are also several other possible ways that extra-parliamentary organizations 
can transnationalise their contention and other political activities. This can for instance be 
through pan-European conferences, meetings, or social events, aimed at fostering closer links 
between the various participants. Yet, these types of actions are not included in the collective 
action examination (see Chapter 2 and Appendix B). 
EUROPEANIZATION OF THE FAR RIGHT 
112
 
EUROPEANIZATION FORMS: FROM ‘DOMESTICATION’ TO 
‘SUPRANATIONALIZATION’ 
Adopting the framework utilised by della Porta and Caiani (2009), the above outlined 
‘scopes’ can be employed to deduce four different Europeanization paths, a collective 
actor may pursue as a means to obtain policy influence. As protests with a ‘domestic’ 
issue scope do not respond to European policies or involve EU institutions, such 
actions are not included in the framework (Ibid.), as they are highly unlikely to lead 
to Europeanization strategies. These actions with a ‘domestic’ issue scope often take 
the form of ‘domestic protests’. A ‘typical’ or ‘routine’ domestic protest constitutes 
domestic actors targeting a domestic institution about a domestic policy-issue (Imig 
& Tarrow 2000). This strategy is frequently shown to still be the prevalent means of 
protesting (see e.g. Hutter 2014a), something that is mainly ascribed to the necessity 
for citizens to address the territorial level of the decision-making (Tarrow 1998). 
Hence, the framework (as outlined on Table 3.1) only includes protests with a 
‘European’ issue scope, and utilises the ‘participant’ and ‘target’ scopes to deduce 
collective actors’ forms of Europeanization:   
Table 3.1: Collective actors’ forms of Europeanization 
 Target scope 
National European 
Actor 
scope 
National Domestication Externalisation 
European 
Transnational 
pressure 
Supranationalisation 
(Adopted from Caiani & Graziano 2018). 
Thus, depending on a group’s strategic deliberations, largely based on its POS, DOS, 
and available resources, it can pursue several Europeanization paths, namely 
domestication, externalization, ‘transnational pressure’ and ‘supranationalization’. As 
outlined in the table, ‘Domestication’ involves domestic actors, who target the 
domestic decision-makers on a European policy issue. ‘Externalization’ also involves 
domestic actors, who, however, target the EU with calls for domestic policy changes 
(pursuing a ‘boomerang’ effect (Keck & Sikkink 1998)). Some groups also choose to 
coalesce with similar-minded groups from other European countries, and either 
exercise ‘Transnational pressure’ by jointly targeting an EU MS in order for it to make 
policy changes, or ‘supranationalize’ their contention by targeting the EU (Caiani & 
Graziano 2018). The latter indicates the development of a European polity, where 
European actors jointly mobilize at the supranational European level (Ibid.). These 
four distinct paths are further explained below. 
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Domestication: Mobilizing at the National Level about EU-Related Policies  
‘Domestication’ refers to domestic actors targeting a domestic institution about an 
issue, where the “EU or its policies are either the source or the indirect target of 
protest” (Caiani & Graziano 2018: 1033f). The actors opting for this strategy wish to 
put “pressure on the EU in favour of national interests” (della Porta & Caiani 2009: 
52), as they see the EU as somewhat responsible for the given problematic situation, 
but they deem it better dealt with by pressuring the national, and electorally 
accountable, government (Monforte 2014). Hence, it involves the voicing of a claim 
about a European policy towards the domestic decision-makers with the aim of 
pressuring the national government to take the point to the EU institutions and 
negotiate on the collective actors’ behalf (Ibid.). 
The targeting of the national politicians is mainly due to two reasons: 1) the domestic 
political opportunities are more open than at the EU-level, and 2) the national 
decision-makers are considered more directly accountable to the electorates, and thus 
expected to be more acquiescent to the public’s demands (della Porta & Caiani 2009). 
Most collective actors are thus expected to internalize their mobilization (della Porta 
& Tarrow 2005) by targeting their national decision-makers concerning policies 
where the EU has the decision-making power55. 
As Tarrow (2005) explains, this can create a ‘triangular relationship’ between 
‘ordinary people’, the national governments, and, in this case, the European 
institutions. He continues by outlining the mechanisms at play in this process. It starts 
                                                          
55 Imig and Tarrow (2001) conducted one of the first studies. They carried out a protest event 
analysis (PEA) to examine the extent to which “citizens” were “protesting EU policies” in the 
period 1984-1997 (2001a: 3). The analysis showed that mobilization against the EU’s policies 
was increasing, yet, domestically, and not directly targeted at the EU (Ibid.). Thus, while the 
“social movements attribute some responsibility for a problematic situation to the European 
Union”, they still “continue to mobilize at the national level”, even though the protests “are 
constructed in reaction to decisions taken at the European level” (Monforte 2014: 143). This 
finding initially posed a conundrum to scholars, as the increased EU competences was expected 
to lead to a rise in direct EU protests. Yet, the most ensuing studies revealed a similar tendency 
(see e.g. Rucht’s (2002) research on German protests, Roederer’s (1999) exploration of  French 
farmers’ protests, Uba and Uggla’s (2011) Europe-wide PEA of the period 1992-2007, and 
Giugni and Passy (2002) on migrant rights protests). Surprisingly, research on the protests 
surrounding the financial crisis in the late 2000s reached similar conclusions. These actors also 
mainly targeted the nation state, and not the EU and other international financial institutions, 
despite many of the problems deriving from there (Flesher Fominaya 2014: 183, see also Kaldor 
et al. 2012; della Porta & Mattoni 2014; Bourne & Chatzopoulou 2015). In fact, most protesters 
participating in the ‘global wave of protest’ during this period mainly intended “to reclaim the 
nation state as a locus and focus of action” (Flesher Fominaya 2014: 183). The member states 
thus continue to be the most important actors in the EU (Parks 2015), just as “public discourse 
is deeper at the national level than it is in Europe as a whole” (Imig & Tarrow 2001b: 41).  
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with external pressure from the EU on the government to adopt the given European 
policy, which the government eventually implements. This leads to citizen 
mobilization around the policy, but targeted at the government, which can choose to 
either repress the protests, offer concessions to the citizens, or broker between the 
citizens and the European institution (Ibid.). It then potentially leads to policy changes 
at the EU- or domestic level.  
The utilisation of the domestication strategy is partly related to the dominant role of 
the member states in the EU decision-making process (Rucht as cited in Chabanet 
2011: 96; see also Parks 2015), something that is also the case regarding migration 
policy (see e.g. Monforte 2014). Hutter’s (2014a) exploration of protest events in six 
European countries from the mid-1970s to the mid-2000s thus showed that protests 
related to ‘immigration’ (either “by, against, or on behalf of migrants” (2014: xix)) 
almost exclusively targeted the national governments (see also Giugni & Passy 2002). 
Hence, protests still most frequently target national political actors, despite the 
growing influence of EU policies on the member states, also concerning migration 
and asylum policies (see e.g. Hutter 2014a; Monforte 2014).  
Domesticated protests and protests with a ‘national’ scope and target are thus likely 
to continue being the prevalent strategy, as research has also demonstrated (see e.g. 
Caiani & Graziano 2018). Moreover, studies indicate that actors who mobilize around 
a policy issue with a ‘politicized’ agenda will have difficulties taking the claims to the 
EU institutions (see e.g. Monforte 2014; Parks 2015). Hence, on this basis, one can 
expect that far right mobilization mainly will take place at the domestic level, targeting 
the national governing bodies. 
Externalization: Taking the Claims to the EU Institutions 
Another possible Europeanization path is for the domestic actor to take the 
mobilization to the European level in order to exercise pressure on the national 
decision-makers by gaining EU-support (della Porta & Caiani 2009; Balme & 
Chabanet 2008). The externalization path thus refers to the reverse strategy of 
domestication, and involves actors targeting the EU because they deem that their 
opportunities are better at this policy level, due to the obstacles faced domestically, 
such as repression or marginalization (Tarrow 2005; della Porta & Caiani 2009). They 
thus “try to mobilize allies at the supranational level; their protest addresses EU 
institutions, pushing them to intervene upon domestic governments” (della Porta 
2007: 375; see also Dür & Mateo 2014; Monforte 2014). Groups that employ this 
strategy most commonly perceive the “European policies” in a particular policy area 
as “more liberal than national policies”56 (Monforte 2014: 144). Moreover, collective 
                                                          
56 Monforte (2014) also identifies multilevel social movements as an Europeanization mode. 
Such movements organize around a central organization (commonly based in Brussels) and aim 
to target both the European and domestic level, as they have no distinct allies at either level. 
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actors that perceive the challenges as supranational, inferring issues such as the 
environment, workers’ or women’s rights, or migration, also frequently opt for an 
externalization strategy (Ibid.).  
‘Externalization’ strategies may involve protest actions on domestic soil targeted at 
the EU. Yet, the extra-parliamentary challengers can also attempt to gain more direct 
access to the EU. These strategies largely depend on the type of organization 
mobilizing. The domestic interest groups and civil societal organisations frequently 
opt for insider strategies (mainly lobbying) (see e.g. Eising 2008; Beyers 2004; Balme 
& Chabanet 2008). Social movement organizations and other types of collective actors 
instead tend to pursue outsider strategies (mainly protest, but also media campaigns) 
and transnational interactions (see e.g. della Porta & Caiani 2009; Bourne & 
Chatzoupolou 2015; Monforte 2014). 
The insider strategy refers to the setting up of a CSO’s own EU office or the joining 
of (already established) representative umbrella organizations (see e.g. McCauley 
2011; Salgado 2014). Marks and McAdam (1996) established that due to the EU’s 
structure, its institutions are more open to conventional (such as lobbyism) rather than 
unconventional actions (like protest campaigns). There is thus a rather broad 
agreement in the literature that “the EU decision-making style is not at all conducive 
to political protests” (Eising 2008: 173). The groups of actors employing insider 
strategies are thus also considered the most Europeanized (Kriesi et al. 2007). This 
finding has later been empirically demonstrated through diverse studies, which show 
that the majority of organizations, which externalize their activities, either set up EU 
offices or join forces in encompassing umbrella organizations, and mainly employ 
lobbying (corporatist instruments) as their action repertoire towards the EU 
institutions (see e.g. Monforte 2014: 185)57. This has also led to a steep increase in 
European public interest groups as the “supranational institutions offer resources and 
allies to local movements which mobilise on issues with a wider audience, namely, 
environmental, gender and human rights issues” (Andretta & Caiani 2005: 284).  
However, in order to obtain the EU access, the groups must adapt to the EU’s rules, 
norms, and requirements (Marks & McAdam 1999). The most successful lobbyists 
thus offer specialized technical expertise and information in exchange for a 
consideration of their views (see e.g. Monforte’s (2014) analysis of pro-migrant 
                                                          
57 This has been the case for environmental groups (see for instance Rucht 2002; Rootes 2002). 
In his research, Rucht showed that these groups were only modestly represented in Brussels but 
also emphasized that “lobbying will prevail over protest” for environmental actors (2001: 140), 
due to both the various barriers to EU protesting, but also because of the opportunities presented 
at the EU-level. As Imig and Tarrow (2001a) explained, environmental groups benefited from 
“a Directorate-General dedicated to their claim, and generous subsidies from the Commission” 
(2001a: 21), making direct EU lobbying a viable strategical option. 
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associations in Brussels). This has meant that larger, more professionalised and 
resource-strong organizations, such as business and professional associations, have 
had easier access to EU deliberation (della Porta 2003). In this way, organizations 
with a specific purpose and organizational set-up are increasingly becoming part of 
the EU decision-making apparatus (Eising 2008; Dür & Mateo 2014). Parks’ (2015) 
research on technical58 and political EU protest campaigns shows a similar finding, as 
it is mainly organizations with more specific interests, which tend to take their claims 
directly to the EU institutions. Her research thus shows that technical campaigns have 
“low levels of popular mobilisation at the national and local levels and high levels of 
engagement with EU level institutions, particularly the Commission.” Political 
campaigns, on the other hand, have “higher levels of popular mobilisation at national 
and local levels and […] lower levels of engagement in consultation” (Parks 2015: 4), 
again indicating that technical, and thus more specific issues, are more beneficially 
targeted at the EU.  
Moreover, in terms of rhetoric and frames, della Porta and Caiani (2009: 15) assert 
that actors, who opt for an insider strategy tend to appeal “to the kinds of discourse 
and identity legitimized at the European level” (see also Eising 2008). Hence, extra-
parliamentary actors with more diffuse interests59 often have more limited material 
and symbolic resources, making them struggle to tackle the high transaction costs of 
such work (della Porta 2007; Giugni & Passy 2002; Rootes 2002; Andretta & Caiani 
2005). Research has thus revealed that there is “an imperfect pluralist system of 
interest representation or an 'empowered pluralism' […] emerging at the EU level” 
(Salgado 2014: 4), signifying that it is usually only the most resource-strong 
organizations that obtain voice.  
Furthermore, some of the reasons for certain groups’ lacking direct EU-interaction 
also relate to the groups’ perceptions of the EU institutions. Research on the Global 
Justice Movement, for instance, revealed that numerous national groups had rather 
limited direct EU interaction, partly due to their perception of the EU institutions as 
being “closed, selective, and unaccountable” (della Porta & Caiani 2009: 96; see also 
Monforte 2014: 197f). So, while there has been an overall increase in civil societal 
actors opting for insider strategies (Parks 2015), when it comes to direct EU-
interaction, social movements and protest groups generally face greater constraints 
and inhibitions in terms of direct access to the EU institutions. 
Nevertheless, numerous organisations expressing diffuse interests still opt for a 
presence in Brussels. These organizations employ a much more technical and process-
oriented language than those remaining outside, while also building “a relationship of 
                                                          
58 Technical campaigns attempt to persuade the power-holders by “demonstrating the 
technically correct solution, seen as somehow 'above' politics” (Parks 2015: 4f). 
59 For instance, ‘civic interest’ representatives, who mobilize on environmental, gender, or 
social rights (della Porta & Caiani 2009). 
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interdependence with EU power-holders” (Monforte 2014: 183; see also Geddes 
2000). Geddes (2000) shows this concerning pro-migrant organizations, which face 
hostility in their home countries due to the issue’s electoral unpopularity. They can 
instead find a more hospitable environment at the supranational level, due to its 
‘insulation’ from the national settings (Geddes 2000). In fact, certain civic political 
associations, such as the European Women’s Lobby, receive EU funding to carry out 
their work (see Salgado 2014; Císař & Vráblíková 2010).  
The outsider strategy, on the other hand, refers to activities that, whilst still being 
directed at the EU institutions, do not involve direct EU institutional representation. 
It can involve protest actions, media and public information campaigns (see e.g. 
Koopmans & Statham 2010)60, and petitions to the EU, for example through the 
Ombudsman or the European Citizens Initiative61. The outsider strategy is usually 
chosen by actors who for various reasons either do not wish to, or cannot, gain access 
to the ‘inside’ of the EU institutions (see e.g. Parks 2015). It can thus be chosen due 
to ideological reasons (such as an aversion towards the EU’s policies (see e.g. 
Monforte 2014)), but also due to to a lack of the required financial resources, which 
tends to be the case for groups that have limited levels of organization. “Poorer 
actors,” such as social movements, thus “have more difficulty in developing insider 
strategies” and instead tend to attempt “to influence decision makers by addressing 
public opinion via disruptive (and newsworthy) tactics” (Lipsky as cited in della Porta 
and Caiani 2009: 104) either at the domestic or the EU level. In fact, protest groups 
do not frequently organize protests directly at the EU institutions, due to the high 
financial costs and the amount of time required to transport the protesters to the 
buildings in Brussels, Luxembourg, or Strasbourg (Marks & McAdam 1999). Eising 
(2008) argues, “social movements have recourse to protests only as a means of last 
resort after all other attempts to influence the EU institutions and policies failed” 
(2008: 173). 
Transnational Contention: Transnational Pressure and Supranationalization 
Nevertheless, “[i]f those richer in resources were the first to open headquarters in 
Brussels, resource-poor actors also started networking supranationally and framing 
                                                          
60 For more studies of protests related to European integration, see e.g. Reising 1999; Balme & 
Chabanet 2008; Uba & Uggla 2011; Caiani & Graziano 2018. 
61 Since the 1990s, but particularly since the French and Dutch rejection of the Constitutional 
Treaty in 2005, the EU has worked towards increasing its political legitimacy by introducing 
more mechanisms for public consultation (such as e.g. the European Citizen’s Initiative and 
discussions with civil societal actors within the EU institutions). Yet, so far, this has not really 
materialized into tangible results as public trust in the institutions is still rather low (albeit rising, 
see e.g. Eurobarometer 2018), plus only very few of these initiatives have reached the required 
signatures, and even fewer amounted to any policy changes (see http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-
initiative/public/welcome). 
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European issues” (della Porta 2006: 18), while exchanging resources, knowledge, and 
expertise with similar-minded European actors (Caiani & Graziano 2018). The 
domestication and externalization paths of domestic extra-parliamentary actors may 
thus also conduce to these groups’ participation in, or creation of, transnational 
networks or coalitions, which carry out actions either to exercise pressure on a given 
EU MS (‘transnational pressure’) or to target the EU (‘supranationalization’) (see e.g. 
della Porta & Caiani 2009). Della Porta and Caiani (2009) referred to such groups as 
‘European social movements,’ but as will be further elaborated below (see p. xx), they 
are referred to as ‘transnational coalitions’ in this study.  
These actors may join forces in order to target the domestic decision-makers and 
European actors simultaneously (Ibid.). Without delving into too much detail about 
this transnational cooperation here, as that is the focus of section 3.3 below, such 
transnational protest coalitions have rather frequently targeted the EU (see e.g. Parks 
2015)62. This is also the case in regard to the far right, where there has, in fact, been 
at least one attempt to protest at the European Parliament buildings in Brussels, 
namely by the Stop the Islamization of Europe association in 2010 (see e.g. Denes 
2012 for more on this group). However, as the mayor of Brussels prohibited the 
demonstration due to the confrontational nature of this type of protest and its likely 
violent development, it indicates that outsider strategies directly in front of the EU 
institutions are also an unlikely option for far right activists. Yet, in his research on 
pro-asylum organizations, Monforte (2014) established that particularly transnational 
movements of grassroot groups tend to organize through outsider strategies, where 
they are “still able to construct contentious European mobilizations, through their 
involvement in more transnational arenas. In doing so, they address European 
institutions indirectly, through the involvement of public opinion” (Monforte 2014: 
233) and without necessarily taking the contention directly to the EU institutions. As 
will be further explained below, this would appear to be a more likely Europeanization 
strategy for far right organizations.  
Hence, as alluded to throughout this section, the given groups will pursue the various 
strategies depending on their (perceived) political opportunities and material and 
symbolic resources. This will be further explained in the following section. 
                                                          
62 During the years, several highly publicised protest campaigns have directly targeted the EU 
and its policies. This involves the protests against the high fuel costs in the early 2000s (Imig 
2004); the signing of the Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice, and Lisbon Treaties in the 1990s-early 
2000s (Parks 2015; FitzGibbon 2010); the anti-austerity protests of 2008-2012 (Van Gent et al. 
2013; Bourne & Chatzopoulou 2015) and the anti-TTIP protests of 2015-16 (Caiani & Graziano 
2018). 
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EUROPEANIZATION STRATEGIES: ROLE OF POS, DOS, AND 
RESOURCES  
Following the rationale of political opportunity theory, a given domestic collective 
actor is expected to direct its protests and other forms of influence attempts towards 
the political decision-making level perceived as the most opportune in terms of 
gaining resonance and potential influence (Kriesi 2004). Such openings in the system 
are highly context-specific, and for far right mobilization, they, for instance, depend 
on the country’s history of authoritarianism, current political leadership, and elite 
divisions. In this way, “pre‐existing domestic structures and internal developments 
are likely to have an important mediating effect” (Bache 2003: 2). This implies that 
the collective actor can pursue several possible strategies concerning policy issues 
with an EU-wide scope (i.e. ‘European’ issue scopes), depending on the political and 
discursive opportunities at the time.  
Hence, as Table 3.2 below shows, if both the domestic and European opportunities 
are ‘open,’ and particularly if the issue is specific, collective actors are expected to 
pursue the ‘multilevel opportunity structures’, i.e. exploit the ‘open’ opportunities at 
both the domestic and European level, in order to gain the most benefits possible 
(Parks 2015). Yet, if the actors deem the domestic level to have the most ‘open’ 
political opportunities, one expects the organizations to domesticate the actions. 
Moreover, as demonstrated by Parks (2015), campaigns around politicized issues also 
tend to predominantly take place domestically, due to the better chances of gaining 
resonance at this level (i.e. the better discursive opportunities). Depending on the 
degree of openness at the domestic level, this either entails collective action in a more 
moderate (open), or radical (closed) form (Caiani & Graziano 2018).  
Conversely, if the given actor experiences repression or has less leverage (i.e. closed 
opportunities) in the domestic setting compared to the EU-level, it may pursue a 
supranational strategy, either “in terms of degree (i.e., EU as actor, level of 
mobilisation and target)” or through an externalization path (Ibid: 1036). This means 
that even if the EU opportunities appear ‘closed’ for an extra-parliamentary group, the 
group may still perceive them as more ‘open’ than the domestic level, leading it to 
externalize the contention (Ibid.). Depending on the group’s material and symbolic 
resources, this externalization will take either the form of an insider (strong material 
resources, and symbolic resources aligning with the norms of the EU) or outsider 
strategy (weak material resources, and often, symbolic resources disaligned with those 
of the EU) (for more on the role of the resources in Ch. 5).  
Both the domestication and externalization paths may lead to the creation of 
transnational coalitions with other European actors sharing the same overarching 
goals (della Porta & Caiani 2009). This infers that the groups may start coalescing 
with actors abroad, nonewithstanding whether their domestic and/or EU-level 
opportunities are closed or open, especially if the aim is to target the EU (see more on 
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this below). However, if both settings are closed, the extra-parliamentary group may 
opt for a radicalization of its protest actions, and/or seek transnational relations with 
actors facing a similar situation (see e.g. Macklin 2013). 
As stated, these opportunities are likely to change over time (Tilly as cited in Caiani 
& Graziano 2018), depending on contextual and political events. Such occurrences 
may lead to fundamental changes in either the political composition (e.g. after 
elections, breaks between elite alignments, etcetera) or at the discursive level (e.g. 
after a terrorist attack, the publication of new crime statistics, etcetera). Hence, if these 
various opportunities change, a contentious actor may move the activity accordingly.  
 Table 3.2: Expected Europeanization paths depending on POS and DOS. 
POS/DOS 
at Domestic 
level 
POS/DOS 
at EU 
level 
Expected strategy 
Open Open Both domestication and externalization (multi-level 
strategy) 
Open Closed Domestication 
Closed Open Externalization (or other supranational activity) 
(aiming for boomerang effects) 
Closed Closed Domestic protest (either more disruptive actions or 
hardly any)  
The above section has now outlined the theoretical framework for the analysis of the 
various extra-parliamentary groups making up Fortress Europe and Generation 
Identity’s collective action Europeanization in the period 2015-2017. The analysis will 
thus be based on the findings regarding the groups’ scopes of issues, targets, 
participants, and events. Beside from a closer consideration of the groups’ protest 
scopes, it will also be deduced which kind of Europeanization forms, the groups 
mainly make use of, by applying the data to Table 3.1 (see above). In order to examine 
the effect of the different national groups’ domestic and European POS, DOS, and 
their resources more closely, the analysis also includes a more context-specific 
analysis of certain of the national cases. This should allow for an exploration of the 
national GI and FE-groups’ Europeanization strategies during the height of the 
‘refugee crisis’. 
For more information about the protest event analysis, please consult the 
Methodological Framework and the Codebook in Appendix B. 
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 EUROPEANIZATION OF NETWORKS: TRANSNATIONAL 
COALITION-BUILDING 
As briefly alluded to above, Europeanization literature explains that once actors 
perceive the need to take their contention to the European level, they frequently 
develop “relationships with other […] European and transnational actors and arenas” 
(Bourne & Chatzopoulou 2015: 46). In the ‘bottom-up’ Europeanization literature, 
scholars have thus pointed to the creation of European networks between extra-
parliamentary actors, which together target the EU institutions and/or EU policies 
through the employment of various forms of collective action (See e.g. della Porta & 
Caiani 2009; Monforte 2014). This externalization process, i.e. the move away from 
the national level and towards the EU-institutions:  
…tends to produce a development of supranational organizational 
structures and identities. The European arenas offer to social movement 
organizations from different EU countries the opportunity to meet each 
other, build organizational networks, coordinate activity, and construct 
supranational discourses. Growing interaction facilitates the development 
of common, more or less European identity (della Porta & Caiani 2009: 
96).  
Yet, not all transnational European coalitions arise in relation to externalization 
strategies or involves the EU as such. A distinction can be made between transnational 
networks that cooperate around EU-related policy issues inside the EU-institutions 
(e.g. umbrella associations, such as the European Youth Forum), or outside of the EU-
institutional setting (such as Diem25 or Plan B (Agustín, 2017)). Moreover, they may 
also involve both levels, taking full advantage of the possible opportunities created by 
the multi-level polity (della Porta & Caiani 2009; Monforte 2014).  
Monforte (2014) refers to the latter two network types as ‘transnational social 
movements’ and ‘multi-level movements’ respectively. In his study on German and 
French pro-migrant social movements and their EU-related strategies, he found that 
the distinct groups’ organization type determined how they Europeanized. Hence, 
humanitarian NGO actors developed multi-level movements, as they were able (in 
terms of resources) and willing (in terms of ideology) to gain EU-institutional access. 
The politicized grassroot actors, on the other hand, created transnational social 
movements outside of the EU institutions, both due to their lack in material resources, 
but also because of their worldviews, which often conflicted with the EU’s principles 
(Monforte 2014). Thus, while some formations might actively pursue direct political 
influence in the EU, e.g. by creating more formalized interest group organizations, 
others might see the construction of a “unified space of struggles” as an end in itself 
(Monforte 2014: 229). 
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Both the multi-level and the transnational movements address, and attempt to 
influence, the “national and European institutions simultaneously” (2015: 232). Yet, 
they differ in their organization. Multi-level organizations typically set up an office in 
Brussels from which they can lobby the EU institutions while also maintaining their 
various national organizations and potentially mixing un- and conventional means 
(i.e. protest actions and lobbyism)63. Transnational movements instead act outside of 
the EU institutions, where they create horizontal linkages with similar-minded 
organizations abroad (Ibid.). In this way, by creating transnational movements, the 
actors are “still able to construct contentious European mobilizations, through their 
involvement in more transnational arenas. In doing so, they address European 
institutions indirectly, through the involvement of public opinion” (Monforte 2014: 
233). Their more politicized nature also infers a more EU-critical stance, frequently 
calling for a complete overhaul of the existing policies in a given policy area, if not 
of the EU project itself. In this way, they foster more contentious relations with the 
European institutions, and will therefore tend to opt for an outsider strategy (Ibid; for 
a similar account, see Agustín 2017).  
While Monforte’s (2014) distinction between multi-level and transnational 
movements is a good starting point for the creation of a theoretical framework 
regarding the transnational networking activities of national actors around the EU 
institutions and/or policies, it still requires further adjustment and elaboration, both in 
terms of the ‘movement’ concept, but also the actual processes involved in this 
activity.   
FROM ‘MOVEMENTS’ TO ‘COALITIONS’: RELATIONAL AND 
IDEOLOGICAL TIES 
Over the years, transnational cooperation between extra-parliamentary actors has been 
defined in a multitude of ways, in terms of both the form and type of transnational 
organizing. Hence, both within the Europeanization, transnationalization, far right, 
and more general social movement literature, there is much disagreement about the 
appropriate concept to use and its definition. It thus necessitates a further clarification 
in order to operationalize for analytical purposes. Thus, in the following, some of the 
proposals from these various literatures will be synthesised, and a working definition 
for ‘transnational coalitions’ will be outlined. 
Within the research field of social movements, the conceptualizations of ‘social 
movements’ abound, differing widely with regards to the strength of the ties between 
the various movement actors, their degree of formality, decision-making structures, 
                                                          
63 Czech women’s rights associations have employed this type of multi-level strategy, as they 
joined the European umbrella organization European Women’s Lobby (EWL) (Císař & 
Vráblíková 2010). It can also involve European branches of international SMOs, like Amnesty 
International (Monforte 2014). 
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goal convergence/agreement, etcetera. Moreover, the great dissimilarity between 
different social movements and their compositions only makes the problem larger, as 
one of the sole uncontented similarities is their “distress with the status quo” (Levi & 
Murphy 2006: 651). Utilizing one of the most frequently cited definitions, della Porta 
and Diani (2006) define a social movement as being “involved in conflictual relations 
with clearly defined opponents; linked by dense informal networks” and sharing “a 
distinct collective identity” (2006: 20). Albeit being a highly contested concept (see 
e.g. Flesher Fominaya’s 2014 discussion), it is this ‘collective identity’, which makes 
a social movement both a more permanent occurrence, and it enables the participating 
activists to act in unison (it has agency).  
Yet, Snow, Soule, and Kriesi (2004), on the other hand, define social movements 
much more openly. They argue that these organizations consist of:  
…collectivities acting with some degree of organization and continuity 
outside of institutional or organizational channels for the purpose of 
challenging or defending extant authority, whether it is institutionally 
based or culturally based in the group, society, culture, or world order of 
which it is a part.” (2004: 11)  
These two examples are illustrative in terms of showing the difficulty in defining the 
research objects satisfactorily. Taking this debate to the transnational level, concepts 
and definitions also abound concerning the cooperation between actors and groups 
from different countries.  
Transnational (Social) Movements 
As already mentioned in the introduction, when a movement or coalition is 
‘transnational,’ it refers to a group of actors, which “retain their rooting in national 
political contexts, which they transcend in order to collaborate with other nationally 
rooted groups and organizations to form transnational networks” (Flesher Fominaya 
2014: 40). These actors from numerous countries mobilize on a shared issue, but their 
interactions may range from low to high levels of institutionalization (see e.g. Froio 
& Ganesh 2018). Hence, in its simplest definition, “Transnational social movements 
are movements whose members, organizations, or actions involve more than one 
nation” (Desai 2008: 959). More elaborately, Tarrow (1998: 184) defines 
transnational movements as “sustained contentious interactions with opponents - 
national or non-national - by connected networks of challengers organized across 
national boundaries” (Tarrow 1998: 184). In 2001, he refined this definition, and 
stated that they entail “socially mobilized groups with constituents in at least two 
states, engaged in sustained contentious interactions with power-holders in at least 
one state other than their own, or against an international institution, or a multinational 
economic actor” (2001: 11). In these and similar definitions, it is particularly the part 
of ‘sustained contentious interactions’, which is the defining feature of a movement 
vis-à-vis more loosely based mobilizations. Moreover, unlike the general definitions 
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of social movements (see above), at the transnational level, they are most frequently 
conceptualized as being organized on a looser basis, and without the explicit mention 
of sharing a ‘collective identity’. This is most likely due to the difficulties of both 
organizing collectively across larger geographical distances (in terms of travel, 
communication, and contexts), but also in terms of creating close identity bonds.    
Regarding their organization, Desai (2008) argues that:  
The dominant organizational form of transnational social movements is 
the network or coalition of groups from several different countries. […] 
Members of networks might meet face to face at international protest 
events or conferences, but they accomplish most of their work through the 
Internet. Hence, the dominant protest repertoire of transnational social 
movements includes education and mobilization, symbolic framing, and 
strategic use of information. (Desai 2008: 959) 
The network concept is also used by other scholars to define transnational movements 
(just as social movements are generally defined as ‘networks of actors’ (see e.g. della 
Porta & Diani 2006). Kouki and Romanos (2011) state that these movements “are best 
seen as networks of actors organized at local, national, and international levels, who 
mobilize people across national boundaries around a shared aim, very often toward 
the promotion of a global change” (Kouki & Romanos 2011: 2). Keck and Sikkink’s 
(1998) concept of ‘transnational advocacy networks’ is also oft cited, consisting of 
various types of actors that attempt to influence policy-making transnationally. Yet, 
they “do not engage in protest or ‘contentious politics’ but, rather, prefer lobbying or 
charitable or voluntary activities as a means of bringing about change” (Flesher 
Fominaya 2014: 40). Instead, Flesher Fominaya (2014) refers to transnational social 
movement networks, which she defines as “non-institutionalized links between 
activists and groups in different countries who share information, strategies, identities 
and goals and who may collaborate on specific campaigns or mobilizations, or through 
the creation of transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs)” (2014: 39).  
Heavily influenced by della Porta and Tarrow’s (2005) definition of transnational 
collective action as consisting of “coordinated international campaigns on the part of 
networks of activists against international actors, other states, or international 
institutions” (2005: 2f), della Porta and Caiani (2009) instead argued that the 
European transnational entities should be referred to as ‘European social movements’. 
In this way, the conceptualization was moderated to apply to the European political 
arena, namely as consisting of “challengers,” who: 
…target different levels of governance at the same time, involving loose 
networks of national (often even local) and transnational groups. The 
objectives of their protests tend to be increasingly general, with the 
participation of national and supranational collective actors that turn 
simultaneously to various governmental levels.” (2009: 16) 
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Between Networks and Movements: Transnational Coalitions 
In a response to the use of the ‘networks’ concept, Tarrow (2005) argues that it is too 
diffuse in terms of instrumentality, i.e. the role, the participating actors ascribe to the 
connections. Instead, he holds ‘coalitions’ to be the better term, as it has a more 
purposive nature. Employing Levi and Murphy’s definition, he argues that coalitions 
are “collaborative, means-oriented arrangements that permit distinct organizational 
entities to pool resources in order to effect change” (Levi & Murphy as cited in Tarrow 
2005: 654). This conceptualization draws strongly on one of the seminal definitions 
of a ‘coalition’, provided by Gamson in 1961. He argued that coalitions were 
“temporary, means-oriented alliances among individuals or groups which differ in 
goals,” but share their resources, while not (necessarily) agreeing on their values. This 
entails that its “stability […] requires tacit neutrality of the coalition on matters which 
go beyond the immediate prerogatives” (Gamson 1961: 374).  Similarly, della Porta 
& Diani (2006) define coalition-members as being “Densely connected to each other 
in terms of alliances,” having defined opponents, yet (potentially) lacking “strong 
identity links,” just as their cooperation is of a more “contingent and instrumental 
nature,” relying solely on the “exchanges and pooling of resources” with the other 
members (2006: 24). This placement of ‘coalitions’ below movements in terms of 
activist ties is rather akin to Fox’s (2010) conceptualization, based on existing 
movement literature. He argues that transnational cooperation can be divided into 
three categories: networks, coalitions and movements, depending on their degrees of 
organizational formalization, worldview alignments and communicational ties, where 
networks share the lowest levels of coordination (see also Di Gregorio 2012).  
For the purposes of this thesis, the term ‘transnational coalitions’ will be used in order 
to define both Generation Identity and Fortress Europe. Based on the literature 
reviewed above, I define a transnational coalition as:  
A (more or less) densely connected and means-oriented alliance between 
nationally-based groups and actors (who may derive from both the non- 
and institutional level), who pool (certain) resources, in order to target a 
shared opponent at the transnational level. Aside from the instrumentality 
of the cooperation, they do not necessarily share any closer identity-based 
affinities. 
This means that they pool some of their resources, yet continue having distinct 
organizational identities (see e.g. Zald & Ash 1966). They are thus organised on a 
looser, and potentially shorter-term basis than social movements and do not 
necessarily involve actors that have shared identities (della Porta & Diani 2006). The 
temporal feature of transnational coalitions will be explained further below. 
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Europeanization Literature and Transnational Coalitions 
Europeanization theory posits that extra-parliamentary organizations and actors, who 
wish to take their claims further than the national arena, will attempt to find adequate 
cooperation partners throughout Europe. The first and most evident step toward 
“moving to the EU (or European) level” thus becomes the “construction of, or 
inclusion into, a coalition across borders” (Monforte 2014: 173) as this permits an 
Europeanization of protest. Just as more general transnationalization theory argues, 
the (potential) European allies will in some way or another share the group’s agenda, 
be it in terms of a specific policy outcome (e.g. environmental questions, fishery 
quotas, a ‘no’ to TTIP, etc.), or more general cross-issue policy objectives (such as 
those called for at the European Social Forums). In this way, “having the same target 
(e.g. an international institution) has brought many similar-minded actors together 
transnationally, coordinating their efforts” (della Porta & Tarrow 2005: 10). 
Moreover, based on “the convergence and harmonization of ideological aims and 
strategic practices,” (Macklin 2013: 177), they may ultimately form more formal 
transnational coalitions or alliances (Tarrow 2005). This cooperation is expected to 
influence both the tactics and frames employed by the participating organizations, as 
they draw inspiration from each other, and will realign their “frames to better mesh 
with a coalition partner” (McCammon & Moon 2015: 332). 
The theory thus argues that the rationale for these actors is to transnationalize in order 
to mobilize against, or within, the EU institutions. Yet, social movement research has 
demonstrated that political actors may choose to pool their resources and carry out 
joint protest activities with actors in other states for various reasons, not only related 
to the EU. In this way, Europeanization of contention, in the sense of ‘simple’ 
transnationalization, can also easily take place without any role ascribed to the EU. In 
these more general instances, one of the main rationales has been the pursuit of similar 
goals, whether or not the distinct actors otherwise share characteristics.  
The following section outlines the expected mechanisms involved in the 
Europeanization of networks, namely transnational diffusion of various mobilization 
aspects (such as frames, protest tactics, and organization set-ups), and factors drawn 
from social movement coalition-building literature that explain the transnational 
networking process of far right collective actors. These mechanisms are not expected 
to take place at distinct moments in time, but rather to be ongoing and intertwined 
processes, which together lead to a certain coalition’s establishment, maintenance, 
and (potential) survival. At the same time, the diffusion does not necessarily take 
place during such a process. Hence, it is not the intention to say that transnational 
diffusion is required for transnational coalition-building, or that transnational 
diffusion only involves actors who cooperate, but rather that diffusion is one of the 
mechanisms or dynamics that may form part of coalition-building. It is thus included 
because of prior research’s demonstrations of its significance in terms of social 
movement interactions and developments, and because it is expected to have taken 
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place regarding the spread of the PEGIDA and Generation Identity groups that form 
part of the two case studies.  
TRANSNATIONAL DIFFUSION  
Prior to the instigation of official transnational networking activities, the various 
similar-minded actors are likely to already have been influenced by other actors active 
abroad. As Soule (1997) argues, it would be wrong to assume that social movements, 
or, more generally, extra-parliamentary collective actors, act in a vacuum, without 
noticing or paying attention to occurrences both at home and abroad. Instead, they 
register the happenings around other, usually similar-minded organizations, either 
through direct or indirect channels. This may in certain instances lead to diffusion 
between these actors. 
In short, the concept of diffusion refers to the “transfer in the same or similar shape 
of forms and claims of contention across space or across sectors and ideological 
divides” (McAdam et al. 2001: 68). Transnational diffusion thus entails certain 
mechanisms that lead a given group, the receiver, to in- or directly adapt objects, 
which it observes by an actor abroad (the transmitter) and decide to utilize in its own 
domestic setting64 (Shawki 2013). This can thus involve both ideational and practical 
diffusion, including the transfer of ideas, ideological fragments, frames, slogans, 
tactics, strategies, protest repertoires, cultural practices and organizational forms 
between two or more actors (Soule 1997; Shawki 2013; Van Hauwaert 2014b; 
Macklin 2013; Fielitz & Laloire 2016; Flesher Fominaya 2014). Studies of far right 
collective action have revealed that many of the groups adapt protest repertoires from 
other “political, social and cultural currents that are translated into a specific 
nationalist framework of interpretation” (Klare & Sturm 2016: 183, author’s 
translation)65. 
The receiver groups are most commonly structurally, culturally, and/or ideologically 
similar to the transmitter (Strang & Soule 1998) and faced with the same global 
economic and political context, to which they must react (Flesher Fominaya 2014). In 
this way, they consider the like-minded groups as “salient reference groups” 
(McAdam & Rucht 1993: 64) whose activities they can use as “potential models for 
their own actions” (Ibid.). Hence, the receiving actors identify an appropriate object, 
“observe its success and will try to reproduce this success by adopting” it to their 
given setting and context (Van Hauwaert 2013: 12). Concerning protest mobilizations, 
                                                          
64 ‘Transmitter’ and ‘receiver’ are also sometimes referred to as the ‘agent’ and ‘receiving actor’ 
(Van Hauwaert 2014b), or ‘sender’ and ‘receiver’ (Gilardi 2012). 
65 Historically, this was visible by the German Nazi-party of the 1930s, which was inspired by 
the German Arbeiterpartei (Worker’s Party). More currently, it is also visible by the 
Autonomous Nationalists and Generation Identity, and their adaptation of left-wing protest 
repertoires.   
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diffusion can thus lead to the spread of collective action across groups and space 
(Beissinger 2007) as a ‘wave’ of a certain type of protest may be instigated (see e.g. 
Soule 1997 for an example) just as other activist groups frequently imitate successful 
protest repertoires (Tilly as cited in Soule 1997: 859).  
Usually, the object of diffusion requires some form of moderation or alteration by the 
receiving actor as it must be aligned to the new national socio-political context, “so 
as to increase its likelihood of direct success” (Van Hauwaert 2014b: 6). Flesher 
Fominaya (2014) refers to this process as (cultural) translation, as the receiver must 
interpret how best to appropriate the object to the new setting, especially concerning 
gaining public resonance. This can be a difficult process, and may lead to “recursive 
interactions, ruptures, backlash, resistance and feedback effects” (Malets & Zajak as 
cited in Flesher Fominaya 2014: 47), making the translation fail. 
Diffusion Mechanisms: Emulation and Learning 
The mechanisms involved in diffusion involve either a process of emulation (or 
imitation) or a process of learning by the receiver. Whilst emulation can take place 
through either direct or indirect/mediated diffusion, learning requires an active 
transmitter, and can thus only take place through direct and active face-to-face 
transmission (Van Hauwaert 2014b). In the relational model of diffusion, the process 
mainly occurs through inter-personal or direct contact or communication (i.e. face-to-
face or via telecommunication), requiring an active transmitter, from whom the 
receiver learns and adapts the given object. This process usually requires “activists 
who travel from one social movement context to another” (Flesher Fominaya 2014) 
to either learn from (receiver), or teach (transmitter), others, but it can also take place 
through online or phone exchanges (see e.g. Macklin 2013). The offline encounters 
can involve brief face-to-face encounters, meetings, seminars and conferences, or at 
protest events. It can involve both an informal exchange of ideas (see e.g. Hafez 2014), 
information dissemination (e.g. of a more technical nature, but also news from abroad 
to be spread via alternative media platforms) (Macklin 2013), or more explicit and 
formal training and workshop sessions (see e.g. Greer & Hauptmeier 2012; Strang & 
Soule 1998). Particularly, the more general practice of ‘networking’ has been found 
to be important for this type of far right transmission, as the practice functions “as a 
crucible for the exchange of ideas and information on policy and praxis” (see Macklin 
2013: 177). 
McAdam and Rucht (1993) introduced the concept of in-direct diffusion. In their 
seminal article on ‘Cross-National Diffusion,’ they pointed to possible ‘non-relational 
channels of diffusion’, where there are no direct ties between the two actors. Since 
then, research has shown that much diffusion takes place through impersonal or non-
direct relations. This can occur via the media, for example. It most often occurs when 
the receivers “identify with transmitters in some way, socially constructing similarity 
between themselves and the transmitters” and therefore emulate or imitate those 
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transmitters’ actions (Shawki 2013: 134). Thus, prior research has demonstrated that 
structurally equivalent actors in terms of factors such as culture, values, beliefs, and 
identity are prone to emulate each other, also without direct contact (Strang & Soule 
1998; Soule 1997; Shawki 2013).  
Limitations to Exploring Diffusion Processes  
It is hard to ascertain how exactly these diffusion processes take place, and how it is 
decided by a receiver that the particular object should be adopted. Particularly, the 
(indirect) diffusion of worldview is very difficult to ascertain, as it might not be that 
explicitly expressed that the ideas come from elsewhere; just as it is hard to establish 
the exact diffusion mechanism as the exact way the object was transferred is not 
always explicated. However, it is the aim “to assemble enough pieces of information 
and convincing ‘smoking guns’ to support the hypothesis that diffusion takes place 
and, especially, to uncover the mechanisms that drive the diffusion process” (Gilardi 
2012: 11). This will be done by considering the frames and protest tactics utilized and 
how they change, plus the available statements about the given direct networking 
between transnational actors (see Methodological Framework for more on the 
methods involved).  
SETTING UP, MAINTAINING, AND SUSTAINING A COALITION 
While these various diffusion processes can go some way in explaining the 
transnational transfer of frames, protest forms, and organizational set-ups between 
extra-parliamentary contentious actors, there is also a need to explore the more 
cooperative and communicative aspects of a coalition-building process. Hence, in the 
following section, the more strategy- and organization-related factors will be outlined.  
The section is divided into three main parts, according to the progression of the 
transnational cooperation. It thus outlines the theoretical expectations related to the 
coalition’s instigation, its maintenance, and, depending on its raison d’être, the 
context, and individual member group developments, its survival or end. Hence, the 
‘maintenance’ refers to the actions that ensure the coalition’s continued existence, and 
(potentially) lead to inter-group unity, while the ‘survival’ refers to the actions, which 
ensure its viability and perseverance. The theoretical output presented here draws on 
social movement coalition-building theories and includes perspectives from political 
opportunity structures, resource mobilization, and collective identity research. It is the 
aim to synthesize these theoretical findings into one overarching theoretical 
framework, which can be employed to analyse the two transnational coalitions. 
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Coalition Initiation  
Research has demonstrated that transnational coalitions are most successful, when 
actors share ideational, cognitive, or emotional ties (i.e. internal propensities), and/or 
see an incentive in collaborating with actors from abroad due to external factors 
(Chang 2008). With the ever-stronger effects of globalization follows also closer 
alignments of perceived concerns of diverse political actors, who can choose to unite 
transnationally in order to address these issues together. In this way, the “shared 
framing of purpose, enemy and tactical preference” can lead to closer transnational 
cooperation (Levi & Murphy 2006: 657). Shared interests and goals are thus seen as 
pivotal prerequisites for coalition building. Yet, they do not usually suffice (Tarrow 
2005). Additionally, scholars have found it beneficial that the coalition members 
(either) feel solidarity towards each other; have overlapping or common beliefs and 
identities, similar cultural backgrounds, pre-existing social ties amongst them, and/or 
flexible or compatible ideologies (Staggenborg 2013; Bandy & Smith 2005; Gerhards 
& Rucht 1992; Imig & Tarrow 2000; McCammon & Moon 2015).  
Hence, the stronger the preceding ‘value homophily’ between the groups, the more 
likely a coalition is to ensue (Di Gregorio 2012: 2). Conversely, scholars have shown 
that too distinct ideologies may stand in the way for coalition formation (see e.g. 
Gerhards & Rucht 1992; Levi & Murphy 2006; Chabanet as cited in Monforte 2014) 
and that a too “particularized world view” can impede a group’s transnational 
coalition opportunities (Rohlinger & Quadagno as cited in McCammon & Moon 
2015: ). It is thus of particular relevance to consider the alignment of the specific 
worldviews and frames employed by the different actors, in order to assess the likely 
viability of said coalition (Ibid.). 
Moreover, pre-existing links and earlier networks are two other frequently cited 
conducers to coalition-formation (Van Dyke 2003; Levi & Murphy 2006). This entails 
that the participating groups have already built up trust relations, and thus, believe in 
each other’s commitment to the given cause (Tarrow 2005). When no ties pre-exist, 
there is need for good networking and relational skills by either experienced activists 
or movement leadership.  
A further issue, which is especially relevant regarding both the far right (see e.g. 
Ahrne et al. 2005), but also coalition-building writ large (see e.g. Monforte 2014), is 
the matter of evaluating the respectability of the other participating groups before 
instigating cooperation. Before joining the given transnational coalition, the group’s 
leadership must thus evaluate whether it is a ‘good fit,’ so to speak, i.e. whether the 
transnational cooperation serves its purposes and helps further the group’s political 
agenda and goals (Ibid.). Thus, the groups in question, especially the parties, must 
evaluate the effect of participating in the given mobilization in terms of a potential 
loss or gain in legitimacy in their national setting – the key place for political influence 
for a political party.  
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On the other hand, the external factors refer to the evaluation of the contextual 
political opportunities and/or threats, which may lead to a search for coalition partners 
(Staggenborg 1986; McCammon & Moon 2015; Chang 2008). Scholars disagree as 
to whether it is the expansion or the contraction of opportunities that foster 
transnational coalitions (Chang 2008). Opening domestic political opportunities, such 
as legislative changes that indicate a more receptive political environment (see e.g. 
Staggenborg 1986) or the creation of relations with elite allies (Van Dyke & 
McCammon 2010) have been found to further coalition-building attempts. 
Conversely, other scholars argue that open national opportunities exclude the need for 
finding transnational alliance partners. Instead, threats, such as hardening legislation 
or government-sponsored repression, have been identified as being more conducive 
to transnational coalition-building as this necessitates a change in a movement’s 
tactical strategy (Chang 2008) (for overview, see McCammon & Moon 2015). This 
latter finding has been somewhat substantiated regarding far right transnational 
networking. Macklin (2013) argues that transnational networking and coalition 
building “facilitates the further development of ‘tolerant’ support networks for 
‘intolerant’ ideologically inspired action” to actors “who are frequently marginalised 
within the context of their own domestic politics” (Macklin 2013: 177). Zúquete 
(2015) similarly argues: “The perception that nationalists are an excluded group, 
marginalized and persecuted because of their difference and their challenge to the 
dominant mainstream paradigm is in fact the fuel behind their cooperation beyond 
national borders” (2015: 80f).  
In summary, transnational coalitions are most frequently instigated by actors who 
share the same goals, if not the same worldview. They are often set up based on pre-
existing networks or the networking skills of movement entrepreneurs. The invited 
actors must thus decide whether to participate based on an evaluation of the 
respectability of the other groups. While it is debatable whether it is open or closed 
domestic political opportunities, which lead to transnationalization, prior research has 
found that far right actors often seek relations to similar-minded actors abroad, as a 
means to find support against suppression.  
Duration of Transnational Coalitions 
Extra-parliamentary groups most frequently arrange coalitions as a means to fight a 
shared threat or to make use of a shared opportunity for mobilization (Tarrow 2005). 
The groups do not always establish the extent of the cooperation from the outset and 
some coalitions may have had either shorter- or longer-term plans than the end-result 
showed (McCammon & Moon 2015). Yet, in general, coalitions can have two goals 
and/or outcomes. Depending on the strength and type of their ties (see e.g. Granovetter 
1973) (e.g. in terms of a more or less shared identity), a transnational coalition may 
be instrumental and for a short duration (weak ties) or substantive and longer-term 
(strong ties) (Di Gregorio 2012). Hence, more material or instructive ties, such as 
resource pooling and information-dissemination, will most likely solely lead to 
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instrumental alliances, while stronger, inter-personal ties between the activists in the 
distinct groups are more likely to foster a substantive alliance (Baldassarri & Diani as 
cited in Di Gregorio 2012). 
Thus, either the coalitions are of a short-term duration, most commonly entailing a 
single campaign or protest event against a defined actor (an ‘event coalition’) or they 
can consist of a long-term sustained level of activism (‘enduring coalitions’), where 
the relationship becomes more formalized and permanent (Levi & Murphy 2006). 
This formalization may involve the creation of common decision-making entities and 
rules, and may lead to the endurance of the coalition by “routinizing transnational 
contacts and facilitating the mobilization of resources for transnational action” (Bandy 
& Smith 2005: 4). 
Coalition-Maintenance: Resource Pooling, Communication, and Shared Activities  
Transnational coalition building thus usually involves some sort of pooling of 
resources between the different national organizations making up the coalition 
(Tarrow 2005; Levi & Murphy 2006; Monforte 2014), especially when it involves 
resource-poor organizations. Most far-right extra-parliamentary actors, for instance, 
neither have strong financial nor material resources (Caiani et al. 2012) and can 
therefore not be considered to have much financial advantage when it comes to 
influencing decision-making (unlike e.g. business interests). Hence, like other extra-
parliamentary actors, they may perceive an advantage in cooperating with (more 
resource strong) actors from abroad in order to stand stronger materially and/or 
ideationally (McCammon & Moon 2015).  
While the participation in transnational un- and conventional actions can provide 
activists with “political and organizational skills that can influence their subsequent 
organizing initiatives” (McAdam as cited in Bandy & Smith 2005: 3), previous 
explorations of social movements’ Europeanization have also revealed that the actors 
face considerable resource-related challenges in this endeavour (see e.g. della Porta 
& Caiani 2009). Moreover, as Rucht has pointed out, the (usually) segmented (grass-
roots) nature of extra-parliamentary actors can provide hindrances for their 
organization and coordination of activities (as cited in Chabanet 2011). Bandy and 
Smith (2005) state that the inclusion of “pre-existing [and well-organised national] 
movements with significant mobilization already underway” into the coalition (2005: 
233) can help overcome these resource-related problems, as they can provide 
organizational expertise and resources.  
Transnational coalitions are thus likely to consist of organizations that have disparate 
levels of power and resources (Flesher Fominaya 2014), and this has effects on the 
roles within the given cooperation. Yet, once a part of the coalition, all member groups 
must at least have the capability to contribute with sufficient resources (Monforte 
2014). The more resources mobilized by a particular group, the more central a role 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
133 
this group will have in the given coalition and the development of its frames and 
collective actions (see e.g. Levi & Murphy 2006). At the same time, the groups that 
do not contribute with many resources will be less actively involved and are more 
‘passively included’ in the coalition (Ibid.). 
(Online) Transnational Communication between Leadership 
Continuous cross-group communication is a key prerequisite for the establishment 
and survival of a transnational coalition. Regular communication permits “the more 
rapid and continuing ‘diffusion’ of movement values, strategies, and goals” (McAdam 
et al. 2001: 68). Thus, the more interaction between the participating groups, the 
bigger the likelihood of a sustained coalition-commitment and of the development of 
a shared vision through frame alignment (Di Gregorio 2012).  
Prior research has demonstrated the difficulty of instigating transnational protests if 
there is a lack of shared identities, solidarity, and social networks between the various 
national groups (Imig & Tarrow 2000). As Imig and Tarrow (2000) argue, the social 
networks are particularly vital as they “provide the interpersonal trust, the collective 
identities and the social communication of opportunities that galvanize individuals 
into collective action and coordinate their actions against significant others in a social 
movement” (2000: 80). While such an assertion often refers to the movements at 
activist level, such creations of affective ties can only be furthered through exchanges 
between the various group leaders. They must first agree on shared transnational 
collective actions and activities where said activists can meet and potentially develop 
a “common, more or less, European identity” (della Porta & Caiani 2009: 96).  
Besides the geographical proximity, especially the introduction of improved digital 
communication channels has facilitated the exchange between national groups 
considerably (della Porta & Tarrow 2005), acting as a tool of empowerment (Castells 
2012), including on the far right66. The main reasons for the extensive use of the 
internet by extra-parliamentary actors relates to issues of anonymity, the geographical 
                                                          
66 The inclusion of the web in the analyses of the far right is a relatively new research agenda. 
Yet, since the early 2000s, there has been a steady increase in scholarly output that focuses on 
this particular arena of mobilization. A multitude of far right actors has embraced the online 
opportunities for ideational work, mobilization, activity coordination, networking, recruitment, 
alliance formation, sale of merchandise, information, and propaganda dissemination (Veugelers 
& Menard 2018; Caiani & della Porta 2018; Caiani &  Parenti 2013). Currently, most far right 
non- and institutional actors have their own websites and social media accounts (especially on 
Facebook and Twitter in a European context). For some groups, particularly on the more 
extreme right (e.g. neo-Nazis and Holocaust revisionists), online activism is a cherished 
possibility to overcome the more closed offline opportunities (Caiani & Parenti 2013; see also 
della Porta & Tarrow 2005), just as more informally structured organizations can remain active 
without having to formalize their organization (e.g. EDL) (Veugelers & Menard 2018). 
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breadth, the speed of dissemination, and the low entry barriers (Caiani & Parenti 2009; 
2013; Jackson & Feldman 2011; Perry 2000 cited in Veugelers & Menard 2018), 
which entails that it is a rather low threshold activity (Van Laer & Van Aelst 2010).  
In short, the internet is used by the far right to “create fences, build barriers, and dig 
trenches” (Caiani & della Porta 2018: 333), and, in this way, acts as an escape from 
marginalization (della Porta & Tarrow 2005). Thus, the groups not only use the online 
offers concerning the mobilization of national activists (consider e.g. PEGIDA 
Germany’s extensive use of Facebook) but also concerning the transnational 
organization of collective action and information and ideology dissemination (Jackson 
& Feldman 2011; Geddes 2014; Caiani & Wagemann 2009). Numerous non- and 
institutional far right actors thus rely heavily on social media, especially Facebook 
(and Twitter), as their “central communicative and organisational tool” (Bartlett et al. 
2011: 4), just as they employ online communicational channels such as YouTube or 
FaceTime to coordinate transnational activities and meetings. It is therefore worth 
exploring further, how frequently they are in contact with their coalition partners to 
assess the degree of cooperation.  
Activities of Transnational Coalitions: Protests and Ideational Work 
Aside from these more organizational and strategical communicative links, plus the 
groups’ collective action, numerous coalitions also carry out other forms of joint 
activities. Research into the activities of the Global Justice Movement, for instance, 
shows that conferences “and other forms of international contact […] create arenas 
for forming and strengthening networks” (Keck and Sikkink 1998:12). More general 
information sharing can also further the trust between the various groups, leading to 
a rise in coalition activities (Ellingson et al. as cited in McCammon & Moon 2015). 
Research into the activities of the far right has also demonstrated that much of the 
transnational interaction among far right non- and institutional activists takes place at 
the more ideational level, e.g. through conferences, meetings, and social events (see 
e.g. Zúquete 2015; Hafez 2014; Stöss 2001). Here, they, for instance, discuss and 
develop shared conceptions of ‘Europe’ and what it means to be ‘European’, plus 
discuss the EU as a political actor. Hence, these gatherings should also be considered 
as part of the Europeanization process of the given actors, due to the ideological 
content and transnational actor participation, and they will also be included in the 
analysis.   
Coalition-Survival?  
Previous research on Europeanization has shown that it has been difficult to maintain 
the transnational ties, and that there were several obstacles hindering the development 
of a European social movement (see e.g. Tarrow 2005). As an initial remark, due to 
the participating actors’ diverse ambitions for influence and national contexts, one 
should not forget that most of them mainly focus their attention on the domestic level, 
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and remain active at home, whilst participating in transnational coalitions. Moreover, 
far right groups, especially the parties, also have other obligations and interests 
besides maintaining and fostering their transnational ties. This also infers that it can 
be problematic to sustain the transnational mobilization, and to continue driving the 
work forward. Moreover, other known factors that may influence the outcome relate 
to issues such as the national differences between groups, both in terms of language, 
but especially the contextual requirements and restraints. The context thus has 
repercussions on the frames employed, the importance and relevance of given issues, 
plus the available resources, and levels of repression faced by a given group (Chase-
Dunn et al. 2014).  
Moreover, concerning the far right and transnational cooperation, the political actors 
on the far right are notorious for their big problems reaching agreement throughout 
the 21st century. This has evolved around more organizational quarrels, like 
leadership battles (Camus & Lebourg 2017). Yet, most of the problems relate to 
ideology, particularly “inherent nationalism and political differences” (Durham & 
Power 2010: 92). Hence, one of the main hindrances of the creation of a nationalist 
international is the organizations’ ideological differences. This has both been a 
problem for inter-party cooperation (e.g. in the European Parliament (Startin 2010; 
Almeida 2010)), but also non- and institutional group interaction. Zúquete (2015) has 
argued that there is “an ideological chasm” between the groups making up the anti-
Islam scene, e.g. regarding their views on the Jews, the U.S., but also Russia, that 
makes deeper cooperation unlikely (2015: 79). Moreover, historical conflicts about 
state borders have also been a hindrance for closer cooperation between several 
European far right groups over time, especially post-WWII (see e.g. Weidinger 2016). 
Nonewithstanding, the social movement literature points to several criteria, which are 
advantageous for the survival of a coalition. These are mainly related to 
communicational and identity aspects. Tarrow (2005) has argued that there must be 
mechanisms in place to tackle challenges in terms of language, tactics, culture, 
ideology, etc., just as other scholars have emphasised the need to either avoid conflicts 
altogether, or at least have methods ready to solve (pending) internal tensions 
(McCammon & Moon 2015). The various processes of convergence and divergence 
in transnational coalitions thus imply an ongoing tension between the groups’ 
homogeneity and heterogeneity and the maintenance work required for successful 
coalition-survival. Furthermore, Bandy and Smith (2005) argue that there are certain 
social conditions that aid transnational coalition survival, namely that they are based 
on “well-organized national movements,” which have the organizational and 
economical capacity to arrange and facilitate transnational mobilization and cross-
border encounters. The development of strong national organizations, which are 
firmly rooted within the national far-right scenes, can thus contribute to a strong 
coalition.  
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The above framework has outlined scholarly findings regarding transnational 
coalitions and far right cooperation. While it has shown that the far right has struggled 
to sustain such coalitions in the past, it has also outlined factors, which have been 
found conducive to both maintain a coalition and ensure its survival. These involve 
both communicational, ideational, organizational, and material aspects, while it is a 
bit more debatable what exact role political opportunities play in terms of both setting 
up and sustaining a coalition. Moreover, it has also explained that particularly 
reputational and legitimacy deliberations and nationalist feuds may prevent groups 
from joining certain other, potentially more contentious, far right actors from abroad. 
At the same time, it has outlined a framework to examine the form(s) of diffusion, 
which took place especially at the initiation of the cooperation, where several of the 
other groups adopted both the name and logo of PEGIDA Germany and GI France. 
Such diffusion may also have occurred at other points during the cooperation, 
indicating the need to further analyse how these diffusion processes take place. All of 
these factors and aspects will be utilised to analyse the initiation, maintenance, and 
(potential) survival of Generation Identity and Fortress Europe. 
 EUROPEANIZATION OF FRAMES  
Scholars, who are interested in exploring the effect of the EU on the European public 
sphere, and who consider society from a constructivist perspective (see e.g. della Porta 
& Caiani 2009), have begun exploring the (potential) Europeanization of extra-
parliamentary actors’ perceptions. Such explorations often aim to unravel the extent 
to which said actors develop shared notions of ‘Europe’, and mobilize around the same 
key issues, against the same opponents, and with the same solutions in mind, thus 
bridging the European borders at the more perceptual level. This study has a similar 
aim, as it wishes to explore the far right groups’ construction of their external reality, 
and how it aligns with groups and activists from abroad. This will be done by 
employing a frame analytical approach.  
Drawing on the work of Goffman and Snow, McAdam and colleagues (1996) 
conceptualized ‘framing’ as the “conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to 
fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and 
motivate collective action” (1996: 6). In this way, so they argued, framing processes 
mediate “between opportunity, organization, and action” (Ibid: 5). It can therefore be 
used beneficially in combination with more structural approaches in order to 
understand a given mobilization, and its (potential) inclusion of transnational actors. 
Hence, in short, ‘frame analysis’ explores the ways political actors “construct and 
communicate their (internal and external) reality” (Caiani et al. 2012: 13) by 
attributing meaning to given issues and conflicts. 
This study employs Snow and Benford’s (1988) approach, and focuses on the groups’ 
constructions of collective action frames, and the transnational collective identity 
frames, which may be produced through these mobilization frames (Benford & Snow 
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2000). While such collective identities are frequently examined at the individual 
activist levels, the approach here instead investigates how the various movement 
entrepreneurs and leaders construct them (see e.g. Hunt et al. 1994; Benford & Snow 
2000). It is thus assumed that the involved groups and actors will begin constructing 
shared worldviews, notions of solidarity, and enemy pictures, once they begin 
cooperating, if not even prior to this, for instance through various transnational 
diffusion processes (see above). Hence, the networking and frame changes do not 
necessarily take place in a linear progression, and may influence each other in various 
ways, which remain to be explored. The following sections will introduce the 
‘collective action frames’ and ‘collective identity frames’ and explain how they relate 
to the far right, and how they will be employed in this study. 
Collective Action Frames 
Looking for a means to account for social movements’ discursive means and 
processes, Snow and Benford (1988) devised the term ‘collective action frames’. They 
defined it as “action oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate 
the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization” (1988: 198). 
Collective action frames are thus located below the level of ideology (Caiani et al. 
2012) and include the groups’ dominant worldviews, often produced and voiced by 
the leadership. An organization utilises the frames strategically in order to “assign 
meaning to and interpret, relevant events and conditions in ways that are intended to” 
both mobilize the proponents, demobilise the opponents, and generally persuade 
others of the worthiness of the cause (see Snow & Benford 1988: 198).  
These frames are strategically constructed around three core framing tasks, namely: 
the outlining of a (perceived) social problem and an implied blame attribution to a 
culpable actor (the diagnosis), ways to solve this given problem (prognosis), and 
incentives plus reasons for taking action (motivational frame) (Snow & Benford 
1988). When constructing these frames, the actors must both consider the potential 
support the given frame can amass (Caiani & della Porta 2018) but also how best to 
create counter-arguments to a regime’s legitimating frames (Andretta & Caiani 2005). 
Moreover, the ‘framers,’ i.e. the movement entrepreneurs, must also be able to 
identify and express the ongoing political developments, and thus, potential 
opportunities, in order to call for social change (Gamson & Meyer as cited in 
Lindekilde 2014). The frames are therefore frequently employed instrumentally, in 
order to sway public opinion and foster social change, by offering alternatives for the 
current political order. This entails that frames can be crucial to campaign outcomes 
as they may lead to political changes if they resonate with the population at large.  
In Europeanization literature, several scholars have looked into the frame shifts that 
take place amongst the organizations (see e.g. Parks 2015; Monforte 2014) and their 
activists (see e.g. della Porta & Caiani 2009) during a Europeanization process. 
Political actors’ use of frames is thus a constantly ongoing and changing process, 
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which depends on the political context, the target(s), the interactions with other actors, 
and the audience (della Porta & Piazza as cited in Monforte 2014: 40). Focusing on 
the leadership, it is the aim here to explore the different national groups’ collective 
action frames, in order to deduce their mobilization objectives and symbolic resources 
(see Chapter 5), plus how they align with those of the other groups in the transnational 
coalition (Chapters 8-9). Hence, it is not the aim to explore the frame shifts over time, 
but rather to analyse the main collective action frames of the distinct groups and how 
they align with both the EU’s language (della Porta & Caiani 2009) and the other 
groups in the respective coalitions (for more on the method, see Chapter 2).  
Collective Identity Frames: The Construction of In- and Out-Group Identities 
In order to create in-group solidarity between the activists of a given collective actor, 
a leader must establish an in-group identity (an ‘us’) around which the activists can 
further their sense of belonging and commitment to the cause, and with this, their 
continued motivation to act in unison (Robnett 2015). One of the first activities of a 
movement entrepreneur, or political leader, is thus to construct a movement identity, 
which is both meant to unite the members and adherents against their adversaries 
(Snow & Benford 1988) as well as to more clearly define the general boundaries of 
the organization (see e.g. Robnett 2015). At the intra-movement level, the boundary-
construction consists of defining “what the collective ‘we’ is, and what it is not” 
(Flesher Fominaya 2010). (Far right) actors including political parties, protest groups, 
vigilante groups, and groupuscules (i.e. most political actors) must thus create a 
‘group identity’ to foster in-group solidarity and shared purpose.  
This so-called ‘collective identity’ is a rather contested concept both in terms of its 
definition as well as its scope67 (see e.g. Flesher Fominaya 2010). Melucci has 
ascertained that some determining characteristics need to be present in order to foster 
a group’s cohesion and ability to act in unison (Melucci 1985). In this way, movement 
organisers must forge a sense of common purpose, “group consciousness, solidarity, 
and commitment” (Robnett 2015: 202), and a “shared perception of belonging to a 
specific social group” (Pries 2012: 22). They do this by constructing an identity 
around which the members can unite and which makes them feel “inextricably linked 
to other actors, not necessarily identical but surely compatible” in a joint collective 
mobilization (della Porta & Diani 2006: 21). In this way, the members of the group 
develop “a shared sense of ‘oneness’ or ‘we-ness’ anchored in real or imagined shared 
attributes and experiences among those who comprise the collectivity in relation or 
contrast to one more actual or imagined sets of others” (Snow 2001: 3). Such an 
identity is forged at the symbolic and the discursive level. The symbolic level refers 
to the (shared) construction of various symbolic and cultural resources, such as 
                                                          
67 One of the major scholarly disagreements is whether to consider ‘collective identity’ as a 
process of constant negotiation (see e.g. Melucci 2000) or rather a symbolic and static property 
or product of a movement, distinguishing it from others (Snow 2001).  
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“names, narratives, symbols, verbal styles, rituals, clothing, and so on” (Poletta & 
Jasper 2001: 285), which create a ‘collective differentiation,’ demarcating the ‘in-
group’ from the ‘out-group’ (see also Snow 2001). A prominent far right example 
could be the skinhead movement. Moreover, for these sentiments to develop, the 
movement leadership or entrepreneurs must construct ‘collective identity frames’ 
around which solidarity can arise (see also Fominaya 2014).  
Collective Action: Creating a Collective Identity around Shared Blame Attributions 
Yet, this identity construction also takes place through various mechanisms of framing 
activities (Snow & McAdam 2000; Hunt et al. 1994) frequently expressed during 
collective actions. The collective identities thus do not emerge naturally from 
movements. Instead, the movement entrepreneurs must strategically frame both their 
understanding of self and of the ‘other’, in order to gather support. This involves 
engaging in a “process of defining this ‘we,’ typically in some opposition to ‘they’ 
who have different interests or values” (Gamson 1992: 7). Such frame constructions 
are usually “built around certain categories, strata or dimensions” (Pries 2012: 22), 
which distinguish the ‘us’ from the ‘them’. One famous example is the Occupy 
Movement’s construction of ‘us’ as ‘the 99%’ (Flesher Fominaya 2014). Hence, in 
terms of far right transnational collective identity construction, there is a necessity to 
consider the group’s dual boundary construction of an in- and outgroup. One must 
both explore how the groups define the ‘others’, but also their uniting frames, which 
are meant to ensure inter-group cohesion amongst the collaborative partners. 
However, especially regarding protest movements, it might even suffice for the 
participants to agree on the opponent, and in this way not share further collective ties 
(McGarthy et al. as cited in Mercea 2017: 547). The antagonised ‘they’ thus 
commonly consist of actors who are perceived as being culpable for the occurrence 
of the given phenomena and to whom the blame is attributed. This most frequently 
entails the actors responsible for the decision-making, or actors found to conflict with 
the causes and identities of the protagonists (Benford & Hunt 1992). These 
adversaries, or opponents, are “often personified as irrational, immoral, and devoid of 
compassion and feeling” (Shibutani as cited in Hunt et al. 1994: 192), while the 
reverse is the case for the antagonist ‘us’ (Ibid.). For example, in regard to the issue 
of climate change, left-wing actors frequently villainise ‘big business’, just as populist 
movements juxtapose ‘us’, ‘the people’, against ‘them’, the economic and/or political 
elites (Aslanidis 2017).  
The Far Right and National and/or Civilizational ‘Othering’ 
When it comes to far right (and thus, nationalist) agitation, the boundary-construction 
is often also extrapolated to the more general societal level where the collective 
identity frames frequently are employed to construct an ethnic or cultural 
differentiation between those who belong to the group (the ‘in-group’), and those who 
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are excluded (the ‘out-group’ or ‘enemy’) (Gerö et al. 2017). Hence, as Carl Schmitt 
has argued, the coherence and communitarian ties of the (most commonly national) 
in-group can be established through the creation of enemy pictures, around which the 
‘we’ can (be) mobilize(d) (as cited in Weiβ 2017). Particularly far right actors, 
including parties, are thus prone to build up their own identity around a set of external 
enemies (‘them’), who the (usually) national, ‘we’ should go up against (see e.g. 
Minkenberg 2011). The literature has demonstrated how this most frequently involves 
a nativist (and thus, exclusionary) construction of a national ‘us’, which must unite 
around the defence of the nation against the ‘intrusive,’ and most frequently, 
ethnically different, ‘them’, be they e.g. immigrants, a national minority, an 
international organisation, or even ‘globalisation’ at the more abstract level. In this 
way, the far right actors attempt to forge symbolical exclusionary societal boundaries 
aiming at pre-defining belonging based on ethnic, and at times, racial criteria (Pytlas 
2018). 
Within the last decades, scholarly attention has been increasingly directed towards 
certain far right actors’ “construction of a complex (and sometimes contradictory) 
identity where traditional nationalistic values and innovative transnational elements 
coexist” (Caiani 2014). This is frequently expressed around more ‘civilizational’ 
notions of exclusion, particularly targeted at Islam and its adherents (see also Zúquete 
2015; Berntzen 2018a). Yet, despite this redirection in focus by many current far right 
organizations and actors, which now base their in-group definitions around 
civilizational criteria68, numerous far right groups still perceive their nation-state 
adherence as being the defining ‘us’ and ‘them’ demarcation feature.  
Coalition Building: Constructing a European ‘We’ against a Common ‘Other’ 
Notwithstanding the exact employed ‘us’ and ‘them’ framing in the national setting 
(i.e. whether ‘national’ or already ‘European’ in boundary terms), the process of 
identity-creation is ever changing, developing according to the ensuing strategies 
pursued in order to gain political influence. Hence, if a given organization decides to 
join forces with other national or foreign groups, it is likely to have to moderate and/or 
expand its boundaries and views on ‘us’ and ‘them’ accordingly, especially if it also 
wishes to take the contention outside of the national context. It is thus through the 
perception of having shared antagonists and agendas that national political actors may 
develop cross-national links with other similar-minded actors and eventually start 
mobilizing jointly. Yet, before this can take place, the different actors must first justify 
their cross-border and European collaboration through their frames in order to 
persuade their constituents and supporters about the justification for joining forces 
                                                          
68 E.g. the Western against the Islamic world (for instance argued by proponents of the Counter-
Jihad Movement), or the European civilization against the rest of the world (e.g. the New Right) 
(see e.g. Betz & Meret 2009; Denes 2012; Hafez 2014; Bar-On 2008). 
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with other European actors. Hence, they must explain why they believe a transnational 
coalition is the answer and what the ‘glue’ is that unites the groups.  
Moreover, the frequent transnational interaction, both through protest actions but also 
more general networking activities, is also anticipated to lead to the creation of cross-
national solidarities and shared goals between the groups, and potentially, even a 
‘European identity’ (Imig & Tarrow 2001a). Hence, it is expected that the groups will 
‘Europeanize’ their definition of ‘us’ through the continued interaction with similar-
minded actors at the transnational European level, as the actors jointly must attempt 
to foster a shared transnational commitment to the cause, together with inter-group 
solidarity (Busher 2016). This is a difficult task, particularly when the different group 
identities are “diffuse and less easily embedded” (Tarrow 2005: 135 about the GJM), 
but also when several of the participating actors have nationalist perceptions of the 
‘us’. Yet, this can be done by drawing on collective conceptions of what it means to 
be ‘European’ and outlining the reasons as to why the European actors must stand 
together. Most frequently, these reasons pertain to the shared perception amongst the 
European (far right) activists that they are up against a common ‘enemy’. Thus, the 
leaders and movement entrepreneurs together conjure collective enemy images, which 
the imagined community must be protected against, and around which to mobilize. 
This can take place by constructing images of a past and present pan-European unity 
against an extra-European ‘other’ (in this process obliterating or neglecting mentions 
of intra-European controversies) or by pointing out the factors that unite the 
Europeans against both the external and internal ‘others’. The enemy in this way 
becomes instrumental for the group formation between otherwise divergent actors 
(see e.g. Gerö et al. 2017; Mercea 2017). 
The analysis of the collective identity frames will form part of Chapters 8-9 as a means 
to establish whether the groups participating in FE and GI respectively developed 
shared transnational collective identity frames during their time of cooperation. If this 
turns out to be the case, then this can give a good indication of the strength of the 
given coalition in terms of inter-group unity. The framing approach will thus be 
utilised to explore several aspects of the far right groups’ perceptions of reality, both 
in terms of the frames around which they organize protest actions (the collective 
action frames) and the ones to create in-group solidarities (the collective identity 
frames). Both aspects will be analysed in order to deduce the transnational overlaps 
in the constructions of ‘Europe’ and ‘Europeans’ and the protagonist/antagonist 
relationships between the organizations and their adversaries across the continent.  
 BRIEF OUTLINE OF THE MODEL FOR ANALYSIS   
The following model explains the theoretical framework outlined above and is guiding 
for the ensuing analysis. It is founded on theoretical approaches that consider the 
strategic deliberations around the networking and collective action involved in far 
right Europeanization, and how this affects, or is affected by, the groups’ collective 
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identities. This allows for the obtainment of a deeper understanding of far right extra-
parliamentary actors’ strategic maneuvering at the domestic and European level 
during a time of pan-European ‘crisis’. Throughout the (anticipated) period of 
Europeanization, the national groups’ strategies are expected to change depending on 
their political and discursive opportunities at the domestic and European level, just as 
their symbolic and material resources are indicative for their mobilization strategies 
(see e.g. della Porta & Caiani 2009; Monforte 2014).  
It is important to keep in mind from the outset that the various transnationalization 
processes do not take place in a linear, or consecutive, fashion. Instead, they occur as 
part of a continuous process of inter-group exchanges, inspirations, and 
collaborations, which again affect the next steps of the various processes, just as the 
national and European political contexts will continuously affect the developments of 
the transnationalization process. Hence, this rather simplistic portrayal of the 
Europeanization process is not as clear-cut in reality and may develop along 
somewhat different paths than the model proscribes.  
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Stage 1: The Domestic Level: Creation of the Groups and Domestic Mobilization 
While the study places its main emphasis on the Europeanization efforts and strategies 
of far right extra-parliamentary actors, the domestic political and historical context is 
important to include in order to argue convincingly about the groups’ different 
political strategies and organizational choices. In terms of the model outlined above, 
during the initial stages of their mobilization, the national groups are expected to adapt 
their organizational set-ups, frames, and political strategies to the context in which 
they are set (Mudde 2007). In fact, many current far right groups do not evolve from 
a vacuum but rather rely on pre-existing structures, networks, and organizational 
features around which they can establish their groups. This can either be based on 
structures in the domestic setting (e.g. French groupuscules, such as Bloc Identitaire) 
or they may draw inspiration from far-right actors abroad (such as e.g. the spread of 
Defence Leagues across Europe, based on the English ‘prototype’) (see e.g. 
Meleagrou-Hitchens & Brun 2013).  
In terms of explaining these developments and how new groups emerge, consolidate 
themselves, and mobilize in the domestic setting, one can beneficially employ the 
theoretical output on political opportunity structures. As Klandermans and Mayer 
(2006) argue, the actors’ influence “depends on the links they have with other 
movements, challengers, allies or opponents in the ‘multi-organizational field’ and on 
the ‘political opportunities’ opened for them” at the given time (2006: 10). Hence, the 
shape and form of the organization and mobilization is not predefined but depends on 
the available political and discursive opportunities, which the actors must strategize 
around in order to find the most suitable option for gaining influence (see e.g. Kriesi 
2004; McCammon 2013). The theory argues that the level of support and/or hostility 
in a given environment preconditions the success of a mobilization to a high degree, 
including those on the far right (see e.g. Berntzen & Weisskircher 2016). Even though 
these political and discursive opportunities might not be perceived, or exploited, by 
the given far right actors, there are still several of the POS and DOS factors that are 
vital to consider, when explaining far right action repertoires and mobilization 
success. This particularly involves the level of state repression, the group’s 
relationship to the elites, and the historical view on authoritarianism in a given 
political setting, but also the discursive openings due to position changes by the 
political elite, the media, and public opinion69.  
While the initial setting up of the organizations, etcetera, are important facets of 
understanding collective actors and their actions, it is not the focus of this study. 
Instead, the analysis focuses on the groups’ mobilization strategies on EU-related 
policy issues. It is expected that the domestic opportunities influence the collective 
                                                          
69 Due to the great number of groups involved in this study, the analysis of the domestic groups 
is limited to three from Fortress Europe and Generation Identity respectively. This decision 
was explained in the Methodological Framework (see Chapter 2).  
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action and the transnational networking of the groups. For one, the choice to network 
with actors from abroad is most likely made due to (perceived) openings in the 
European political and/or discursive opportunities, even though it is a contentious 
issue how exactly the POS influence an actor’s choice to seek European allies (see 
e.g. McCammon & Moon 2015). Collective action at the EU or transnational level is 
likewise more likely to ensue if the actors perceive an open opportunity in this action 
choice aside from, or rather than, their domestic protests (i.e. either in pursuit of a 
multi-level strategy or externalization). The inclusion of the POS and DOS 
perspectives thus allows for the examination of some of the underlying rationales 
behind the mobilization choices and the role of the national context in terms of 
understanding far right contention more generally. At the same time, one must keep 
in mind that while political and discursive opportunities may be available to pursue 
for the given actors, they also have to both be aware of them and want to pursue that 
strategic opening. The strategic choices thus both depend on the openings themselves, 
especially those that implicitly affect the mobilization, such as the level of repression 
or the role of the domestic far right parties, but also more ‘subjective’ factors, such as 
the group’s identity, the leaders’ level of mobilization expertise, and their preferences 
in terms of protest tactics. 
Moreover, a group’s symbolic and material resources are also expected to influence 
its strategic manoeuvring, in terms of both collective action and networking. As 
further explained below (Chapter 5), the group’s options of collective action at the 
EU-level highly depend on the level and type of said resources (see e.g. della Porta & 
Caiani 2009). The resources are also important in regards to the networks, as the role-
division in transnational networks often relates to the distinct groups’ levels of 
particularly material resources (see e.g. Monforte 2014).   
Hence, the thesis stipulates that the political and discursive opportunities and the 
groups’ symbolic and material resources (the independent variable) influence the 
national groups’ Europeanization (the dependent variable) (see Figure 3.1 above). A 
group can thus pursue various Europeanization strategies, depending on its POS, 
DOS, and resources. In the following, these will be considered in relation to the 
groups’ collective action and transnational networks.   
Stage 2: Europeanization of… 
…Collective Action: (Transnational) Mobilization Strategies  
The Europeanization literature posits that extra-parliamentary actors predominantly 
Europeanize their contention in order to mobilize at, or against, the EU. Through the 
examination of social movements and civil societal organizations’ mobilization on 
EU-related policy issues, Europeanization scholars have thus determined four distinct 
paths of collective action Europeanization, namely domestication, externalization, 
‘transnational pressure,’ and ‘supranationalization’. These paths can be determined 
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based on the groups’ protest scopes in terms of issues, targets, participants, and events, 
and whether these predominantly have ‘national’ or ‘European’ scopes. All four of 
these scopes are also interesting to examine more closely in their own right, as they 
reveal a lot about the role ascribed to Europe and other European actors for far right 
extra-parliamentary actors. Hence, the thesis analyses these aspects more extensively, 
in order to deduce the extent to which the far right extra-parliamentary groups 
mobilize around ‘European’ issues, against ‘European’ targets, with other ‘European’ 
actors, and/or at ‘European’ events. 
The available POS and DOS plus the groups’ symbolic and material resources are 
expected to guide their separate and shared (transnational) collective action strategies. 
The strategies can involve either predominantly domestic protest strategies, or, if the 
opportunities are more open at the EU level, insider (such as lobbying) or outsider 
(e.g. protesting or media campaigns) strategies at the EU-institutional level (see e.g. 
Parks 2015). If both the domestic and EU POS and DOS are perceived as open, the 
groups may also pursue multi-level access (della Porta & Caiani 2009). As stated 
above, the particular path chosen is highly dependent on the group’s symbolic and 
material resources, and the (perceived) availability of political and discursive 
opportunities at both the national and European level. Hence, the more resource-
strong, the more likely an extra-parliamentary actor is to pursue direct EU-level 
access, particularly if it mobilizes on a specific policy issue (rather than a diffuse 
interest), and/or can employ more technical language and expertise. Moreover, the 
symbolic resources are also highly important, as they (partially) determine whether 
the given actor is likely to gain resonance at the EU-level, but also whether it would 
even seek such resonance to begin with. Hence, symbolic resources refer to, among 
other aspects, the group’s frames, worldview, and more general expression forms, and 
if they conflict too extensively with the EU’s ethos, the actor is highly unlikely to gain 
EU-access and/or resonance (see e.g. della Porta & Caiani 2009). The groups’ 
symbolic resources will be determined based on an analysis of their protest 
repertoires, appearance, and main collective action frames, including a consideration 
of their views on the EU, as this also is rather indicative as to whether an extra-
parliamentary actor will pursue EU access (see e.g. Monforte 2014; della Porta & 
Caiani 2009). The given group must thus also consider its available resources when 
evaluating which political decision-making level to target, based on its political and 
discursive opportunities. For instance, a collective actor is unlikely to organize a 
demonstration in front of the EU institutions, if it does not have the material and/or 
human resources available to do so.  
At the same time, the collective action analysis also considers the alignment of the 
groups’ protest repertoires and tactics across the European borders, again to consider 
their Europeanization in more relational and ideational terms. The two cases chosen 
are particularly suitable for such an exploration, as they involve groups, which have 
adopted the same name and logo (i.e. Generation Identity and PEGIDA), entailing that 
they are expected to carry out somewhat the same type of actions in their domestic 
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settings. The analysis thus also considers the groups’ respective protest frequencies 
and repertoires, and explains their (potential) differences, again by drawing on the 
groups’ averse POS, DOS, and resources.  
Hence, the protest event analysis will shed more light on the strategies of far right 
collective action, both domestically and transnationally, including the deliberations 
regarding the possibilities and hindrances behind the choices. This includes the 
decisions as to the place of transnational collective action (in terms of geography, 
repression levels, and resources). Moreover, by considering the participant 
composition and the leaders’ portrayal of these transnational protest strategies, it will 
be possible to deduce how big a role such events play for the actors themselves and 
potentially also what they are used for in terms of the national groups’ own, domestic 
goals. 
…Networks: Transnational Coalition-Building  
Once the national groups have been set up and established their (initial) strategies and 
protest repertoires, they may opt to transnationalize their mobilisation as part of these 
strategies (for various reasons). Europeanization theory postulates that due to the 
global, or at least European, nature of a given policy issue, the actors will look for 
similar-minded actors abroad in order to be able to act more resourcefully towards 
both the domestic and European decision-makers. This entails the creation of a 
transnational coalition, which can have varied overarching goals and features, but 
(usually) involves national groups that pool their resources, develop shared problem 
formulations and solutions (collective action frames), and (potentially) consolidate 
the network into a more long-term collaboration. Depending on the material and 
symbolic resources available to the different groups composing the coalition, the 
cooperation will either include EU-level activities (multi-level movements), or take 
place at the transnational level, outside of the EU institutions (transnational 
movements) (Monforte 2014) (see Figure above). Regardless of which type of 
coalition, the research literature expects them to develop rather similarly.  
In order to investigate thoroughly how exactly the national GI and FE member groups 
instigate the coalition-building process, and their distinct rationales for participating, 
the analysis considers the various stages involved, i.e. from the initiation to the 
(potential) end of a transnational coalition. The theoretical framework thus draws on 
more general social movement transnationalization, coalition-building, and framing 
literature, in order to arrive at the factors that influence how the far right transnational 
coalitions develop. 
In terms of the coalition-building process as such, it is not from one day to the next 
that actors start cooperating. Instead, such processes usually evolve around pre-
existing relations, which are often omitted consideration in the Europeanization 
literature. Such pre-established ties can be created through various diffusion 
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processes; via either direct border-crossing communication, or indirectly, e.g. through 
news stories about the given actors being read prior to the actual coalition-building 
taking place (see e.g. Shawki 2013). In fact, these transnational diffusion processes 
may be constantly ongoing and can involve various mobilization-related aspects, 
including the spread of frames, ideas, protest repertoires, and strategies.  
Due to the aim of gaining a better understanding of far right transnationalization, the 
present study is particularly interested in establishing how the far right transnational 
ties are forged and maintained. The participating actors might have very diverse aims 
and rationales for wanting to cooperate with actors from abroad but will need to align 
their views at least to some degree in order to mobilize jointly. As argued above, actors 
often instigate transnational coalitions as a means to oppose shared enemies, making 
it highly relevant also to explore the far right groups’ joint ‘othering’. As demonstrated 
in existing literature, this has recently tended to involve anti-Islam frames for the far 
right in general (see e.g. Zúquete 2015). During the coalition-building process, the 
groups may thus also begin aligning their various framings of ‘us,’ while jointly 
constructing a ‘them’, and thus develop shared transnational collective identity 
frames. This is a particularly relevant issue to explore in terms of far right actors, as 
they are usually conceptualised as strongly nationalist actors whose transnational 
networking has been perceived as somewhat of a paradox (see e.g. Almeida 2010). 
The group leaders and/or spokespersons are thus expected to frame a collective 
identity that all of the transnational coalition-partners can commit themselves to and 
mobilize around (i.e. the development of a Europeanized ‘us’). In other words, there 
is an expectation that the actors will begin framing the ‘us’ as ‘European’, plus to 
emphasize the ‘European’ scope of the problems and solutions, and thus, call for 
European mobilization in their transnational networks (Monforte 2014). 
In terms of the coalitions’ outcome, its development is very context- and actor-
dependent. Some transnational coalitions will become sustained political groups 
(‘Coalition survival’) and will develop closer ties and organizational features between 
the groups. Other coalitions will instead cease to exist, and the individual groups are 
expected to ‘re-nationalize’ their contention, i.e. return to their domestic settings and 
continue mobilizing from there or to stop mobilizing altogether70. This aspect is 
particularly important to include in order to better understand the possible obstacles 
for closer European far right cooperation. The analysis thus also considers how and 
whether the coalition survived, by looking at domestic factors, the matching of 
expectations, shared rules, and other organizational aspects of the participating 
groups, which may influence the outcome. 
  
                                                          
70 This could be due to a won or a lost cause, e.g. the anti-TTIP-demonstrations of 2016, which 
largely ended once the final EP-decision had been made (see Caiani & Graziano 2018). 
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Structure of Analysis 
After the conceptualization of the ‘far right’ (Chapter 4), the following chapters 
analyse the groups’ Europeanization strategies in the 2015-2017 period. Chapter 5 
sets out by analysing the GI and FE extra-parliamentary groups’ anticipated 
Europeanization based on their material and symbolic resources, and moderates 
Figure 3.1 according to these expectations. The following chapters continues the 
exploration of the groups’ Europeanization, by first considering their collective action 
strategies (Chapters 6-7), and then their European network, or coalition, formation 
(Chapters 8-9). As the network formation periods overlap with that of the collective 
action, it infers that these chapters should be read as part of the same developments, 
and could thus in theory be read in reverse order as well. Moreover, as already 
explained, the GI and FE coalition-formation did not take place during the same period 
(the first GI groups already began cooperating in 2013 and the network has 
continuously expanded throughout the period, while FE only was formed in 2016), 
inferring that there is no ‘most logical’ order of the chapters. This also explains why 
there will be mentions of the same events in both chapters, for instance their 
transnational protests, which both form part of the collective action, but at the same 
time were organized by the GI and/or FE coalitions.  
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CHAPTER 4. CATEGORIZING THE 
‘FAR RIGHT’ 
 THE ‘FAR RIGHT’: CONCEPTUALISING A MUDDY FIELD 
It is a bit of a daunting task to come to terms with the huge bulk of literature on, and 
definitions of, the group of political actors making up the margins of the right-wing 
spectrum. For one, since the early 1990s, the research on this particular group of actors 
has constantly grown, together with the disagreements on their conceptualization and 
classification (see e.g. Mudde 2016; 2017a), making it very difficult to come to terms 
with the many concepts and denominations to define and classify the European far 
right. Hence, more than twenty years since Mudde (1996) problematized the “war of 
words defining the extreme right party family,” scholars still argue about the best way 
to define the actors and their extra-parliamentary ‘relatives’.  
One of the main definitional challenges lies in the actors’ employment of a vast array 
of expression forms and strategies (e.g. of moderation or institutionalization), leading 
to “an impressive plurality of definitions, most of which resemble mere shoppinglists 
of criteria rather than conceptually grounded definitions” (Minkenberg 2000: 171). 
The fact that different national literatures on the far right employ adverse 
denominations for the actors only brings further confusion to the debate. American 
scholars thus tend to employ the term ‘radical’ (just as does Minkenberg (2015) and 
other German researchers), while Anglo-Saxon scholars often opt for the 
denomination ‘far right’ (see e.g. Kitschelt & McGann 1997), and Continental 
European scholars tend to opt for the ‘extreme’ right (see e.g. Ignazi 2003 (Italian); 
Virchow 2016b (German)). Furthermore, these conceptualizations are based on 
diverse genealogies, again adding to the difficulty of defining the groups. Yet, some 
of the most widely cited definitions include the categorisations and typologies by 
Kitschelt & McGann (1997), Carter (2005), Ignazi (2003), and Rydgren (2005).  
Being aware of these scholarly disagreements, and the highly contentious conceptual 
debates, I have decided to follow Halikiopoulou’s (2018), Ravndal and Bjørgo’s 
(2018), Camus and Lebourg’s (2017), and Mudde’s (2019) examples, amongst others, 
and denominate the actors in their entirety as pertaining to the ‘far right’. 
Acknowledging the limitations involved in putting this array of groups and viewpoints 
under one umbrella, Halikiopoulou (2018) argues that the ‘far right’ term both allows 
the researcher “to identify the overarching similarities that make them comparable” 
and “to distinguish between different variants” including the potential “idiosyncrasies 
of specific cases” (2018). I similarly argue that the ‘far right’ encompasses actors and 
groups, who “all justify a broad range of policy positions on socioeconomic issues on 
the basis of nationalism” (Ibid.).  
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It is important to establish from the outset that albeit most far right actors today target 
more or less the same type of enemies (external and internal ‘others’, especially 
Muslim immigrants and the left-wing establishment), it is not by any means a “united 
family” (Caiani et al. 2012: 3). Aside from the far right parties, the scene consists of 
a multitude of extra-parliamentary actors, such as protest groups, student fraternities, 
subcultural groupuscules, civil societal associations, hooligan associations, media 
outlets, music bands, and various other types of activists (see e.g. Veugelers & Menard 
2018). While one can somewhat easily categorize the parties ideologically based on 
their manifestos and public statements (see e.g. Mudde 2007), the street level actors 
provide bigger hardships in terms of classification. With the further diversification of 
the far right scene in the late 1990s and onwards (see e.g. Fielitz & Laloire 2016), the 
expression forms have only become more varied, just as the actors’ different domestic 
settings also influence their organization form and action repertoires. To add further 
confusion, the frames and focus points of the organizations that already occupy this 
political space also tend to change over time. As Wright (2009) argues, “While the 
core beliefs of the far right have remained relatively constant, the reframing of the 
message and the ability to capitalize on widely shared perceptions of new threats has 
been essential to movement success” (2009: 194, emphasis added).  
Features of the ‘Far Right’ 
What then are these ‘core beliefs’? Taking the term ‘right’ to begin with, there is rather 
broad scholarly agreement that the ‘right’ is distinguishable from the ‘left’ based on 
predominantly socio-cultural criteria. Thus, while the ‘left’ is progressive in outlook, 
the ‘right’ is hostile towards modernity and expresses a moral conservatism. 
Moreover, whereas the groups on the left pursue “collective economic and social 
rights as their principal agenda” (March & Mudde 2005: 25), the ‘right’ believes that 
“individual inequality falls outside of the limits of the state,” and is thus not a concern 
for the decision-makers (Bobbio as cited in Van Hauwaert 2014a: 67; see also Durham 
& Power 2010).  
In very general terms, one can gradate the right-wing parties into two degrees of right-
wing expression, namely the center-right, which contains the liberal parties and the 
conservatives (e.g. the Danish Liberal Party (Venstre), the British Conservatives, etc.) 
and the far right, which are mainly distinguishable due to their nationalism71. Hence, 
there is broad scholarly agreement that the far right’s ideological viewpoints consist 
of several core features including (exclusionary) nationalism, anti-liberalism, 
authoritarianism (the search for hierarchy and order) and, in its current expression, 
anti-immigration (see e.g. Betz & Meret 2009; Camus & Lebourg 2017). Ravndal and 
Bjørgo (2018) have also recently defined far right members as sharing an 
                                                          
71 This contention is yet again not without a need for moderation, particularly in the current 
political climate, where numerous centre-right and –left parties attempt to accommodate the 
nationalist appeals by developing similar stances (see e.g. Joon Han 2015). 
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“authoritarian inclination, that is, an inherent need for sameness, oneness, and group 
authority, resulting in intolerance towards diversity and individual autonomy, and 
some form of nativism or ethnic nationalism” (2018: 6). 
Considering the radical right72 from a historical lens, Minkenberg (2000) explains that 
one should understand them as actors that wish to “undo” the “social change”, which 
modernisation, and the therefrom-ensuing individual autonomy and functional 
differentiation, has brought to society. The far right instead promotes the ideas of the 
“nationally defined community” and the “return to traditional roles and status of the 
individual,” thereby fostering “social homogeneity” (2000: 174). As ‘nationalism’ is 
widely considered the key concept for understanding the far right, the following 
section will briefly conceptualize the term. 
Nationalism, Nativism, and ‘Civilisationalism’  
Bar-On (2018) argues that nationalism is the ‘master concept’, or “the main animating 
feature” of the radical righ (Bar-On 2018: 17). Nationalism is based in “the belief that 
the political unit [the state] and the ethnic unit [the nation] should be congruent” 
(Mudde 2000: 187)73. In his conceptualization of the ‘populist radical right,’ Mudde 
(2007) utilized the related term ‘nativism’. It combines nationalism and xenophobia74, 
and refers to the belief that the nation (or the mythical and romanticized ‘imagined 
heartland’ (Taggart 2004)) only belongs to the native, or autochthonous, homogenous 
population, and that it should be protected from all external ‘others’ who are 
threatening its continued existence (Mudde 2007: 19). The term thus has a clear anti-
pluralist and exclusionary core (Pytlas 2018; see also Wodak 2015: 183), and this 
protectionist standpoint, both in economic, social, and civilizational terms, is a key 
trope of most far right actors’ worldviews. For instance, proponents of nativism often 
voice their economic stance in welfare protectionist terms (see e.g. Siim & Stolz 
2013), employing statements such as ‘our own people first!’ However, the far right’s 
expression of ‘nationalism’ is different from country to country, depending on the 
historical and societal contexts, plus the advancement of the far right in the given state. 
One example is German nationalism, which tends to focus more on ‘blood relations’ 
between the autochthonous citizens, due to its historical evolution since the 
‘Konservative Revolution’ in the 1920s (Goodwin & Eatwell 2018).  
                                                          
72 Drawing on Rucht’s conceptualization of modernization, Minkenberg (2000) refers to the 
actors as ‘radical right’ without distinguishing further between the pluralities of actors. 
73 Conversely, ‘patriotism’ solely refers to a “feeling of attachment and commitment to a 
country, nation, or political community” (Britannica), and nationalists often employ the term 
themselves, in order to convey a more palpable version of their viewpoints. 
74 I.e. the “fear and hatred of strangers or foreigners or of anything that is strange or foreign” 
(Merriam Webster Online Dictionary). 
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Yet, while nationalism is a core feature of all far right groups’ worldviews, one can 
further distinguish the actors making up this political space from each other, by 
employing the terms ‘radical’ and ‘extreme’ right. 
RADICAL VS. EXTREME RIGHT DIFFERENTIATION 
Even though there is much scholarly disagreement as to whether one can distinguish 
between different groups of far right actors in terms of ideology or not75, it is still 
contended here that such a division is feasible, and even necessary, due to the 
heterogeneity of the actors making up the far right. Again, partly following 
Halikiopoulou’s (2018) example, the focus in this thesis, and thus, this conceptual 
framework, is on the ‘radical’ and ‘extreme’ right of the political spectrum, as 
expressed at both the party and extra-parliamentary level. This entails a division 
between the (populist) radical right (e.g. the Alternative for Germany, the Danish 
People’s Party, PEGIDA Germany, etc.) and the extreme right (e.g. the National 
Democratic Party of Germany, the Party of the Danes, the Greek Golden Dawn, etc.). 
Halikiopoulou (2018) defines the extreme right as actors who are “often openly racist, 
have clear ties to fascism and also employ violence and aggressive tactics […]. They 
tend to oppose procedural democracy” (Halikiopoulou 2018). While she does not 
deem the opposition to democracy as a defining feature of the extreme right, this tends 
to be the prevalent differentiating factor between the two sides in the scholarly 
literature (see e.g. Mudde 2012). Hence, the most frequently employed distinction of 
the radical and extreme right considers their attitude towards democratic deliberation. 
Whereas the extreme right completely denounces democracy (or at least its key 
aspects, such as the fundamental values and human rights, popular sovereignty, and 
majority rule), the radical right is against liberal democracy (they accept democratic 
deliberation, yet, in an anti-egalitarian, ethnic sense, defending an ethnocracy) 
(Hirsch-Hoefler & Mudde 2013; Mudde 2012; Caiani et al. 2012; Minkenberg 2000). 
This means that the radical right agrees to adhere to the rules of the democratic system, 
while the extreme right rejects such participation, and is, instead, on a quest for “a 
revolutionary overthrow” of the entire political system (Fielitz & Laloire 2016: 15). 
Hence, this thesis distinguishes the radical and extreme right from each other based 
on their positions on, and relationship towards, ‘democracy’.  
Moreover, extreme right actors tend to view the employment of violence as a means 
to attain their goals, just as they generally espouse a more aggressive behaviour than 
the radical right (Caiani et al. 2012). They predominantly direct this at immigrants, 
                                                          
75 Some scholars argue that they all belong to the same group. Minkenberg (2015), for instance, 
argues that the entire far right scene is part of the ‘radical right’, while other German scholars 
conglomerate the actors under the term ‘Rechtsextremismus’ (see e.g. Virchow 2016b for a 
discussion). Conversely, Betz (2003a) argued that one should split the radical right into two 
parts, those espousing ‘exclusionary populism’ and those ‘fascism’. 
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domestic minority groups (such as LGBTQ), (radical) left-wing groups, and other 
political opponents. Heitmeyer argues that this relates to their ideologies of inequality 
(such as “exaggerated nationalism, racist denigration, and totalitarian views of the 
law”), which contain a dehumanizing effect (as cited in Caiani et al. 2012: 7), meaning 
that they can more easily justify the application of violence.  
Rather simply put, identifying the extreme right thus “simply means going to the poles 
of the ideological scale,” when considering the specific issues in question (Lipset & 
Raab as cited in Klandermans & Mayer 2006: 4). One can then classify the extreme 
right as ultra-nationalist (Jamin 2013), rejecting democracy and equality, ultra-
authoritarian, and most frequently violent, while the radical right also is nationalist, 
rejects liberal democracy, authoritarian, and most frequently employs non-violent 
means to gain traction. 
FROM ANTI-SEMITISM TO ANTI-ISLAM: A (VERY) SHORT HISTORY 
OF THE FAR RIGHT 
The European far right has radically changed over time, taking advantage of the 
opportunities presented to them due to the political and socio-economic changes in 
their respective societies. As the following brief look at the far right’s historical 
evolution demonstrates, the more profound ideological and/or frame shifts of far right 
actors have occurred due to the macro-structural openings or closures in the political 
system, plus movement intellectuals’ ability to frame the worldviews in persuading 
ways.  
The section is inspired by Minkenberg’s (2015) categorization of the current European 
far right (or radical right, in his terminology) based on “a fundamental ideological 
dividing line” along a time perspective (2015: 30). He differentiates between 
historical (interwar) movements and ideologies (proponents of Nazism, fascism, and 
other authoritarian ideologies), and contemporary racist or ethno-centrist nationalists, 
which do not express as extreme a version of radical right sentiments (Ibid: 3f). This 
leads him to divide the actors into four groups, namely Autocratic-fascists, 
racists/ethno-centrists, populist-authoritarians, and religious-fundamentalists (Ibid.). 
Similarly, as Minkenberg (2015), this thesis divides the far right currents into five 
categories, roughly based on the time of their creation and the key aspects of their 
worldviews. Yet, the terms employed differ slightly, and do not include the ‘religious-
fundamentalist’ groups76.  
The following historical overview of the European far right plays the dual role of 
explaining the ever-changing nature of the European far right, while also outlining the 
core features of arguably the five main far right expressions in Europe today. This 
                                                          
76 This is due to the specific focus of the thesis and not because they are not deemed as being 
important actors on the far right scene. 
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involves (neo-)Fascism, (neo-)Nazism, the New Right, the populist radical 
right/nationalist populists, and Anti-Islam/Islamophobes (see also Ravndal & Bjørgo 
2018 for a similar approach). These definitions will later be employed in the ideal-
typological framework, which outlines the characteristics of the current European far 
right. It is thus the point of this section to both explain wherefrom the various 
worldviews derive, and at the same time explain their current expression form. The 
time perspective is mainly included to contextualize the current worldviews in their 
historical settings, and do not infer that actors ascribing to one or the other of these 
worldviews cannot move along the spectrum over time, nor that an actor cannot 
ascribe to a mix of these categories (more on this below). Moreover, the overview is 
also written fully knowing that it is bridging the works of various researchers of the 
far right, who have averse genealogical starting points for their conclusions. Yet, as it 
is the ambition to explain the different worldviews as concisely as possible, plus to 
consider the societal circumstances that led to the far right ideology’s further 
advancement and mutations, this was opted as the most appropriate approach.  
1920-1940s: Fascism and Nazism 
Due to the heterogeneous and highly context-dependent expression forms of the actors 
adhering to Fascism or Nazism, the definitions of the two terms in their generic forms 
are highly contested (see e.g. Paxton 2004; Wolfreys 2013 for a discussion). However, 
scholars agree that the development of the specific worldviews correlate with the 
national contexts of their developers, i.e. Italy for Fascism (Mussolini) and Germany 
for Nazism (Hitler), and that one has to consider the mood at the time in order to 
understand the spread of the two currents (see e.g. Camus & Lebourg 2017). Scholars 
thus argue that the World War I experience, plus the aftermath of the Russian 
Revolution, led to the development of classic fascism (Ibid.). Paxton has similarly 
ascertained that the ideology “developed as a reaction against modern democratic 
society, liberal individualism, constitutionalism and the left,” and arose in a period 
“when mass democracy had difficulties” and socialists’ parliamentary seats began 
compromising them (as cited in Wolfreys 2013: 21). In terms of Nazism, the more 
extreme expression of Fascism (Camus & Lebourg 2017), Germany was similarly 
struggling to recover economically from World War I, facing high war reparations 
demands, soaring unemployment, hyperinflation, and general financial turmoil (Lang 
2010).  
Thus, all fascist movements have a common foundation in “the rejection of 
democracy, an aversion to Communism, the promotion of violence, a cult of 
personality devoted to a leader, along with racism, anti-Semitism, and ethnic 
chauvinism” (Camus & Lebourg 2017: 24). Moreover, Goodwin and Eatwell (2018) 
assert that extreme nationalism forms the core of fascism, together with the perception 
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of the nation as being ‘organic’77. There is some scholarly disagreement about fascism 
and its views on economy, yet, Goodwin and Eatwell (Ibid.) argue that fascists 
promote an authoritarian ‘third way’, placed between capitalism and socialism (Ibid.: 
62). Conversely, ‘Nazism’ combines “radical Fascism, völkisch ideology, and 
conservative-revolutionary concepts” (Camus & Lebourg 2017: 32). Adherents hold 
that the autochthonous population belongs to the nation on a blood basis (i.e. based 
on biological and racial terms), while Jews are seen as the greatest foreign threat 
(Goodwin & Eatwell 2018).  
Post-War Period: Neo-Fascism and -Nazism 
In the post-war period, openly fascist and Nazi groups either remained fringe 
occurrences, or were suppressed, marginalized, and/or discredited in their national 
settings (Von Beyme 1988). Moreover, due to the completely new political context 
after WWII, Fascists and Nazis had to moderate their worldviews, and initially 
struggled to reorganize (see e.g. Iriye & Mitter 2010). Their main aim thus became 
sheer survival as an organization, but they also started to deliberate on a new ‘master 
frame’ or ideology, seeing as the original had become unviable (Rydgren 2005). 
Developing a new, more moderate, ideational framework, neo-Fascists continued to 
advocate “extreme nationalism, opposed liberal individualism, attacked Marxist and 
other left-wing ideologies, indulged in racist and xenophobic scapegoating, and 
promoted populist right-wing economic programs” (Soucy 2019).  
After further contextual moderations, current neo-Fascism is not explicitly fascist, as 
its ‘othering’ considers non-European immigrants, and not Jews,78 and it is not set on 
gaining ‘Lebensraum’ (‘living space’) through military conquest (Ibid). However, the 
military and battle frames still play a big role in neo-Fascist discourse, while neo-
Nazis continue to express anti-Semitic and racially superior terms, particularly 
targeted against Jews and African-Americans. Even though many neo-fascist and –
Nazi groups face closed political opportunities in several (Western) European settings, 
numerous smaller subcultural groups continue ascribing to Fascist and/or Nazi 
viewpoints, despite the high societal costs of associating with such currents in many 
European countries (see e.g. Klandermans & Mayer 2006). This, for instance, 
involves the Italian CasaPound (neo-Fascism) and the Nordic Resistance Movement 
                                                          
77 Conversely, Griffin asserts that fascism has “a mobilizing mythic core of revolutionary ultra-
nationalist rebirth (palingenesis),” to be achieved by a revolutionary overthrow of the ongoing 
decadence and degeneration of society (Griffin as cited in Copsey 2018: 112). Yet, other 
scholars far from share this conceptualisation (see e.g. Virchow 2016b for a critique). 
Moreover, as a means to move away from solely focusing on the ideology as such, but also 
consider the proponents’ actual actions, Mann also incorporates the paramilitary organization 
as a key aspect of Fascism (as cited in Wolfreys 2013). 
78 Even though many of its proponents are “attracted to Holocaust denial and readier to admire 
Nazism and fascism” (Veugelers & Menard 2018: 289). 
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(neo-Nazi). Conversely, certain neo-Fascist parties instead moderated their stances 
according to the new political realities, and ‘shifted’ their worldviews slightly towards 
the centre (most famously Front National, see e.g. Mammone 2014).  
Populist Protest Parties (1950s-1970s) 
From the 1950s until the mid-1970s, Europe also experienced a ‘populist protest 
phase,’ where right-wing populist parties without links to Fascism began appearing, 
in reaction to the social and economic modernization processes of the post-war period. 
They often had charismatic leaders with a strong ‘us-vs.-them’ discourse against the 
political elite, frequently around tax policies (see e.g. Von Beyme 1988; Minkenberg 
2000). Examples of such parties include the French Poujadist Movement, the Nordic 
Progress Parties, and the Dutch Farmer’s Party. They had some initial electoral 
success, but as Minkenberg (2000) argues, as the public increasingly accepted “the 
new political situation,” these new movements and parties “faded away” in the 1970s 
(2000: 175), but to be replaced with the populist radical right some years later.  
French ‘New Right’ Revival of the Right (1960s Onwards)  
In the late 1960s, another development took place in France, namely the foundation 
of the Nouvelle Droite. In 1968, the French Groupement de recherche et d'études pour 
la civilisation européenne (Research and Study Group for European Civilization, 
GRECE) was created as a right-wing response to the New Social Movements. It was 
thus formed in the same “context of far-reaching social and cultural change in Western 
societies,” due to the societal shift towards post-industrialism or post-modernity 
(Minkenberg 2000: 176). Due to the think tank’s ‘new’ visions for society, French 
scholars began referring to the writers as the ‘new right,’ even though much of the 
writings drew on the German Konservative Revolution (KR) of the 1920s79. Hence, 
adopting and appropriating the “strategies and issues of its political opponents, 
especially the New Left and new social movements” (Minkenberg 2000: 180), the 
New Right aimed at being seen as ‘mainstream’, non-violent, and democratic. Unlike 
the ‘old-right’, it thus presented itself as not being reactionary or anti-modernist, but 
instead searching for alternative modernities (Bar-On 2013). Yet, similar to Fascism, 
its proponents aimed for a revolution. It should be achieved through the reclamation 
of the societal cultural hegemony from the ‘1968ers,’ by means of a ‘right-wing 
                                                          
79 Armin Mohler introduced the term ‘Conservative Revolution’ as a conglomerating term for 
various right-wing conservative and extremist currents, which expressed “anti-liberal, anti-
democratic and anti-egalitarian positions” during the Weimar Republic (Verfassungsschutz 
Baden-Württemberg 2018: 178). Some of the most important writers for the later new right 
developments are Ernst Jünger, Carl Schmitt, and Edgar Julius Jung.  
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Gramscianism,’ involving a takeover of the discourses on “societal themes, 
interpretations and solutions” (Hafeneger 2014: 3, author’s translation).  
The school of thought quickly diffused to other European countries and led to the 
creation of numerous new right magazines, journals, and philosophical groups abroad 
(see e.g. Minkenberg 2000; Bar-On 2011; Camus & Lebourg 2017). Particularly the 
German neue rechte became increasingly influential both domestically and abroad. In 
the late 1960s, the German scholar Henning Eichberg80 introduced one of the New 
Right’s key concepts, ‘Ethnopluralism’ (or ‘ethnodifferentialism’). It signifies that 
ethnically and culturally heterogeneous people are hierarchically equal, yet, cannot 
coexist in the same geographical space, without this leading to ethnic conflict. Instead, 
each civilization should have the ‘right to difference’ (Bruns et al. 2017), in order for 
the diversity not to go lost. At its core, the concept aims to keep the various states and 
civilisations homogenously pure, inferring a ‘global apartheid’, as the only way to 
ensure ethnic diversity is maintained through the geographical segregation of cultures 
(Minkenberg 2000). The argument is, then, only a linguistic turn away from explicit 
racism, as ‘culture’ has replaced ‘race’, thereby upholding the differentialist racism 
(Eckes 2016) and totalitarian worldview of the past (Mense 2017). Several scholars 
thus argue that the New Right’s discarding of Fascism more was a strategic 
manoeuver, in order to appear more legitimate, and that they in fact continue to belong 
to the extreme right of the political spectrum (see e.g. Spektorowski 2003; Eckes 
2016). 
The current New Right mainly organizes at the extra-parliamentary level in think 
tanks and publishing houses from where the writers attempt to influence the societal 
discourse. It has become particularly influential in Germany, Italy, and France within 
the last two to three decades (see e.g. Geisler et al. 2016). The groups and actors span 
across Europe and vary from blogs (e.g. Riposte Laïque (‘Secular Response’)), to 
think tanks (Institut für Staatspolitik (IfS), to political associations (Bloc Identitaire), 
and to smaller groupuscules (the various Generation Identity groups, more on this 
categorization below).  
Populist Radical Right/Nationalist Populists (from the Early-1980s Onwards) 
As Ignazi (2003), Rydgren (2005), von Beyme (1988), and Van Hauwaert (2014a) 
have demonstrated, in the 1980s-1990s, several previously Fascist parties re-framed 
their viewpoints into a more moderate and modern packaging, both in terms of 
                                                          
80 Henning Eichberg was a German cultural sociologist and historian. Strongly influenced by 
the thoughts espoused by Europe-Action, he developed the ‘ethnopluralism’ concept in the late 
1960s (Camus & Lebourg 2017). 
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economic policy (to a statist policy)81 and democracy (moderation/accommodation). 
Von Beyme (1988) argues that this third wave arose amidst rising unemployment, 
economic turbulence, plus a growing disquiet about the European immigration 
figures, which had risen due to the economic boom in the post-war period. In his text 
on the ‘silent counter-revolution,’ Ignazi (2003) considered the broader macro-
structural factors, which he argued led to this frameshift, mainly based on the change 
from industrialist to post-industrialist conceptions of society82.  
Hence, led by Front National’s ‘master frame,’ numerous parties reoriented their 
ideologies towards populism and ethno-nationalism, argued in ethnopluralist terms83, 
and thus,  found “an escape route from the margins” (Akkerman et al. 2016: 1). This 
departure from their extreme right anti-democratic traditions has mainly been 
considered as a strategic means to fit in to a setting of representative democracy 
(Rydgren 2005) or their “capacity to repackage old hatreds into new crusades” 
(Mammone et al. 2013: 2). Hence, this partly explains why some scholars still place 
FPÖ and FN as part of the extreme right (see e.g. Ibid; Wolfreys 2013). 
Yet, others argued that the parties had created a new far right ideological expression. 
Mudde (2007), for instance, devised the term ‘populist radical right’ (PRR) to the 
parties due to their adherence to nativism84, authoritarianism, and use of populism (in 
the sense of a thin ideology85). Of these three concepts, nativism is the most important 
for their ideology. The PRR parties are by far the most prominent far right actors in 
the last three decades, both in terms of scholarly interest, and national plus European 
election results (Mudde 2007). Yet, with time, Mudde’s conceptualization was 
considered increasingly inadequate, leading to new attempts at a convincing 
terminology. In 2018, Eatwell and Goodwin published a book about the rise of 
                                                          
81 There is not consensus in the literature as to how to define the parties’ socio-economic 
policies, as they differ largely between the different European nations, plus scholars disagree 
on the best denomination (see e.g. Van Hauwaert 2014a for a short discussion) 
82 Based on an investigation of the political evolution of MSI into Alleanza Nazionale in 1994, 
and the internal differences within the same group of actors, he distinguished between two 
groups of parties, namely the classical (or the ‘old extreme right’) and the ‘post-industrial’ 
extreme right (Ignazi 2003). 
83 They based this on ideological notions developed by the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI), 
the Nouvelle Droite, and Poujadism (see e.g. Minkenberg 2011). As an example, FN reduced 
“their neofascist aspects to a sort of ‘rightwing socialism’ with anti-globalist and anti-liberalist 
traits” (Caiani 2017: 7). 
84 Mudde (2007) defines nativism as “an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited 
exclusively by members of the native group (“the nation”) and that non-native elements 
(persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state” (2007: 22). 
85 Perceiving ‘populism’ as a ‘thin ideology’ infers that it must always be combined with 
another key issue in order to work. In the case of the far right, this usually involves nativism 
and/or the idea of the ‘Heartland’ (Taggart 2004). 
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‘national populists,’ which largely refer to the same groups of political actors as 
covered by Mudde’s concept. The two scholars argue that these actors’ narratives 
focus less “on the detail of policy,” but instead discuss “national decline and 
destruction, which they link not only to immigration and ethnic change, but also to 
what they see as culturally incompatible Muslims and refugees” (2018). Hence, the 
actors’ nationalism is based on a strong ‘us’ and ‘them’ distinction on ethnic and 
cultural terms, particularly targeted at adherents of Islam. 
Anti-Islam/Islamophobia 
Especially since 9/11, 2001, and further aided by the 2005 ‘Mohammad Cartoons 
Crisis,’ anti-Islam has become one of the main features of most far right worldviews, 
including its own distinct category (yet, Islamophobia can be traced further back in 
time (see e.g. Betz & Meret 2009)). Adherents of this political belief perceive a great 
cultural threat in a pending Islamization86 of Europe through immigration from 
Muslim countries (akin to Huntington’s (1993) Clash of Civilizations theory). The 
threat is thought eventually to destroy the Western societies, both in terms of 
democratic values and through Islamist terrorism. The actors thus draw on Europe’s 
Christian heritage, values, and culture, in order to underline the differences (see e.g. 
Betz & Meret 2009; Berntzen 2018a). Moreover, unlike extreme right ideology, many 
current radical right actors include LGBTQ and women’s rights in the narratives, as a 
means to demonstrate the ‘backwardness’ of Islam (see e.g. Mondon & Winter 2018 
on ‘Liberal Islamophobia’), just as the actors promote the protection of Jews, also to 
dissociate themselves from Fascism (see e.g. Shroufi 2015; Hafez 2014 for more on 
this). Yet, based on the works by Said, Kalmar and Ramadan, Narkowicz (2018) 
argues that the anti-Islam position remains a form of racial Othering (2018). Muslims 
are in this way essentialized and considered a homogeneous group (Zúquete 2008) or 
a ‘monolithic block’ (Lee 2016), perceived as civilizationally inferior and ‘backward’ 
to the ‘West’ (see e.g. Hafez 2014; Berntzen 2018a).  
While anti-Islam is currently also voiced by ‘older’ far right currents, including actors 
on both the radical and extreme right, the 2000s have witnessed the rise of actors, 
which almost solely focus on the incompatibility between Islam and ‘Western 
civilization’ (see e.g. Meleagrou-Hitchens & Brun 2013; Goodwin 2013; Berntzen 
2018a). There is some scholarly disagreement as to how to define these far-right 
actors, who primarily oppose Islam as a religion and Muslims as an ethnic group. 
Some refer to them as ‘Islamophobes,’ while others instead draw attention to their 
specific ‘Othering’ target, by naming them ‘anti-Islam’ actors (see e.g. Berntzen 
2018a for a discussion). Without delving into this discussion, this study employs the 
term ‘anti-Islam’. 
                                                          
86 The Collins Online Dictionary’s defines Islamization as “to convert to or bring under the 
influence of Islam” (https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/islamize). 
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Protests against Islam and its allegedly incompatible nature vis-à-vis Western 
civilisation became the new object of European far-right extra-parliamentary 
contention in the mid-2000s (see e.g. Berntzen 2018a). This involved various types of 
groups, such as citizen initiatives (e.g. the German Pro-Movement against mosques), 
protest groups (such as the English Defence League), but also transnational networks 
(such as the Counter-Jihad Network) (see e.g. Goodwin 2013; Berntzen 2018a for an 
overview).  
 IDEAL-TYPICAL CATEGORIES OF FAR RIGHT IDEOLOGY 
I distinguish between the five outlined far right ideal categories, i.e. ‘Neo-Nazism,’ 
‘Neo-fascism,’ ‘New Right,’ ‘Populist radical right,’ and ‘anti-Islam,’ based on their 
placement on the radical and extreme right. The groups that express neo-fascist and 
neo-Nazi viewpoints are thus placed on the ‘extreme right’ of the political spectrum, 
as they, also according to Minkenberg (2015), tend to be anti-democratic and often 
employ violence as part of their action repertoires, largely aligning with the definition 
of extreme right actors as explained above. The populist radical right actors are instead 
placed in the ‘Radical right’ category, as they only object to liberal democracy, do not 
employ violence, and generally do not express themselves in ultra-nationalist or racist 
ways.  
Conversely, the ‘New Right’ and ‘Anti-Islam’ categories are deliberately placed to 
the right in the ‘radical right’ field, as it is a rather contentious question whether actors 
such as PEGIDA and Generation Identity should be classified as radical or extreme 
right. As Ruzza (2009) also ascertains in his analysis of ‘right-wing civil societal 
groups’, these groups “often thread a fine line between conducting legal or illegal 
activities” (2009: 91). Yet, when looking at their worldviews, they do not (openly, at 
least) employ violent means, nor are they strictly anti-democratic. The ‘New Right’ is 
arguably the hardest to place in terms of the two parts of the far right spectrum. Certain 
scholars argue that it still is neo-fascist at its core (see e.g. Spektorowski 2003). Yet, 
conversely, this thesis aligns itself with Berntzen (2018b), who argues that the New 
Right accepts the “democratic principle […] as the path to power” (2018b: 82), thus 
inferring that it mainly belongs among the radical right. However, as can be seen on 
Figure 4.1 below, the ‘New Right’ has been placed between the radical and extreme 
right, due to the ambiguity of its worldview (see also Bar-On 2008; 2011; Weiβ 2017 
for a discussion of the ideology). 
Hence, beginning with the populist radical right and ending with neo-Nazis, the 
following ideal-typical figure distinguishes the ‘far right’ into five distinct worldview 
categories, which all have developed at various key moments in the European history, 
and with various ambitions. 
Figure 4.1: Ideal-Typical Categorization of Far Right Worldviews. 
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WESTERN VS. EASTERN EUROPEAN FAR RIGHT 
Aside from the differences in European far right expression forms, which have 
developed over time, one must also keep in mind that there also are large geographical 
differences, due to the averse political, social, and historical contexts of the various 
European countries. While this is the case for all the EU member states, the 
differences are particularly large between Western and Eastern Europe.  
Hence, due to these contextual circumstances, the Western and Eastern European far 
right have developed rather adversely from each other over time. For one, while the 
Western European far right actors could develop their political viewpoints and 
agendas along with the recovery of the democratic regimes after the Second World 
War, the Eastern European far right was only ‘re-established’ after the fall of the 
Communist regime in 1989-91 (Pytlas 2018). This has entailed a scholarly 
‘overlooking’ of the Central and Eastern European non- and institutional far right 
actors in much of the initial writing on the far right post-1990.  
Yet, with the increased scrutiny by scholars such as Minkenberg (2015; 2018) and 
Kopecky and Mudde (2003), they are also gradually becoming part of the more 
general far right debates (see e.g. Pytlas 2018), just as the continuous empirical 
findings of exchanges and movement overlaps between Eastern and Western Europe 
also demands more consideration of the European far right.   
However, the highly different contextual circumstances and expression forms infers a 
reluctance by some scholars to employ the same vocabulary to describe the Western 
European far right about Central and Eastern European groups (see e.g. Camus & 
Lebourg 2017; Buštíková 2018). For one, these differences relate to the far right’s 
focus points on the two sides of the continent. Drawing on numerous scholars’ 
findings, Pytlas (2018) ascertains that the Western European far right’s core issues 
mainly involve opposition to immigration, integration, and Islam, together with 
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criticism against the establishment (Pytlas 2018). In Eastern Europe, on the other 
hand, the focus has largely remained on the nation-state, and evolves around much 
more “authoritarian ethnicist and nationalist tendencies” than in the west (Camus & 
Lebourg 2017: 2). Pytlas (2018) thus argues that the Eastern European far right 
perceive numerous threats to the nation-state, “including both ethnic and sexual 
minorities (LGBTI), left-liberal ‘Western’ values and their proponents” (2018: 5). At 
the same time, anti-Semitism and blatant racist utterances are more prevalent in CEE 
(Ibid.). Yet, with the onset of the refugee crisis, the focus of Eastern European far 
right ‘othering’ has also largely shifted towards anti-Islam and –immigration (Hafez 
2018), a trend which had already begun many years prior to this (see e.g. Mareš 2017).  
Hence, at least in terms of certain of the Eastern European far right actors, it is 
possible to consider them through the same framework as developed for actors in 
Western Europe, especially those Eastern European groups which have adopted the 
blueprint from a Western European counterpart (like e.g. GI Czech Republic or the 
Czech Defense League). In the following typology, which unites far right ideology 
with organization types, I will thus also add Eastern European groups and actors, 
where appropriate, knowing well that there are rather big differences between the 
actors on the two sides of the continent. However, since the partial aim of this research 
is to explore how and whether Eastern and Western European groups cooperate, it 
must be established where they have potential for cooperation in ideological and/or 
organizational terms. 
CATEGORIZING FAR RIGHT ORGANIZATIONS 
After having determined the ideological tenets of the far right, I will now return to the 
plurality of organizations, which make up the current European far right scene. They 
vary in terms of both worldview, organization form, and activity types, and they are 
ever changing and re-forming according to the given opportunities for gaining 
influence and resonance (see e.g. Wright 2009). According to Fielitz and Laloire 
(2016), the current far right actors can broadly be divided into two types, both of 
which are going through a “process of restructuring”. On the one hand, there are the 
more regressive and ‘traditional’ organizations, which “have begun to fundamentally 
alter their image and political positions”, while, on the other hand, other groups “[…] 
draw on new forms of mobilization, agitation and (transnational) networking while 
integrating ideological components that had previously been alien to far-right 
ideologies and constituencies” (Fielitz & Laloire 2016: 13f).  
  
EUROPEANIZATION OF THE FAR RIGHT 
164
 
In short, these actors span from:  
…right-wing parties to several radical political movements, from neo-Nazi 
groups to fascist nostalgic/revisionists and cultural associations, from 
publishers, commercial sites and militaria to a radically differentiated 
subcultural radical right area composed of skinhead, music and sports 
groups. (Caiani & Parenti 2013: 45) 
All of these actors can be considered challengers “for political and cultural hegemony 
in contemporary liberal democracies” (Veugelers & Menard 2018: 286). Together 
they form the ‘galaxy’ of the European far right, a plethora of actors that have 
increasingly begun aligning their views. Today, they agree more or less about their 
oppositions, namely towards (liberal) democracy, proponents of liberalism, and 
immigrants, particularly of Muslim faith, often combining “elements of left-wing and 
right-wing philosophy with populist language and rhetoric” (Caiani & della Porta 
2018: 340).  
The following categorization again largely draws on the works of Minkenberg (2015), 
yet, with some added categories. Minkenberg considers the actors in relation to their 
approach to, and role in, institutional politics. He differentiates between political 
parties (which seek to win institutional seats), social movement organizations (which 
attempt to mobilize public support, but not to be elected), and finally, “smaller groups 
and socio-cultural milieus” (independent from parties and movements, and without 
formal organizational forms) (2015: 4).  
The subcultural actors usually gather in smaller, underground, groups without formal 
organizations or leadership. They may have access restrictions, only permitting 
“individuals considered reliable and worthy of trust” to become part of the core group, 
while other activists remain at the margins of the group, making the boundaries rather 
‘fuzzy’ (Bjørgo 2009: 30). Such groups develop their collective identity around “their 
own symbols, myths, and language” (Caiani et al. 2012: 3), which usually is “more 
extreme than that of the parties or movement organizations,” and may include the 
employment of violence (Minkenberg 2015: 31). In 2003, Griffin developed the 
related term groupuscule (derived from French), which he defines as a “non-
hierarchical, leaderless and centreless (or rather polycentric) movement with fluid 
boundaries and constantly changing components” (2003: 30). These groups have 
“tighter boundaries around membership and stricter rules over action,” yet, they are 
more likely to strike ‘pragmatic’ and ‘informal’ alliances with other far right groups 
(Veugelers & Menard 2018: 295).  
In addition to these three categories and drawing on the article by Veugelers and 
Menard (2018), the category of ‘Alternative Media Outlets and Publishers’ is also 
added, due to the role such actors places for the dissemination of far right worldviews. 
The category includes political blogs, think tanks, publishing houses, and so on, 
certain of which also became members of Fortress Europe. 
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Table 4.1 below thus attempts to categorize various political organizations according 
to their position on both the ‘far right’ and ‘organization’ scale. Such a definitional 
task is in itself challenging, and can thus best be ideal-typical. However, in order to 
employ the terminology convincingly throughout the analysis (especially in terms of 
the ‘radical’ and ‘extreme’ right distinctions), the following table depicts the position 
of numerous current far right non- and institutional organizations on the basis of their 
ideology. Nevertheless, a caveat must be given: The great volatility in the 
organizations’ standpoints on certain issues infers that, one year, they can be classified 
as belonging to one group, and over time, maybe move either more right-wards (e.g. 
Alternative for Germany), or closer to the centre (such as Front National and the 
Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) have allegedly done). Again, this entails that the table 
should not be considered irrefutable. 
The groups mentioned below are not all part of the ensuing analysis, but should rather 
be considered as current examples of the given far right category. As can be seen, 
certain of the groups have been placed in more than one far right category, as their 
worldviews bridge several far right categories. This form of ‘multiple belonging’ 
again accentuates the difficulty of defining the far right political spectrum. 
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As can be seen on the table above, the extra-parliamentary groups that joined the 
Fortress Europe coalition are almost all placed amongst the radical right anti-Islam 
actors. Particularly PEGIDA Germany could also be argued to form part of the 
Populist radical right due to its strong use of populist frames and more general 
opposition to the political establishment, which is expressed somewhat differently 
than by its European namesakes (see e.g. Vorländer et al. 2018). The various GI 
groups mainly draw their inspiration from the Nouvelle Droite (or the ‘New Right’), 
and are thus placed among the radical right actors. Yet, as the GI groups also have 
adopted many of the neo-fascist CasaPound’s frames and protest repertoires (see e.g. 
Zúquete 2018), several scholars, particularly in German- and French-speaking 
countries, classify GI as a neo-Fascist mobilization (see e.g. Goetz et al. 2017; Bruns 
et al. 2017; Bouron 2014). The GI groups’ worldview thus consists of a mix of the 
two expression forms (i.e. New Right and neo-Fascism); again further accentuating 
the tricky task of categorising the actors on the far right. 
The following chapter will introduce the GI and FE extra-parliamentary actors’ 
worldview and expression forms in a more detailed manner, which especially will 
emphasise the varied objectives with their mobilizations and how this relates to their 
worldviews. Hence, it will differentiate between GI’s New Right meta-political 
ambitions verus the FE groups’ anti-Islam populist demands for change.   
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CHAPTER 5. FE AND GI: RESOURCES 
AND EUROPEANIZATION 
STRATEGIES 
This first analytical chapter introduces the extra-parliamentary groups that form part 
of the two transnational coalitions Fortress Europe and Generation Identity and 
situate them in their organizational and ideational contexts. This ‘casing’ has the dual 
purpose of introducing the groups to the reader, but also, and more importantly, to 
deduce their likely Europeanization paths based on the Europeanization literature. As 
explained in the theoretical framework, earlier studies have found that the strategies 
pursued by political actors in relation to the EU and its institutions depend highly on 
their available financial means, technical knowledge, and types of claims and 
discourses (see also della Porta & Caiani 2009). This chapter will thus assess the 
distinct domestic FE and GI groups’ material and symbolic resources and their most 
prevalent protest repertoires, and discuss their likely Europeanization strategies on 
this basis. The data employed derives from all of the extra-parliamentary groups 
partaking in the GI and FE coalitions and was retrieved from the groups’ own sources, 
just as secondary sources about the groups were utilized for background information 
and to explain their worldviews. 
As outlined in the theoretical framework, the amount and type of a group’s available 
resources affects its possibility (and willingness) of externalizing its contention, 
particularly concerning access to the EU institutions. The material and symbolic 
resources have been found to be especially crucial (della Porta & Caiani 2009). 
Material resources refer to the groups’ finances, organization type and capacities, 
infrastructure, membership figures, degree of professionalization, and expertise 
(Milan 2013). Regarding Europeanization strategies, particularly the group’s 
economic situation, size, and degree of professionalization are relevant to consider 
further as it is usually only the more resourceful extra-parliamentary actors, such as 
business interest groups, which have the material capacities to lobby directly at the 
EU level (Caiani & Graziano 2018). The symbolic resources, on the other hand, more 
broadly refer to the ideational and identity aspects, and include the groups’ frames, 
discourses, use of language as means of persuasion (verbal styles), rituals, culture, and 
symbolic markers (Poletta & Jasper 2001). In terms of the Europeanization literature, 
particularly their issue foci (technical/politicized) and type of issue (specific/diffuse) 
matters, plus their stance on the EU as a political actor. The chapter will thus consider 
the groups’ main collective action frames in order to deduce these aspects, and how 
they relate to the various possible Europeanization paths. 
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Moreover, a collective actor’s protest repertoires or tactics are also rather indicative 
of its likely Europeanization strategy. If the actor mainly employs unconventional 
tactics, it often implies a lower level of organizational resources (Hjelmar 1996). The 
protest tactics’ nature can also give important pointers about a given actor’s most 
likely mobilization strategy. As Jasper (2008) for instance states, “Tactics are rarely, 
if ever, neutral means about which protestors do not care. Tactics represent important 
routines, emotionally and morally salient in these people’s lives. Just as their 
ideologies do their activities express protestors’ political identities and moral visions” 
(2008: 237). Hence, the analysis also briefly introduces the groups’ protest repertoires.  
Table 5.1 below briefly sums up the possible strategies depending on a group’s 
symbolic and material resources and protest repertoires. It is mainly based on the 
works of della Porta and Caiani (2009), Parks (2015), and Monforte (2014).  
Table 5.1: Expected Europeanization for extra-parliamentary actors, based on resources and 
action repertoires.  
Strategic 
Option  
Material Resources Symbolic 
Resources 
Action Repertoire/ 
Tactics 
Insider at EU-
level (Open EU 
POS/DOS) 
Strong (funds, 
expertise, degrees of 
professionalization, 
size) 
Technical issue, 
specific interests, 
process-oriented, 
and appealing to EU 
approved discourses 
and identity  
Conventional 
Outsider at 
EU-level (Open 
EU POS) 
Weak (limited 
funds, no expertise, 
low membership 
numbers) 
(Most commonly) 
Politicized issue  
Unconventional 
(mainly 
demonstrative) 
Transnational 
Protest (Closed 
EU POS/DOS) 
Weak (limited 
funds, no expertise 
low membership 
numbers) 
Politicized issue, 
diffuse interests 
(Potentially 
perceiving the EU 
negatively) 
Unconventional 
(demonstrative and 
confrontational) 
The chapter is organized in the following way: First, it introduces Generation Identity 
and Fortress Europe’s extra-parliamentary members’ shared antecedents (the 
Counter-Jihad Movement) in order to situate them as part of the same type of far right 
contention. The following two sections introduce the two groups separately, starting 
with Generation Identity. They include an introduction to the groups’ immediate 
antecedents in the form of the groups and/or events that led to the key groups’ creation 
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(GI France and PEGIDA Germany, i.e. the ‘blue prints’ for some of the other groups 
in the coalitions). This is followed by a consideration of the groups’ levels and types 
of material and symbolic resources in 2015, plus their mobilization strategies and 
protest repertoires. Finally, the last section of the chapter deduces the expected 
Europeanization paths based on previously established scholarly findings. 
 ANTECEDENTS: THE 2007 COUNTER-JIHAD MOVEMENT  
The roots of most of the extra-parliamentary actors making up the two coalitions can 
be traced back to earlier developments on the European radical and extreme right 
scene. In fact, the majority of the groups are part of the more overall anti-Islam 
movement, which became increasingly vocal during the 2000s (See e.g. Berntzen 
2018a). It had its onset in the early 2000s and gradually expanded in terms of both 
geography, members, and organizational types (Ibid.). It encompasses a large part of 
the European far right, at both the extra- and parliamentary level. Initially, it was 
mainly an online phenomenon, as American and Western European bloggers and 
alternative media sites began depicting Islam and its adherents as the greatest threat 
facing the Western world today. This involved the development of conspiracy 
theories, such as Bat Ye’or’s Eurabia thesis87 of which the main claim was that the 
pending Muslim ‘take-over’ of Europe would transform the European continent “into 
an Islamic colony called ‘Eurabia’”, and turn the European population into dhimmies, 
a form of slaves (Carr 2006: 1). Ye’Or’s publication received consensus amongst 
various actors on the right.  
In 2007, the so-called Counter-Jihad Movement (CJM) had its first offline summit. 
The CJM gathers the main anti-Islam groups and activists from Europe and the U.S. 
on a loose basis with most communication occurring online (see e.g. Meleagrou-
Hitchens & Brun 2013; Gates of Vienna 2011; Lee 2015; 2016). While the 
participating actors did not necessarily refer to Bat Ye’Or’s thesis to a high extent, 
they all still united around the cultural threat perception (Lee 2016). They thus 
“depicted Europe as a doomed continent, on the brink of cultural extinction in the face 
of a relentless and co-ordinated campaign of Islamicisation” (Carr 2006: 2).  
The network comprises “movements that are more confrontational, chaotic and 
unpredictable than traditional anti-immigrant and ethnic nationalist movements in 
                                                          
87 In 2002, Bat Ye’or (aka Gisele Littman) developed the idea of a secret political project 
between the Arab world and European politicians deriving from the Euro-Arab cooperation in 
the Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD) programme during the oil-crisis in the 1970s. This “consciously 
designed” project aimed at furthering the so-called Islamization of Europe, in order to make 
Europe a strong world power. Europe was portrayed as “a collaborator in its own downfall” 
(Carr 2006: 1), and thus villainized to the same extent as the Arabs carrying out the 
‘Islamization’, which would finally end with the creation of “a new geographical entity – 
Eurabia” (Ye-or as cited in Ibid: 6). 
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Western democracies” (Goodwin 2013: 3). Moreover, particularly with the initiation 
of the English Defence League’s (EDL) demonstrations in 2009, several of the groups 
became increasingly street active88 (see e.g. Berntzen 2018a). According to Goodwin 
(2013), the CJM consisted of the following actors: 
[T]he ‘defence leagues’ in Australia, Denmark, England, Finland, 
Norway, Poland, Scotland, Serbia and Sweden, groups such as Pro-
Cologne and the Citizens’ Movement Pax Europa in Germany, Generation 
Identity in France, the “Stop the Islamization” networks in Europe and the 
United States, the American Freedom Defense Initiative and the 
International Civil Liberties Alliance. (Goodwin 2013: 3) 
These groups all united around the master frame that there is an inherent 
incompatibility between Islam and the Western civilization, mainly based on cultural 
differences (Berntzen 2018a). It is within this so-called Counter-Jihad scene’s 
offspring that one can locate most of the extra-parliamentary actors making up the two 
coalitions. The members of both coalitions thus denounce fascism and racism and 
form part of this new wave of far right expression, which strongly mobilizes against 
Muslim immigrants (See e.g. Berntzen 2018a for more). Yet, aside from these more 
general ideological overlaps, there are several distinguishing factors between the two 
mobilizations. They will be explained in the following sections.  
 GENERATION IDENTITY89  
ANTECEDENT: IDENTITARIAN BLOC 
GI France started out as the youth association of the Identitarian Bloc (Bloc 
Identitaire, BI) (now The Identitarians (Les Identitaires)). Collecting the remnants of 
Unité Radicale, Phillipe Vardon, Guillaume Luyt, and Fabrice Robert created the 
political association Identitarian Bloc in 2002-03 after the forced dissolution of Unité 
Radicale, an anti-Semitic neo-Nazi Skinhead movement90 (Bruns et al. 2017). Setting 
                                                          
88 By 2013, the main impetus of the EDL mobilization had faded, and it no longer attracted 
strong crowds. These problems further increased with the resignation of its leaders, Robinson 
and Carroll in October 2013 (BBC 2013). Nevertheless, together with its namesakes in the 
European Defence League (the Dutch, German, Swedish, Finnish, Danish, and Czech Defence 
League to name a few), the Defence League groups continue mobilising to various extents and 
with various success in their home countries (see e.g. HopeNotHate n.d.d). 
89 Due to their earlier founding dates, sizes, and higher activity levels, most available data about 
the GI groups consider GI France, GI Austria, and GI Germany. This means that the following 
analysis also mainly refers to these groups in terms of explicit information. 
90 Unité Radicale was created in the 1990s, and it was linked to Guillaume Faye, a French new 
right writer. After a failed assassination attempt against Jacques Chirac by one of its members, 
the government dissolved the group in 2001, and forbade it in August 2002 (Bruns et al. 2017). 
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out as a nationalist-revolutionary anti-U.S. and anti-Semitic association in 2001, in 
the aftermath of 9/11, BI shifted its focus to anti-Islam and third country immigration 
(Cahuzac & François 2013). At its creation, the groupuscule referred to itself as a 
Mouvement social européen (Ibid: 276), and due to its emphasis on Europe and 
European identity, the association looked for European network opportunities 
throughout the period of 2002 to 2012. It was thus in contact with numerous European 
radical and extreme right groups (see e.g. Rippon 2012).  
This European ambition was also visible in BI’s aspiration to set up a youth 
association. It thus initially founded Jeunesse Identitaire (Identitarian Youth), which 
was envisioned to encompass “all the young Europeans”, who would partake in a 
“modern fight” to “defend our land and our people, threatened as much by the plague 
of immigration-invasion as by the globalist cholera” (Jeunesse Identitaire manifesto 
2008). Yet, in 2007, the French authorities closed down Identitarian Youth, as it was 
found to simply be a derivation of Unité Radicale. In 2009, another attempt was made 
to create a youth group, Une Autre Jeunesse (Another Youth), which disappeared with 
the creation of Génération Identitaire in 2012. GI largely consists of the same 
leadership as had Jeunesse Identitaire (e.g. Pierre Larti and Damien Rieu) (for more 
on GI France and the other GI groups’ creation, see Ch. 8).  
THE NATIONAL GI GROUPS’ MATERIAL RESOURCES 
All of the national GI groups consist of numerous local and regional subcultural 
groupuscules, which carry out activities independently of each other, employing 
social movement protest repertoires, and consisting of members in the ages 15-3091. 
The GI groups are all structured like most other subcultural groupuscules, namely in 
concentric circles, with an inner circle consisting of the leadership (or elite), 
surrounded by the activists, then the supporters, and finally, the sympathisers 
(Hentges et al. 2014). Even though it is very difficult to establish the exact number of 
members, due to their rather secretive inner workings, plus their own exaggerated 
figures, none of the local or national groups has substantial active memberships 
(Bruns et al. 2017). The figures vary from national group to group, and so do their 
material resources and levels of activism.  
Hence, Generation Identity is not a large organization in terms of actual active 
membership, neither in any of the countries where it is present, nor all of them 
combined. The four largest GI groups, GI France, GI Austria, GI Germany, and GI 
Italy, all have around 100-600 core members. Their biggest local groups are found in 
the larger (student) cities (see map of the local groups, Chapter 6) where they have 
created political and social centres, largely inspired by the Italian CasaPound 
                                                          
91 The four GI characteristics of youth, activism, pop culture, and their ‘corporate identity’  
make the GI groups rather unique in relation to other New Right organizations in Europe, which 
have historically “had the image of an old boys’ club” (Bruns et al. 2017: 68). 
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movement. GI France built on the pre-existing structures created by BI (such as e.g. 
the GI Nice chapter, which Phillippe Vardon founded in 2002. This was later to 
become one of the most active GI France regional groups (called Nissa Rebela)) (see 
Speit 2018 for more). Conversely, GI Austria cooperated rather closely with different 
Burschenschaften initially, and took advantage of their available resources until the 
group had amassed sufficient funds to start establishing its own structures (Glösel 
2019)92. Their reliance on previous structures partly explains how the two groups have 
become the most resource-strong GI groups. 
The groups are all rather resourceful in terms of their human resources. Most of the 
core members of GI in France, Germany, Austria, Italy, and the Czech Republic have 
higher educations, while they mainly recruit the basic activists amongst pupils, 
apprentices, and students (Bruns et al. 2017: 68). The groups place a strong emphasis 
on their branding strategy, which is highly professional, entailing an expertise for 
online and offline media-communication (see more on the online activism below). 
However, at the same time, due to their young ages, hardly any of the activists have 
much experience with lobbyism and other types of political negotiation.   
Financial Resources 
There is very limited knowledge about the different GI groups’ financial resources, 
but the reliance on few members and the employment of mainly smaller-scale protest 
tactics indicate rather limited funds. The little available information points toward a 
heavy reliance on funding from their own members. All of the GI groups make use of 
online crowd funding and other technological means to gather financial resources (in 
the shape of membership fees and donations, as they do not receive any public funds). 
Moreover, research on the German and Austrian GI groups reveals that both are 
registered as ‘associations/clubs’ (and may thus ask for membership payment) (Glösel 
2019). The Austrian group is the best organised and resource strong of the two and 
most of its funding comes from three sources, namely: membership fees, crowd 
funding, and merchandise sales (Quent and Fuchs as cited in Röhlig 2019). Phalanx 
Europa, a company set up in 2013 by the two GI Austria activists Martin Sellner and 
Patrick Lenart (Eckes 2016), mainly produce the merchandise, and GI France, GI 
Austria, and GI Germany have online GI merchandise webshops (Glösel 2019).  
Hence, by 2015, the Austrian and French GI groups were by far the most resourceful, 
while both GI Czech Republic and GI Italy have been struggling to amass both recruits 
and financial means (Interview with GI Czech Republic 2018; Bruns et al. 2017). GI 
Germany is found somewhere in between these groups in terms of material resources.  
                                                          
92 The first ‘centre’ was in Linz, and is named ‘Khevenhüller Zentrum’. It has the same address 
as the ‘Burschenschaft Arminia Czernowitz’ (Glösel 2019). Moreover, GI Austria employs an 
FPÖ-member’s apartment in Graz as the address for their association (Wiener Zeitung 2019). 
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Table 5.2: The GI groups’ material resources and membership figures. 
(Estimates) Material resources Membership figures  
GI France Limited (but strongest of 
the 8 GI groups)   
1000 (Speit 2018) 
GI Austria Limited (but strongest of 
the 8 GI groups)   
300 (Seiser & Lindorfer 
2019)  
GI Germany Limited93  400-500 (Häusler as cited 
in Naumann 2017) 
GI Italy Limited 150 (Bruns et al. 2017) 
GI Czech Republic Limited Est. 20-50 
GI Slovenia Limited Est. 20-50 
GI Hungary Limited Est. 20-50 
GI Switzerland Limited No data found 
SYMBOLIC RESOURCES: STYLES AND FRAMES  
Symbols, Style, and ‘Collective Differentiation’ (Rituals, clothing, etc.) 
The GI groups have gone to great length to dissociate themselves from neo-Nazi and 
other extreme right organizations. This is visible, for example, in their assertion of 
being about “100% Identity, 0% racism” (GI Austria/Germany n.d.). Moreover, the 
activists’ attire holds no resemblance to more ‘traditional’, and highly stigmatized, 
extreme right outfits, such as those worn by skinheads. Instead, the media often 
referred to the GI activists as ‘hipsters of the right’ (Somaskanda 2017) or Ibsters, in 
the German-speaking context (‘Ib-’ referring to ‘Identitäre Bewegung’). They are thus 
smartly dressed, sporty, and “healthy looking” (Interview with GI Italy 2017), and 
look like most other young people in their respective countries in an attempt to 
underline the ‘normalcy’ of their attitudes and viewpoints, and thus, attract support. If 
the activists wear any GI-symbols, then they are mainly in the form of t-shirts with 
GI’s logo (depicting the Greek lambda symbol) or slogans (Eckes 2016). 
The GI Group’s Main Collective Action Frames94 
The following section outlines the shared worldview of the GI activists. Despite 
certain smaller differences, the European groups all voice the same main collective 
action frames, which will be outlined below (Chapter 8 explains how they reached 
such similar conclusions). In order to understand the GI leaders’ construction of 
                                                          
93 With the creation of EinProzent in 2016, the German GI network’s funding has considerably 
increased (Röhlig 2019), but not to the same levels as the Austrian and French groups. 
94 This section largely draws on my forthcoming book chapter ‘The Transnational Mobilization 
of Generation Identity’. In: A. Hellström, O.C. Norocel & M.B. Jørgensen (Eds.), Hope and 
Nostalgia at the Intersection between Culture and Welfare. Springer. 
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collective action frames, one must first unravel their perception of ‘identity,’ the key 
term for the groups. They all see their identity and culture as consisting of three 
interdependent layers: the regional (bodily-generative or fleshly (French: charnelle)), 
national (historical), and European (civilizational) (BI as cited in Jarassé 2012), and 
particularly highlight rural traditions and idyll in their writings (Weiß 2017: 94). The 
activists employ the image of a matrioshka to explain this three-tiered view. You can 
therefore not be German without also being e.g. Bavarian and European, meaning that 
a mere citizenship of a European country does not make you truly European (Robert 
as cited in Ibid: 105). This infers that all GI groups understand identity as 
ethnocultural and organic, as culture and identity are considered static, essentialist, 
and nativist (Mense 2017). Moreover, employing this three-tiered identity 
construction also involves a distancing from the ‘ideology’ of nationalism, which is 
discarded, together with liberalism and Marxism (Sellner 2017a).  
The GI groups’ opposition to immigration is based in an ethnopluralist conception of 
society. In GI France’s first video statement, the group announced that: “We are the 
generation of ethnic fracture, of the total failure of integration, the generation of forced 
crossbreeding” (Morgan 2013: 9). This quote argues along the lines of Huntington 
(1993), and refers to the fact that the GI groupuscules consider the world’s different 
civilisations too distinct to live side by side peacefully, and they are instead destined 
to wage war against each other. In terms of diagnostic frames, then, this ethnic 
distinction mainly targets one particular ‘other’, namely Islam and its adherents, who 
are considered the greatest visible threat currently facing the identity and culture of 
Europe’s autochthonous population. One can largely divide this threat perception into 
four distinct types, namely a cultural, demographic, economic, and security threat. 
Unsurprisingly, all the GI groups mainly voice a cultural threat frame, as they fear 
the erosion of a culturally and biologically based European identity through Muslim 
immigration and alleged ‘Islamization’. They thus believe that the communitarian and 
homogenous “we” is in danger of disappearing through the mass-immigration of 
civilizational “others”. This is visible, for instance, in GI Germany’s constant 
referencing to statistics on the ratio of Muslim immigrants in certain districts and the 
groups’ opposition to the introduction of Sharia legislation and building of mosques 
and Islamic centres (see Ch. 6 on Collective Action). Moreover, the GI activists see 
no possibility for successful integration, as “A multicultural society in the long run is 
completely impossible to implement. Integration does not exist; it would mean giving 
up identity” (Fiato from GI Italy as cited in Palladino 2018a)95.  
                                                          
95 This relates to GI’s general argument that it is not the third-country migrants’ fault that they 
are not able to integrate. Instead, GI considers it natural that the incompatibility between a 
migrant’s cultural background and the one s/he is faced with in the hosting society will lead to 
confusion and resentment in the mind of the immigrant. 
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The demographic threat frame closely interlinks with the cultural threat outlined 
above revolves around the conviction that Europe is currently undergoing a ‘Great 
Replacement’. Adopting Renaud Camus’96 concept, the GI groups argue that the 
European autochthonous population is gradually being “repressed and replaced” by 
non-European immigrants, due to the combination of falling birth rates and the 
“growth of Islamic parallel societies and mass-immigration” (GI Germany n.d.a). 
Particularly in Western Europe, GI activists fear becoming minorities in their own 
country within a few decades, leaving them with the sentiment of ‘feeling like 
strangers in our own country’ (Janzen 2013), and even becoming “the Indians of 
Europe” 97 (Morgan 2013: 33). In reference to Eastern Europe, activists argue that 
once the West is “full”, the East will follow (Hucek 2014). 
Considering the economic threat, GI employs the welfare chauvinist frames shared 
by many radical right parties (see e.g. Lazaridis et al. 2016). It considers third-country 
immigrants detrimental to the European social systems (Morgan 2013). This framing 
is often employed together with their direct social actions, which aim at improving 
the situations for vulnerable autochthonous citizens (see more on these actions below).  
Finally, the security threat diagnostic frame is based on the ethnopluralist premise 
that culturally distinct people cannot live in the same geographical place without this 
leading to ethnic strife, conflicts, and violence (instigated by the non-autochthonous 
residents). For instance, since 2012, GI France has carried out several campaigns 
against criminal immigrants (so-called “riff-raff”), who they accuse of acting violently 
against the autochthonous population. GI Austria and GI Italy have conducted similar 
actions. Moreover, with ISIS’ announcement of the Caliphate in 2014, which led to a 
surge in Islamist terrorist attacks in Europe, the GI groups also increasingly began 
mobilizing around anti-terrorist frames (see Ch. 6 for more). 
The GI groups’ over-arching diagnostic frame is thus that Muslim mass-immigration 
poses a threat to the European autochthonous population. While there are, of course, 
certain differences between the frames of the various GI groups, all the frames are 
intrinsically linked, and at their core, they lead to the same conclusion (i.e. prognosis). 
Due to the existential threat posed by Muslim immigrants to the European 
                                                          
96 The French author published the book Le Changement de peuple in 2013, outlining the 
ongoing ‘phenomenon’ of a Great Replacement in Europe. The main claim is that 
globalization’s acculturalisation of the autochthonous European population has made the 
people replaceable and “stripped of all national, ethnic and cultural specificity”, thus leaving it 
currently undergoing a gradual replacement by Muslim immigrants. 
97 This refusal of Islam based on ‘colonization’ fears has, in fact, been an important component 
of the overall Identitarian Movement since the late 1990s-early 2000s. It springs from the book 
by Guillaume Faye, ‘La Colonisation de l’Europe - Discours vrai sur l’immigration et l’Islam’ 
(English title: ‘The Colonisation of Europe’), which was published in 2000. In the book, Faye 
calls for the defence of the ‘white world’ against the threat of an ‘invasion’ of Muslim 
‘colonising’ immigrants (Dlouhý 2016b). 
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autochthonous population, there should be no Muslims in Europe. This entails two 
main prognoses: to close both the internal and external EU borders and to begin a 
process of ‘remigration’. The so-called “remigration” of third-country immigrants is 
a term GI has adopted from BI, referring to the (forced) returning of third-country 
immigrants to their home countries. As argued by Aftenberger (2017), this is merely 
a rewriting of the neo-Nazi calls for “Foreigners out” (Ausländer raus). The ultimate 
aim with these exclusionary diagnoses is to establish a future return to an imagined 
past, where Europe consisted of ethnically homogenous communities all belonging to 
the European cultural sphere. As Willinger states in his GI Manifesto: “We are the 
rightful heirs to this continent, and we will not give up our inheritance” (2013: 38). 
Yet, while the Muslim ‘other’ is diagnosed as the greatest immediate threat to GI, it 
is, in reality, the political liberalist and ‘cultural Marxist’ elites who are blamed for 
the occurrences, and are considered the absolute enemy (Weiß 2017: 218)98. Hence, 
the aforementioned static understanding of identity is expressed through the rejection 
of Universalist and egalitarian principles introduced in Europe in the aftermath of the 
French Revolution and their proponents (Winkler 2017). The groupuscules argue that 
the European population is currently experiencing an existential crisis due to the 
influences of modernity and globalization (particularly Americanization) and the 
therefrom-ensuing individualisation of society (Willinger 2013). This is leading to the 
current societal decay and an acculturalisation of the autochthonous population, 
replaced by multiculturalist and liberalist values (Eckes 2016; Franҫois as cited in 
Devecchio 2012; Weiß 2017). As GI France states in their ‘Declaration of War’: “We 
stopped believing that Kader could be our brother, the planet our village and humanity 
our family" (Génération Identitaire 2013a)99.  
Particularly the 1968 generation is strongly castigated for its ‘soft’ political stances, 
which have allowed society to come close to falling apart. One clear example is the 
breakdown of the traditional family structures. All the GI groups across Europe 
deplore the promotion of LGBTQ, gender policies, and other similar measures, which 
                                                          
98 See Ch.8 of Weiß 2017 for a more substantial explanation of this argument. 
99 Similarly, at the ‘European Identity’ conference in Austria in April 2015, Adam Bercik from 
GI Czech Republic expressed that: “We are not only exposed to external dangers, but the roots 
of our civilization itself have also been attacked from within for decades. We can call them 
liberals, neo-Marxists, cultural Marxists, Frankfurt School, Generation 68, or otherwise - it does 
not matter. It is those who, in line with Gramsci's strategy of the long march, occupy the 
important places in all areas of life, whether in politics, education or economics. They apply 
the principle of cultural hegemony to taunt and destroy all traditional values. They speak of 
multiculturalism, but their ultimate goal is not conservation of natural differences, but mixing 
which will create a homogeneous mass of mindless consumers. In the name of universal 
equality, they destroy the natural order” (GI Germany 2015a, author’s translation). 
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further decrease the autochthonous demographics (see e.g. GI France (Novopress 
2014;  GI Czech Republic 2017c).  
GI also blames the cultural ‘take-over’ on the deplorable state of the Europeans’ self-
image, which must be re-boosted. This is especially a concern for the German and 
Austrian groups due to the Nazi history. Thus, they both use the slogan ‘Love for your 
own people’ (‘Liebe zum eigenen’) to prod the pride in the national heritage and 
thereby prevent the (alleged) ‘self-abolition’. GI France also insists on re-establishing 
that the autochthonous French (i.e. ‘le français de souche’) are ‘masters in our own 
house’ (‘maîtres chez nous’), by insisting on “our determination to continue living on 
our land according to our laws, our values, in the respect of our identity” (GI France 
FB-post, author’s translation100). GI Germany similarly states, “We want patriotism to 
become a social leading value, and a true freedom of expression, which also allows 
our substantive positions a legitimate space of articulation” (GI Germany n.d.c). This 
ambition of both a national and a European reconquista (reclaiming) of the ‘patriotic 
hegemony’ should take place at the metapolitical level as a counter-measure to the 
liberal zeitgeist (Ibid.) (see more on this below). 
View on ‘Europe’ and the EU 
Due to their conception of ‘European identity’ as referring to people adhering to the 
same civilizational culture, the GI groups perceive of Europeans as making up a 
‘community of fate’ or ‘destiny’ (Bruns et al. 2017). Yet, as the various European 
regions correspond spatially to the 'ancestral peoples' (Eckes 2016), the GI groups 
prefer European cooperation organized around a ‘Europe of Nations,’ or of a 
European network of federally organized regions. 
They therefore object to the moves toward a ‘closer Union’ in terms of sovereignty 
losses but also to the technocratic and bureaucratic nature of the EU (see e.g. 
Novopress 2012). Yet, particularly the Western European GI groups do not generally 
devote much attention to the EU and its policies in their texts. Moreover, the 
individual GI activists do not have a completely unitary stance on the EU as such, 
neither across the national GI groups, nor within them (Interview with GI Germany 
2017). As the spokesperson of GI Germany elaborated, the lacking focus on the EU 
is mainly due to the GI groups’ perception that there are several more urgent societal 
issues, which need to be dealt with, before they can consider the EU (Interview with 
GI Germany 2017; see also Zúquete 2018). Fiato from GI Italy similarly stated: “[…] 
our movement does not have a main point regarding the European Union. […] This is 
not something we are talking about. We are acting on […] mass immigration and 
                                                          
100 As mentioned in the Methodological Framework, the contents of the Facebook posts are 
available upon request. 
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things related to this. […] 90 per cent of our activities are on other issues [than the 
EU]” (Interview with GI Italy 2018).  
Mobilization Aim: Reclaiming the Societal Hegemonic Discourse  
The GI groups’ ideological inspiration from the French New Right infers that they act 
as a groupuscular counter-culture at the meta-political level (Griffin 2003; see also 
Bar-On 2008). It is the groups’ main ambition to circumvent the mainstream (pro-
immigrant) discourse and the liberal ethos of European societies (see e.g. Zúquete 
2018 for more)101. Most of their protests aim to undermine the liberal voices within 
European society, including the mainstream (both right- and left-wing) parties, and 
portraying Identitarianism as the sole answer to today’s crises. The GI groups thus 
carry out many symbolic forms of protests, and they do not (in the first place) aim for 
policy changes at the national or European level, but rather work towards shifting the 
general societal discourse (Interview with GI Denmark 2018). Bódi Ábel, the leader 
of GI Hungary, explains the small numbers of GI activists with this ambition, as he 
states that it suffices to have few, well-prepared activists, in order to control the 
societal discourse (Bódi Ábel as cited in Tamás 2019). 
Protest Repertoires: ‘Spontaneous’ Happenings as the Main Protest Tactic 
Drawing heavily on the Italian neo-Fascist movement CasaPound’s protest 
repertoires (see e.g. Bruns et al. 2017), and strongly inspired by left-wing extra-
parliamentary mobilizations, such as Greenpeace102, the GI groups’ main protest form 
involves non-violent agitprop campaigning, especially in the form of so-called 
‘spontaneous’ happenings103. These actions usually only involve 5-20 activists and 
aim at attracting media attention with a limited use of resources in both financial and 
activist terms (see e.g. Cahuzac and François 2013). This, however, also infers that 
the GI groups can “convey political messages without having to recur to 
                                                          
101 As GI Germany states, “To be sure, today we are in no direct military confrontation and yet, 
the zeitgeist of self-abolition is dominated by the ideology of multiculturalism. It is therefore 
primarily a struggle for ideas, concepts and political positions. As the Identitarian Movement, 
we want to recapture the social spaces of discourse that were previously dominated by a left-
liberal hegemony” (GI Germany, nd). 
102 Translating the left-wing repertoires “into a specific nationalist framework of interpretation” 
(Klare & Sturm 2016: 183), Martin Sellner has referred to GI as a ‘patriotic Greenpeace’, which 
acts as the “activist avant-garde of the silent critical mass” (Litschko 2016). Other GI activists 
argue similarly. Robert Timm, the leader of GI Berlin, has stated: “[W]e would be stupid, if we 
did not learn from the experiences of left-wing activism” (Ibid.). They also emphasize the need 
for acts of civil disobedience (Interview with GI Italy 2017) (see also Castelli Gattinara & Froio 
2018; Cahuzac & François 2013 on the role of Bloc Identitaire for GI’s protest strategies). 
103 This strategy was adopted from Identitarian Bloc whose founders had to come up with a 
non-violent alternative to their prior activities due to state repression (François 2018). 
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confrontational actions or physical violence” (Froio 2018). Moreover, the actions’ 
relatively short duration and ‘spontaneous’ nature, plus the fact that many of the 
banner-drops and symbolic actions take place during the night make them hard to 
suppress. In order to gain media attention, the protests often take place in clearly 
visible and/or symbolic places, such as on historical monuments, city squares, or tall 
central buildings. Moreover, as part of their strategy to circumvent the prevailing 
societal liberal hegemony, many of the actions of especially GI Hungary, GI Slovenia, 
GI Germany and GI Austria take place at their respective countries’ universities and 
often involve strong criticism of the educational system (see e.g. GI Germany 2015b). 
The actions also frequently include attention-grapping props or stagings, like big 
banners and flares or controversial scenes (such as imitating ISIS terrorist attacks), or 
the occupation of buildings and roads. The majority of the protest actions are thus 
“artistically orchestrated performances” (Froio 2018), which “to an important extent” 
are “scripted and staged to maximize the chances of drawing media attention” 
(Koopmans & Olzak 2004: 204).  
The GI groups strive toward expressing racist and exclusionary viewpoints in a more 
‘modern packaging’ of action-oriented far right mobilization (Häusler as cited in 
Janzen 2013), with a strong focus on appearing moderate. Several of the GI activists 
have previously been associated with violent extreme right associations (see e.g. 
François 2018; see Ch. 8 for more on this), yet, now, the GI groups underline their 
non-violent nature. In this sense, GI finds “[t]he iPhone […] mightier than the boot” 
(BBC News 2017). The motives behind this dismissal of violence as a protest strategy 
are numerous and include “the sterility of this path, the lack of manpower, the context 
of a peaceful society,” just as it is a matter of gaining legitimacy to the Identitarian 
combat promoted by the GI network (François 2018)104. Moreover, this non-violent 
nature is also used as a means to differentiate themselves from their political 
opponents, especially Antifa, by pointing at the more violent proclivities of these 
activists (and of course downplaying, or not mentioning at all, violence perpetrated 
                                                          
104 In the words of a leading member of the Jungen Nationaldemokraten (Young 
Nationaldemocrats): “Whether as an autonomous, strong movement in the large pre-political 
space, as a door opener to new youth areas or as a conduit for the modernizing nationalist 
groups. [...] The Identitarians are [...] an action form that can be used when JN or NPD flags 
are not appropriate” (as cited in DOEW 2014b). 
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by one or more GI activists) (see e.g. GI demonstration in Austria on June 10, 2016 
(GI Germany 2016e))105.  
Hence, as an alternative, the GI groups across Europe frequently employ non-violent 
‘intervention-provocation’ tactics (Camus & François 2011), which have the intention 
to trigger shock-effects. According to Sellner, who is considered the main movement 
entrepreneur and thus strategist for the German-speaking GI groups, these actions 
should act like “performance art” with the “aim to disrupt and influence the 
mainstream narrative by producing rapid fire images that the media will rebroadcast 
in outrage” (Sellner & Lichtsmesz as cited in Barthélemy 2018). This involves, for 
example, the initial ‘hard-bass actions’ by GI Austria and GI Germany,106 the banner-
drops, etcetera. 
Direct Social Actions as a Strategy to Influence the Societal Discourse 
Many of the GI groups’ protest tactics can be classified as ‘direct social actions’ (see 
Bosi & Zamponi 2015; Froio & Castelli Gattinara 2016 on the Italian far right; 
Zúquete 2018 on the Identitarians). Drawing on “the idea of a self-changing society”, 
the activists aim to solve public problems without directly addressing the responsible 
authorities, but instead carry out actions themselves in order to resolve the issues (Bosi 
& Zamponi 2015: 371; Froio & Castelli Gattinara 2016). These actions derive from 
(neo-)fascist ideology, which draw on the “organic conception of the national 
community, the cult for action, the opposition to parliamentary democracy, and 
communitarianism” (Tarchi as cited in Ibid: 1044), making it a sort of ‘mystic duty’ 
for the activists to be solidaristic. For GI, these actions more specifically involve 
socio-economic issues,107 and issues that combine the topics of immigration and law 
and order108. They all aim at helping the autochthonous (national or European) 
                                                          
105 Due to GI’s anti-pluralist conception of identity and democracy, several of the national and 
regional groups are monitored by the authorities in Germany and Austria (see e.g. ARD 2016; 
Thalhammer 2016), while certain French parties already called for the group’s abolition in 2012 
(Canellas & Ponthus 2012). Several of the groups’ texts or protest actions have also been 
banned by the authorities/Facebook, etc., just as GI Slovenia and GI Hungary have had their 
webpages removed. Moreover, the majority of GI’s demonstrations in Austria and Germany 
are met with strong counter-demonstrations of left-wing civil societal coalitions and Antifa 
activists, also leading to physical attacks, both perpetrated by the counter-protesters and the GI 
activists (see e.g. GI Germany 2016e).   
106 This tactic was only employed in the first two years of their creation, i.e. 2012-2013. After 
this, the two national GI groups moderated their tactics. 
107 Such as giving food to the homeless or poor (e.g. GI France’s Génération Solidaire 
campaigns); collecting money for dog kennels, poor families and sick children (GI Czech); and 
providing warm clothes for the homeless (GI Germany and GI Austria), etcetera. 
108 E.g. ‘securing’ the neighbourhoods, metros and squares; occupying/blocking entrances to 
buildings for refugees, or roads/train tracks, where refugees travelled; and emergency actions 
(e.g. in relation to the Italian earthquake in 2016). 
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population, most frequently with the argument that the authorities’ focus on helping 
the migrants or other minority groups leads to their neglect (Interview with GI Czech 
Republic 2018). In this way, they combine anti-establishment discourses with anti-
immigration and solidarity expressions (see e.g. Froio & Castelli Gattinara 2016 for 
more on the far right and DSAs).  
Hence, very similar to neo-fascist parties and organizations, such as Golden Dawn 
(Greece), Hogar Social (Spain) and CasaPound (Italy), certain of the national GI 
groups take the welfare-protectionist stance to a further extreme through their so-
called “Generation Solidarity”, or “Patriotic Solidarity” actions. They are based on 
the same claims as those of the radical right, namely that the migrants are offered 
better social benefits than the socially vulnerable autochthonous Europeans who are 
considered “left behind” by the national governments and civil society organizations. 
Yet, by adhering to a sort of “ethnicized socialism” (François 2009), GI frames these 
direct social actions as an instance of explicit anti-national racism (e.g. anti-French, 
anti-Italian), and carries out acts of resistance. Activists have, for instance, organized 
charity and assistance drives exclusively targeting “autochthonous” groups of 
socioeconomically vulnerable individuals. 
Online Activism 
GI’s online activism is key to understanding the spread of their messages and their 
attempt to gain attention. According to Fabrice Robert, the leader of The Identitarians 
in France, it is the combination of street action and the internet, which allows the 
Identitarians “to bypass the media and break into the mainstream” (as cited in 
Barthélemy 2018). Unlike most other far right groupuscules, which tend to act ‘under 
the radar’, due to the contentious nature of their actions (Glösel as cited in Courtil 
2017), GI very openly seeks media attention through their actions. To spread news 
about their events, and in an attempt to conjure a buzz around their protests (Bouron 
2014), the young GI activists make strong use of social media. Drawing on marketing 
strategies, they cleverly frame and publicize their political statements through a 
professional medial staging strategy (see e.g. Castelli Gattinara & Froio 2018), also 
referred to as a ‘guerilla media tactics’ (Zúquete 2018). The different GI groups put 
particular emphasis on social media, communication (including rhetoric and the 
production of memes (see e.g. Bruns et al. 2017)), and protest training of all the 
activists, and generally display strong media- and communication-savviness.  
They also demonstrate this professionalism during their protest actions. The GI 
activists, for instance, rely on professional camera operators, who aim at making the 
protests “symbolise power, strength and victory,” by capturing the “masses and flags” 
(Biermann et al. 2017). In this way, they attempt to make “an image say more than a 
thousand words” (Interview with GI Denmark 2018), and ‘inject’ the concepts and 
images into the minds of people (Sellner as cited in Dusini & Panzenböck 2016) even 
though the actual protest action itself does not conjure much attention from passers-
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by (Froio 2018). It thus becomes a means to appear larger than they actually are, and 
it allows for a “multiplication of militantism” (François 2018)109. As most of the 
protest events are of a smaller nature, it is far from all of them that garner much 
mainstream media attention. Yet, the members’ awareness of social media strategy 
ensures the dissemination of information on various sites (until April 2018 especially 
on Facebook). 
The above section has shown that whilst the national GI groups mainly consist of 
university-educated members, who have strong (online) media and communication 
skills, they all have limited material resources. Their aim of influencing the societal 
discourse rather than exercising political pressure means that their protest repertoires 
mainly take the form of direct social actions, often of a more confrontational nature. 
The groups’ worldview is mainly informed by new right literature, and entails a strong 
focus on ‘identity,’ understood organically, thus inferring a sense of the Europeans as 
belonging to a ‘community of fate,’ which stands in opposition to the EU’s visions.  
 FORTRESS EUROPE  
The following section introduces the symbolic and material resources of the extra-
parliamentary actors that joined Fortress Europe at its creation in January 2016 (i.e. 
PEGIDA Germany, PEGIDA Austria, PEGIDA Netherlands, For Freedom (ex-
PEGIDA DK), PEGIDA Bulgaria110, PEGIDA UK, NGO ISIS, and BPI). PEGIDA 
Germany began demonstrating in October 2014 and IVČRN in December. Most of the 
other groups only became street-active either in January-February 2015 (PEGIDA 
Austria and PEGIDA DK (the later For Freedom)), or later still (NGO ISIS in June 
2015; PEGIDA Netherlands in October111; and PEGIDA UK in February 2016112).   
Like the preceding section on the GI coalition, the text is divided into several sub-
sections, starting with a consideration of the antecedents leading up to PEGIDA’s 
creation. This is followed by an analysis of the distinct FE-groups’ material and 
symbolic resources, plus their protest repertoires.  
                                                          
109 François refers to this communication strategy as ‘Digital gramscism’. It aims at watering 
down and trivializing far right theses online in order to “make them acceptable to the public”, 
plus enhancing their legitimacy and getting a better ‘brand’ image (François 2018). 
110 As stated in the Methodological Framework, it was not possible to find sufficient data on 
this group to include it in the analysis. 
111 Albeit after a failed attempt at setting up a Dutch PEGIDA group in January 2015 
(HopeNotHate n.d.a.). 
112 This was also after a failed attempt in March 2015, which, after a successful mobilization in 
Newcastle, dissolved after a London demonstration, due to leadership infights (HopeNotHate 
n.d.b). 
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ANTECEDENT: THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE LEAGUE 
In the late 1990s and 2000s, Germany witnessed a rise in street mobilization by groups 
expressing xenophobic sentiments toward Islam (Rucht 2018). This involved the Pro-
Movement, which mobilized against ‘Islamization’ in the mid-2000s, particularly 
opposing the construction of mosques. Around the same time, the anti-Islam English 
Defence League (EDL) was experiencing rather great mobilization success in the UK, 
leading several European far right activists to adopt the EDL blueprint. Numerous 
national Defence Leagues thus appeared across the continent, all mobilizing against 
Islam and its adherents (see e.g. Meleagrou-Hitchens & Brun 2013). Yet, none of 
these offshoots amassed anywhere near as strong activist numbers as did EDL, despite 
the attempt to unite the groups under a European Defence League umbrella 
association in 2012. Nevertheless, most groups remained active at a smaller scale, 
mainly online (see e.g. HopeNotHate n.d.d). 
In October 2014, a German mobilization inspired by the English Defence League saw 
the light of day, namely the so-called Hooligans against Salafism (Hooligans gegen 
Salafismus, HoGeSa), which was created by a “loosely organised network of right-
wing soccer fans” (Virchow 2016a: 543). It assembled in the aftermath of a Kurdish 
demonstration in Hamburg in September 2014, where around 600 Kurdish protesters 
clashed with a group of Salafists (Buchanan 2014). A Dresden citizen, Lutz 
Bachmann, was similarly outraged by the occurrence of foreign ‘battles’ in his 
country, leading him to post a video suggesting that something should be done against 
this praise of violence on the streets of Dresden (see e.g. Vorländer et al. 2018). He 
set up a Facebook page and quickly obtained the support of a crowd of friends from 
the football fan milieu (Virchow 2016a) including an activist (Simon Däbritz) linked 
to the German Defence League (Popp & Wassermann 2015). The clashes between the 
Kurds and the Salafists thus provided a catalyst, leading to anti-Muslim 
demonstrations by both HoGeSa113 and PEGIDA, starting in October 2014. After the 
terrorist attack on Charlie Hebdo in January 2015, several PEGIDA-offshoots started 
protesting across Europe, many of which could be linked to the Defence Leagues. 
Several European Defence League activists thus joined PEGIDA demonstrations. 
English Defence League activists took part in PEGIDA UK’s protests (HopeNotHate 
n.d.b), the Dutch Defence League joined PEGIDA Netherlands (Sterkenburg 2016), 
and activists from the Danish Defence League have participated in For Freedom’s 
                                                          
113 Aside from some smaller, regional protests, HoGeSa arranged three larger demonstrations, 
all aimed at countering various aspects of Islam, especially the so-called ‘Islamization’ of the 
West (see e.g. Virchow 2016a). The demonstrations took place in Cologne (October 26, 2014 
with 4500 participants and heavy police clashes), in Hanover (November 15, 2014 with 3000 
participants, and a strong police presence), and finally, in Cologne October 2015, on the one 
year anniversary of the first demonstration (Virchow 2016a). The Cologne protest attracted 
around 5000 participants from various extreme right groupings. 
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demonstrations (Na & Schwarz-Nielsen 2016). Moreover, IVČRN directly derives 
from the Czech Defence League (Mrva 2014), while the Finnish Defence League 
cooperates with NGO ISIS (NGO ISIS n.d.). This gives a very strong initial indication 
of the types of resources, frames, and mobilization styles of the various PEGIDA 
groups across Europe. The following section consider the groups further.  
THE NATIONAL FE GROUPS’ MATERIAL RESOURCES 
As was the case for GI France and the other GI groups, most of the protest groups 
participating in Fortress Europe have used PEGIDA Germany’s blueprint as the 
model for their organizations and protest repertoires (for more on this, see Ch. 9). The 
majority of these extra-parliamentary groups are thus protest groups. In fact, only the 
Estonian group NGO ISIS (abbreviation for NGO International Stop 
Immigration/Islamisation Society) did not organize its own demonstrations, but 
instead, joined demonstrations both in Estonia and abroad. 
It is rather challenging to establish the groups’ organizational features and financial 
resources, as they do not always provide extensive information about such aspects 
themselves. Hence, while it is evident that there was wide variation in the set ups of 
the PEGIDA groups around Europe, it is much harder to say much concretely about 
their compositions. Yet, we do know quite a lot about the organization of PEGIDA 
Germany’s demonstrations. Initially, the demonstrations were organised by a team of 
12 people (the so-called ‘Orga-team’) of whom only three had prior experience with 
political organization,114 while several did not have jobs, nor higher educations, and 
could not be deemed as ‘professional’ in the sense of experts in a field.  
Most of the European PEGIDA groups’ (official) leaderships consisted of 2-5 actors 
from the far right milieu, including a mix of activists from the Stop Islamization of 
Europe and the various Defense Leagues, and new actors on the scene (see e.g. 
Berntzen 2019). In terms of the various European PEGIDA groups, the examples of 
backgrounds include:  
 Nicolai Sennels, PEGIDA DK (tpsychologist and candidate for the Danish 
People’s Party before setting up PEGIDA-DK (then later For Freedom)) 
 Georg I. Nagel, PEGIDA Austria (member of GI Austria and writer for Zur 
Zeit (by PEGIDA Austria until February 2015) (Ajanovic et al. 2016)) 
 Ignaz Bearth, PEGIDA Switzerland (President of Direct-Democratic Party 
Switzerland (Direktdemokratische Partei Schweiz) (DPS), and ex-member 
                                                          
114 The Orga-team members derived from Bachmann’s circle of friends, the ‘party scene’, and 
football supporters from Dresden (Bachmann as cited in Virchow 2016a: 544). As examples, 
Bachmann is a trained chef and founder of an advertisement agency, while Simon Däbritz is a 
former city council candidate of the German Free Democratic Party (FDP), and Thomas 
Tallacker is from the Christian Democratic Union (CDU).  
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of the extreme right party Swiss Nationalist Party (National Orientierter 
Schweizer (Pnos)) (Zumach 2015)) 
 Tommy Robinson, PEGIDA UK (ex-leader of the English Defence League) 
 Anne Marie Waters, PEGIDA UK (creator of Sharia Watch UK and UKIP 
member) 
 Edwin Wagensveld, PEGIDA Netherlands (participant in HoGeSa 
demonstrations and linked to Dutch football hooligan scene (Bos 2016)) 
 Raffie Chohan, PEGIDA Netherlands (leader of the Dutch Defence League) 
The national PEGIDA groups’ inner circle of organizers thus mainly consisted of far 
right activists, who, broadly speaking, did not have strong professional backgrounds, 
and especially not regarding more issue-specific expertise around e.g. migration and 
integration policy. Moreover, some of the leaders’ extreme right backgrounds also 
inferred lacking respectability among the public, leading to low attention numbers and 
strong medial criticism (see e.g. Hafez 2016 on PEGIDA Austria). Similarly, the 
Czech group IVČRN (We do not Want Islam in the Czech Republic) also did not have 
many resources or strong expertise (see e.g. Císař & Navrátil 2018; Prokupkova 
2018a). Deriving from the Czech Defence League (Mrva 2014), it was led by the 
Czech biologist Martin Konvička. It consisted of a small group of leaders, plus 
numerous local groups, which organized protests and public talks. Aside from a few 
of the members, the organizers did not have much political experience.  
Hence, in terms of human resources, none of the groups were particularly resourceful, 
neither in terms of numbers nor professionalism, except for a few of the members, 
who either had political party experience (like Jana Volfová from BPI) or professional 
communication (like Tatjana Festerling who has a background in PR). 
Financial Resources 
At the same time, none of the PEGIDA groups had strong financial resources as they 
were dependent on donations from their members (either collected at the 
demonstrations or online), or their own, personal funds (Interview with Wagensveld 
2017; Interview with For Freedom 2017)115. The only exception to this was IVČRN. It 
united with other Czech anti-Islam activists in the summer of 2015 and created the 
political association Blok proti Islamú (Blok Against Islam, BPI), which soon began 
cooperating with the Czech party Dawn (Úsvit). This cooperation inferred that BPI 
had access to more financial resources due to Dawn’s parliamentary seats, which 
included funds from the state. 
                                                          
115 PEGIDA Germany was registered as a company in the German Trade register in December 
2014 (as PEGIDA e.V., see Handelsregister n.d.) and attempted to become a charitable 
association in January 2015, inferring that donations to the protest group would be tax 
deductible (Speit 2015). 
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Table 5.3: The extra-parliamentary FE-groups’ material resources. 
Groups Material Resources 
PEGIDA Germany Very limited 
IVČRN  Very limited 
Blok against Islam Limited (but could draw on 
Dawn’s funds after fall 
2015) 
PEGIDA Austria Very limited 
PEGIDA 
Netherlands 
Very limited 
NGO ISIS Very limited 
PEGIDA UK Very limited 
For Freedom  Very limited 
SYMBOLIC RESOURCES: STYLES AND FRAMES  
Symbols, Style, and ‘Collective Differentiation’ (Rituals, clothing, etc.) 
Similar to the GI groups, the FE groups’ activists look like ‘regular’ people, i.e. they 
do not wear any attire that clearly distinguishes them as far right activists of any kind. 
This aligns with their aim of appearing moderate and respectable and as being ‘of the 
people’ (see e.g. Aslanidis 2017). PEGIDA’s logo underlines this sentiment, as it 
depicts a person who is symbolically throwing ‘totalitarian’ ideologies in the bin 
(including the swastika, the ISIS flag, and the logos of Antifa, and the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK)). Some of the German protesters also quickly started waving 
the black-red-yellow Phillipus Cross flag, which was created by a group plotting a 
coup against Hitler (Kellerhoff 2015), again as a symbolic rejection of Nazism. 
Conversely, IVČRN and BPI’s logos show a crossed-out mosque and minaret (see 
IVČRN n.d.a), in this way clearly underlining their anti-Islam sentiments. 
The Extra-Parliamentary FE-Members’ Main Collective Action Frames 
As its name indicates, PEGIDA, or the Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization 
of the Occident (i.e. the Western world), consists of ‘Patriotic Europeans,’ who oppose 
the so-called ‘Islamization’ of Western Europe. While PEGIDA Germany’s 
worldview goes beyond anti-Islam consternation, and in fact, covers a much broader 
anti-immigration agenda (Fano Fernadez as cited in Fielitz & Laloire 2016), most of 
the other PEGIDA groups, while largely adopting PEGIDA Germany’s main frames, 
are single-issue, mobilizing against Islam and Muslim immigrants, combined with 
populist anti-establishment frames. As Berntzen and Weisskircher (2016) assert, at 
their core, all the PEGIDA groups propagate an end to Islam’s influence on Europe 
(so-called ‘Islamization’), and thereby draw on many of the same key mobilizing 
frames and symbols as the Defence Leagues and the general Counter-Jihad Movement 
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(see e.g. Berntzen 2018a; Lee 2016; Denes 2012). In other words, “[t]heir grievances 
mirror that of the contemporary anti-Islamic radical right movement with the external 
enemy being Islam and Muslims, while the internal enemy is the elite: politicians, the 
press, academia and human rights activists” (Berntzen & Sandberg as cited in 
Berntzen & Weisskircher 2016: 559). This populist framing is visible in PEGIDA 
Germany’s chant ‘We are the people’ (‘Wir sind das Volk’). 
While the Czech IVČRN and the later BPI were not officially part of the PEGIDA 
network, they employ very similar frames, also largely drawing on the ideological 
output from actors within the Counter-Jihad Movement, such as Bill Warner. Thus, 
the group does not target any other immigrant group, nor hardly act on other, broader, 
societal issues. It mainly targets Muslims due to the (alleged) cultural incompatibility 
between Christian Europeans and Islam, and the later established Blok against Islam 
continued expressing this worldview (Císař & Navrátil 2018). Finally, the Estonian 
NGO ISIS was created in the summer of 2015 in response to the “the wave of forced 
migration” from African and Muslim countries during the ‘refugee crisis’ (Kirsberg 
2018). It has the main aim of fighting immigration and ‘Islamism’ (Ibid.), utilising 
very similar collective action frames as the other FE-members. 
If one looks more closely at the diagnostic frames employed by the various groups, 
they are very similar as those used by GI, and thus mainly evolve around a threat 
perception of ‘Islam’ mainly argued along cultural, security, and existential frames.  
All the extra-parliamentary groups share the main diagnosis, namely that Islam poses 
a cultural threat to Europe due to its adherents’ alleged gradual ‘take-over’ of the 
continent. They therefore argue that Islam and so-called ‘Islamization’ threatens the 
European civilization and culture. For Freedom, for instance, opposes the “creeping 
Islamization of Denmark and the West” by “fundamental Islam” (see e.g. Eltard-
Sørensen 2015). Especially BPI, IVČRN, NGO ISIS, and PEGIDA UK post numerous 
conspiracy theories on their websites and Facebook accounts, for instance about the 
‘Phases of Islamization’ (BPI n.d.; see also Kirsberg 2016a about ISIS’ gradual take-
over of the world) and videos predicting the end of Europe in 2050 replaced by a 
Muslim caliphate (Kirsberg 2015b). They mainly base this fear in the shared belief 
that the Western civilization is a homogenous and superior civilization, which should 
be protected against adherents of Islam (see also Berntzen 2018a). Robinson from 
PEGIDA UK, for example, expresses this through the claim that “The European 
heritage is the envy of the world” (Robinson as cited in 4freedoms 2015). Tania Groth 
from For Freedom instead argues it more nostalgically, calling for the need to “restore 
all that we have built and what has made the West the greatest, freest and fairest place 
FE AND GI: RESOURCES AND EUROPEANIZATION STRATEGIES 
189 
for humanity in all human history.  We will turn back the clock and fight for the life 
that so many have died to create for us” (För Frihet 2016)116. 
Despite the low number of Muslims in the Czech Republic and Estonia, both IVČRN, 
BPI, and NGO ISIS perceive the same great cultural threat in Islam, often drawing on 
Western European experiences and occurrences to underline the incompatibility and 
the pending problems. IVČRN (2014), for instance, argues that by allowing a few 
hundred Muslims to enter the country as refugees, more will come, as they then have 
a base to join. They consider this a problem, due to Islam’s disregard for other 
cultures, as seen in IVČRN’s motto “We like diversity, so we reject Islam” (IVČRN 
n.d.a.). Similarly, NGO ISIS holds that “Islam does not recognize European lifestyle, 
norms and local jurisdiction” (Kirsberg 2018). The shared viewpoint makes several 
groups develop the related diagnosis that multiculturalism does not work, as it is not 
deemed possible to integrate Muslims to the host societies (PEGIDA Germany 
(Festerling 2016a); PEGIDA DK (Winther 2015); IVČRN 2015a). Tommy Robinson 
even compares Muslims with the allegedly much better integrated Sikh community in 
the UK (Goldberg 2016), while both IVČRN and PEGIDA Germany called for the 
European reception of solely Christian refugees from Syria (IVČRN 2014d; PEGIDA 
Germany 2015b). It is thus the ultimate fear that the ‘mismatch’ between Islam and 
Western civilization will lead to the rupture of the European societal cohesion.  
According to the groups, the ongoing ‘Islamization’ process is visible in several 
things. For instance, in the increase in Halal butchers (see e.g. IVČRN’s ‘Stop Halal’ 
campaign (IVČRN n.d.b.) or PEGIDA Netherlands’ protest actions against halal 
butchers (see e.g. PEGIDA Netherlands 2015), Muslim schools (see e.g. IVČRN 
2014b), and mosques (NGO ISIS (Kirsberg 2015b); PEGIDA Netherlands (n.d.)). 
Moreover, the (possible) introduction of Sharia law and Islamic courts is deemed as 
particularly problematic (see e.g. Buchanan 2015 on PEGIDA UK; IVČRN 2014a), 
just as is the more general introduction of Muslim customs and traditions (e.g. 
PEGIDA Germany (Baron Bodissey 2014); PEGIDA Netherlands n.d.a). This mainly 
relates to the fact that many of the groups consider Islam less of a religion but more 
of an ideology in its own right (PEGIDA UK as cited in Dearden 2015a; IVČRN 
2015b.). Some even go as far as referring to it as ‘fascist’ (e.g. PEGIDA DK as cited 
in Eltard-Sørensen 2015; BPI 2016b), and the Koran is frequently compared to 
Hitler’s Mein Kampf. These are all ideas, which were also widespread amongst the 
Counter-Jihad actors (see e.g. Meleagrou-Hitchens & Brun 2013), and which 
underline the great threat perception in terms of the pending ‘overtake’ of the 
European continent by Islam and its adherents.  
                                                          
116 Wagensveld similarly wishes to take the Netherlands back to its cultural state of the 1970-
80s, so that it is “one’s own people, which counts, and one’s own traditions and culture, and 
with that also the return of the freedom of opinion, because this we have, and this is clearly 
evident in most areas, completely lost” (Interview with PEGIDA Netherlands 2017). 
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One of the most frequently employed means to express the incompatibility between 
Islam and Western culture is through the focus on the treatment of women in Islam, 
particularly regarding their subordination. This is for instance visible in the groups’ 
focus on the Muslim veil and burka (see e.g. For Freedom 2015; PEGIDA Netherlands 
n.d.a; PEGIDA Austria (as cited in PEGIDA Graz FB-post); PEGIDA Germany (as 
cited in Baron Bodissey 2014) and IVČRN 2015j). These adoptions of more liberalist 
frames in order to protect both the autochthonous and the migrant women have 
recently been referred to as ‘liberal Islamophobia’ by the two scholars Mondon and 
Winter (2018). They find this type of Islamophobia to be “anchored in a pseudo-
progressive discourse in the defence of the rule of law based on liberal equality, 
freedom and rights (e.g. liberal versions of freedom of speech, gender and sexual 
equality)” (2018: 62). Yet, instead, one should rather see it as the exploitation of 
feminist issues in anti-Islam campaigns in order to stigmatize Muslim men (see e.g. 
the literature on femo-nationalism, e.g. by Farris 2017). The ambivalence in terms of 
how to understand such defences of women’s rights is further underlined by the fact 
that some of the groups otherwise strongly problematize gender policies (PEGIDA 
Germany for instance derogatively refer to it as ‘Gender Wahn’, i.e. ‘gender craze’, 
and For Freedom’s spokesperson problematizes feminism (see e.g. För Frihet 2016).  
Another oft-voiced diagnostic frame is the security threat posed by particularly male 
Muslim immigrants. It is argued around several aspects, but mainly in terms of a fear 
of possible rises in European terrorist attacks, plus the (allegedly) violent behaviour 
of Muslim immigrants and asylum seekers (see Ekman 2015). This particular threat 
perception was strongly voiced after the January 7, 2015, Charlie Hebdo terrorist 
attack in France but also prior to this. At PEGIDA Germany’s first demonstration in 
October 2014, for instance, Däbritz stated online “We don't want terrorist, Islamist 
powers to fight their religious war on our streets. We are against IS, PKK, al-Qaida 
and all the others” (Popp & Wassermann 2015). Moreover, many of the protest groups 
also draw attention to the (allegedly) violent and sexually deviant nature of Muslim 
third-country immigrants, for instance, by pointing to growing crime rates (NGO ISIS 
Kirsberg 2015a; PEGIDA Germany 2015b; Robinson (as cited in Goldberg 2016)). 
While some of the protest groups also underline the demographic threat posed by 
Islam by drawing on Camus’ fear of a ‘great replacement’. Festerling from PEGIDA 
Germany for instance used the term ‘Umvolkung’ or ‘replacement’ of the German 
population  (see Vorländer et al. 2018: 18), i.e. the gradual overtaking of the European 
continent by Muslim immigrants, and thus, “essentially genocide” (Groth speech in 
Sweden in November 2015 (För Frihet n.d.). Yet, this is not a generally oft-voiced 
frame. Similarly, both NGO ISIS and IVČRN (IVČRN May 2015) at times mention 
the economic threat posed by immigration in terms of the welfare burden and the 
potential rupture of the societal cohesion, but again, this is not a continuously raised 
concern.  
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However, the combination of the external cultural and security threats makes several 
of the groups’ leaders express their perception of Islam as an existential threat and 
fear for the deteriorating states of their countries (see e.g. Wagensveld as cited in 
Feenstra 2016). For these actors, it becomes a question of the sheer survival of 
Western culture and European values (see e.g. Hafez 2014; Betz & Meret 2009 for 
more on this). Robinson, for example, states that resistance is required “for the future 
of our children” (Epoch Times 2015f; PEGIDA FB-Post). According to him, “Islam 
is the greatest threat our generation has to fight. In the past, every European people 
has had external threats to fight against. Now we have the enemy in our midst” 
(Dispatch International 2016a).  
This frame is frequently aligned with the issue of illegal immigration, and the main 
prognosis is to stop immigration by curbing their rights in the nation-states and closing 
the open borders as a means to control whether, for instance, ISIS members arrive to 
the European continent (see e.g. IVČRNd; BPI 2015a; PEGIDA Germany 2015b). 
(Populist) Perceptions of the Liberal Elite  
Aside from the groups’ strong criticism of Islam and its adherents, they also oppose 
the liberal elites and proponents of left-wing politics. This is not so much based in a 
framing that discards the historical hegemonic influences of the political belief (as 
was the case for the Generation Identity groups), but more in its current treatment of 
the far right. Similarly as GI, several of the FE-groups thus oppose the influence of 
so-called ‘cultural Marxists,’ who are accused of being the main culprits for the 
multiculturalist attitudes prevalent in Europe today (see e.g. Jamin 2018 for an 
explanation of the term). The proponents of multiculturalism are considered blind to 
the ongoing changes to European societies, and instead, place too much emphasis on 
‘political correctness’. Groth from For Freedom, for instance, states that “2000 years 
of reason has been replaced by cultural Marxism and Islamic supremacy in the form 
of political correctness. Cultural Marxism and cultural relativism is anathema and 
lethal to our civilization” (För Frihet n.d.). The ‘political correctness’ witnessed in the 
lacking ability to discuss the integration problems freely, plus the moralizing by the 
left, is thus problematised as inhibiting the opportunity to freely discuss what is going 
on in Europe (see e.g. Festerling 2015a). Moreover, particularly PEGIDA Germany 
expresses a very strong anti-elitism, diagnosing the political leadership as ‘Betrayers 
of the people’ (‘Volksverräter’) due to their disregard for the (autochthonous) 
populations’ concerns and general well-being (as cited in Skrobala 2015). 
At the same time, other actors, such as the mainstream media, are also criticized, 
particularly when they report negatively about the groups (for instance when referring 
to them as being ‘extreme’ or ‘racist’ (see e.g. IVČRN (IVČRN (2015f)). Yet, they are 
also criticized for their more positive reporting of the ‘refugee crisis,’ while at the 
same time ‘not listening to’ the far right (see e.g. PEGIDA Germany and the 
‘Lügenpresse’ (e.g. Skrobala 2015). The groups’ leaders thus lament the ways they 
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are portrayed by mainstream media and political opponents, particularly Antifa and 
other far left activist groups, who, in their view, appear more concerned about 
targeting anti-Islam actors than actually questioning what goes on in the Muslim 
societies. 
Views on ‘Europe’ and the EU 
The EU does not play an important role in all FE-groups’ argumentation. Yet, very 
similarly to most other European far right actors (see e.g. Vasilopoulou 2018; Mudde 
2007; Brack 2015), they agree that the EU and its ‘dictatorial’ policy output infringes 
on the national sovereignty of the EU-member states (see e.g. PEGIDA Netherlands 
n.d.a; PEGIDA Germany 2015a (see also Epoch Times 2015a); IVČRN 2015d). Most 
of the groups also problematize the undemocratic and overly techno- and bureaucratic 
nature of the Union (Interview with PEGIDA Netherlands 2017; PEGIDA Germany 
as cited in Epoch Times 2015a). Aside from this, much of the critique revolves around 
an anti-establishment frame, just as some of the groups slander the EU for being run 
by a left-wing elite (see e.g. Kirsberg 2015c) and even make personal attacks, such as 
drawing attention to the alleged alcoholism of Jean-Claude Juncker (Festerling 
2016c). 
Instead, most of the groups call for a European cooperation akin to the European 
Economic Community (EEC) up until the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which turned the 
cooperation into a ‘Union,’ and simultaneously, gradually increased the EU’s 
supranational powers over the member states (Interview with PEGIDA Netherlands 
2017). The cooperation should thus mainly involve trade policies, and each country 
should have the right to make its own, sovereign decisions. Yet, the groups are split 
in terms of whether or not their country should continue its membership of the EU or 
not. PEGIDA Netherlands calls for a so-called ‘Dexit’ (PEGIDA Netherlands n.d.a), 
just as does PEGIDA Germany, stating that it wishes to leave “the useless outfit that 
oppresses” all member states (PEGIDA Germany 2015b). Moreover, some of the 
Eastern European groups feel let down regarding the outcome of their EU accession 
in 2004, finding that this was not what they were promised (IVČRN 2015h; see also 
Caiani & Kluknavská 2017). 
Protest Repertoires: Mainly Non-violent Demonstrations  
Lutz Bachmann and his co-organizers arranged the first PEGIDA ‘evening walk’ 
(‘Abendspaziergang’) on October 20, 2014, in Dresden. This quickly turned into a 
weekly recurring event, taking place each Monday. It involves a march through the 
centre of Dresden, Saxony. The protesters did not employ violence, as proscribed by 
the organizers. Gradually, more rituals were added to the walk, such as a PEGIDA 
anthem, the singing of the national anthem, and holding up cell phones with the 
flashlights on in order to “‘enlighten’ those at the top” (Virchow 2016a: 545). Rucht 
(2018) likens PEGIDA’s performance with those of other far right protests, having the 
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aim to present “a collective body, arranged as a densely packed crowd that epitomizes 
coherence, will, energy, determination and power” (2018: 233f). Vorländer and 
colleagues (2018) compare it with other (left-wing) protest movements, alluding to 
“The high emotionality, the confrontational air, the mode of putting one’s indignation 
on display, and the successful attempt to generate communicative power on prominent 
squares and streets.” This has all made PEGIDA “into a new style of protest 
movement, a right-wing populist movement of indignation” (2018: 198)117.  
The other German and European -IDAs initially adapted the German protest repertoire 
to their local and domestic settings in an attempt to gather as strong crowds as their 
German predecessor. The protest groups thus organized broadly advertised still-
standing rallies or processions (depending on whether they obtained the permit to 
walk through town centres or not (see e.g. Lowe 2016)), with the intention of 
including ‘normal people’ (Wagensveld as cited in ibid.), and in this way, amass 
enough people to pressure the decision-makers (Møller 2016). Despite the fact that 
many of the organizers derived from the more violence prone hooligans’ scene and 
the various European Defence Leagues, they insisted on non-violent protests in an 
attempt to appear more moderate, and thus respectable (Lowe 2016). For Freedom’s 
leader explains this aspect thusly: 
We make a big point out of the fact that we walk peacefully […]. We are 
ordinary people. We are not a bunch of hooligans, who feel like fighting. 
And if any hooligans or similar try to participate in the demonstrations, 
and I find out about this, then I expel them. […] We simply cannot 
afford… Because the media are there all the time, and they have not been 
very nice towards us, one could say. (Interview with For Freedom 2017) 
In order to ensure that this moderation is maintained, also in the face of provocations 
from counter-mobilizers, such as Antifa activists and other anti-racist coalitions, all 
groups place special emphasis on the maintenance of order and discipline during the 
demonstrations. This, for instance, involves the staunch rejection of National 
Socialism, the prohibition of alcohol and violence, and the request that the supporters 
follow the orders of the police (Rucht 2018). In this sense, they attempt to fulfil the 
old EDL slogan “not racist, not violent, just no longer silent” (Pilkington 2016). 
Nevertheless, at the same time, the vast majority of the speeches of all PEGIDA 
groups are delivered with a highly inflammatory language, and the boundaries 
                                                          
117 While Virchow (2016a) refers to PEGIDA as a ‘völkisch-nationalist movement’, Druxes 
(2016) instead refers to it as “an identitarian populist movement that shares the white nationalist 
beliefs of the New Right” (2016: 30), and Rucht (2018) names it a right-wing populist 
movement. This demonstrates the difficulty of determining the different PEGIDA groups’ exact 
ideological positions, particularly due to the turnover in speakers, and the various topics, they 
touch upon, etcetera. 
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between the radical and extreme right are continuously crossed, yet most often without 
stating anything that conflicts with the law (Rucht 2018).  
The Czech IVČRN and BPI protest groups were also highly inspired by PEGIDA 
Germany in terms of their protest tactics (Prokupkova 2018b). IVČRN organized its 
first demonstration on December 18, 2014, but its protest tactics reached beyond 
demonstrations, mainly involving conventional action forms (see Ch. 7). The two 
people behind NGO ISIS, on the other hand, were mainly active online, but also 
participated in various demonstrations organized by other far right actors in Estonia, 
Finland, and Germany, aside from their political work for EKRE.  
Online Activism 
All of the protest groups had, and some still have, a rather strong online presence, 
especially on Facebook (see e.g. Berntzen & Weisskircher 2016). Yet, unlike the GI 
groups, the FE-groups did not construct and utilize the pages with high strategic 
communications ambitions or based on technological media-savviness (see e.g. Haller 
& Holt 2019). Instead, most groups mainly employ the online sphere for mobilization 
for, and advertisement of, upcoming events, yet, in a more low-key fashion than GI, 
and mainly directed towards the actual participants. There are thus not many accounts 
of how the events went, postings of press releases, and etcetera. This indicates a 
limited interest in mainstream media dissemination, which aligns with the anti-
establishment frames expressed by most of the groups. According to Haller and Holt 
(2019), due to their general disbelief in mainstream media, “PEGIDA leaders [in 
Germany and in other countries] do not focus on mass media communication, for 
example by using press statements or organizing press conferences, but channel their 
communication with supporters and the general public exclusively through social 
media” (2019: 1668).  
Notwithstanding, several of the protest groups are highly active on their social media 
platforms and websites, placing much emphasis on disseminating both political 
messages, such as news stories and derogatory memes, pictures, and cartoons about 
immigrants and other political opponents, plus information about upcoming protest 
actions and events. In this way, they attempt to garner support and influence public 
opinion via online sources together with their protest tactics. Many of the news stories 
derive from blogs and media portals created by other far right actors, just as news 
articles, which portray migrants and asylum seekers negatively, are frequently utilised 
to underline that ‘we said this all along’. As an example, IVČRN had both a very active 
website and Facebook page, where it mainly re-posted articles and blog posts from 
national, European, and American websites with the intention to “warn, inform, 
instruct people” about Islam (IVČRN 2015b). NGO ISIS, on the other hand, mainly 
posted blog entries about the current political situation across Europe crafted by 
Kirsberg himself.  
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The above section has shown that none of the extra-parliamentary FE members had 
strong material resources, in terms of neither absolute numbers, nor professionalism 
or expertise on their protest issues. In fact, only PEGIDA Germany drew huge crowds, 
and could potentially instigate protests in Brussels, but limited funding precludes such 
an occurrence. Moreover, the groups’ far right anti-Islam worldview both involves a 
diffuse policy issue, but also a strong criticism of the EU as a political institution, and 
a preference for a much looser level of cooperation between the European states. 
 DISCUSSION: LIKELY EU-RELATIONS OF THE GI AND FE 
GROUPS 
The introduction to the groups making up Generation Identity and Fortress Europe 
have revealed several features, which can help deduce their likely Europeanization 
strategies.  
Material Resources: Limited for Both the GI and FE Groups 
For one, it has been argued, and to a certain extent demonstrated, that none of the 
extra-parliamentary GI and FE groups have either the manpower, level of 
professionalization, or required financial means to set up offices at the EU institutions. 
At the same time, the subcultural and groupuscular GI groups, the various PEGIDA 
protest groups, IVČRN’s small core organizational team, and NGO ISIS’ blog nature 
infer very informal and highly fragmented organizational forms, without high 
numbers of formal memberships, something that is also not conducive to the pursuit 
of insider strategies at the EU level. Hence, even though some of the GI groups 
(especially GI France, GI Austria, and GI Germany) have a rather professional, and 
to some extent, efficient media strategy, plus are very apt at political communication 
(see e.g. Castelli Gattinara & Froio 2018), they have neither the organizational 
capacity, nor the ideational interest, to take this professionalism to the EU-level. 
Symbolic Resources: Mobilizing on Diffuse, Political, and Politicized Issues 
Drawing on Islamophobic fears, the GI and FE groups deliver the same core message: 
the so-called ‘Islamization’ of Western societies and the religion’s impact on the 
European culture, demography, society, and politics must be curtailed. They thus call 
for the maintenance of a culturally and ethnically homogenous autochthonous 
European civilization, whose culture is under threat by the Muslim ‘other’ (Hirsch-
Hoefler & Mudde 2013). This mainly evolves around the perception that “Muslims 
are aggressively forcing their beliefs upon indigenous nations,” for instance, through 
the introduction of Sharia law together with the fear that “Islam” will soon “become 
the dominant religion in Europe” (Madisson & Ventsel as cited in Kasekamp et al. 
2018: 8). Moreover, the actors making up both coalitions employ anti-liberal and -
establishment discursive appeals. In this way, they not only target Muslim immigrants 
and refugees but also the national and EU elites, who they blame for the problems 
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facing many EU Member States (see Ch. 6 and 7 for more on these blame attributions). 
The groups’ mobilizing frames thus mainly evolve around opposition to Islam and 
third-country immigration, and these topics belong under the category of ‘diffuse’ 
interests (della Porta & Caiani 2009).  
In addition, the frames consider a political campaign topic (Parks 2015), and thus, are 
most likely to lead to protest actions and other means of simultaneously addressing 
both the public and the decision-makers. This aligns with both the GI and FE groups’ 
more overarching ambitions of swaying public opinion rather than directly 
influencing the political decision-makers through lobbyism and other conventional 
means (such as is a frequent approach by interest groups, see e.g. Beyers 2004). The 
groups’ strong distrust in established politics, which particularly the FE protest groups 
express, is also likely to make them refrain from seeking personal contacts to EU 
representatives, aside from potentially far right MEPs.  
Additionally, the topic of immigration has become a ‘hot topic’ in European politics 
in recent decades, and as a policy issue, it involves intense political conflicts and 
divisions, making it highly politicized (see e.g. Grande et al. 2018). In this sense, both 
the GI groupuscules and the FE extra-parliamentary groups largely equate the actors, 
which made up the transnational movements according to Monforte’s (2014) research. 
They mobilize employing strongly politicized frames, and they have no interest in 
political processes and deliberations, just as they are unlikely to meet resonance in the 
EU setting due to their averse symbolic resources, both in terms of expression styles 
and content.  
The GI and FE Groups’ Negative Stances on the EU 
As all the groups hold negative perceptions of the EU, which is founded in an 
opposition to its supranational powers, and to its (perceived) bureaucratic, inefficient, 
and elitist nature, it is highly unlikely that any of the groups will want to take their 
demands to the EU buildings. All the groups at least state that they are proponents of 
democracy, but mainly advocate more direct democratic means, i.e. a larger inclusion 
of the public in the decision-making process. 
The EU’s Negative Stance on the Far Right 
At the same time, due to the GI and FE groups’ anti-liberal and xenophobic viewpoints 
and statements, there is absolutely no expectation that the EU is willing to either fund, 
or accommodate the work of these far right extra-parliamentary actors. As Article 2 
of the Treaty on the European Union states,  
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, 
including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are 
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common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-
discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women 
and men prevail. (OJEU 2012) 
These values clearly conflict with those expressed by both the GI and FE-groups. In 
fact, due to the European extreme right party group Alliance of European National 
Movements’ (AENM) racist and undemocratic worldview, it is already highly 
controversial that the EP provides funding for this group of actors (see e.g. Taylor 
2012). Moreover, unlike in most national European parliaments, the anti-immigration 
discourse of the radical right parties has still not become part of the dominant 
discourse within the EP. In fact, “[a]t the EU level a powerful coalition of institutional 
actors and human rights activists have spearheaded anti-racist legislation and 
successfully contributed to the diffusion of anti-racist concerns in all European 
institutions” (Fella & Ruzza 2013: 20)118. Thus, there are numerous examples of 
groups and legislative initiatives, which attempt to counter the rise of xenophobic and 
anti-immigrant behaviour and pan-European CSOs, which attempt to exercise 
influence, when the EP is deliberating legislation on migration rights (like the 
European Network Against Racism (ENAR) or the European Network of Migrant 
Women (ENoMW)119. Hence, GI’s centring of “white identity as the primary cause for 
organizing political, social, and cultural life” (Donovan et al. 2018) is highly unlikely 
to draw support from any EU actors, just as the essentialist portrayal of Islam by both 
coalition’s groups juxtapose the EU’s framework on human rights (see e.g. European 
Commission n.d.). 
                                                          
118 Particularly the European Commission and the EP’s (usual) promotion of liberal and more 
progressive values and policies makes it highly unlikely that extra-parliamentary actors, which 
express protectionism and hostility towards liberalism, democracy and third country 
immigration, will be permitted a voice within the institutions. This has already been plainly 
visible in terms of the populist radical right MEPs, against whom a cordon sanitaire was 
imposed by the other EP fractions, as the grand coalition (S&D and EPP) assures that the radical 
right MEPs do not become successful with their policy proposals (Startin 2010). Populist 
discourse is similarly met with great condemnation by the EU leaders (consider, for instance, 
the Commission President, Jean Claude Juncker, who has strongly admonished Eurosceptic 
populist parties (see e.g. Juncker’s State of the Union, 2016: Europe faces “galloping populism” 
(Ellyatt 2016), or the great criticism, which has been directed towards the Hungarian PM Victor 
Órban). Moreover, MEP activists have also created various groups against xenophobia and 
racism (e.g. EP Intergroups and the S&D group’s working group on extremism, populism, and 
xenophobia). 
119 On the other hand, in their research on pro-migrant organizations and the EU, Giugni and 
Passy (2002) explain how the EU institutions’ own political agenda may also inhibit civil 
societal direct involvement in the EU institutions. They argue that the European Commission’s 
re-direction of focus on the EU’s external borders in the late 1990s-early 2000s meant that the 
EU doors ‘closed’ for pro-migrant organizations (Ibid.). 
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It can therefore be expected that the EU institutions impose a restraint on far right 
extra-parliamentary actors who are unlikely to be greeted with open arms by EU 
officials. The GI and FE leaders are thus unlikely to conceive EU access as a viable 
political and discursive opportunity. This assumption has already somewhat been 
affirmed by prior research, as “in the consultation of civil society during the EU 
constitutional process, a bias in favour of more ‘civilized’, moderate, often EU‐
sponsored civil society organizations has been noted” (Lombardo as cited in della 
Porta & Caiani 2009: 8). One should thus not expect that far right extra-parliamentary 
actors Europeanize through insider strategies at the EU-level. 
Expected Europeanization Strategies 
Returning to the framework introduced at the beginning of this chapter, and the 
analytical model introduced in the theoretical framework (see Figure 3.1), both the GI 
and FE extra-parliamentary groups lack the material resources to mobilize through 
insider strategies at the EU level. Moreover, their action repertoires and worldviews, 
i.e. their symbolic resources, do not align with the culture and ethos of the EU and its 
institutions, making any form of collective action at the EU institutions improbable, 
as the EU representatives are unlikely to respond to the actors’ demands. 
Instead, the far right extra-parliamentary groups are expected to pursue more 
transnational avenues and indirectly target the EU institutions by attempts to 
influence the European public opinion (Monforte 2014). Together with their critical 
stance towards the EU, the politicized and diffuse nature of their mobilization issue, 
and their protest repertoires, they are more likely to form part of ‘transnational 
movements’ (Ibid.).
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SECTION 1: EUROPEANIZATION OF 
COLLECTIVE ACTION 
In order to situate the mobilization of the extra-parliamentary members of Generation 
Identity (GI) and Fortress Europe (FE) in the European context of the 2015-2017 
period, this section shortly accounts for the political events regarding the ‘refugee 
crisis’ in Europe, with a particular focus on the EU-level. It first very briefly outlines 
the development of the European migration and asylum policies over time, and then 
consider the occurrences in the 2015-2017 period more specifically. This should aid 
in determining the European and national political and discursive opportunities to be 
employed in the ensuing two chapters as a means to explain the various GI and FE 
groups’ strategies and protest tactics in terms of collective action.  
EU’S MIGRATION AND ASYLUM POLICIES: MAINLY MEMBER STATE 
COMPETENCIES 
Throughout the history of the European Union, its competencies have steadily grown 
in practically all areas of politics, and it is currently the strongest international 
organization in terms of supranational powers. Yet, at the same time, the EU remains 
“a composite polity composed of semi-sovereign states, quasi-autonomous European 
institutions, and virtually represented citizens” (Imig & Tarrow 2001a: 16). 
Particularly, the semi-sovereign statehood, and the problems related to this for a 
supranational decision-making body, became abundantly clear during the 2015 
‘refugee crisis’. This will be explored further after a short introduction to the EU’s 
role in the member states’ (MS) third-country immigration and asylum policies. 
The EU’s Migration Policy Regime: Supranational vs. National Competencies 
As explained by Monforte (2014), migration and asylum policies have historically 
been a key public policy area for the creation of the nation-states, as these “policies” 
made the powerholders “able to exclude categories of people from individual, political 
and social rights and thus to define their territory as a homogeneous political space” 
(2014: 235). Hence, in the early phases of the European integration project, migration 
policy was exclusively a national matter (Monforte 2014).  
Yet, in the early 1990s, the need for a joint response to the reception of refugees from 
the Balkans meant that the EU’s competences concerning third country immigration 
and asylum policy began growing significantly (Karamanidou 2015). The EU MS thus 
gradually began developing common norms on immigration and asylum (Monforte 
2014), and the EU obtained more and more competences on the MS’ migration control 
and policies (Guiraudon 2010; Karamanidou 2015).  
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The EU policy output has thus developed steadily over the last three decades, going 
from intergovernmental cooperation on asylum policies to the introduction of 
Schengen in 1992 (as a means to control migration via VISA requirements), while the 
Treaty of Amsterdam in 1996 ensured that migration and asylum policies became an 
EU policy matter (Karamanidou 2015). The EU initially attempted to both introduce 
a human rights and a securitization approach (Boswell as cited in Ibid.). Yet, as the 
EU MS mainly considered free movement as a potential security risk, the focus of the 
1990s was to control migration, rather than to concentrate on the integration of these 
new citizens and to curtail the rights of asylum seekers (Chabanet 2011). This 
securitization ambition, further exacerbated after 9/11, as European governments 
tightened their security policies, “often acting under the cloak of EU-level 
agreements” (Fella & Ruzza 2013: 3). The ambition led to the introduction of the 
European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX) in 2004, whose aim is to 
protect the EU MS’ external borders. The EU’s migration and asylum policy regime 
has thus been very much under the heading of the EU defending its external borders, 
leading to the development of a so-called ‘Fortress Europe’ (Geddes 2000). 
Hence, as explained by Chabanet (2011) and Monforte (2014), from being an 
exclusive national matter up until the 1980s, migration policy has increasingly 
Europeanized, and the EU institutions now have many competences in the policy area. 
Yet, the migration policy’s further Europeanization continues to be dependent on the 
European Council, i.e. the EU MS’ ministers, while asylum legislation remains a 
matter of national sovereignty (Monforte 2014: 4). Thus, the determinant factors 
remain “the internal dynamics of the member states,” while it “for the most part 
escapes the influence of other EU institutions” (Chabanet 2011: 99). Immigration and 
asylum policies thus involve competence sharing between the EU MS and the EU 
institutions, but with most decision-making power placed at the member state level 
(Monforte 2014). Yet, of the two (migration and asylum policy), the EU does have a 
high level of competences in terms of EU MS’ asylum policies, as this does not 
directly relate to a country’s citizenship legislation (Ibid.). 
The MS’ key decision-making power in this policy field vis-à-vis the EU became 
blatantly clear during the ‘refugee crisis’. Looking more closely at the occurrences at 
the EU-level during this period, the following section outlines the developments and 
key moments of contention in the period 2015-2017. This will lead to a consideration 
of the far rights’ opportunities for mobilization against the EU’s refugee policy. 
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EU Political Developments during the ‘Refugee Crisis’ (2015-2017)   
The Syrian civil war drove thousands of Syrians to flee to Europe, leading to an 
exponential rise in refugee and migrant arrivals to Europe in the 2014-2015 period, 
arriving to Greece from Turkey, and to Italy from Libya (BBC 2016a). In April 2015, 
the first larger EU-level debates about the European reception of refugees took place 
after a migrant boat-accident in the Mediterranean (Kingsley 2015). The European 
Commission also began calling for joint EU responses, including “an emergency 
relocation mechanism” (European Commission 2015a). On April 20, the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica 
Mogherini, presented the first proposal of refugee distribution quotas (Ibid.), leading 
the Commission to propose the first ‘quota scheme’ in May. Yet, despite support from 
larger EU MS like Germany and Italy, it failed as countries like Hungary, Slovakia, 
France and Spain opposed the idea (Traynor 2015a). The European Council was thus 
highly divided, inferring a division in elite alignmments at the EU-level. As a 
compromise, the European Council decided on a voluntary reallocation scheme (i.e. 
not mandatory quotas) for 60,000 migrants on June 26, which were allocated at a 
Summit between the EU MS’ Interior Ministers in June (European Council 2015a).  
In autumn 2015, the pressure on the EU’s external borders increased substantially, as 
thousands of refugees and immigrants from the MENA countries started arriving 
(BBC 2018). The national and European responses to this ‘long summer of migration’ 
(della Porta 2018) varied greatly. The EU’s influence capacities were diminished, and 
the national governments were instead decisive, especially after the Visegrad 
countries rejected the quota proposals. The period thus saw the re-construction of 
various national borders, first by Hungary (Dunai 2015), and then by other EU MS 
(see e.g. Mortimer 2015). The numbers of EU MS that increased the national border 
security only increased further after the German Chancellor Angela Merkel said the, 
by now, infamous words “Wir schaffen das” (“We can make it”) on August 31, 
effectively making the Dublin Agreement temporarily void (Bannas 2015), and thus 
leading to an unprecedented level of third-country immigration to and through 
Europe. Throughout September, more countries thus reinstated border controls. 
Around the same time, on September 2, the, by now iconic, picture of Alan Kurdi, the 
drowned Syrian boy whose body washed ashore, circulated through the European 
media, leading to a more humanitarian media portrayal of the ‘refugee crisis’, in terms 
of its human toll and hardships (see e.g. Sajir & Aouragh 2019). This made the EU 
MS, led by Germany and France, try to instate new quota measures, but again the 
Visegrad countries refused, while Hungary even further restricted its migration 
policies (Traynor 2015b). 
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On September 9, the European Commission proposed new refugee allocation 
measures and called for the relocation of 120,000 refugees, again leading to strong 
Visegrad opposition120 (Dominiczak et al. 2015). Indicating the increasingly polarized 
populations across Europe, on September 12, a huge pro-refugee ‘Day of Action’ took 
place across (mainly Western) Europe and in Australia, involving tens of thousands 
of people. They demanded more lenient national migration and aslylum policies (BBC 
2015b). Yet, on the same day, there were also numerous anti-immigration 
demonstrations and rallies in Warsaw, Prague and Bratislava (Ibid.). 
At the September 22 Justice and Home Affairs Council Meeting, the Visegrad 
countries were overruled on the vote to relocate 120,000 refugees across Europe, and 
the EC wanted this decision to be mandatory for all EU MS (European Council 
2015b). Moreover, after Slovenia announced a state of emergency due to the arrivals 
of too many migrants for it to handle, on October 25, an emergency Balkan Summit 
was held, where eleven EU Member States and three non-EU Member States agreed 
to ensure 100,000 more refugee centre spaces, plus the deployment of 400 police 
officers to Slovenia (Chrisafis 2015). Nevertheless, due to the exceeding pressure on 
its borders, on October 28th, Austria decided to build a fence on its Slovenian border, 
and the work began on November 4th (DW 2015b).  
The period thus showed an EU that was under extreme pressure, both from the 
migratory numbers (more than a million migrants arrived ‘irregularly’ in 2015 
(Euronews 2015)), but also politically. The European Commission and the main 
European Council countries thus had to balance the national calls for restrictions, 
while also finding viable Europe-wide solutions to the migration numbers. The 
competence-division was thus more and more in favour of the EU MS, which made 
increasingly unilateral decisions, whilst the EU and its leaders appeared insecure and 
indecisive. 
The Paris terrorist attacks on November 13, 2015 (Bataclan) only further exacerbated 
the ‘crisis,’ as some of the Islamic State perpetrators had arrived in Europe amongst 
the migrants and refugees, while others were French and Belgian citizens121. The 
Cologne sexual attacks of January 1, 2016, only aggravated the situation, and the 
European far right parties were quick to take this as an opening discursive opportunity 
to target immigrants and refugees (see e.g. Yardley 2016). 
                                                          
120 This was mainly voiced by Órban, who feared that the Commission’s plan would lead to the 
arrival of “tens of millions” of migrants (Dominiczak et al. 2015). 
121 This led to the introduction of passport screenings for third-country immigrants and tourists, 
and the media revealed that Europol did not know the geographical location of 3,000 Jihadists 
from its database (Holehouse 2015). 
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As the EU MS struggled to reach agreement about the best ways to allocate the 
refugees in Europe, and this was leading to quarrels between the various 
governments,122 the EU began looking towards Turkey for a possible solution. Due to 
the country’s geographical position, it was a transit country for many refugees on their 
road to Europe, and the EU leaders wanted the country to prevent their further travel 
to the continent123. Hence, with the increased pressure on the other Southern European 
MS, due to the closure of the ‘Balkan Route’ a few weeks prior, on March 18, the EU 
signed a deal with Turkey124. The leaders agreed to speed up EU visa liberalization 
for Turks and to renew talks on Turkey joining the EU, if Turkey would stem the 
influx of migrants to the continent (European Council 2016).  
Needing to come up with a new means to ease the asylum pressure and mend the 
problems in the Dublin Convention,125 in addition to the lacking results of the original 
scheme, the European Commission suggested a ‘fairness mechanism,’ inferring that 
the wealthier and larger EU MS should take the largest share of the migrants (EP 
2017). Yet, this was not fulfilled by the EU MS, and in early May 2016, the European 
Commission stated that it would begin substantially fining those countries that refused 
                                                          
122 After having instigated court proceedings against the EU’s mandatory quotas in December 
2015 together with Slovakia (DW 2015a), on February 24, Órban proclaimed that Hungary 
would hold a referendum about the EU’s mandatory migrant quotas (Traynor 2016). This 
decision was strongly criticized by the European Commission and the European Parliament 
(Euronews 2016). In mid-February 2016, the Austrian government organized a mini-Summit 
with Western Balkan countries about the ‘Balkan route’. Yet, as Greece had not been invited to 
the meeting, the country retracted its ambassador in Austria (DW 2016). On March 9, the 
Balkan countries restricted the migrant entry demands, leading Merkel to chastise the Balkan 
countries for putting further pressure on Greece (BBC 2016b). On the same day, Órban declared 
Hungary to be in a state of emergency due to the Balkan route’s closure and further strengthened 
the border security enforcement (Sullivan 2016). 
123 The European Council had already backed an EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan in November 
2015 (European Council 2016). 
124 It included that irregular migrants “not applying for asylum or whose application has been 
found unfounded or inadmissible in accordance with the said directive” entering Greece would 
be sent back to Turkey (European Council 2016). For each Syrian person returned to Turkey, 
another would be resettled in the EU. 
125 The Dublin Convention in its current state (as of 2003) was not apt to the current situation, 
as its provision that asylum applications should be made in the first country of entry did not 
envision a situation, in which all migrants largely entered in the same 3-4 EU MS. The European 
Parliament had already called for revisions in 2009 but these had not been made (EP 2017). In 
April 2016, the European Commission wrote the European Parliament and the European 
Council about “inherent weaknesses” in the Common European Asylum System and called for 
revisions of the Dublin Regulations, including better burden-sharing provisions, for instance a 
‘reference key’ based on the national GDP and population sizes (European Commission 2016a). 
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to take in the allocated refugee numbers126. The Visegrad countries’ leaders found this 
“unacceptable” (Órban as cited in BBC 2016b), and the leader of the Polish PiS party, 
Jaroslaw Kasczynski, cited the terrorist threat as the main reason for opposing the 
quotas (Broomfield 2016). 
In June, the British vote to leave the EU (the so-called ‘Brexit’) provided further 
problems for an already strained EU Commission and European Council, and 
underlined the EU’s divisions between the EU MS. While no other MS decided to call 
for similar national referenda, numerous, mainly right wing, politicians across Europe 
voiced the idea (BBC 2016c).   
At the European Council’s Bratislava Summit in September 2016, Merkel announced 
the abandonment of the refugee quota mechanisms due to the staunch opposition 
expressed by the Eastern European EU MS (Mével 2016). Finally, in February 2017, 
the EU MS leaders agreed on the Malta Declaration, which increased cooperation with 
Libya, due to its role as a transit country towards Europe (BBC 2017), implementing 
a further limitation of migrants entering Europe.  
2015-2017 PERIOD: EUROPEAN OPENINGS IN POS/DOS 
After this brief description of the political occurrences at the EU-level during the 
2015-2017 ‘refugee crisis’, the following table shows the openings in the European 
POS and DOS in the period. As already argued in Chapter 5, one must assume closed 
political opportunities at the EU-level for far right actors, due to their specific policy 
stances and limited material resources. However, at the same time, the developments 
during the ‘crisis’ had Europe-wide effects, inferring potential openings at the 
European discursive level, just as the decisions by other EU MS could be utilized to 
exercise pressure on the groups’ national governments (e.g. the members of the 
Visegrad countries).  
 
  
                                                          
126 The money should then instead go to the main migrant recipient countries, such as Italy and 
Greece, which temporarily housed a lot of the migrants and refugees, due to border controls in 
the neighbouring countries (BBC 2016b). 
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Table S1.1: EU-events in 2015-2017 and effect on the far right’s POS and DOS. 
When What  POS/DOS Effect 
Jan 2015  
 
Terrorist attack on Charlie 
Hebdo in Paris, France 
Discursive openings at the 
national levels (public, media, 
and politicians condemning 
attacks) 
Apr-May 2015 
 
EC quota proposal (‘No’ 
by Hungary) 
Divided European Council 
infers break in elite alignments 
(POS)  
Domestic POS in some 
countries, due to national 
government’s choice of either 
accepting or rejecting the EU 
quotas.  
Domestic DOS due to rise in 
saliency of refugee topic 
Aug-Sept 2015 Border constructions and 
Visegrad ‘no’ to quotas, 
(but overruled)  
Divided European Council 
infers break in elite alignments 
(POS)   
DOS more favourable at 
national levels, as several MS 
begin expressing opposition to 
EU demands and EU’s 
incapacity of acting. 
Yet, refugees still portrayed 
positively in media and 
European public opinion largely 
favourable. 
Nov 2015 
 
Bataclan terrorist attack 
(France) 
Elite condemnation and security 
concerns grow, leading to calls 
for further border restrictions. 
DOS more favourable at 
national levels 
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Jan 2016 
 
Cologne sexual attacks  
Merkel instating German 
border controls 
National DOS, especially in 
Germany and Austria (media, 
politicians, and public)  
Apr 2016 Renewed EU-attempt to 
introduce quotas, again 
Visegrad opposition 
European Council divided (elite 
alignment divisions (POS))  
DOS more favourable in most 
EU countries, as public opinion 
is turning against the refugees, 
and the media is also 
increasingly hostile 
June 2016 Brexit DOS more favourable for anti-
EU mobilization, particularly in 
countries with Eurosceptic 
populations. 
Sept 2016 Renewed EU-attempt at 
introducing quotas  
Visegrad countries firmly 
reject the proposal 
European Council divided (elite 
alignment divisions (POS))  
Spring 2017 ‘Refugee crisis’ debates 
begin to fade out, 
particularly after EU closes 
deal with Turkey. 
DOS: More limited chance for 
resonance 
THE DOMESTIC POS AND DOS IN GERMANY, FRANCE, THE 
NETHERLANDS, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC IN 2015-2017 
During the ‘crisis,’ the EU Member States’ domestic contexts all varied in terms of 
political and discursive opportunities. In the 2015-2017 period, all the European 
countries’ far right discursive opportunities opened as the ‘refugee crisis’ advanced, 
as both the media, the mainstream elites, and public opinion became increasingly 
hostile towards further third-country immigration and asylum seekers (see e.g. 
Consterdine 2018).  
Moreover, Eurobarometer opinion polls also showed that the European public saw 
‘immigration’ as one of the most important policy issues in the period (European 
Commission 2015b; 2016b), a development that had been visible for almost a decade 
already (see e.g. Stokes 2016). With the ‘crisis’ there was a further increase in the 
salience of the issue, just as the public sentiments were becoming more polarized. 
SECTION 1: EUROPEANIZATION OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 
207 
From being initially sympathetic towards the refugees, the row of Islamist terrorist 
attacks that hit Europe in the 2015-2016 period strongly influenced the growing 
hostility127. The European media and political debates regarding the refugees were 
particularly strong from spring 2015 to spring 2016, whereafter the EU’s deal with 
Turkey meant that the issue gradually received less attention across all EU member 
states. 
In terms of the four countries in focus here, the period saw a strengthening of the 
electoral results of their main radical right parties. Both Alternative for Germany 
(AfD), the French Front National (now Rassemblement National), the Dutch Party 
for Freedom, and the Czech Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) experienced 
strong public support and ensuing electoral results (all around 12-13% at the national 
elections) (BBC 2019b). Like most other Western European countries, Germany, 
France, and the Netherlands have all been experiencing a mainstreaming of far right 
discourse within the 2000s (see e.g. Kallis 2013; Joon Han 2015), and anti-
immigration policies are high on the national political agendas, just as ‘immigration’ 
is deemed an important issue for the general public. At the same time, the Czech 
population expressed strong Islamophobic sentiments, despite the low number of 
Muslims in the country (Císař & Navrátil 2018). This infers rather open discursive 
opportunities in all four EU MS, due to the salience of immigration and the debates 
about the role of Islam in the respective countries. 
Yet, conversely, it was only the Czech and French groups, which had (near) open 
political opportunities. Oppositely, the history of Nazism (especially for the German 
and the Dutch groups), and the strong role of the domestic far right parties (especially 
in the Dutch case), inferred closed opportunities (see more in Appendix C). Table S1.2 
below shows the expected mobilization strategies for the far right in Germany, France, 
the Netherlands, and the Czech Republic respectively. They will be used to examine 
the protest developments of GI Germany, PEGIDA Germany, IVČRN/BPI, GI Czech 
Republic, PEGIDA Netherlands, and GI France in the following two chapters.     
  
                                                          
127 The terrorist attacks for instance involved the attacks on ‘Charlie Hebdo’ (January 2015); 
on Bataclan (November 2015); Brussels (March 2016); Nice (Bastille Day, July 2016); Rouen 
and various German attacks (Summer 2016) and Berlin Christmas Market (December 2016). 
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Table S1.2: Expected far right strategies in DE, FR, NL, and CZ in 2015-2017.  
 Domestic level European level Expected actions 
Germany (Near) Closed POS  
Open DOS 
Closed POS at 
EU-level 
Open discursive 
opportunities at 
transnational 
European level 
Domestic protests, 
likely of a more 
disruptive nature 
(Political elite adopts 
demands that accord 
with dominant ideas, 
while excluding or 
suppressing actor) 
France (Near) Open POS 
Open DOS 
Closed POS at 
EU-level 
Open discursive 
opportunities at 
transnational 
European level 
Domestic protests, 
targeting government 
(which fully 
responds) 
Netherlands (Near) Closed POS 
Open DOS 
Closed POS at 
EU-level 
Open discursive 
opportunities at 
transnational 
European level 
Domestic protests, 
likely of a more 
disruptive nature 
(Political elite adopts 
demands that accord 
with dominant ideas, 
while excluding or 
suppressing actor) 
Czech Rep.  (Near) Open POS 
Open DOS 
Closed POS at 
EU-level 
Open discursive 
opportunities at 
transnational 
European level 
Domestic protests, 
targeting government 
(which fully 
responds) 
(Based on Table 3.2 in Theoretical framework and Koopmans & Statham 1999a). 
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CHAPTER 6. GENERATION IDENTITY 
AND EUROPEANIZATION OF 
COLLECTIVE ACTION 
The following chapter examines the Generation Identity (GI) groups’ mobilization 
patterns and forms of action in the period 2015-2017. It investigates the 
Europeanization of the national groups’ collective action, while also paying attention 
to the cross-national differences in protest strategies, and the role assigned to the EU 
and the European level for the coalition groups’ street mobilization. In order to 
consider all of these facets, the chapter is divided into three main parts that explore 
the: 1) alignment of protest repertoires across the groups; 2) Europeanization of the 
protest ‘scopes’ (i.e. issue, targets, participants, and events) and the Europeanization 
forms; and 3) the role of the national contexts for this (potential) Europeanization.  
The chapter first considers all the GI groups’ protest repertoires in the 2015-2017 
period,128 introducing the groups’ protest forms, tactics, and participant compositions, 
while evaluating the national GI groups’ degree of alignment of protest frequencies, 
forms, and tactics. The following section explores the groups’ collective action 
Europeanization with a focus on the scopes of the groups’ issues, targets, participants, 
and events, and how these (potentially) changed as the ‘refugee crisis’ developed. The 
final part of the section considers the specific forms of Europeanization the groups 
made use of during the ‘refugee crisis.’ The third and last section explores the role of 
the national political and discursive opportunities for far right Europeanization by 
closely analyzing the protest actions of GI France, GI Germany, and GI Czech 
Republic. The three groups were chosen due to: i) their prominence in the GI coalition, 
especially in terms of protest frequency; and ii) the aims to include groups from both 
Western and Eastern Europe; and iii) to compare across the GI and FE groups. Finally, 
the conclusion sums up the findings. The chapter thus analyses the groups’ domestic 
and transnational protest strategies, the role assigned to the EU, and make an initial 
assessment of the relationship between the groups, both in terms of protest alignment 
and transnational mobilization. 
                                                          
128 The initial period of the GI-group formation (2012-2014) is thus not considered here. Yet, 
the data shows that it involved a comparatively low level of mobilization from all groups 
besides GI France and GI Austria. By 2015, GI Germany, GI Italy, and GI Czech Republic also 
increased their street presence, mainly due to the strengthening of their organisational cohesion 
(as discussed in Chapter 8). GI Hungary organised a few protest events since its creation in 
2014, but only became truly active in 2016, together with GI Slovenia. 
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 THE GI-GROUPS’ PROTEST FORMS AND TACTICS: GROUP 
ALIGNMENT? 
The protest data derives from the national GI groups’ websites and Facebook pages, 
and consists of 682 protest and solidarity actions129 from seven GI groups (GI France, 
GI Germany, GI Czech Republic, GI Austria, GI Italy, GI Slovenia, and GI 
Hungary130), and events with participation by all GI groups (referred to as ‘GI 
Europe’). The data shows that none of the GI-groups’ protests took place in front of 
or inside the EU-institutions in Brussels, as anticipated in Chapter 5.  
Table 6.1 below shows that GI Germany, GI France, and GI Austria have organized 
the highest numbers of protests in the period. This is due to their comparatively longer 
existence, better material resources, stronger pre-existing networks, and higher 
numbers of local and regional groups in the respective countries131 (see Chapter 5). 
Table 6.1: The national GI groups’ number of protest events (2015-2017). 
GI Group Pct. (PEs) 
GI Germany 32.7 (223) 
GI France 22.3 (152) 
GI Czech Republic 5.3 (36) 
GI Austria 21.1 (144) 
GI Italy 9.7 (66) 
GI Hungary 5.6 (38) 
GI Slovenia 1.9 (13) 
GI Europe 1.5 (10) 
Total 100.0 (682) 
Note: N: 682. Pct (No. of protests). 
The numbers also demonstrate the geographic scope of the New Right worldview and 
its dominance in France, Germany, Austria, and Italy (see e.g. Minkenberg 2000). The 
GI-groups’ New Right worldview appears to have problems ‘catching on’ in Eastern 
                                                          
129 ‘Solidarity actions’ refer to actions such as giving food to the homeless and gathering 
donations for less well-off segments of the population.  
130 At the end of 2017, GI UK & Ireland, GI Denmark, and GI Poland had only organized a 
few protests each, and they were thus not included in this analysis. At the same time, the Swiss 
and Belgian GI groups were hardly active offline except for the participation by some of their 
activists in the annual BI/GI Summer University in France and the transnational GI 
demonstrations in Germany and Austria (Bruns et al. 2017). 
131 The finding correlates with those of other scholars, who also point to the comparatively 
higher activity levels of the French, German, and Austrian groups vis-à-vis the Eastern 
European and Italian GI-groups (see e.g. Bruns et al. 2017; Zúquete 2018). 
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Europe, affecting both the groups’ levels of members and resources (Berlekamp & 
Opielka 2018; see also Ch. 8). GI Hungary, GI Czech Republic, and GI Slovenia are 
thus rather marginal in their domestic settings, due to, for one, their divergent far right 
viewpoints. Yet, another reason is also found in the already strong influence of far 
right discourses on the government in the countries, meaning that the extra-
parliamentary far right is crowded out (Berlekamp & Opielka 2018).  
Similarly, in the case of GI Italy, other far right extra-parliamentary groups already 
cover the New Right viewpoints expressed by the group, thus making it rather 
superfluous. Moreover, the extreme right CasaPound already more or less employs 
the same protest repertoire, just as GI Italy copies many of CasaPound’s collective 
action frames, meaning that the political space for New Right mobilization is already 
filled. Moreover, as GI Italy is not explicitly fascist, it is also excluded from the Italian 
extreme right segment (Expert Interview with Castelli Gattinara 2019). 
Conversely, GI France and GI Austria are not crowded out domestically, despite the 
strong roles of FN and FPÖ. This can be explained by the more symbiotic relationship 
between FN and the French New Right actors (see e.g. Gattinara 2018), just as GI 
Austria has managed to embed itself in the Austria far right scene, particularly by 
drawing on the Burschenschaften’s resources, and obtaining the validation by FPÖ 
(see e.g. Ajanovic et al. 2016). In the German case, it was only in 2017 that a strong 
far right party, AfD, entered the Bundestag, and GI Germany could exploit the 
opportunities provided by the rise of PEGIDA Germany in late 2014 (see more below). 
Regional Dispersion of GI Protest Events132 
If we consider the spread of protests across the different regions and cities of France, 
Germany, Austria, Italy, and the Czech Republic133 (excluding press releases and 
protests organized by the national GI-groups), the following ‘activity-map’ emerges: 
  
                                                          
132 The overview of the regional GI groups’ protest actions is based on the protest events 
mentioned on the websites and Facebook pages of the national GI groups. Thus, there may be 
a number of protests missing depending on whether or not they were reported by the national 
groups or not. Yet, the overview still gives a good indication of the dispersion of protests across 
the five countries. 
133 There were insufficient data for GI Hungary and GI Slovenia in terms of regional dispersion, 
but GI Hungary is mainly active in Budapest, where the group also was set up (Berlekamp & 
Opielka 2018), while GI Slovenia mainly mobilizes in Ljubljana, Maribor, and Velenje, the 
largest, second, and fifth largest Slovenian city respectively (Cirman & Vuković 2018). 
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Figure 6.1: Regional spread of GI protests (FR, DE, AT, IT, CZ) (2015-2017). 
 
Note: N: 545. The figure was created with Datawrapper (https://www.datawrapper.de/). 
The figure is highly revelatory in terms of the importance of the various groupuscules’ 
material resources and partly their political opportunities, thus further accentuating 
the relevance of structural factors for the groups’ mobilization. The map also reveals 
the somewhat ‘skewed’ regional activity levels, indicating the national groups’ actual 
strengths in each country.  
Due to the larger recruitment-potential, several of the most active groups are found in 
university-cities. In France, the most active groups are based in the three regions that 
house the oldest, largest, and most resourceful French GI groups, namely GI Paris 
(‘Projet Apache’ in Ile-de-France), GI Lyon (‘Rebeyne’ in Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes) 
and GI Nice (‘Nissa Rebella’ in Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur) respectively (Speit 
2018). Similarly, in Austria, GI groups in Steiermark and Vienna have carried out 
most of GI Austria’s actions. Both regions house universities (in Vienna and Graz), 
and the student associations (including the Burschenschaften) thus provide GI with 
potential recruits (see e.g. Weidinger 2016).  
In Germany, the better political and discursive opportunities in Eastern Germany 
explain the high number of protests in Saxony. Far right repression is more limited in 
the region, just as the rise of PEGIDA Germany provided more space for the far right 
here (see e.g. Häusler as cited in Naumann 2017). In Italy, the northern Lombardy 
region has the most active local GI groups, especially in Milan, as this is where the 
national GI group was created in 2012 (GI Italy n.d). It thus houses the best-
established and member-strongest group, just as Lega derives from the region. Finally, 
in the Czech Republic, most GI protests take place in the western part of the country, 
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particularly in Prague, the capital, and in Ustí nad Labem, where the movement was 
created and where the leader, Bercik, resides (Dlouhý 2016a).  
Thus, the map clearly shows the rather uneven distribution of GI actions across the 
regions in Germany, Austria, France, Italy, and the Czech Republic, underlining the 
role of material resources and the local groups’ period of existence. 
GI PROTEST FREQUENCIES OVER TIME 
Figure 6.2 shows the seven national GI groups’ protest frequency development from 
January 2015 to December 2017, including the joint protest actions in 2017 (‘GI 
Europe’).  
Figure 6.2: The GI groups’ protest frequency per quarter (2015-2017). 
 
Note: N: 682. Cramer’s V = .199*** (*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001). 
The figure shows rather different protest developments for the various national GI 
groups in the 2015-2017 period, just as the individual groups’ protest frequency differ 
over time (V = .199). While the years 2012-2014 are not included here, the data 
indicates that 2015 marked a steep rise in protests for all GI groups active at the time 
(except for GI France, whose action frequency has remained rather constant). The rise 
is mainly ascribable to the opening of especially the discursive opportunities across 
Europe in the period, largely due to the onset of the ‘refugee crisis,’ particularly since 
spring 2015 (see Section 1 above).  
Yet, despite the rise in protests from 2015 onwards, GI Italy and GI Czech Republic 
still only organized a comparatively low number of protests, together with GI Slovenia 
and GI Hungary, which only really began mobilizing from 2016 onwards. As 
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explained above, these low figures relate to their lack of resources, especially in terms 
of active members, plus their limited domestic political space. Conversely, GI 
Germany, GI France, and GI Austria were all particularly active in 2016. Their peaks 
in the second half of the year can largely be ascribed to mobilization against the 
terrorist attacks in France and Germany in the summer of 2016, plus GI Austria’s 
protests against the Green’s candidate for the Austrian presidential elections, 
Alexander van der Bellen (see e.g. GI Austria 2016i). One can in fact observe a very 
interesting almost parallel increase in GI Germany and GI Austria’s protest activities, 
indicating an opening in their (perceived) opportunities from 2015 onwards. GI 
Germany continued mobilizing comparatively strongly in the autumn of 2017, just as 
this is the period where the GI groups carried out most transnational protests (‘GI 
Europe’).  
This initial analysis of the groups’ mobilization frequencies has shown rather 
disparate figures across the continent, which can be explained by GI Germany, GI 
Austria, and GI France’s better material resources, just as these groups do not 
experience the same form of ‘out-crowding’ as their namesakes in Italy, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia. At the same time, the regional overview also 
demonstrated the importance of resources, as the most active GI groups can mainly 
be found in the larger university cities. The following paragraphs turn to the groups’ 
protest repertoires and the national groups’ (potential) protest form alignment.  
CONTESTING THROUGH WHICH MEANS? THE GI GROUPS’ 
PROTEST FORMS 
Table 6.2 below shows the seven national GI groups’ protest forms in the 2015-2017 
period. Demonstrative actions are the predominant protest form (60% of all actions), 
while conventional, confrontational, and solidarity actions each amount to around 12-
14% of the total. This preference for demonstrative actions mainly relates to the 
groups’ aim of attracting media attention through spectacular, yet non-violent, means 
(see e.g. Bouron 2014; see also Chapter 5). The table also shows a substantial 
quantitative rise in protest actions from 2015 to 2016 (from 142 to 297 actions, or an 
increase of 109.2%), which is mainly ascribable to the rise in GI Germany, GI Austria, 
and GI France’s protests in the period (see Figure 6.2 above).  
Table 6.2: The GI coalitions’ forms of protest across time (2015-2017). 
Year  Conventional Demonstr. Confront. 
Solidarity 
Action 
Total 
2015 11.3 (16) 57.7 (82) 19.7 (28) 11.3 (16) 100.0 (142) 
2016 10.1 (30) 59.3 (176) 13.5 (40) 17.1 (51) 100.0 (297) 
2017 17.3 (42) 63.0 (153) 11.9 (29) 7.8 (19) 100.0 (243) 
Total 12.9 (88) 60.3 (412) 14.2 (97) 12.6 (86) 100.0 (682) 
Note: N: 682. Pct (No. of protests). Cramer’s V = .120** (*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001). 
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Yet, as shown in Table 6.3 below, the national GI groups have not made use of the 
various protest forms to the same extent. Instead, one can begin seeing the relevance 
of the national contexts and the groups’ somewhat independent natures in terms of 
expression forms (V= .356). The table shows that all groups aside from GI France 
mainly carried out demonstrative protests during the 2015-2017 period. These range 
from around 47% of all their protest actions (GI Czech Republic) to 92% (GI 
Slovenia). The majority of these actions involve banner-drops (47%), followed by 
various forms of demonstrations and rallies (17%), and street theatres and flash mobs 
(11%). These three tactics combined thus make up 75% of all the GI groups’ 
demonstrative actions (see Chapter 5 for more on these types of actions).  
Table 6.3: The national GI groups’ protest forms (2015-2017). 
Note: N: 682. Pct (No. of protests). Cramer’s V = .356*** (*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001). 
GI France, GI Italy, and GI Hungary also made use of conventional actions to a 
rather large degree, mainly in the form of press releases (95.5% of the 88 PEs), while 
open letters to politicians make out the remaining 4.5%. GI France’s comparatively 
higher reliance on this form can partly be explained by the closer involvement of The 
Identitarians (Les Identitaires) in its strategy vis-à-vis the other GI groups due to the 
French initiator’s strong focus on the exercising of media pressure (See e.g. Cahuzac 
& François 2013; Castelli Gattinara & Froio 2018). Moreover, its better domestic 
political opportunities entails a higher reliance on more conventional action forms. 
Yet, while it is mainly GI France that uses press releases as a means to express its 
policy issues, the other groups also frequently provide statements to the press in 
relation to their larger demonstrations and generally do much to attract attention 
through their actions. 
  
 
Conventional Demonstr. Confront. 
Solid. 
Action 
Total 
GI FR 27.0 (41) 30.9 (47) 9.9 (15) 32.2 (49) 100.0 (152) 
GI DE 1.8 (4) 79.4 (177) 16.6 (37) 2.2 (5) 100.0 (223) 
GI CZ 5.6 (2) 47.2 (17) 5.6 (2) 41.7 (15) 100.0 (36) 
GI AT 6.3 (9) 69.4 (100) 22.2 (32) 2.1 (3) 100.0 (144) 
GI IT 24.2 (16) 57.6 (38) 3.0 (2) 15.2 (10) 100.0 (66) 
GI HU 23.7 (9) 52.6 (20) 13.2 (5) 10.5 (4) 100.0 (38) 
GI SL 0.0 (0) 92.3 (12) 7.7 (1) 0.0 (0) 100.0 (13) 
GI EU 70.0 (7) 0.0 (0) 30.0 (3) 0.0 (0) 100.0 (10) 
Total 12.9 (88) 60.3 (411) 14.2 (97) 12.6 (86) 100.0 (682) 
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The confrontational actions mainly consist of direct social actions (see Chapter 5), 
most frequently employed in relation to the groups’ objection to the reception of 
refugees134. Most take the form of entrance and passage blockades (27%), building 
occupations (22%), meeting disruptions (22%), and counter-protests (19%)135. The 
comparatively frequent use of confrontational actions by GI Austria, and GI Germany 
mainly relate to their better resources (Interview with GI Czech Republic 2018), just 
as their closed domestic political opportunities and the surveillance by the authorities 
can explain the two groups’ higher proclivity towards more confrontational tactics 
(Eisinger as cited in Caiani & Graziano 2018; Rucht 2018; Caiani 2017). Conversely, 
the other groups’ comparably more moderate action forms can also be related to the 
fact that these groups’ demands are already being catered to, either by a strong radical 
right party or the mainstream politicians, inferring that they do not need to utilise 
radical expression forms (see Koopmans et al. 2005).  
Finally, only GI France and GI Czech Republic have carried out a substantial share 
of solidarity actions beside the demonstrative actions. GI France has organized this 
type of action since 2013, strongly inspired by both the Identitarian Bloc and 
CasaPound (see Chapter 5). GI Czech Republic’s spokesperson explains the group’s 
high number of solidarity actions with its lacking resources, as these actions require 
very limited resources to carry out (Interview with GI Czech Republic 2018). While 
GI France’s actions mainly involve the provision of food and clothing for 
autochthonous homeless people (‘les SDFs’), GI Czech Republic instead focuses on 
both aiding abandoned animals and poor Czech citizens.  
The above section has shown that while all groups mainly employ demonstrative 
action forms (except GI France), and generally make use of very similar protest 
tactics, they employ the various protest forms to highly varying degrees, again due to 
their diverse levels of political opportunities and material resources. 
                                                          
134 Action examples include the erection of border fences by GI Austria (OE24 2015), and 
entrance blockades to refugee centres, either through ‘sit-ins’ (see e.g. Generace Identity 2015) 
or the construction of brick walls (see e.g. RT France 2016). Moreover, particularly GI 
Germany and GI Austria use the tactic of disrupting public meetings (see e.g. GI Austria 
2016d), theatre plays (GI Germany 2016i), and other public events, mainly as a means to 
intimidate their political opponents (for more about these types of protest tactics, see Castelli 
Gattinara 2018; Froio & Castelli Gattinara 2018).  
135 Several of these actions border the lines of legality. Yet, despite numerous arrests of GI 
activists (for instance, the ‘Poitiers 4’ from GI France’s Poitiers mosque occupation 
(Génération Identitaire 2013b), they are very apt at staying within the bounds of the law, 
indicating a strong understanding of the legal system, which again underlines their 
professionalism. 
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SIZE OF PROTESTS 
In order to determine the mobilization potential of the GI-groups in terms of 
Europeanization, it is also relevant to consider the sizes of their protests aside from 
their frequencies (see also Caiani & Graziano 2018). Table 6.4 below shows that the 
majority of the GI groups’ protest actions consist of a low number of participants, 
only involving between 1-10 activists (75%). The demonstrations with 50+ 
participants have mainly been organized by GI Austria (16, or 50% of the 50+ 
protests), GI Germany (9, or 28%), and GI France (5, or 15.6%), just as the 
‘Indeterminate’ cases also mainly refer to these three groups’ protests.  
Table 6.4: Size of the GI groups’ protests (2015-2017).136 
Protest Form Total 
Announcement (1 person) 14.8 (101) 
Few (2-10 people) 59.7 (408) 
Moderate (10-50) 9.8 (66) 
Small demo (50-250) 2.6 (18) 
Moderate demo (250-1000) 1.5 (10) 
Big demo (1000+) 0.6 (4) 
(Indeterminate137) 11.0 (75) 
Total 100.0 (682) 
Note: N: 682. Pct (No. of protests). 
The low protest sizes both relate to the GI-groups’ limited number of core members 
and material resources and to their inability to attract supporters to their own 
demonstrations (Froio 2018). Moreover, several of GI’s planned demonstrations have 
either been cancelled,138 moved to a less prominent site139 by the authorities, or 
                                                          
136 While the GI groups in certain cases specify how many activists took place in the given 
event, the figures in the table are mainly based on the estimated required amount of people for 
carrying out such an activity. Hence, a banner-drop is, for instance, only estimated to require 
around 2-10 people, while the writing of an announcement, such as a press release, only requires 
one person. Yet, for the demonstrations, it is only the participant rates published by either GI 
themselves or newspaper articles, which have been included. This explains the lacking 
information for 75 of the protest events.   
137 Rallies, demonstrations, and vigils organized by GI, where it was not possible to deduce 
from the data how many people participated. 
138 Such as the Moolenbeek rally after the Brussels terrorist attack in 2016 (The Bulletin 2016), 
or the ‘Face aux Islamistes’ demonstration in Paris in November 2017 (20 Minutes 2017). 
139 Like GI Austria’s planned rally in front of the Austrian Greens office in 2016 (Kurier 2016).  
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interfered with by counter-protesters140, making it more opportune to organize smaller 
scale ‘spontaneous’ protests that can still create a ‘buzz’ (Bouron 2014). The low 
participant levels also imply that none of the GI groups has (or at least has not yet) 
become a truly independent far right movement with a strong mobilization potential 
(such as e.g. PEGIDA Germany). This thus also implies that they did not organize 
sizeable protests around European issues in the period, already indicating a low impact 
in terms of organizing people-strong protests directed at the decision-makers. 
Participating in Other Far Right Organizations’ Demonstrations 
Instead, the GI groups rather rely on other far-right actors, like PEGIDA, to organize 
sizeable demonstrations in which they can participate. Several of the national and 
local GI groups thus also took part in other far right groups’ demonstrations, both at 
the domestic and European level. Aside from the mobilization size perspective, this 
protest participation also relates to the GI-groups’ aim of seeking cooperation with 
similar-minded domestic groups (see e.g. Lipp 2017; Interview with GI Czech 
Republic 2018) as a means to become consolidated, accepted, and embedded parts of 
their domestic far right scenes, an acceptance that is vital for a group’s survival. 
The 37 identified protests are divided among five of the seven national GI groups, 
namely GI Germany (16 with other groups)141, GI Austria (9)142, GI Czech Republic 
(7)143, GI France (4)144, and GI Slovenia (1)145. Particularly GI Germany, GI Austria, 
and GI Czech Republic attempt to become an established part of their national far right 
scenes (or German-speaking, in GI Austria’s case) as this allows them to draw benefits 
and increased resonance from the other groups’ resources and experiences. 
Conversely, GI France only joined a few protests hosted by other French far right 
                                                          
140 Such as the annual transnationally attended demonstration in Berlin in the summer of 2017, 
where counter-protesters kept attempting to block the Identitarians’ route (BZ-Berlin 2017). 
141 GI Germany joined nine PEGIDA Germany rallies (mainly GI Saxony). German GI activists 
have also taken part in demonstrations by German PEGIDA offshoots (see e.g. GI Germany-
FB post), by the radical right Alternative for Germany (GI Germany 2016b), plus in two far 
right citizen’s initiatives’ demonstrations (Citizens for Erfurt (‘Bürger für Erfurt’) (GI Germany 
2017b) and Citizen Forum Saxony (‘Bürgerforum Sachsen e.V.’) (GI Germany 2015g). 
142 GI Austria joined four anti-immigration protests in Austria in February 2016, organized by, 
amongst others, the FPÖ (GI Austria 2016c) and PEGIDA Austria (GI Austria FB-Post), and 
joined citizens’ initiatives against refugee housing (see e.g. GI Austria 2016e; Schmidt 2016). 
143 GI Czech Republic joined four anti-immigration rallies organized by the extreme right NE 
Bruselu – Národní demokracie (NO Brussels – National Democracy) party (see e.g. GI Czech 
Republic 2015d), and it participated in Blok Against Islam’s FE-protest in February 2016 (GI 
Czech Republic 2016a). 
144 One was with a regional Front National branch (Guiot 2015), while the other three involved 
anti-refugee citizens’ initiatives (see e.g. Castanier & D’Angelo 2017; Foulon 2016). 
145 GI Slovenia joined a protest against refugee housing in February 2016 (GI Slovenia 2017). 
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groups, thus acting more independently (and perhaps carefully) in terms of open 
cooperation with domestic far right actors. Moreover, GI Italy’s lacking (open) 
participation in other Italian groups’ protests can be explained by its attempt to 
dissociate itself from fascist organizations. 
As explained above, several of the rallies joined by GI activists are hosted by more 
successful demonstration organizers, such as Pegida Germany146, or by radical and 
extreme right political parties, like local Front National (FN), Freedom Party of 
Austria (FPÖ), and the Czech NO Brussels – National Democracy branches, which 
all have considerably better resources than the GI groups. Scholars argue that GI 
Czech Republic’s participation in the more well-established National Democracy’s 
protests mainly is a means to introduce itself to the other actors on the Czech far right 
scene (Berlekamp & Opielka 2018: 234).  
Aside from the domestic links, GI Czech Republic activists also participated in far 
right demonstrations abroad, namely in Dresden, Warsaw, and Bratislava147. GI Czech 
Republic’s leader explained these protest participations as the group being “willing to 
support basically everything that somehow corresponds with our opinions,” even if 
the viewpoints do not correlate one to one, and it involves extreme right actors 
(Interview with GI Czech Republic 2018). This open cooperation with extreme right 
groups aligns with the porous borders between right-wing actors in Eastern Europe, 
and the lacking need for dissociation from far right actors considered extreme. Thus, 
the Eastern European GI groups do not need to consider the respectability of their 
domestic protest partners to the same extent as in Western Europe (Minkenberg 2018). 
This initial section has shown that there is a wide variety in the GI groups’ amount of 
protests, their frequencies over time, and predominant forms, and that this is largely 
ascribable to the groups’ diverse material resources, plus, to a more limited extent, 
their political opportunities. Yet, at the same time, the national GI-groups almost all 
mainly organized demonstrative protests, and relied on many of the same protest 
tactics (such as banner-drops, rallies, and street theatres), indicating a certain level of 
transnational coordination. Moreover, the fact that the protest frequencies at the 
regional levels differ highly, most GI protest actions only involve a limited number of 
activists, and the groups participate in other, more prominent, far right organizations’ 
protests, are all revealing in terms of the GI-groups’ actual sizes.  
                                                          
146 Both activists from GI Germany (9 of their 16 protests with other groups), and GI Czech 
Republic have joined PEGIDA Germany’s demonstrations.  
147 For instance, the Polish National Independence Day march in November 2016 (GI Czech 
Republic FB-Post), and in the large Slovakian anti-refugee demonstration on June 20, 2015 (GI 
Italy FB-post). Due to the proximity of Dresden to Ústi nad Labem, where several of the Czech 
GI activists live, Czech GI activists have also participated in Pegida Germany’s demonstrations 
(see e.g. GI Czech Republic 2015a). 
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 EUROPEANIZATION OF THE GI GROUPS’ COLLECTIVE 
ACTION?  
After having considered the GI groups’ protest forms and frequencies, the following 
section will consider their (different) paths of collective action Europeanization. The 
first part briefly considers the groups’ overarching protest issues in the 2015-2017 
period. This is followed by an analysis of the scopes of the issues, targets, 
participants, and events, in order to explore the degrees to which the various groups’ 
protest scopes Europeanized in the period. 
THE GI-GROUPS’ MOBILIZATION ISSUES OVER TIME 
Table 6.5 below shows the GI-groups’ overarching mobilization issues in the 2015-
2017 period (see Codebook in Appendix B). It shows that the most frequent GI protest 
topics involve ‘Anti-immigration’, ‘Anti-Islam(isation)’, and ‘Anti-refugee/asylum 
(policy),’ accounting for 63% of the protests. The ‘Welfare protectionism,’ which is 
mostly expressed during the groups’ solidarity actions, also mostly relates to the 
(alleged) preferential treatment of third-country nationals versus the autochthonous 
population. Yet, in the case of GI Czech Republic, these actions instead criticise the 
government’s general social policy (Interview with GI Czech Republic 2018). Hence, 
the largest share by far of the GI groups’ protests involves opposition to third-country 
nationals, mainly of Muslim faith. 
When considering the groups individually, ‘Anti-immigration’ and ‘–Islamization’ 
remain the most frequent mobilization issues for all the GI groups in the 2015-2017 
period, except for GI Czech Republic, which mainly mobilized around ‘Welfare 
protectionism’ and ‘Identity (preservation)’. ‘Gender-related’ protests are most 
predominant for GI Hungary and GI Slovenia, mainly targeted at LGBT-associations 
and NGOs (See e.g. 24.hu 2016)148.  
  
                                                          
148 For GI Slovenia, this was in response to the parliamentary discussions on civil marriage and 
the recognition of same sex couples in Slovenia. The law was adopted in February 2017 (Novak 
2017). The Western European GI groups have also mobilized on this issue. GI Germany, for 
instance, took part in the German ‘Demo für alle’ (‘Demo for all’) in 2015 (GI Germany 2015c), 
organised by an association, which found inspiration in the French ‘Manif pour tous’ (‘Demo 
for all’) that mobilized strongly against homosexual marriage 2013-2014. 
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Table 6.5: The GI groups’ overarching issues of mobilization 2015-2017. 
Overarching Issues 2015 2016 2017 Total 
Anti-immigration 35.9 (51) 22.6 (67) 24.3 (59) 26.0 (177) 
Anti-Islam(isation) 7.7 (11) 25.9 (77) 22.6 (55) 21.0 (143) 
Anti-ref./asylum (policy) 31.7 (45) 10.4 (31) 13.6 (33) 16.0 (109) 
Welfare protectionism 10.6 (15) 16.8 (50) 8.6 (21) 12.6 (86) 
Identity (preservation) 6.3 (9) 11.1 (33) 10.3 (25) 9.8 (67) 
Pro/Vs Political actors 0.7 (1) 3.4 (10) 6.6 (16) 4.0 (27) 
Opposing suppression 4.2 (6) 6.7 (20) 8.2 (20) 6.7 (46) 
Gender-related 2.1 (3) 0.7 (2) 4.1 (10) 2.2 (15) 
Other topics 0.7 (1) 2.4 (7) 1.6 (4) 1.8 (12) 
Total 100.0 (142) 100.0 (297) 100.0 (243) 100.0 (682) 
Note: (N: 682). Pct (No. of protests). Cramer’s V = .243*** (*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001). 
The GI protests thus played into the increasingly growing European public worries 
about immigration at the time (see e.g. Debomy 2015). While the five initial GI groups 
had mobilized around rather disparate protest issues in the 2012-2014 period149, the 
‘refugee crisis’ meant that the national GI groups began aligning their issue foci with 
each other, all mobilizing against the refugees and immigrants. Hence, while GI 
Austria had already carried out a protest action against Austria and the EU’s asylum 
policy in 2013 (Lichtmesz 2013), the onset of ‘the long summer of migration’ in 
autumn 2015 (della Porta 2018) meant that all GI groups began mobilizing against 
third-country immigration, refugees, and asylum seekers. This was especially the case 
during the height of the ‘refugee crisis’ (i.e. winter 2015-2016), where the five active 
groups at the time demanded the closure of refugee housing sites, the resurrection of 
national borders, and the ‘remigration’150 of immigrants and refugees. 
                                                          
149 In the 2012-2014 period, when active, the national GI groups made rather disparate claims, 
mainly addressing national issues. The topics of mobilization largely coalesced around: Anti-
immigration/Islamization (particularly by GI France, GI Austria, GI Germany, and GI Italy), 
anti-LGBT/Gender policy (GI France (Loi Taubira on same sex marriage)), and more general 
protests about identity preservation (GI Czech Republic). 
150 ‘Remigration’ is a term adopted from Bloc Identitaire, referring to the (forced) returning of 
third-country immigrants to their home countries. As argued by Aftenberger (2017), this is 
merely a rewriting of the neo-Nazi calls for ‘Foreigners out’ (Ausländer raus). At the protest 
events, the ‘remigration’ demand was mainly directed towards ‘illegal’ and ‘criminal’ 
immigrants and ‘economic refugees’. Yet, in reality, it relates to all third-country immigrants, 
as, in the words of GI Germany, there should be “a demographic tendency change towards 
remigration” (GI Germany n.d.b). 
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Actions that make more general calls for ‘Identity preservation’ (see e.g. GI Czech 
Republic 2016d), and other protests that are mainly organized as an attempt to set the 
agenda according to the GI-movement rationales, do not tend to attract much media 
attention. Particularly GI France, GI Austria, and GI Germany thus mainly act on the 
contentious issues of the moment by organizing protests that combine their main 
collective action frames (see Chapter 5) with ongoing events as a means to draw 
attention to the (alleged) faultiness of the situation. They are thus highly driven by the 
political and media agenda of the moment, reacting (quickly) to ongoing events. 
Hence, aside from main campaigns, which last a few months (such as GI Austria’s 
‘Great Replacement’ campaign in the spring of 2015, or GI France’s ‘This is our 
home!’ (‘On est chez nous!’) campaign in the autumn of 2015), most of GI’s protests 
are organized in reaction to ongoing events as a means to profit from the discursive 
opportunities and thus gain resonance (see e.g. Koopmans & Olzak 2004). Such 
events, for instance, include new legislative decisions (e.g. the local housing of 
refugees (see e.g. Génération Identitaire 2015c; GI Austria 2016d; GI Slovenia 2017), 
or GI Germany’s protests against the German surveillance legislation (see e.g. GI 
Germany n.d.e)). Yet, they also react to news stories (such as violent attacks 
perpetrated by third-country nationals (see e.g. GI Germany 2016a), the sexual 
assaults in Cologne (see e.g. GI Austria 2016a)), or ongoing parliamentary and 
public/media debates (like calls for national border closures in the winter of 2015 (see 
e.g. GI Germany 2015e)). 
Considering the GI mobilization against refugees and asylum seekers more 
specifically, most took place in the winter of 2015-2016. As Table 6.5 shows, the 
‘Anti-refugee/asylum seeker’ mobilization decreased by 31% from 2015 to 2016, and 
remained at the same level in 2017, while more general ‘Anti-immigration’ and ‘Anti-
Islamization’ protests rose instead (V= .243). The anti-refugee and asylum seeker 
protests mainly involved issues such as the securing of the external and, mainly, 
internal EU borders, opposition to refugee and migrant camps, and demands for 
asylum and refugee policy changes. Moreover, GI Germany, GI France, and GI 
Austria mobilized rather heavily against radical Islamist terrorism in July-September 
2016, i.e. in the aftermath of the terrorist attack in Nice on Bastille Day, July 14, and 
the numerous smaller attacks in Germany over the summer of 2016 (see e.g. Les 
Identitaires 2016; GI Germany 2016g; GI Austria 2016h). Furthermore, while the anti-
refugee mobilization had decreased by 2017, it was nevertheless also in this year that 
the GI groups organized one of their most elaborate protests against said refugees, 
namely the ‘Defend Europe’ mission (see more on this below). 
The following section will now turn the focus toward the scopes of the protests, in 
order to determine the extent to which they involved European issues, targets, 
participants, and events. 
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THE GI-GROUPS’ EUROPEANIZATION PATHS 
Scope of Protest Issues 
Considering the issue scopes, i.e. whether the expressed GI demands involve 
‘European’ or ‘national’ policy issues, Table 6.6 shows that the majority of the GI-
groups’ protests involve ‘national’ issues, already indicating a limited degree of 
collective action Europeanization by these actors (see Chapter 3). Hence, from 2015 
to 2016, an interesting development took place, involving a shift from the groups 
predominantly mobilizing around ‘European’ issues, to ‘National’. Yet, the absolute 
numbers of protests with a ‘European’ issue scope actually remained rather constant 
during the three years (around 90-110 PEs), while instead it is the amount of protests 
with a ‘National’ focus that increases by 244% in 2016 (V = .190).  
Table 6.6: Issue scope of all GI groups’ protests per year (2015-2017).  
 2015 2016 2017 Total 
National 38.7 (55) 63.6 (189) 58.0 (141) 56.5 (385) 
European 61.3 (87) 36.4 (108) 42.0 (102) 43.5 (297) 
Total 100.0 (142) 100.0 (297) 100.0 (243) 100.0 (682) 
Note: N: 682. Pct (No. of protests). Cramer’s V = .190*** (*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001). 
These figures are largely explainable by the fact that GI France, GI Austria, and GI 
Germany organized a comparatively much higher amount of protests, implying that 
their actions have a larger effect on the overall figures. In 2015, GI Austria and GI 
Germany thus predominantly mobilized around ‘European’ policy issues, especially 
regarding border security, while GI France, in fact, mainly focused on the domestic 
policy level. In 2016 and 2017, GI Austria and GI France mainly organized protests 
with a ‘national’ protest issue, while the remaining five GI groups’ protests were 
rather evenly divided between ‘national’ and ‘European’ issue foci in both years, in 
terms of absolute numbers.  
Looking at the issue scopes in correlation with the issues of the protests, Table 6.7 
below shows that while all GI’s other mobilizing issues have a predominantly 
‘national’ scope in terms of policy-making, the mobilization against immigrants, 
refugees, and asylum seekers (i.e the top three categories) mainly have a ‘European’ 
scope (average of 61.9%) (V = .492). This is not so surprising, considering that 
migration, and particularly asylum, policy is “global by nature” (compared to, for 
instance, agricultural policy), and many policies necessitate EU decisions (Monforte 
2014: 230). The actions with a ‘European’ scope, for instance, involve protests around 
border security and terrorism, while the ‘national’ includes protests against refugee 
and migrant housing, and the ‘mal-integration’ of Muslim immigrants, plus solidarity 
actions in favor of the autochthonous citizens (See the Codebook in Appendix B). 
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Table 6.7: Issue scope of the GI protests’ overarching issues. 
Topic/Issue Scope National European Total 
Anti-immigration 39.5 (70) 60.5 (107) 100.0 (177) 
Anti-Islamization 39.9 (57) 60.1 (86) 100.0 (143) 
Anti-refugee/asylum (policy) 34.9 (38) 65.1 (71) 100.0 (109) 
Welfare protectionism 98.8 (85) 1.2 (1) 100.0 (86) 
Gender-related issues 80.0 (12) 20.0 (3) 100.0 (15) 
Identity preservation 73.1 (49) 26.9 (18) 100.0 (67) 
Opposing suppression 93.5 (43) 6.5 (3) 100.0 (46) 
Other topics 75.0 (9) 25.0 (3) 100.0 (12) 
Pro/Vs Political actors 81.5 (22) 18.5 (5) 100.0 (27) 
Total 56.5 (385) 43.5 (297) 100.0 (682) 
Note: N: 682. Pct (No. of protests). Cramer’s V = .492*** (*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001) 
Thus, 264, or 38.7%, of all the 682 GI-actions involve anti-immigration frames with 
a ‘European’ scope. Hence, it is around the issue of third-country immigration that the 
European GI groups can align around a common cause at the transnational protest 
level. This also explains why the French GI initiators were interested in making the 
‘movement’ European from the outset, as these issues are the main concern for the 
group, and frequently affect all of Europe, requiring pan-European policy responses.  
Scope of Targets 
The GI groups’ extensive use of direct social actions (see Chapter 5) infers that they 
do not make use of “traditional forms of engagement addressing third parties (e.g. the 
state, the media) and demanding their mediation to solve a public problem” to a large 
extent (Castelli Gattinara 2018: 279). Instead, “they offer a direct contribution against 
something perceived as dysfunctional” (Ibid.) by taking the protest to where it 
occurs151. Hence, due to the GI activists’ meta-political ambition of influencing the 
public discursive and perceptive level rather than solely targeting the decision-makers 
in order to achieve political change, many of the GI groups’ protests either target the 
public (e.g. GI Austria’s banners with statements such as ‘Defend yourself!’ (‘Wehr 
dich!’) (Identitäre Bewegung Österreich 2017), or involve more symbolic protests, 
often addressed against the foreign ‘others’ (e.g. against the ‘Great replacement’ or 
‘Islamization’). Both of these factors combined (i.e. the groups’ use of direct social 
actions and their cultural hegemony ambitions) infers that many of the GI groups’ 
                                                          
151 Consider e.g. GI Germany’s statement that “we carry the protest exactly to the places where 
the aberrations and those responsible centralize. If the politicians are not willing to protect our 
borders, we become active to point out the enforcement of law and order” (GI Germany n.d.i, 
author’s translation). 
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protest actions are addressed to the general population and the media, in order to gain 
attention and attract support. 
Hence, the groups usually frame their actions in opposition to governments and other, 
mainly domestic, political, and societal entities, such as left-wing political 
associations (including NGOs) and other proponents of multiculturalism. Yet, the 
groups do not always target these actors directly. Instead, the protests involve blame 
attributions, thus involving indirect targeting. This blaming strategy mainly aims at 
villainizing and delegitimizing the current leadership and liberal doctrines, while 
accentuating the benefits of ‘patriotic’ legislation (in their pursuit of an ethnically pure 
population). As an example, GI France explained its entrance blockade of the Calais 
migrant camp in 2016 with the words:  
This situation is the result of an irresponsible policy, of which national and 
European political leaders in Paris, Berlin and Brussels are guilty. Since 
these rulers refuse to protect the populations by restoring borders, 
nationally as well as European, they will see the people building 
barricades!” (Robert 2017, author’s translation).  
The various GI groups, in fact, often voice this sentiment of ‘the politicians did not 
act, so we have to,’ particularly regarding policy responses to the ‘open borders,’ the 
housing of refugees and migrants, and to terrorist attacks on European ground, just as 
the Western European governments are castigated for their ‘politically correct’ 
behaviour.  
Looking more specifically at the groups’ protest targets, Table 6.8 below shows that 
the share of protests targeting a specific political decision-making entity is rather 
limited (only around a third of all GI protests). Furthermore, while 50% of the protests 
in 2015 targeted a political decision-making entity, this had changed to solely being 
around 30% by 2016 and 2017 (V = .159). 
The table also reveals that despite the pan-European nature of the ‘refugee crisis’ and 
the role of the EU, the national government remains the main target of the protests for 
most of the GI-groups. The EU and other EU MS are, in fact, hardly the target of 
mobilization. This finding correlates with other scholars’ findings regarding the 
(potential) Europeanization of collective action (see e.g. Bourne & Chatzopoulou 
2015) and, as will be further elaborated upon below, relates to the GI-groups better 
(perceived) domestic discursive opportunities. Hence, when targeting a political 
decision-maker, GI Slovenia (39% of its total protests), GI Austria (38%), GI France 
(33%), GI Germany (32%), GI Italy (27%), and GI Czech Republic (19%) mainly took 
their claims to their respective national governments. Conversely, due to the anti-
immigrant and -liberal turn of Fidesz and Órban (see e.g. Krekó et al. 2019), GI 
Hungary, in fact, carried out protest actions in support of its national government (see 
e.g. GI Hungary FB-post). 
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Table 6.8: The GI coalition’s protest targets per year (2015-2017). 
Targets 2015 2016 2017 Total 
National government 46.5 (66) 26.9 (80) 25.5 (62) 30.5 (208) 
Other MS' gov. 0.7 (1) 2.0 (6) 2.1 (5) 1.8 (12) 
EU 2.8 (4) 0.7 (2) 0.8 (2) 1.2 (8) 
Muslims/migrants/ref. 9.9 (14) 13.1 (39) 11.5 (28) 11.9 (81) 
Public 19.0 (27) 16.8 (50) 23.0 (56) 19.5 (133) 
Others152 17.6 (25) 33.0 (98) 31.3 (76) 29.2 (199) 
Non-specified 3.5 (5) 7.4 (22) 5.8 (14) 6.0 (41) 
Total 100.0 (142) 100.0 (297) 100.0 (243) 100.0 (682) 
Note: N: 682. Pct (No. of protests). Cramer’s V = .159** (*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001). 
The table shows that only eight of the GI groups’ protest actions targeted the EU. In 
fact, only four of the GI groups have directed their demands towards the EU153, 
underlining the generally limited role given to the EU for the groups’ mobilization 
(see Chapter 5). Hence, none of the interviewed GI leaders had ever approached EU 
institutions or actors directly, through neither protest actions nor insider strategies 
(such as contacting MEPs or lobbying). GI Czech Republic’s spokesperson elaborated 
that he could not imagine contacting MEPs, due to the “patriotic parties” lacking 
decision-making powers in the EP (Interview with GI Czech Republic 2018). GI 
Germany’s spokesperson instead stated that the targeting of the EU “was more a” GI 
“topic in 2014-2015” (in reference to the ‘Our Europe is not your Union’ 
demonstration in Vienna in May 2014 (see e.g. Lichtmesz 2014)), and that the EP’s 
limited political capacities made the group refrain from contacting people in this 
institution (Interview with GI Germany 2017). These responses imply that the GI 
groups do not as such reject the EU, but rather take a more pragmatic and strategic 
position on its institutions in terms of externalization. This aligns with previous 
findings on extra-parliamentary actors and their EU-strategies. Caiani and della Porta 
(2009), for example, discovered that several of the SMOs they interviewed had rather 
                                                          
152 The ‘Others’ cover, amongst others: Autochthonous nationals or Europeans in need of 
assistance (86 protests), Left-wing actors (47), Pro-refugee/migrant NGOs (25), Media (10), 
Educational institutions (8), Turkish government or associations (4), (Multi-)national 
businesses (4), National trade unions (2), and Facebook (1). 
153 Either by approaching an EU office (European Commission) or association related to the 
EU (FRA) (more on these two below), or by making explicit anti-EU demonstrative actions. 
Only GI Italy and GI Czech Republic organized explicit anti-EU demonstrations. 10 days after 
the Brexit referendum in the UK, on July 8, 2016, GI Italy held an anti-EU demonstration (GI 
Italy 2016a).  
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limited direct EU-actor interaction, including to MEPs, in certain cases due to the 
lacking decision-making power of the European Parliament (2009: 122)154. 
Other EU MS’ governments were also only targeted to a limited extent (12 protests in 
total). These protests included rallies at embassies, either to oppose the country’s 
refugee policies (GI Hungary 2017a at the German Embassy), or to express 
‘solidarity’ with the Visegrad countries (see e.g. GI Germany FB-post for Hungary; 
GI Austria in support of Poland (Koralewski 2014)). It also included vigils for 
countries targeted by terrorism (see e.g. GI Austria at the German Embassy after the 
attack on a Berlin Christmas market in 2016 (GI Austria 2016j). A few of the actions 
were carried out as joint transnational protests, yet, they were not as such instances of 
‘transnational pressure,’ as they did not involve calls for policy changes or moves 
towards further integration (della Porta & Caiani 2009). In October 2017, for instance, 
as part of GI Hungary’s ‘Border Fence Campaign’ (GI Hungary 2017c), ten GI 
activists from GI Hungary, GI Austria, GI Germany, and GI Slovenia visited 
Hungarian border patrollers and thanked them for their efforts during the ‘refugee 
crisis’ (GI Austria 2017b). Hence, this event instead fit well into the GI framing of 
Orbán and the other Visegrad members as being the only ‘true’ European patriots, 
ensuring the protection of the European population (see e.g. Sellner 2017b), and was 
thus a more symbolic gesture, aimed at furthering the GI groups’ patriotic cause. Most 
criticism against other EU MS was thus again mainly expressed through blame 
attributions, especially directed at Merkel, while simultaneously highlighting the 
bravery of those political actors who dared to oppose the mainstream politicians.  
Aside from the (limited) targeting of the decision-makers, Table 6.8 above also shows 
that a rather large share of the GI-groups’ protests are directed towards other societal 
actors, mainly of a left-wing persuasion, and that this number rises over time (V = 
.159). Particularly GI Germany and GI Austria have targeted pro-immigration 
political actors, including left-wing parties and pro-refugee CSOs and NGOs rather 
frequently (a total of 72 protest actions, or 18% of their combined protests) by 
blocking the entrances to offices, disrupting meetings, and similar acts of intimidation. 
Moreover, especially GI France’s frames during its solidarity actions entail blame 
attributions towards the national politicians and pro-migrant organisations, whom it 
accuses of sidelining the interests of the autochthonous population in favour of the 
                                                          
154 Nevertheless, while the spokesperson for GI Germany stated that he personally did not have 
any contacts with EU actors, he could not deny that any German activist might have such 
connections (Interview with GI Germany 2017). The data does also reveal several (unofficial) 
links to radical right parties’ MEPs, with whom GI activists have been in contact at various 
domestic and transnational far right events (e.g. Borghezio from Northern League (Palladino 
2017)). Moreover, in February 2018, after the Defend Europe Mission, Borghezio invited GI 
representatives to come to the EP account for the observations made during the Mediterranean 
‘boat-mission’ (Palladino 2018b). Yet, the majority of these meetings, conferences, and protests 
do not appear to evolve around EU-politics. 
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foreign ‘other’ (see e.g. GI France FB-post). Similarly, GI Slovenia and GI Hungary 
have targeted pro-LGBTQ activists during their protests, while GI Czech Republic has 
made more symbolic actions in opposition to the consumerist and ‘identity-less’ 
society of today. 
In this way, the GI groups construct shared frames around the internal ‘others,’ who 
both consist of the politically responsible, but also actors who conflict with the GI 
activists’ causes and identity (Benford & Hunt 1992). Thus, while the GI activists 
diagnose third country immigrants as the most acute threat to the ‘European identity,’ 
the coalition identifies national, and in rare cases European, governments and the left-
wing establishment as the main culprits. The main antagonists, in other words, are 
those actors who, in their appeals to pluralism and egalitarianism, do not counter third-
country immigration to Europe, and thus come into conflict with GI’s cause of 
preserving the European continent as homogeneously ‘pure’. This strategy of blaming 
the politicians or pro-migrant actors has several purposes. For one, it allows GI “to 
construct migrants, refugees or Muslims as problems, without explicitly naming them 
as such” (Lehner 2017: 150). Yet, more importantly, the villainisation of the liberal 
actors is, in reality, an adoption of the “decade-old” extreme right topoi of 
constructing “a left-wing, anti-national hegemony” (Aftenberger 2017: 218). Hence, 
by drawing attention to their ‘unpatriotic’ political opponents, who allegedly act 
against the peoples’ interests, the GI groups attempt to further their ambition of re-
claiming the societal cultural hegemony. 
The third-country immigrants and refugees are also strongly antagonised, albeit not 
always directly. Aside from the very direct accusations of Muslims ‘Islamizing’ the 
European societies, most frequently framed around ‘radical Islamists’, who are 
portrayed as being predisposed to violence, the GI groups also villainise the 
immigrants and refugees in more indirect ways. One of these ways is by continuously 
employing terms questioning the refugees and immigrants’ claims for residence in 
Europe. This de-legitimisation strategy strongly antagonises the refugees, as they are 
attributed with the immoral agenda of false residence claims, and is done, for instance, 
by putting inverted commas around the term refugee (i.e. ‘refugee’), or generally 
referring them as ‘illegal’ or ‘clandestine’ (several of the FE groups employ the same 
strategy). 
The targets of the GI groups’ protests thus involve many different types of actors, 
albeit predominantly from the domestic context, indicating that the groups perceive 
the domestic setting to be the most opportune arena for mobilization. 
Scope of Participants 
Table 6.9 below shows that the extent to which the GI groups joined each other’s 
protests was rather limited, as only 7.5% of all GI protests involved activists from 
more than one national GI group (either from a neighbouring country (‘Cross-border’) 
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or from several European countries (‘European’)). Yet, the table also shows that these 
numbers changed throughout the three-year period (V = .164). While the amount of 
‘Cross-border’ protests substantially rose, and peaked, in 2016, the groups carried out 
16 ‘European’ GI-protests in 2017 (largely due to the ‘Defend Europe’ mission (9 of 
the 16 protests), see more below). Conversely, more than 62% of the protests only 
involve local or regional GI-groups, again revealing a lot about the groupuscular 
features of the GI-mobilization (see e.g. Griffin 2003). 
Table 6.9: Participant scopes of all GI groups’ protests per year (2015-2017). 
 2015 2016 2017 Total 
Local 59.2 (84) 56.6 (168) 71.2 (173) 62.3 (425) 
National 33.8 (48) 36.4 (108) 20.6 (50) 30.2 (206) 
Cross-border 4.9 (7) 6.1 (18) 1.6 (4) 4.3 (29) 
European 2.1 (3) 1.0 (3) 6.6 (16) 3.2 (22) 
Total 100.0 (142) 100.0 (297) 100.0 (243) 100.0 (682) 
Note: N: 682. Pct (No. of protests). Cramer’s V = .164*** (*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001). 
Most of the protests that include GI activists from abroad take the form of 
demonstrations and banner-drops. Aside from the GI Europe protests, GI France, GI 
Austria, and GI Germany have hosted the majority of the protests with ‘European’ 
participation155. This is due to their better resources, more prominent roles in the 
coalition (see also Chapter 8), and the geographical positions of especially Vienna and 
Berlin, two cities that are easy to reach for all GI groups. Usually, the demonstration 
participation only involves a small ‘delegation’ of foreign GI activists (around 5-10 
activists), who come to show ‘solidarity’ (GI Austria 2017b), ‘European unity’ 
(Interview with GI Italy 2017), and to underline the European nature of the GI 
coalition (see e.g. GI Hungary 2017b). More strategically speaking, this protest 
participation is also a means to boost the protest numbers, a strategy many other 
extreme right protest groups also employ (see e.g. Schlembach 2011). 
GI Germany (9 protests), GI Austria (7), and GI France (6) also mainly host the 
protests with ‘cross-border’ participation, but GI Italy and GI Slovenia have also co-
organized a few actions in Italy (see e.g. GI Italy FB-post). Particularly GI Austria 
and GI Germany have joined each other’s protests rather frequently, due to their 
shared language and links to the German New Right scene (see e.g. Bruns et al. 2017). 
Conversely, GI France has not partaken in many smaller-scale cross-border protests 
in other countries. However, GI activists from especially Italy have visited France (see 
                                                          
155 In the winter of 2015, GI Austria, for instance, organized several border protests with foreign 
GI participation. This involved a demonstration at Spielfeld on the Austrian-Slovenian border 
in November 2015 with GI representatives from Slovenia, France, the Czech Republic, and 
Germany (GI Germany 2015e), and one with GI Germany at Freilassing, Bavaria, on the border 
between Austria and Germany (see e.g. GI Germany 2015f). 
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e.g. GI Italy FB-Post), just as the local GI-groups in Lyon and Normandy raised 
money for the Italian earthquake victims in 2016 (see e.g. GI France FB-post).  
Nevertheless, as Table 6.x clearly shows, the extent of transnational GI collective 
action is very limited, most likely related to the high costs of travelling, both money 
and time-wise. 
Scope of Events 
Based on the findings above, one can deduce that the amount of European, or 
transnational, events also is limited. In fact, out of the 682 GI protests, only seven 
qualify as transnational protests, whereof none took place at the EU institutions in 
Brussels or Luxembourg. In fact, most of these protests do not evolve around a 
specific policy proposal or event-related issue, unlike many other mobilizations 
explored through a Europeanization lens (such as the anti-TTIP mobilization (Caiani 
& Graziano 2018), the demonstrations against the EU’s economic policies in Southern 
Europe in 2008 (Bourne & Chatzopoulou 2015), or the FE-coalition explored in 
Chapter 7). Rather, the groups’ shared ambition of curbing third-country immigration 
to the European continent is the uniting topic at the transnational level. Most 
transnational GI protests thus relate to either anti-Islam or –immigration, but again, 
without always having a direct target (see above), and thus frequently act more as a 
means to further their European unity as a coalition (see Ch.8 for more). 
Since 2014, the GI groups have thus organized an annually recurring transnational 
protest each summer, the first three in Austria in 2014-2016, and then in Germany in 
2017 and 2018156. The remaining four transnational protests all took place in 2017. 
They involved two commemorative marches in Budapest, Hungary (GI Hungary 
2017b) and Vienna, Austria (GI Austria 2017a) respectively,157 plus the two so-called 
                                                          
156 The annual demonstrations have taken place in the school summer holidays since 2014, with 
participation by several GI activists from abroad. The 2015 event was simultaneously the 
culmination of GI Austria and GI Germany’s ‘Stop the Great Replacement’ campaign 
(Identitäre Bewegung Österreich 2015b), while the June 2016 demonstration was titled ‘Defend 
Europe – For a Free and Strong Europe for the Future’ (GI Austria 2016f). The German 2017 
demonstration ‘Future of Europe - Move and Change’ coincided with the anniversary of the 
East German Uprising on June 17, 1953, a date deliberately chosen by GI Germany.  
157 In Budapest, GI Hungary called for a procession to commemorate the 1686 Battle of Buda, 
which involved armies from the Holy League and the Ottoman Empire and ended with the 
recapturing of Buda from the Ottomans (Freedom Day). Despite the strong mobilization efforts 
prior to the event, only around 50 people participated, amongst them GI activists from Austria, 
Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia, Germany, and Italy (GI Hungary 2017b). A similar protest 
took place in Vienna on September 9, 2017, on the Vienna Day of Freedom, in commemoration 
of the Battle of Vienna. The torch procession consisted of around 200 GI members and other 
far right activists (GI Austria 2017a).  
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‘Defend Europe missions’ in the Mediterranean in May (GI Germany 2017c) and 
July-August (GI Italy 2017b). 
Beginning with the May 2014 ‘Our Europe is not your Union’158 demonstration and 
GI conference, GI Austria “dared to take another step towards the establishment of a 
new right-wing youth movement” (DOEW 2014b), by bringing the more informal GI 
transnational networking onto the streets. This joint European GI event was aided by 
the gradually opening European DOS in the period, especially after election polls 
indicated that the far right parties running for the EP-elections in May 2014 were 
going to do well (see e.g. Mudde 2014). Thus, the timing was good for the initiation 
of more regular transnational GI protest actions. Aside from being an event-specific 
transnational protest (in the run-up to the EP-elections), the rally was also the GI 
groups’ first opportunity to mobilize jointly, in addition to organizing a widely 
advertised event, introducing the organizations, and evaluating its reception by media 
and the public. The demonstration thus became an annual transnational event, 
organized in either Austria or Germany. 
The 2017 ‘Defend Europe’ Missions: First Truly Transnational GI Endeavours  
Yet, according to GI Italy’s spokesperson, it was only in 2017 that the GI “movement” 
reached its “maturity stage”, due to GI’s ‘Defend Europe’ campaign, which was 
“really transnational” (Interview with GI Italy 2017). Having made a name for 
themselves in (inter)national and European far right circles and media outlets during 
the ‘refugee crisis’ (consider e.g. Breitbart’s extensive coverage (see Breitbart n.d.)), 
in May 2017, the four main national GI groups, i.e. GI France, GI Italy, GI Germany 
and GI Austria, initiated the so-called ‘Defend Europe’ campaign. It was directed 
against the NGO-boats in the Mediterranean, which they accused of human trafficking 
(see e.g. GI Germany n.d.f). The ‘mission’ played into the growing far right disquiet 
about the NGO-boats (see e.g. Gefira 2016), just as mainstream politicians also had 
begun expressing concerns about the NGOs and their Mediterranean activities (see 
e.g. the Austrian Foreign Minister’s statement in March 2017 (Der Standard 2017)). 
Martin Sellner from GI Austria thus argued that “We are the helpers for right-wing 
politicians, who wish to close this route: Kurz, Strache, Doskozil or Sobotka […]. We 
really felt like the executors of a public opinion that says: it's enough, it has to stop 
eventually” (Zotter 2017).  
In May 2017, Italian, French, and Austrian GI activists thus initiated the ‘Defend 
Europe’ campaign by sailing out to block a German NGO ship from leaving a Sicilian 
harbour, accusing it of smuggling immigrants to Italy, and thus mainly targeting pro-
                                                          
158 The demonstration took place on May 17, 2014, i.e. a week before the EP elections 
(Lichtmesz 2014). 
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migrant and human rights NGOs (GI Germany 2017c).159 Throughout spring 2017, 
the GI activists also collected financial resources via online crowdfunding to hire a 
crew and a boat, the C-Star160, and in a three-week period in July-August, ten GI 
activists sailed around in the Mediteranean to ‘monitor’ the NGO ships and report any 
prohibited activities (GI Italy 2017c) (see Oppenheim 2017 for an account).  
GI Italy’s spokesperson explains that all GI groups were involved in the mission, as 
“Everyone had their own task and we were really busy. There were people on boats, 
but also people on land doing PR stuff or translating videos, working with the social 
[media] like Twitter, Facebook and other stuff” (Interview with GI Italy 2017), 
underlining the transnational nature of the action. Yet, the GI boat’s team consisted 
of solely the Western European GI groups, who were partly chosen based on their 
English skills (Ibid.).  
In the ensuing period, the participating activists spent most of the autumn of 2017 on 
debriefing and media interviews about the ‘mission’. Even though the mission’s 
‘success’ is highly debatable, it was presented as such by the GI activists (see e.g. RT 
France 2017). Fiato also pointed to the change in opinion of several European 
politicians after the action (Interview with GI Italy 2017)161, thus trying to make 
Generation Identity’s impact much larger than was actually the case.  
THE GI-GROUPS’ FORMS OF EUROPEANIZATION 
The above analysis has indicated that all the GI groups mainly employed ‘Domestic’ 
or ‘Domestication’ strategies in the 2015-2017 period, acknowledging the lacking 
political and discursive opportunities at the EU-level, implying that none of the GI 
groups attempted to take their claims to this political institution. In fact, over half of 
the GI-groups’ protests (50.7% of the 682 protests) were cases of ‘Domestic protests,’ 
i.e. they involved both national issues, participants, and targets (Imig and Tarrow 
2000). The limited border-crossing protest participation thus also indicates a low 
degree of trans- and supranationalization. 
                                                          
159 In July, GI France sent out a petition targeted at the European Council President and the 
leaders of France, Germany, and Italy, demanding the end of NGOs and ‘human traffickers’ in 
the Mediterranean. The petition only obtained 411 signatures (France-pétitions.com 2017). 
160 They collected $234,456 US Dollars (around 196,000 Euros). They first had their PayPal 
account closed by PayPal, but found a new crowdfunding site, American WeSearchr (founded 
by Charles Johnson, a contributor to the Breitbart page). 
161 The third ‘mission’ was carried out in April 2018, and consisted of a huge banner being 
spread out on the mountain range between Italy and France with the statement “No Way – You 
will not make Europe home” on it (a reference to the Australian authorities’ anti-immigration 
campaign) (see e.g. The Local France 2018). 
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In order to deduce the GI-groups’ Europeanization forms, Table 6.10 below employs 
the framework outlined in the Theoretical Framework (see Chapter 3), and correlates 
the ‘participant scope’ with the ‘target scope’ for the protests with a ‘European’ issue 
scope. It shows that, in terms of Europeanization, the GI-groups mainly rely on 
‘Domestication’ strategies, i.e. targeting the national government or other domestic 
actors regarding European issues. This involved demonstrations where, for instance, 
the groups called on the national government to close the national borders or to oppose 
the EU’s refugee quotas. 
Table 6.10: The GI groups’ forms of Europeanization (2015-2017)162. 
Participant/Target Scope National European 
National 
77.6% (76)  
(Domestication) 
 
7.1% (7) 
(Externalization) 
 
European 
14.3% (14) 
(Transnational pressure) 
1.0% (1) 
(Supranationalisation) 
Note: N: 98. Pct (No. of protests). 
Hence, the groups’ main mobilization focus remained on the domestic level, both in 
the form of ‘Domestic protests’ and ‘Domestication’. The GI groups thus only 
transnationalized their contention to a very limited extent in terms of transnational 
pressure and supranationalisation, and very rarely as a means to exert explicit pressure 
on the decision-makers. These actions were instead mainly carried out as part of the 
groups’ more symbolic ambitions of promoting themselves as a pan-European 
movement, and exercised more general criticism against the liberal mainstream.  
 THE ROLE OF NATIONAL CONTEXTS AND POLITICAL AND 
DISCURSIVE OPPORTUNITIES  
As briefly explained above, the national GI groups had very different political and 
discursive opportunities in their respective domestic settings. The political 
opportunities were nearly or entirely open in France, Italy, Hungary, Slovenia, and 
the Czech Republic, yet, except for GI France, the groups’ more limited material 
resources, plus the fact that they had problems establishing themselves on their 
                                                          
162 For the ‘Participant’ scopes, the ‘Local’ and ‘National’ participation are collated to 
‘National’ participants, while the ‘Cross-border’ and ‘European’ both count as ‘European’. In 
terms of the ‘Target’ scope, it is only the protests targeting the national government or the EU, 
which are included, explaining the relatively low number of protests. 
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respective domestic far right scenes,163 meant that they did not organize many actions 
domestically (see section 6.1). In Austria, GI Austria is embedded in the domestic far 
right scene, mainly due to its connections with the Burschenschaften (Weidinger 
2016), and the approval of FPÖ (Ajanovic et al. 2016). Yet, it faces state surveillance, 
and thus, more closed political opportunities than most of the other GI-groups 
(together with GI Germany), making it carry out a larger share of confrontational 
actions. 
The following section examines GI Germany, GI France, and GI Czech Republic’s 
protest developments and strategies in the 2015-2017 period more closely in order to 
deduce the exact role of their different domestic contexts, POS, DOS, and resources 
in the period. These differences meant that the groups mobilized on diverse issues and 
with varied protest strategies. As an introductory notion, one should keep all of their 
limited membership and protest sizes in mind throughout the analysis. 
PROTEST DEVELOPMENTS OF GI FRANCE, GI GERMANY, AND GI 
CZECH REPUBLIC 
Each section begins with a more general consideration of the group’s domestic 
political and discursive opportunities, followed by a closer consideration of its protest 
developments in the 2015-2017 period. 
GI France 
GI France faces rather open domestic political opportunities (see Appendix C). It had 
managed to establish itself as a rather prominent and active French far right actor prior 
to 2015,164 despite the strong role of a far right party in the country, namely Front 
National (Now National Rally). While this has led to a lower level of far right extra-
parliamentary mobilization in other countries, this is not the case in France. This 
mainly relates to the symbiotic nature between Front National and the French New 
                                                          
163 Either due to ‘out-crowding’ by the respective governments (in Hungary and Czech 
Republic) or main far right parties (Slovenia), or hostility from the other domestic far right 
actors (Italy). 
164 Starting with the Poitiers roof occupation in October 2012, the group carried out a row of 
controversial protest actions, which ensured considerable media attention (see e.g. Licourt 2019 
for a short overview). These actions were mainly in the form of direct social actions (see p. xx), 
such as ‘securitisation’ of the metro in Lille in 2014 (see e.g. Licourt 2014), defending the 
autochthonous population against ‘riffraff’ (‘racailles’), plus ‘solidarity’ actions in favour of 
the French homeless people since January 2013 (see e.g. Le Cain 2015). Moreover, in 2013-
2014, it also mobilized strongly against the Loi Taubira (Taubira Law), which permitted 
marriages between homosexual couples, both as part of numerous demonstrations together with 
other French far right groups, but also through its occupation of UMP’s headquarters (see e.g. 
Le Parisien 2014). 
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Right extra-parliamentary actors, inferring that the two types of actors co-exist on the 
French far right scene without this inhibiting any of their activity levels or 
mobilization spaces (see e.g. Castelli Gattinara 2018). The Identitarians (ex-
Identitarian Bloc) thus play a particularly prominent role in France, being the “most 
important extra-parliamentary national opposition,” also in terms of Front National 
recruitment (Camus as cited in Speit 2018), and GI France has benefitted from its 
strong role and position. 
The more accommodative reception of the group on the French political scene also 
partly explains why GI France did not ‘radicalize’ its contention substantially at any 
point in the 2015-2017 period (see Figure 6.3 below). Instead, the group mainly opted 
for demonstrative and conventional actions, aside from the annually recurring winter 
solidarity actions. These types of actions were initiated by The Identitarians in the 
mid-2000s (François 2009) and several local GI groups continued the distribution of 
soup and clothes to homeless autochthonous people in the winters of 2015-2016 and 
2016-2017, employing the welfare protectionist slogan ‘Ours before the others’ (‘Les 
nôtres avant les autres’)165. The (comparatively limited) confrontational actions 
mainly involved direct social actions, for example when protesting against refugee 
housing by ‘occupying’ or blocking entrances to a centre (see e.g. Génération 
Identitaire 2015c).  
Figure 6.3: GI France’s protest forms per semester (2015-2017). 
 
Note: (N: 152). Cramer’s V = .293** (*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001). 
                                                          
165 In the first months of 2015, GI France shared many posts from regional and local French GI 
groups, but only containing pictures. These could no longer be accessed after the Facebook-
network was closed down in 2018. It is my assumption that these posts contained pictures of 
‘social assistance’ acts, but as this cannot be verified, they have not been included in the protest 
event data. 
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As can be seen in Table 6.11 below, GI France strongly focused its protest actions on 
the national level, as 87% of its protests had a domestic target, either involving the 
national government (33% of the protests) or other domestic actors, such as the 
autochthonous French citizens, which were aided through the solidarity actions (also 
33%). Thus, the group mainly worked on the domestic mainstreaming of far right 
worldviews, and only organized a few protest actions against the EU or other 
European decision-makers in the 2015-2017 period. It therefore perceived the 
domestic political and discursive opportunities as more promising and mainly 
mobilized around ‘Domestic’ issues, while only pursuing a supranationalisation 
strategy in 2017, together with the other GI-groups in the ‘Defend Europe’ mission 
(see above).  
Table 6.11: Issue and target scopes of GI France’s protests (2015-2017). 
Issue/Target National  European  Other Total 
  Nat.Gov  EU   
National 74.3 (113) 26.3 (40) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 2.6 (4) 77.0 (117) 
European 12.5 (19) 6.6 (10) 3.3 (5) 2.0 (3) 7.2 (11) 23.0 (35) 
Total 86.8 (132) 32.9 (50) 3.3 (5) 2.0 (3) 9.9 (15) 100.0 (152) 
Note: N: 152. Pct (No. of protests). Cramer’s V = .536*** (*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001). 
The figures for ‘National government’ and ‘EU’ form part of the ‘National’ and ‘European’ totals 
respectively.  
In fact, GI France only targeted the EU in three protests. One of these was after the 
European Commission published its refugee quota proposal. On May 23, 2015, i.e. 
ten days after the quotas were officially proposed, and four days after the French 
President Hollande had refused these quotas (The Local France 2015),166 GI France 
‘occupied’ the European Commission’s Paris office (Ibid.)167. GI France thus seized 
both the open domestic and European discursive opportunity created by the division 
between the EU’s demands and the MS’ responses, in order to highlight the EU’s 
inadequate dealing with third-country immigration. The group thus targeted the EU, 
                                                          
166 GI Denmark and GI Czech Republic similarly targeted ‘European Houses’ in their respective 
capitals in early 2018. GI Czech Republic’s twenty-minute blockade was directed at the 
European Commission (EC), which had offices in the building, after the EC had instigated 
infringement procedures against the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, because they 
rejected the immigration quotas. The activists wore prison uniforms, and held signs with the 
statement: “I love my country, and the EU sees me as a criminal because of that,” in Czech, 
Polish, and Hungarian (Interview with GI Czech Republic 2018).  
167 The protest linked to GI Austria’s occupation of the EU’s Agency for Human Rights (FRA) 
a week later (GI Austria 2015). GI Austria argued that FRA symbolized the ‘Lobby for the 
Great Replacement’, due to its humanist and open-armed endorsement of refugees and 
immigrants (Ibid.). 
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albeit on domestic soil, speaking into the ongoing domestic debates about the 
reception of refugees (see e.g. Atlantico 2016), and exploited the more open domestic 
political opportunities for mobilization. 
The domestic setting was thus in focus in most of GI France’s protests, and many of 
these actions were related to the ‘refugee crisis’. In September 2015, for instance, the 
French government agreed to take in 24,000 refugees over a two-year period 
(McPartland 2015a). At this point, the French population was still in favour of 
accepting refugees (Atlantico 2016). However, from autumn 2015 onwards, there was 
a strong media debate in France about problems related to refugee and migrant camps, 
especially in Calais and Paris (see Appendix C). As the public was dissatisfied with 
the government’s handling of the problems, it led to growing popular dismay (Ibid.). 
As Castelli Gattinara (2018) has already demonstrated empirically, GI France seized 
this discursive opportunity and carried out several “direct interventions and 
confrontational actions against the settlement, displacement, and management of 
migrants” in various cities across France throughout the three year period (2018: 279). 
In October-November 2015, this particularly involved the targeting of refugee 
housing facilities (see e.g. Génération Identitaire 2015c). Research has, in fact, shown 
that such local actions against migrant centres are a rather ‘common’ protest response, 
when politicians decide to place asylum seekers and refugees in a specified location 
(see e.g. Haselbacher & Rosenberger 2018 for more). Moreover, GI France also 
organized a few protests at the various French border crossings, for example, against 
the refugees at the Italian border by Ventimiglia in June 2015, a protest that also 
targeted the EU (Génération Identitaire 2015a). 
The problems in Calais, in fact, provided one of the best opportunities for GI France 
to attract public attention and (potential) resonance. Together with the growing 
migratory pressure on the French-British border-crossing, the debate about the ‘Calais 
Jungle’s’ future received much political and societal attention in France in the 2015-
2016 period (see e.g. McPartland 2015b). After an escalation of the situation in March 
2016, GI France blocked the bridges between the camp and the city, arguing that this 
was to curb the rising crime rates and attacks on the security forces (Robert 2017). 
Moreover, GI France was quick to react to the surge in public disquiet in the aftermath 
of terrorist attacks (see e.g. Atlantico 2016). The group organized numerous protest 
actions on the issues of anti-terrorism and radical Islam, attempting to profit from the 
fear and anger generated amongst the population. Most ISIS attacks in France and 
Europe were followed by actions that included demands for an ‘Expulsion of the 
Islamists’ (see e.g. Génération Identitaire 2015b). This was the case after the attacks 
on Bataclan in November 2015, Brussels April 2016, the Bastille Day attack in Nice 
in July 2016, and the killing of a priest in Normandy in July 2016 (leading to the 
‘Defend your church!’ (‘Défend ton église’) campaign (see e.g. Bui 2016)). At the 
same time, GI France also mobilized strongly against the ‘Islamist’ Union of Islamic 
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Organizations in France (‘Union des organizations islamiques de France’ (UOIF)), 
an organization, Front National also opposed (see e.g. Fayet 2017).  
Hence, due to its amassed resources from the 2012-2015 period, the national GI 
France group and its local chapters were able to organize protest actions rather 
frequently in the 2015-2017 period, mobilizing heavily against Islam, refugees, and 
immigrants. Despite the European nature of the ‘refugee crisis,’ GI France mainly 
mobilized on national issues (around 77% of its protests) and targeted national actors 
(87% of all its protests) (see Table 6.11), indicating that the group perceived the 
domestic opportunities as most favourable for its mobilization. This aligns with the 
expectations from the theoretical framework. 
GI Germany 
While GI France had organized numerous protest actions prior to 2015, it was only 
from 2015 onwards that it is possible to discern a substantial increase in GI Germany’s 
protest frequency. This is mainly due to the opening domestic discursive 
opportunities, at least in Eastern Germany, due to PEGIDA Germany’s successful 
mobilization in Dresden (Rucht 2018). PEGIDA’s rise therefore acted as a catalyst for 
GI Germany’s protests (Vorländer as cited in Merkur 2018). The special political and 
societal circumstances of Saxony (where one finds Dresden) also explains why the 
local GI groups in this federal state by far mobilized most frequently (see map in 
section 6.1). Yet, at the same time, the German history of Nazism infers that the 
German far right, including GI Germany, experiences strong societal suppression 
attempts from both the authorities, the media, and the public (see e.g. Caiani et al. 
2012). The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (‘Verfassungsschutz’) 
has thus monitored GI Germany since 2016, just as certain regional groups have been 
under surveillance for a longer period, due to the group’s racist worldview and anti-
systemic nature (ARD 2016). Hence, even though the group had comparably more 
open mobilization opportunities in Saxony, GI Germany, as a whole, faced closed 
political opportunities.  
The political opportunity framework suggests that with closed, or limited, political 
and discursive opportunities, non-institutional collective actors are likely to employ 
more disruptive protest tactics (Tarrow 2001). This finding is to some extent based on 
data from the German context, where historically, extreme right mobilization has been 
very violent and disruptive (see e.g. Rucht 2018). Yet, as can be seen in Figure 6.4 
below, similar to GI France, GI Germany’s protest actions mainly involved 
demonstrative actions, usually taking the form of non-violent direct social actions, 
aimed at undermining the national mainstream and the liberal hegemony. 
Nevertheless, GI Germany did, in fact, carry out more confrontational actions than by 
its French namesake, in accordance with the theoretical expectations. This was 
particularly the case in the second half of 2016 (see Figure 6.4), just as the group in 
general organized most protests in 2016, as an effect of the electoral gains for AfD at 
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the regional levels from May 2016 onwards. The party’s rise simultaneously inferred 
that the domestic opportunities for far right activism significantly increased, leading 
the GI Germany groups’ actions to both rise in numbers, but also to become more 
confrontational (V = .184). In August 2016, GI Germany thus occupied the symbolic 
Brandenburg Gate, a protest that was considered a landmark event for the group, as it 
led to a lot of media attention (see e.g. Welt 2016b; Rbb24 2016).  
Figure 6.4: GI Germany’s protest forms per semester (2015-2017). 
 
Note: N: 223. Cramer’s V = .184 (*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001). 
Yet, while the Brandenburg Gate protest addressed the national government, the 
majority of the confrontational actions instead targeted domestic left-wing 
representatives, in an intimidation attempt (see e.g. Spiegel 2015b). As was the case 
for GI France, and again, due to the closed opportunities at the EU-level, GI Germany 
almost exclusively targeted local or national actors (see Table 6.12 below). The 
protests addressed at the local and national governments mainly consisted of 
admonishing them for their policy decisions but also for attempting to dissuade people 
from voting for a given politician at upcoming elections168, and in general, these 
protests mainly concerned immigration and refugee-related issues. Conversely, the 
EU was only targeted in one of GI Germany’s protest actions, just as it made two 
banner drops at pro-EU actors’ events, with the statement ‘Our Europe is not your 
Union’ (see e.g. GI Germany 2017d).  
  
                                                          
168 The protests have included, for instance, seven explicit Anti-Merkel actions, which were 
mainly organized around the time of the national elections in November 2017. 
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Table 6.12: Issue and target scopes of GI Germany’s protests (2015-2017). 
Issue/Target National   European  Other Total 
   Nat.Gov  EU   
National 44.4 (99)  16.6 (37) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 3.1 (7) 47.5 (106) 
European 41.7 (93)  15.7 (35) 2.2 (5) 0.4 (1) 8.5 (19) 52.5 (117) 
Total 86.1 (192)  32.3 (72) 2.2 (5) 0.4 (1) 11.6 (26) 100.0 (223) 
Note: N: 223. Pct (No. of protests). Cramer’s V = .214 (*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001). The 
figures for ‘National government’ and ‘EU’ form part of the ‘National’ and ‘European’ totals 
respectively. 
In terms of the protest issues, then, aside from participating in PEGIDA Germany’s 
demonstrations from early on, GI Germany also largely adopted PEGIDA’s anti-
establishment agenda, for instance its ‘lying press’ mantra (see e.g. GI Germany 
2017a). Unlike GI France, GI Germany thus organized several protests targeted at 
mainstream media and its (alleged) ‘political correctness,’ while presenting itself as 
the victim of persecution by both the media and the left (see e.g. GI Germany 2016f; 
GI Germany 2016h). This strategy of self-victimization vis-à-vis actors who uphold 
the “societal consensus” against the far right is, in fact, one of the features that makes 
Germany “a special case for right-wing extremism” (Caiani et al. 2012: 48). Similarly, 
when the German Minister of Justice Heiko Maas introduced new legislation 
involving the monitoring of websites in 2017, GI Germany strongly opposed this 
move, and made numerous protest actions derogatorily targeting the minister (see e.g. 
GI Germany n.d.e). Thus, many of the group’s protests against national targets were 
directed at other actors aside from the government, including left-wing opposition 
parties, the media, and anti-racist civil societal organizations.  
Aside from numerous similar actions against left-wing parties and actors, the German 
government, particularly Angela Merkel, became the target for the brunt of the 
German GI protests. For one, her announcement of an ‘open border’ policy in late-
August 2015 quickly came under fire by both the leader of CDU’s sister party, CSU, 
and by the German far right, including GI Germany, which could use CSU’s 
certification of the anti-immigratory viewpoints as a legitimation of their cause (see 
e.g. Gupta 2008). Hence, in September 2015, shortly after the Austrian and German 
governments had decided in conjunction to allow asylum seekers, who wished to 
travel to Germany, passage to Austria from Hungary, GI Austria initiated a campaign 
called “Secure borders for a secure future” (“Sichere Grenzen für eine sichere 
Zukunft”), which GI Germany joined. Throughout the winter of 2015-2016, GI 
Germany thus took part in demonstrations on the Austrian-German border organized 
by GI Austria (GI Germany 2015e). These protests have, in fact, been the best-
attended GI demonstrations so far. The two groups also jointly launched a ‘We are the 
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border’ (‘Wir sind die Grenze’) campaign (GI Germany 2015f), just as GI Saxony 
made several symbolic protests close to the Czech border (GI Germany 2015g)169.  
GI Germany’s opposition to the reception of refugees was also targeted at other 
societal actors, particularly pro-refugee NGOs. In 2016 and 2017 (i.e. in the lead up 
to GI’s ‘Defend Europe’ campaign), GI Germany carried out many confrontational 
and demonstrative protests against civil societal actors, as several of the NGOs that 
attempted to save people from drowning in the Mediterranean came from Germany 
(Klingst 2017). This ‘dissuasion’ strategy against left-wing organizations (see e.g. 
Castelli Gattinara 2018) overlapped with the many disruptions and building 
occupations of its other political adversaries throughout the period. 
Like GI France, GI Germany also made protest actions in response to practically all 
larger terrorist attacks in Europe in an attempt to exploit the fear, just as the local GI 
groups frequently mobilized when a third-country immigrant had perpetrated violent 
attacks. The local and national GI groups thus mobilized strongly in July-September 
2016, after the attacks in France and Germany. The GI activists employed the slogan 
‘Terror as the normal state’ (‘Terror als Normalzustand’) (GI Germany 2017e), as a 
means of drawing attention to the problems of radical Islam. The attack on the Berlin 
Christmas market in December 2016 similarly led to strong mobilization, including a 
blockade of the CDU office in Berlin (GI Germany 2016j). The following year, the 
group organized a ‘No victim is forgotten’ (‘Kein Opfer ist vergessen’) campaign (GI 
Germany n.d.g), as part of the criticism against the mainstream media and political 
establishment, which ‘lied’ about e.g. crime levels of migrants, a rationale that again 
strongly aligned with the utterances made by Pegida Germany (see e.g. Vorländer et 
al. 2018). Moreover, in the aftermath of the attacks on women on New Year’s Eve 
2015-2016 in Cologne, local German and Austrian GI groups exploited the great 
outcry by the public, the media, and several mainstream politicians. They attempted 
to speak into this growing fear and anger by provocatively handing out pepper spray 
and CS gas to women as a means of self-protection (see e.g. GI Germany 2016d; GI 
Austria 2016b).  
Due to its particular political context, and unlike GI France, most of GI Germany’s 
protests involved the expression of strong anti-establishment frames, especially 
targeted at the media and left wing politicians and activists. The group thus made a 
much more concerted effort at attempting to reverse the liberal hegemony and making 
it acceptable to voice nationalist sentiments by constantly second-guessing the actions 
of the left. In terms of protest targets, the data shows that GI Germany mainly targeted 
                                                          
169 Yet, unlike GI France and GI Austria, GI Germany did not carry out many protest actions 
against refugee housing except for a few protests. The lacking (published) protests against the 
refugee centres could be related to the fact that GI Germany did not want to be associated with 
the more violent attacks perpetrated by other extreme right activists in the country, especially 
in Eastern Germany (see e.g. Rucht 2018). 
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national actors, and that more of these actions involved domestication strategies than 
was the case for GI France (see above). Moreover, due to the repression of the far 
right in the country, GI Germany’s protests frequently had a more disruptive and 
confrontational form than was the case for GI France. 
GI Czech Republic 
Compared to GI France and GI Germany, GI Czech Republic was not very active on 
the streets in the 2015-2017 period, despite its relatively open political opportunities 
(see Appendix C). While the group gradually obtained a stable structure, built up 
around 20 core members (Berlekamp & Opielka 2018), its rather low membership 
numbers and its more general lack of resources inhibited its actions (Interview with 
GI Czech Republic 2018). Furthermore, as most members of the Czech political 
establishment also opposed the EU’s demands and third-country (particularly 
Muslim) immigration, there was also a lack of political space on the national scene 
(Berlekamp & Opielka 2018). Moreover, unlike Blok Against Islam, GI Czech 
Republic did not forge close relations to a far right party present in the parliament, 
even though Okamura from Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) did join some of 
National Democracy’s demonstrations, together with the Czech GI group. 
These factors partly explain the predominance of ‘solidarity actions’ as GI Czech 
Republic’s protest form (see Figure 6.5 below), together with demonstrative actions, 
which peaked in the first half of 2016 (V = .518), and its rather frequent participation 
in demonstrative protests organised by other groups (see above). 
Figure 6.5: GI Czech Republic’s protest forms per semester (2015-2017). 
 
Note: N: 36. Cramer’s V = .518* (*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001) 
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Several of GI Czech Republic’s protest actions have thus consisted of the participation 
in other domestic far right groups’ demonstrations, both the anti-Islam group Blok 
against Islam, but especially the national-conservative and extreme right NO to 
Brussels - National Democracy party, led by Adam Bartos,170 which, as its name 
indicates, is against the EU171. This cooperation partner, combined with other 
factors,172 indicates that GI Czech Republic does not fear being associated with the 
extreme right (Berlekamp & Opielka 2018). This can partly be explained by the 
different perception of the extreme right in Eastern Europe, which implies that society 
is less preoccupied with degrees of right-wingedness, when determining a political 
actor’s legitimacy (see e.g. Minkenberg 2018).  
Considering the group’s targets during the ‘refugee crisis’ (see Table 6.13 below), GI 
Czech Republic actively mobilized against the reception of refugees, largely directing 
its criticism against the EU. Yet, the protests were mainly targeted at the national 
government. The Czech GI group demanded it to align itself with the other Visegrad 
countries. In July 2015, for instance, the group posted an open letter to the 
government, calling for a referendum on non-EU immigration to the Czech Republic, 
stating that said migrants posed a health, social, and security threat to the Czechs, 
while also being better off staying in their home countries (GI Czech Republic 2015c).  
Table 6.13: Issue and target scopes of GI Czech Republic’ protests (2015-2017). 
Issue/Target National   European  Other Total 
   Nat. Gov  EU   
National 44.4 (16)  2.8 (1) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.5 (2) 50.0 (18) 
European 27.8 (10)  16.7 (6) 16.7 (6) 2.8 (1) 0.5 (2) 50.0 (18) 
Total 72.2 (26)  19.4 (7) 16.7 (6) 2.8 (1) 11.1 (4) 100.0 (36) 
Note: N: 36. Pct (No. of protests). Cramer’s V = .453* (*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001). The 
figures for ‘National government’ and ‘EU’ form part of the ‘National’ and ‘European’ totals 
respectively.   
                                                          
170 In March 2016, the leader of National Democracy, Bartoš, was sentenced for anti-Semitic 
statements, and in April the same year, the Czech police introduced legal proceedings against 
him for his written and verbal ‘attacks on human dignity’ (Bućan 2016). 
171 When asked about this cooperation in the interview, the GI Czech Republic spokesperson 
stated that he would not refer to it as ‘cooperation’, but simply ‘event participation’ by GI Czech 
Republic, because GI protested against immigration and did not necessarily agree with all of 
the party’s policies. This is again a very clear demonstration of the GI groups’ overall ambition 
of appearing moderate. 
172 For instance, GI Czech Republic’s choice to commemorate the day of an American airstrike 
in Ústi nad Labem in April 2016, which has also been done by other Czech extreme right groups 
in the past (Berlekamp & Opielka 2018), just as many of its website posts are phrased 
considerably more radically than the Western European groups. 
EUROPEANIZATION OF THE FAR RIGHT 
244
 
The group also organized a few demonstrations against the refugee quotas, and one 
explicit anti-EU protest in the 2015-2017 period. This mobilization began with the 
European Commission’s initial quota proposal in May 2015, which was rejected by 
the Czech government from early on (see e.g. Robert et al. 2015). Yet, it still led to 
strong Czech far right street mobilization. GI Czech Republic directed its demands 
towards the government, mainly arguing for the maintenance of national sovereignty 
of the EU MS, and the right for the Czech Republic to oppose the quotas.  
The relatively strong mobilization against the quotas can partly be explained by the 
fact that the Czech Republic has one of the most Eurosceptic populations in Europe 
(see e.g. European Commission 2015b), just as most Czechs were against the 
reception of refugees (Hovet 2015). It was thus a very opportune topic for the Czech 
far right to mobilize around during the ‘refugee crisis’, even though, as mentioned 
above, it was shared with many mainstream politicians already, and the government 
thus responded to the demands from early on (see also Hafez 2018). 
GI Czech Republic also joined National Democracy’s demonstrations in July 2015 
(the so-called ‘People’s Camps’) (see e.g. GI Czech Republic 2015d), which targeted 
the national government in order to change the EU’s policies. In 2016, this anti-
refugee mobilization continued, and after having joined several demonstrations 
organized by other actors (see section 6.1), in April the Czech GI group organized its 
own demonstration explicitly targeting the EU around its latest attempt at instating 
EU MS refugee quotas. The protest attracted around 30 participants (GI Czech 
Republic 2016b)173. Moreover, in response to the Brexit-vote in June, on the Czech 
Statehood Day (September 28, 2016), GI Czech Republic organised a ‘funeral 
procession’ simulating the ‘death’ of the concept of the EU. The group carried a coffin 
draped in the EU-flag to the Czech Parliament and buried it in a wastebasket, under 
the symbolic sounds of the “March of the Fallen Revolutionaries” (GI Czech Republic 
2016c).  
Several of GI Czech Republic’s protests thus went up against the EU’s demands, yet, 
without explicitly targeting the institution. Yet, it did mobilize more explicitly against 
the EU’s demands than GI Germany and GI France, largely because of the 
government’s rejection of the quotas, plus the public’s attitude towards the EU and 
the refugees (see Hafez 2018). The group thus clearly made use of a ‘domestication’ 
strategy during the ‘crisis’, but its lacking resources, plus the limited political space 
on the far right, inferred a considerably low street mobilization frequency, just as the 
group did not organize many demonstrations on its own initiative, instead joining 
more well-established groups. 
                                                          
173 The protest invitation involved a long list of criticisms, such as the loss of sovereignty, the 
security risks due to migration, and the irresponsible U.S.-backed foreign policy of the EU, 
which “co-sponsored” the current wave of migration (GI Czech Republic 2016b). 
GENERATION IDENTITY AND EUROPEANIZATION OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 
245 
 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The above analysis has shown that the national and local GI groups display large 
differences in their protest frequencies. This was explained as being largely due to the 
varied roles of their respective countries’ main radical right parties (Western European 
groups), the government’s position on immigration (Eastern European groups), and 
the groupuscules’ levels of material resources. Hence, while GI France, GI Germany, 
and GI Austria all organized frequent protest actions in the 2015-2017 period, GI Italy, 
GI Czech Republic, GI Slovenia, and GI Hungary struggled to mobilize support and 
thus also to organize protests.  
In terms of Europeanization, the analysis showed that hardly any of the national and 
local GI groups targeted the EU in their protest actions, nor paid much attention to the 
EU and its institutions more generally in the 2015-2017 period, instead opting for a 
‘domestication strategy.’ This was also anticipated in the theoretical framework, due 
to both Generation Identity’s more conflictual relationship with the EU, and the topic 
of third-country immigration, which is a highly politicized policy issue, inferring a 
predominance for domestic mobilization (see Chapter 5).  
Moreover, the national focus also aligns with the groups’ overarching viewpoints and 
enemy-constructions, which mainly involve antagonist framings of the proponents of 
liberalism, as part of GI’s aim of overturning the societal liberal hegemony. The GI 
groups thus construct many of their collective action frames around domestic ‘others,’ 
a strategy that if applied by all the GI groups entails the targeting of a wide selection 
of the European liberal elite. Moreover, instead of targeting the EU, one of the groups’ 
transnational protests, the ‘Defend Europe mission’, was also aimed at European pro-
refugee NGOs. In fact, of the seven groups, only GI Italy and GI Czech Republic 
mobilized explicitly against the EU, in alignment with the domestic far right (see e.g. 
Hafez 2018). Aside from GI France and GI Austria’s protests at the offices of the 
European Commission and FRA respectively, it was only GI Czech Republic, which, 
mostly together with National Democracy, exercised pressure on the national 
government in order to make it decline the EU’s quota proposal. 
The closer analysis of GI France, GI Germany, and GI Czech Republic’s protest 
developments in the 2015-2017 period further underlined the high variation in the 
groups’ protest frequencies, employment of tactics, specific mobilization issues, and 
targets. Interestingly, the section also further demonstrated how particularly GI 
France and GI Germany mobilize around specific events and political decisions, 
rather than solely focusing on the formulation of their own movement agenda, just as 
GI Germany’s involvement in the German new right scene explains its strong anti-
media and –establishment agenda as compared to the French and Czech groups. These 
differences are strongly related to the three groups’ diverse domestic political and 
discursive opportunities, times of creation, and resources, just as their nation-states’ 
different political, historical, and societal contexts suggest the necessity for varied 
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types of protest strategies and issue foci. This thus acentuates the continued high 
relevance of the national contexts for far right mobilization, despite the GI groups’ 
concerted efforts to appear as a united European force. 
Having now highlighted the differences across the countries, the initial section of the 
chapter also indicated that the groups display a certain level of homogeneity across 
the national boundaries, as they mobilized with remarkably similar protest forms, 
tactics, and campaign issues in the period, indicating that some form of diffusion is 
taking place between them.     
Transnational Diffusion of GI Protest Tactics and Campaign Issues  
The GI groups’ protest activities have several similar features, suggesting a process 
of diffusion in the shape of ‘proximal diffusion,’ implying actors, who “mimic others 
who are spatially or culturally relevant to them” (Soule 2004: 295). The GI activists 
thus both imitate European left-wing movements’ action repertoires (see Chapter 5), 
but also each other’s. For one, all of the other national GI-groups adopted GI France’s 
corporate identity (Eckes 2016), including its logo, worldview, protest forms, and 
rationale through both in- and direct diffusion channels (see Chapter 8 for more on 
this).  
During the 2015-2017 period, one can also observe various types of campaign and 
protest tactic diffusion taking place between the groups, despite their rather varied 
national strategies in terms of street mobilization in the period. As an example, GI 
Italy and GI Germany adopted GI Austria’s ‘Great Replacement’ campaign. 
Moreover, the rise in Islamist terrorist attacks on European soil in the period 2015-
2016 also led to several GI protests against Islamist terrorism. One of their more 
explicit ways of demonstrating the dangerous nature of Jihadi Islamists was through 
public performances of imitated terrorist attacks and/or ISIS killings. This particular 
type of protest event began in Austria in September 2014 (Erstaunlich 2014), and 
diffused to Prague (GI Germany FB-post), several German cities (see e.g. GI Austria 
2016g), and Budapest (GI Hungary FB-post). Another similar example of diffusion is 
the expression of anti-Islamization by dressing up statues in burkas as an indication 
of ‘the future of Europe’. The German GI Hannover group first carried out this protest 
tactic in July 2013 (GI Germany FB-post). Local groups from GI Austria (GI Austria 
2016h), GI Czech Republic (GI Czech Republic FB-post), and GI Italy (GI Italy 
2016b) later emulated it in their own domestic settings, most famously by GI Vienna, 
which covered the 20 meter high Maria-Theresien statue with a burka, leading to a lot 
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of media attention174 (see e.g. Heute 2016). Moreover, as demonstrated above, the 
solidarity actions, which GI France adopted from Bloc Identitaire were also adapted 
to the Czech, Austrian, and German settings, albeit in rather different forms 
(especially in the Czech Republic), and to a much more limited extent. Other examples 
of protest tactic diffusion include banner-drops from noticeable and symbolic 
buildings (often the first type of protest by a new GI group), and hanging signs with 
slogans around the necks of statues of prominent writers (see e.g. GI Germany 2017f; 
GI Italy 2017a). 
When asked about this similarity in protest tactics, GI Denmark’s spokesperson 
explained that the GI-groups “are very inspired by each other,” and that there is a 
“healthy competition” between the groups in terms of making the most aesthetically 
pleasing protests. They thus observe the protest activities of the other national groups, 
and “either you think ‘that would never have worked here’ or ‘maybe we can use some 
of it in another context, if it becomes relevant’”. It is thus seen as “a creative process”, 
where “you collect such fragments that you can use when the occasion fits” (Interview 
with GI Denmark 2018)175.  
This is also the case with several terms and slogans that the various national GI groups 
attempt to introduce into the societal discourse of their countries. These terms mainly 
consist of diminutions of extreme right slogans, such as ‘remigration’ instead of 
‘foreigners out!’ (‘Ausländer raus!”) (Aftenberger 2017), just as the term ‘Great 
Replacement’ is also a prominent example. Jean-David Cattin (GI France) and 
Alexander Markovics (GI Austria), for instance, introduced and explained the concept 
to the Czech GI group at a meeting in the Czech Republic in May 2015 (GI Czech 
Republic 2015b), whereafter GI Czech Republic employed it in subsequent protest 
actions (see e.g. GI Czech Republic 2015e)176. There are numerous other examples of 
                                                          
174 For example, GI Italy adapted the burka-draping of statues to the Italian setting. The group 
posted the following Facebook post:  “This action, which is naturally inspired by others of this 
kind carried out in Europe, first of all on the statue of Empress Maria Theresa in Vienna, is 
something completely new to our country, and the effect we have achieved has been a complete 
success" (GI Italy FB-post, author’s emphasis). 
175 Explaining the diffusion process of protest actions, GI Denmark’s spokesperson also 
highlights the autonomy granted to each group as a plus because all groups need to address their 
own national and regional cultures: “[…] all countries have different cultures and we learn a lot 
from each other as well. Because well, France started it all, so they might have one idea about 
what works. When it then moves to, for example, Austria and Italy, then they work out which 
of the things have been local, and which can be spread throughout Europe, so there are some 
cultural differences. We, for instance, clearly use more humour here in Denmark than they 
might in France, because the culture is a little different” (Interview with GI Denmark 2018). 
176 Aside from the terms that diffuse from one GI group to the others, some of the national GI 
groups also adapt terms and slogans introduced by other political actors. One prominent 
example is GI France’s use of the Australian government’s dissuasion campaign against 
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such direct and indirect diffusion processes of protest tactics and slogans, which the 
groups can employ when and if they deem it fitting. This indicates that the groups 
follow each other’s protest actions rather closely and draw inspiration from each other, 
demonstrating a concerted attempt at appearing as a united transnational coalition. 
Hence, the groups have not Europeanized their collective action to a large degree in 
terms of protest targets, participation, and events. Instead, the Europeanization mainly 
takes place around the transnational diffusion of protest campaigns, forms, and tactics, 
with the shared aim of reversing the liberal hegemony in the European societies, plus, 
more broadly, to ‘defend Europe’ in terms of its people (security and demography), 
borders (soil) and culture (identity). Thus, while the groups’ specific protest issues do 
not align across the borders from a timing perspective (it was only GI Austria and GI 
Germany, for example, which organized border security demonstrations in 2015), the 
groups still formulate shared, European, responses to the ‘threats’ facing the 
continent, indicating a Europeanization from below. 
The chapter thus revealed that the GI coalition has not Europeanized their contention 
by targeting the EU and its institutions, but that it is rather working towards suggesting 
‘Another Europe’ externally of the EU institutions and in opposition to mainstream 
and left-wing liberal influences. The GI groups do this by employing collective protest 
repertoires and main collective action frames appropriated to the domestic settings. In 
this political setting, the extra-parliamentary pressures are largely replaced with the 
attempt to influence popular opinion, very much in alignment with Kriesi (2004) and 
Goodwin & Jasper’s (1999) expectations about subcultural actors. In this way, the GI 
groups exercise an indirect pressure on the national and European governments by 
drawing attention to their faulty handling of the ‘refugee crisis’, yet, without (always) 
targeting them directly. 
                                                          
asylum seekers, which it launched in April 2014, with the slogan “NO WAY! You will not 
make Australia home” (see e.g. Laughland 2014). GI France activists wrote the slogan on a 
banner, which was placed at the Italian-French border in 2015, having replaced the word 
‘Australia’ with ‘Europe’ (Génération Identitaire 2015a), just as the German GI Zwickau local 
group, for instance, also employed the slogan in a protest against immigrants (GI Germany 
2016c). 
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CHAPTER 7. FORTRESS EUROPE 
AND EUROPEANIZATION OF 
COLLECTIVE ACTION  
This chapter considers the collective action of the extra-parliamentary groups and 
activists that were among the initial 12 signatories of the Prague Declaration in 
January 2016 and thus became members of the Fortress Europe (FE) coalition. The 
groups are PEGIDA Germany, PEGIDA Netherlands, For Freedom (Denmark), We 
Do Not Want Islam in the Czech Republic (IVČRN), the Czech Blok Against Islam 
(BPI) (after May 2016: Block Against Islamization), PEGIDA Austria, NGO 
International Stop Immigration/Islamisation Society (NGO ISIS)177 (Estonia), and 
PEGIDA UK178.  
The chapter is organized in the same way as Chapter 6. It thus aims to explore the 
Europeanization of the FE-groups’ collective action in terms of: 1) alignment of 
protest repertoires and frequencies across the European groups; 2) the protest ‘scopes’ 
(i.e. issue, targets, participants, and events) and the groups’ forms of Europeanization; 
and finally, 3) the role of the national contexts for Europeanization. The chapter starts 
out with a consideration of the extra-parliamentary groups’ protest repertoires in the 
2015-2017 period and the degree of alignment between the various national groups. 
This is followed by an analysis of the groups’ collective action Europeanization, with 
a focus on the scopes of the groups’ issues, targets, participants, and events, and their 
(potential) changes as the ‘crisis’ developed. The section ends with an analysis of the 
groups’ forms of Europeanization. The last section explores the role of the national 
political and discursive opportunities for far right Europeanization, by closely 
analyzing PEGIDA Germany, IVČRN/BPI, and PEGIDA Netherlands’ mobilization 
in the period. The three were chosen due to: a) their importance in the FE coalition; 
b) their comparability to the three GI groups’ collective action analyzed in Chapter 6; 
and c) their positioning within Western and Eastern Europe respectively. 
                                                          
177 NGO ISIS consists of Maria Kaljuste (EKRE) and Georg Kirsberg (Free Party), who set up 
the association in the summer of 2015. Kirsberg became a member of EKRE in July 2016, after 
having been excluded from the Free Party in June that year, due to charges of racism (DELFI 
2016). 
178 PEGIDA Bulgaria also signed the Prague Declaration in January 2016. Yet, the group has 
not been included in the analysis due to the difficulties in identifying its protest events. 
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 THE FE-GROUPS’ PROTEST FORMS AND TACTICS: GROUP 
ALIGNMENT?  
The gathered data from the groups and activists’ websites and Facebook pages 
consists of 355 protest events spread over nine protest groups and political 
associations (as outlined above). Moreover, the actions by the two activists Tatjana 
Festerling and Edwin Wagensveld are also included, as aside from their leadership 
roles in PEGIDA Germany and PEGIDA Netherlands respectively, the two also 
carried out their own protest actions in the period from 2015-2017. The transnational 
FE- protests are included under the designation ‘Fortress Europe’. Table 7.1 shows 
the distribution of protest actions by groups and actors. 
Table 7.1: The national FE members’ number of protest events (2015-2017). 
FE Group Pct. (PEs) 
PEGIDA Germany 37.2 (132) 
PEGIDA Netherlands 14.1 (50) 
IVČRN 11.3 (40) 
Blok against Islam (BPI)179 10.4 (37) 
Blok against Islamization180 2.8 (10) 
For Freedom181 12.1 (43) 
Festerling and Wagensveld 3.7 (13) 
PEGIDA Austria 2.5 (9) 
Tatjana Festerling 1.7 (6) 
PEGIDA UK 1.7 (6) 
NGO ISIS 1.4 (5) 
Fortress Europe 1.1 (4) 
Total 100.0 (355) 
Note: N: 355. Pct (No. of protests). 
Similar to the GI-groups, the data shows that all of the groups’ protest actions in the 
2015-2017 period took place at the member state level, i.e. none of the groups 
mobilized actions in front of, or inside, the EU-institutions, as anticipated in Chapter 
5. Yet, aside from this finding, there is high variation in the groups’ protest frequency 
during the period. PEGIDA Germany has, by far, organized the most protests (more 
than a third of all the actions), while conversely, PEGIDA UK and NGO ISIS only 
                                                          
179 Nine of these protest events were organized together with the Czech political party Dawn – 
National Coalition. 
180 The remnants of BPI after the group’s dissolution in May 2016 (Novinky 2016). 
181 Including protests by PEGIDA DK, which was the name of the group until April 2015 
(Eltard-Sørensen 2015). 
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organized six and eight protests respectively, while all the FE-groups only organized 
four joint protests (see section 7.2). NGO ISIS’ low numbers relate to its organization 
form, as it is a political blog, whose two members (Kirsberg and Kaljuste) mainly 
participate in other groups’ protests. Similarly, Wagensveld and Festerling’s ‘single 
activist’ actions also largely consisted of giving speeches at other groups’ rallies, plus 
organizing small direct actions. As for the Czech groups, the combined protests for 
IVČRN, BPI and Blok against Islamization amount to 88, or 22.8%, of the FE-total. 
IVČRN organized protests against Islam from 2014 onwards, and in May 2015, 
IVČRN and other Czech anti-Islam groups created the political association Blok 
Against Islam (BPI). Yet, in May 2016, an internal strife in BPI led to its dissolution, 
and Blok against Islamization was created in its stead (Novinky 2016). 
FE PROTEST FREQUENCIES OVER TIME 
Figure 7.1 below shows the eleven actors’ protest frequencies in the 2015-2017 
period. It reveals that due to its weekly demonstrations, PEGIDA Germany has 
organized a high number of, and rather frequent, protest actions during the years 2015-
2017. Both IVČRN and BPI were very active in 2015 and early 2016. The Czech anti-
Islam groups’ protest actions dropped considerably in the second half of 2016, mainly 
due to a loss in momentum (for more on their actions, see section 7.3) (V = .374). 
Figure 7.1: The FE groups’ protest frequency per semester (2015-2017).  
 
Note: N: 355. Cramer’s V = .374*** (*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001). 
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While PEGIDA Germany and IVČRN had already begun organizing demonstrations 
from 2014 onwards (Vorländer et al. 2018; Islám v ČR nechceme 2014), some of the 
other groups182 only began mobilizing in the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo terrorist 
attack in Paris, France, in January 2015, around an anti-terrorism frame, which, 
however, quickly evolved into more general anti-Islam(ization) protests.  
Aside from PEGIDA Germany and the Czech groups, the FE-groups all struggled to 
uphold their protest frequencies due to low turnout. PEGIDA Netherlands, For 
Freedom, and PEGIDA Austria’s low protest numbers are largely explainable by their 
lacking domestic political space. The strong far right parties mobilizing against Islam 
and immigration in their respective countries (Party for Freedom, Danish People’s 
Party183, and the Freedom Party of Austria respectively) thus crowd out their 
mobilizations (see Muis & van Kessel 2017; Ejsing 2017; Ajanovic et al. 2016). A 
similar occurrence can be deduced in the UK, where PEGIDA UK was ‘out-crowded’ 
by both the British National Party and UKIP, whose supporters shared many traits 
with those of the EDL (see e.g. Stanyer et al. 2016). These parties’ prominence thus 
inferred little space for mobilization at the extra-parliamentary level, despite the 
increasingly favorable discursive opportunities across Western Europe as the ‘refugee 
crisis’ developed (see e.g. Krzyżanowski et al. 2018). Moreover, in the Austrian 
setting, unlike GI Austria, PEGIDA Austria’s leaders struggled to gain support from 
FPÖ and to embed themselves in the far right scene, leading to very low participation 
rates at its protests and hostility from the other actors on the scene (Ajanovic et al. 
2016). 
Hence, after hosting a few demonstrations (in the spring of both 2015 and 2016), 
PEGIDA UK and PEGIDA Austria quickly had to give up on their endeavors, mainly 
due to low turnouts and strong counter-mobilization (see e.g. HopeNotHate n.d.b for 
PEGIDA UK and Ajanovic et al. 2016 for PEGIDA Austria). In Denmark, For 
Freedom (ex-PEGIDA DK) initially organized weekly demonstrations like PEGIDA 
Germany, but since September 2015, it began only hosting monthly processions in an 
attempt to boost the participation rates. PEGIDA Netherlands did arrange a 
comparably higher and rather frequent amount of protests since the winter of 2015. 
Yet, as the later analysis will explain further (see below), these actions are often small 
and carried out together with other Dutch far right groupings.  
                                                          
182 This is the case for PEGIDA UK, PEGIDA Austria, and PEGIDA DK.  
183 As Chris Holmsted Larsen stated in a newspaper interview, PEGIDA “has not caught on in 
Denmark. Maybe because the Danish People’s Party has been so apt at monopolizing the fight 
against Islam. Yes, a bit cheekily one could say that the entire political rhetoric against Islam is 
so harsh that it dampens the extreme right’s ability to really profile itself on anti-Islamism” (as 
cited in Ejsing 2017). 
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CONTESTING THROUGH WHICH MEANS? THE FE GROUPS’ ACTION 
FORMS 
Table 7.2 shows the eleven actors’ protest forms from 2015 to 2017. Unlike the GI 
groups, only one of the groups (IVČRN) organized a ‘Solidarity action’ in the period 
of investigation, calling for donations to the Kurds, who ‘stayed behind’ and fought 
ISIS (IVČRN 2015i). Instead, the vast majority take the form of demonstrative actions 
(81% of the 355 PEs), while conventional and confrontational actions only amount to 
18.3% combined. The table also shows that the absolute number of protests dropped 
substantially in 2017 (56 actions less, or a drop by 41.5%), mainly because several of 
the FE-groups had stopped mobilizing by this point, just as the Czech groups’ protests 
steeply decreased in the second half of 2016 (see Figure 7.1 above). As explained 
below, this also explains the considerable drop in conventional actions in 2017, while 
the confrontational protests instead increase (V = .151). 
Table 7.2: The FE coalitions’ forms of protest across time (2015-2017).  
Year Conventional Demonstr. Confront. 
Solid. 
Action 
Total 
2015 18.4 (26) 78.7 (111) 2.1 (3) 0.7 (1) 100.0 (141) 
2016 17.0 (23) 79.3 (107) 3.7 (5) 0.0 (0) 100.0 (135) 
2017 2.5 (2) 89.9 (71) 7.6 (6) 0.0 (0) 100.0 (79) 
Total 14.4 (51) 81.4 (289) 3.9 (14) 0.3 (1) 100.0 (355) 
Note: N: 355. Pct (No. of protests). Cramer’s V = .151* (*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001). 
As emerges from Table 7.3 below, the FE groups’ use of protest forms varies to a 
rather large degree (V = .523). All groups, except for BPI and IVČRN, predominantly 
organized demonstrative actions, mainly in the form of demonstrations and rallies 
(85%). While the FE-groups do not use the same plethora of protest tactics as GI (see 
Chapter 6), particularly Wagensveld, Festerling, and IVČRN/BPI did also carry out 
actions such as street theatres, banner-drops, and symbolic protests (18PEs, or 6.3% 
of all protests). Moreover, petitions only make out 2.1% (7) of all demonstrative 
actions, indicating that the direct pressure on the decision-makers is not considered 
the preferred option for mobilization. 
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Table 7.3: The national FE groups’ protest forms (2015-2017). 
Note: (N: 355). Pct (No. of protests). Cramer’s V = .523*** (*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001). 
IVČRN and BPI have employed the highest share of the conventional actions 
(88.5%). These actions mainly consist of press releases (63.5% of the 52) and open 
letters to political actors (17.3%). Due to their more open political opportunities, 
which meant more access to the decision-makers, IVČRN and BPI mainly employed 
press releases as a means to target and/or criticize the national government, plus to 
express anger about suppression attempts (see e.g. BPI 2015a; IVČRN 2015c). 
Conversely, the PEGIDA groups hardly used any conventional actions, mainly due to 
their lacking political opportunities, plus their distrust in the media and the political 
establishment, which made them refrain from using this channel of communication to 
the supporters (see Chapter 5 for more). The PEGIDA groups’ tactics thus differ 
highly from certain of the GI groups, which employed press releases to a greater extent 
(especially GI France and GI Italy).  
The FE-groups did not employ confrontational actions as frequently as the GI-
groups (see Chapter 6). In fact, one group, PEGIDA Netherlands, is behind almost 
half of them (6 of the 14 actions), while Wagensveld also has carried out three 
confrontational protests together with Festerling. His and PEGIDA Netherlands’ 
higher reliance on this action form are partially due to the group’s more limited 
domestic political opportunities, but Wagensveld also explained it by the strong 
inspiration found in Generation Identity’s activities, and their ideas about ‘acts of civil 
                                                          
184 The ‘Solidarity action’ has been added to this category in this particular table, as it entailed 
a call for action (donation of food and clothes to Syrian families). 
FE Group Conventional Demonstr. Confront. Total 
PEGIDA DE 0.8 (1) 97.0 (128) 2.3 (3) 100.0 (132) 
PEGIDA NL 0.0 (0) 88.0 (44) 12.0 (6) 100.0 (50) 
IVČRN 57.5 (23)184 42.5 (17) 0.0 (0) 100.0 (40) 
BPI 62.2 (23) 32.4 (12) 5.4 (2) 100.0 (37) 
BA Islamiz 20.0 (2) 80.0 (8) 0.0 (0) 100.0 (10) 
For Freedom 0.0 (0) 100.0 (33) 0.0 (0) 100.0 (33) 
Fest/Wagens. 0.0 (0) 76.9 (10) 23.1 (3) 100.0 (13) 
PEGIDA DK 0.0 (0) 100.0 (10) 0.0 (0) 100.0 (10) 
PEGIDA A 0.0 (0) 100.0 (9) 0.0 (0) 100.0 (9) 
Festerling 16.7 (1) 83.3 (5) 0.0 (0) 100.0 (6) 
PEGIDA UK 0.0 (0) 100.0 (6) 0.0 (0) 100.0 (6) 
NGO ISIS 20.0 (1) 80.0 (4) 0.0 (0) 100.0 (5) 
FE 25.0 (1) 75.0 (3) 0.0 (0) 100.0 (4) 
Total 14.6 (52) 81.4 (289) 3.9 (14) 100,0 (355) 
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disobedience’ (Interview with Wagensveld 2017), indicating protest repertoire 
diffusion. The actions consist of three types, namely counter-demonstrations (42.9%), 
passage and entrance blockades (35.7%), and disruptions of meetings (21.4%).  
SIZE OF PROTESTS 
Based on the data presented above, one can also make remarks about the sizes of the 
various protest actions in order to say more about the mobilization potential. As Table 
7.4 shows, the number of ‘Big demonstrations’ is considerably higher for the FE-
coalition than for the GI-groups (see Chapter 6). Yet, this number is solely due to the 
demonstrations of PEGIDA Germany (97 protests with +1000 people) and BPI (four 
protests), plus the Fortress Europe demonstration in May 2016. PEGIDA Germany is 
also the only group that maintained a comparably strong participation rate over time 
(between 1000-3000 participants on average since February 2015) (Durchgezählt 
n.d.). Conversely, For Freedom’s demonstrations tend to only have around 30-50 
participants, while PEGIDA Netherlands’ vary between a ‘Moderate’ number of 
participants to ‘Small demonstrations’. Both PEGIDA Austria and PEGIDA UK’s 
demonstrations attracted between 50-250 supporters (i.e. they were ‘Small 
demonstrations’). 
Table 7.4: Size of the FE groups’ protests (2015-2017)185. 
Protest Form Total 
Announcement (1 person) 15.5 (55) 
Few (2-10 people) 8.7 (31) 
Moderate (10-50) 5.6 (20) 
Small demo (50-250) 10.1 (36) 
Moderate demo (250-1000) 2.5 (9) 
Big demo (1000+) 28.7 (102) 
(Indeterminate186) 28.8 (102) 
Total 100.0 (355) 
Note: N: 355. Pct (No. of protests). 
                                                          
185 The figures in the table are based on the information provided about the different protests 
either from the group itself, or from media accounts about the event. In terms of the ‘Few’ 
category, this is based on pictures of their smaller protest actions, and/or the estimated number 
of people required for a certain action (e.g. a banner-drop). The figures about the various types 
of demonstrations, and the ‘Moderate’ category are only included if a number was specified in 
the retrieved data. This explains the categorization of 102 as ‘Indeterminate’.  
186 Rallies, demonstrations, and vigils organized by GI, where it was not possible to deduce 
from the data how many people participated. 
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The table also shows that, compared to the GI-groups (see Chapter 6), a rather limited 
number of the FE-groups’ protests only involved ‘Few’ activists (8.7% of the total). 
Most of these were carried out by PEGIDA Netherlands (17 PEs) and 
Wagensveld/Festerling (eight PEs), due to their lack of human resources, plus more 
confrontational natures. The other PEGIDA groups, plus IVČRN and BPI, maintained 
PEGIDA Germany’s demonstration model, or opted for conventional means, such as 
press releases and letters to politicians. 
Participating in Other Far Right Organizations’ Demonstrations 
Aside from their own protest actions, the dataset also includes 31 protests organized 
by other far right groups, in which some of the FE members participated. These protest 
participations are divided among eight of the FE-groups and actors, namely PEGIDA 
Netherlands (7 with other far right groups); Festerling (5); Festerling and Wagensveld 
(4); For Freedom (4); PEGIDA Austria (4); IVČRN (2); NGO ISIS (3); and PEGIDA 
Germany (2). The rationales for these FE-actors’ multiple-participations mainly 
pertain to the actors’ own limited human resources, and their desire to coalesce with 
other domestic actors in order to become embedded in the far right scene. 
Due to the weak material resources of most Dutch far right subcultural actors, 
PEGIDA Netherlands cooperated extensively with other domestic far right actors as 
a means to boost both its own numbers and those of the other groups (both well-
established smaller parties, subcultural groups, and newly created citizens’ initiatives) 
(see e.g. Wagenaar 2019). This was also the case for For Freedom and its cooperation 
with similar-minded actors from the neighboring country, Sweden. Aside from the 
Dutch protests, Wagensveld also gave speeches at various German demonstrations, 
either in his capacity as the PEGIDA Netherlands leader,187 or with Tatjana Festerling, 
due to their prominent roles on the German far right188. Festerling’s protest 
participations without Wagensveld were very similar in terms of the organizing 
                                                          
187 Either organized by PEGIDA-offshoots, such as BRAGIDA, or by so-called ‘citizen’s 
initiatives’ like Sulzbach Defends Itself (‘Sulzbach wehrt sich’) (for more information about the 
group, see Flätgen & Wagner 2018). 
188 This involved HoGeSa (of which both were staunch supporters) and the two PEGIDA-
offshoots LEGIDA (PEGIDA in Leipzig, Saxony) and PEGIDA NRW. 
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groups189, and they both thus pursued closer relations with both the Dutch and the 
German far right scenes in their pursuits of political change. 
Conversely, PEGIDA Germany’s organizers mainly focused on their own 
demonstrations in Dresden. Yet, Bachmann also joined a GI Germany rally in Berlin 
in the summer of 2017 (PEGIDA Germany 2017a), as a means of showing support to 
the group, which also frequently participated in PEGIDA’s demonstrations (see 
Chapter 6). Moreover, in the period, PEGIDA Germany also began cooperating with 
Alternative for Germany (AfD), and it organized a demonstration with a local Saxon 
AfD group in July 2017 (PEGIDA Germany 2017b) (see more on the PEGIDA-AfD 
cooperation below).  
PEGIDA Austria’s leader, Werner Wirth, participated in rallies organized by the 
Austrian neo-Nazi Party of the People (‘Partei des Volkes’), and even spoke at one of 
its demonstrations in September 2015 (Schmidt 2015), indicating that he had a more 
extreme right worldview than the one presented at the PEGIDA demonstrations. 
Finally, the two NGO ISIS members joined a demonstration in Finland (titled ‘Keep 
Finland Finnish’, co-organized by, amongst others, the True Finns party), where 
Kaljuste and Kirsberg participated as Fortress Europe representatives (Kirsberg 
2016b).   
The above section has shown that the extra-parliamentary FE-groups’ protests have 
developed rather distinctly from each other in the 2015-2017 period, especially in 
terms of frequencies, and to some extent also the protest forms. Hence, even though 
all groups, except for IVČRN and BPI, mainly made use of demonstrative actions, 
there were large discrepancies in terms of the participant rates and frequencies, 
something that can largely be explained by the political space on the far right in the 
different countries. Similarly, the higher reliance on conventional actions by the 
Czech groups both indicate better political opportunities in the country, but also 
relates to the more conflictual relationship between the other groups and 
establishment. Hence, the differences largely relate to the diverse political and 
discursive opportunities in the various European countries. 
                                                          
189 She spoke at a rally organized by the extreme right Democratic Departure Saxonian 
Switzerland (DASS, ‘Demokratischer Aufbruch Sächsischer Schweiz’) (Tatjana Festerling TV 
2016a), which is under surveillance by the German Verfassungsschutz, and she spoke at a rally 
against a refugee centre by Hohenstein-Ernstthal Says NO to the Centre (‘Hohenstein-Ernstthal 
sagt NEIN zum Heim’) (Festerling 2015d). Finally, she joined OnePercent’s (‘EinProzent’) 
vigil to commemorate the German victims of the terrorist attack on Breidtscheidplatz in Berlin 
in December 2016 (Festerling 2016j). 
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 EUROPEANIZATION OF THE FE GROUPS’ COLLECTIVE 
ACTION? 
After the initial overview of the different FE-groups’ protest frequency and forms in 
the 2015-2017 period, the following section focuses on the various groups’ 
Europeanization strategies in terms of collective action. The initial part briefly 
considers the groups’ protest developments over time in terms of issue focus. This is 
followed by an analysis of the various groups’ issue, target, participant, and event 
scopes, which leads into a consideration of their forms of Europeanization.  
THE FE-GROUPS’ MOBILIZATION ISSUES OVER TIME 
Before explaining the issue foci development in the 2015-2017 period, a caveat must 
be mentioned. It was not possible to establish the exact issues of each PEGIDA 
demonstration in Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, Denmark, and Austria, as their 
demonstrations mostly did not have a specific title and involved the mention of 
various topics related to anti-Islam, nativism, and against the establishment. Yet, 
based on the groups’ raison d’être and scholarly literature (see e.g. Berntzen & 
Weisskircher 2016; HopeNotHate n.d.a), these unspecifiable PEGIDA 
demonstrations are coded as having ‘Anti-Islam(ization)’ as the overarching topic. At 
the same time, several FE-groups also carried out actions specifically directed against 
Islam as a religion, or specific aspects of its practices, like actions against burqas, 
mosques, halal meat, and violence against Muslim women (see e.g. PEGIDA 
Netherlands (Kuipers 2017); IVČRN (IVČRN (2015j); For Freedom (Sjunnesson 
2016)). These actions were also coded as ‘Anti-Islam(ization)’ protests. Hence, unless 
another topic is explicitly stated in the sources, or it can be deduced from the type of 
activity carried out (e.g. a rally by a refugee centre), the issue was coded as ‘Anti-
Islam(ization)’.  
Table 7.5 shows that most protests were organized around threat perceptions related 
to Islam’s potential effect on the countries’ cultures (societal ‘Islamization’) (25.9%, 
of these 239 protests were explicitly against Islam and its practitioners). Conversely, 
only 16.9% of the protest involved issues that were not directly related to the issues 
of immigration, asylum seeking, and Islam. 
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Table 7.5: The FE groups’ overarching issues of mobilization 2015-2017. 
Overarching Protest Issues 2015 2016 2017 Total 
Anti-Islam(isation) 67.4 (95) 58.5 (79) 82.3 (65) 67.3 (239) 
Anti-refugee/asylum (policy) 20.6 (29) 13.3 (18) 2.5 (2) 13.8 (49) 
Anti-immigration 1.4 (2) 3.0 (4) 1.3 (1) 2.0 (7) 
Opposing suppression 6.4 (9) 14.1 (19) 10.1 (8) 10.1 (36) 
Pro/Vs. Political actor 1.4 (2) 5.2 (7) 0.0 (0) 2.5 (9) 
Identity (preservation) 0.0 (0) 2.2 (3) 3.8 (3) 1.7 (6) 
Social assistance 0.7 (1) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.3 (1) 
Other 2.1 (3) 3.7 (5) 0.0 (0) 2.3 (8) 
Total 100.0 (141) 100.0 (135) 100.0 (79) 100.0 (355) 
Note: N: 355. Pct (No. of protests). Cramer’s V = .228*** (*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001). 
With the increase in refugees entering Europe in late-summer 2015, the groups’ anti-
Islam frames merged with anti-refugee and –immigration frames. Yet, while For 
Freedom, PEGIDA UK, PEGIDA Austria, NGO ISIS, and PEGIDA Germany mainly, 
if not exclusively, organized, or took part in, ‘Anti-Islam(ization)’ demonstrations, 
which also, but not exclusively, drew in anti-refugee frames, particularly PEGIDA 
Netherlands and the three Czech groups carried out actions with more varied issue 
foci. Hence, while IVČRN had mobilized against the refugees since January 2015, 
coupling the Syrian refugees with the ‘dangers’ of Islam (Císař & Navrátil 2018), 
PEGIDA Germany, PEGIDA Netherlands, and For Freedom’s demonstrations 
increasingly focused on the ‘refugee crisis’ from July 2015 onwards. Nevertheless, 
besides the Czech and Dutch groups, the other groups did not organize many explicit 
protests against refugees (‘Anti-refugee/asylum (policy)’) protests only made out 
13.8% of the total number of protests). 
IVČRN‘s mobilization was intertwined with protests against Islam writ large in the 
spring of 2015 and developed into strong action against the refugee quotas proposed 
by the EU from April 2015 onwards, an issue NGO ISIS also mobilized around (see 
e.g. Kirsberg 2017). In the autumn and winter of 2015, only BPI and PEGIDA 
Germany mobilized for the closing of the national borders, in a very similar fashion 
as witnessed by GI Austria and GI Germany, and almost in the same period of the 
‘crisis’, namely September-November 2015 (Sputnik Germany 2015; Epoch Times 
2015d). This was also the period in which BPI and PEGIDA Germany developed the 
idea of the Fortress Europe coalition (see more in Chapter 9), which held its first 
demonstration against the refugees and the EU in February 2016.  
In the first half of 2016, PEGIDA Netherlands organized numerous actions against 
the construction of Dutch refugee and migrant centres (see e.g. Kafka 2016), just as 
Festerling joined local German demonstrations against the housing of refugees and 
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migrants (Festerling 2015d). While this mobilization against refugee centres is quite 
similar to the actions by GI, the Dutch protests mainly took place in February-April 
2016, i.e. a bit later than the GI groups (see Chapter 6). From the second half of 2016 
onwards, the overall protest frequency dropped (see above), and the protests mainly 
involved objection to ‘Islamization’ more broadly, while the ‘Anti-refugee/asylum 
(policy)’ protests also largely ended by 2017 (V = .228). 
THE FE-EUROPEANIZATION PATHS 
Scope of Protest Issues 
Table 7.6 below shows the various ‘Issue scopes’ of the protests. Due to the ambiguity 
of the ‘anti-Islam(ization)’ frames, which were frequently linked to both the ‘national’ 
scope of integration, but also the ‘European’ of immigration, and the lacking data on 
the specific statements at the various ‘Anti-Islam(ization)’ demonstrations, these 
demonstrations were coded as ‘Both,’ as they are both national and European. 
Exceptions to this involve protests against specific Muslim practices, such as e.g. the 
construction of mosques or the production of halal meat (both coded as ‘national’, as 
they are a matter of national legislation), or that called for measures against terrorism 
(coded as ‘European’) (see the PE-Codebook in Appendix B). 
Table 7.6: Issue scope of all FE groups’ protests per year (2015-2017). 
 2015 2016 2017 Total 
National 14.2 (20) 31.9 (43) 24.1 (19) 23.1 (78) 
European 39.7 (56) 23.7 (32) 10.1 (8) 27.0 (96) 
Both 46.1 (65) 44.4 (60) 65.8 (52) 49.9 (177) 
Total 100.0 (141) 100.0 (135) 100.0 (79) 100.0 (355) 
Note: N: 355.  Pct (No. of protests). Cramer’s V = .212*** (*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001).   
The table reveals an interesting development regarding the degrees to which the 
groups mobilized around ‘European’ issues. It shows that most protests with a 
‘European’ issue scope were organized in 2015, in alignment with the height of the 
EU MS’ discussions about the ‘refugee crisis’. Moreover, after June 2016, i.e. once 
the EU’s deal with Turkey in March began having an effect on the numbers of boat 
arrivals to Europe (see European Commission 2018a), protests with a ‘European’ 
scope gradually began decreasing (V = 212). At the same time, the protests that both 
involve national and European policy issues (i.e. the ‘Both’ category on the table) 
almost remain constant over the three-year period, due to the consistent PEGIDA 
Germany, For Freedom, and PEGIDA Netherlands demonstrations in all three years. 
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As Table 7.7 shows, the protests with a ‘European’ scope mainly refer to ‘Anti-
immigration’ and ‘Anti-refugee/asylum (policy)’ protests, i.e. protests that aim at 
curbing the immigration of third-country nationals to the respective EU MS, while the 
anti-Islamization protests are a bit more ambiguous. The remaining protests instead 
all involve ‘national’ issues (V = .644). Like the GI-groups, it therefore again becomes 
apparent here why the different national groups are interested in European cooperation 
with similar-minded actors, considering that their main reasons for agitation (i.e. 
opposition to Islam and its adherents) are mainly framed as a ‘European’ matter, 
particularly concerning the ‘Anti-refugee/asylum (policy)’ issue. 
Table 7.7: Issue scope of the FE protests’ overarching issues. 
Topic/Issue Scope National European Both Total 
Anti-immigration 42.9 (3) 57.1 (4) 0.0 (0) 100.0 (7) 
Anti-Islamization 8.4 (20) 17.6 (42) 74.1 (177) 100.0 (239) 
Anti-refugee/asylum (policy) 16.3 (8) 83.7 (41) 0.0 (0) 100.0 (49) 
Opposing suppression 91.7 (33) 8.3 (3) 0.0 (0) 100.0 (36) 
Pro/Vs Political actors 66.7 (6) 33.3 (3) 0.0 (0) 100.0 (9) 
Identity preservation 66.7 (4) 33.3 (2) 0.0 (0) 100.0 (6) 
Welfare protectionism 0.0 (0) 100.0 (1) 0.0 (0) 100.0 (1) 
Other 100.0 (8) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 100.0 (8) 
Total 23.1 (82) 27.0 (96) 49.9 (177) 100.0 (355) 
Note: N: 355. Pct (No. of protests). Cramer’s V = .644*** (*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001). 
Scope of Targets  
Table 7.8 below shows that most of the FE-groups’ protest actions target Muslims, 
migrants, and/or refugees, rather than a political decision-making entity, just as the 
media and other kinds of ‘suppressers’ are also targeted to a somewhat large degree 
(‘Others’). Most of the groups thus create a dual enemy picture around the external 
‘others’ (migrants and refugees, particularly of Muslim faith) and the internal left-
wing and establishment (see e.g. Wagenaar 2019). Yet, even though most of the 
groups do make populist statements against the political elites and the establishment 
plus voice critique of left-wing activism during their actions, it is still mainly the 
foreign ‘others’ who are targeted. Especially PEGIDA Germany and its offshoots thus 
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predominantly mobilize around an opposition to ‘Islam’ and ‘Islamization,’190 
involving criticism of the religion and its adherents, plus third-country nationals more 
generally. Hence, the demonstrations are mostly intended to draw attention to the anti-
Islam and -migration cause than to actually voice (policy) demands towards a 
specified political actor or institution (see also Chapter 6)191. 
Table 7.8: The FE coalition’s protest targets per year (2015-2017). 
Target 2015 2016 2017 Total 
National government 36.9 (52) 28.1 (38) 13.9 (11) 28.5 (101) 
Other MS' government  2.1 (3) 3.0 (4) 2.5 (2) 2.5 (9) 
EU 0.0 (0) 3.0 (4) 1.3 (1) 1.4 (5) 
Muslims/migrants/refugees 56.7 (80) 46.7 (63) 75.9 (60) 57.2 (203) 
Other 4.3 (6) 19.3 (26) 6.3 (5) 10.4 (37) 
Total 100.0 (141) 100.0 (135) 100.0 (79) 100.0 (355) 
Note: (N: 355). Pct (No. of protests). Cramer’s V = .231*** (*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001).  
Considering the various groups’ protest targets in 2015-2017, Table 7.8 thus shows 
the percentage of protest actions, which explicitly target either the national (including 
local) governments, the EU, or the governments of other EU member states, just as 
the categories ‘Muslims/migrants/refugees’ and ‘Other’192 have been included, when 
the target was not a decision-making entity.  
Table 7.8 thus shows that 28.5% of all the FE-groups’ protests targeted the national 
government, while neither other MS’ governments nor the EU were targeted to a very 
high extent. This implies that the national government is, by far, the most frequently 
targeted political entity for the FE groups, just as is the case for most other types of 
social movements (della Porta & Caiani 2009), including Generation Identity (see 
Chapter 6). One can also see a noticeable decrease in the targeting of the government 
over time (V =.231), mainly due to the diminished protest frequencies of particularly 
                                                          
190 It is, however, difficult to code particularly PEGIDA Germany’s protest contents due to its 
blend of anti-Islam and anti-establishment frames (see e.g. Vorländer et al. 2018). Yet, as 
argued above, its name, plus much of the speech content, involve opposition to ‘Islamization,’ 
and it is on this basis its protests are coded as being against ‘Muslims/migrants/refugees,’ even 
though especially the German PEGIDA group criticizes the national politicians extensively as 
well during the demonstrations.  
191 As an example of this strategy, consider e.g. For Freedom’s statement about one of its 2017 
demonstrations that, from then on, it would begin targeting the government and demanding 
more explicit policy changes (For Freedom FB-Post), something it had not done up to this point 
- also according to the gathered data (see blame attributions section below). 
192 The ‘Other’ category involves ‘repressers’ (like the media and the left-wing), internal strifes, 
national commemoration, far right cooperation, etc. (see Codebook in Appendix B for more). 
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the Czech groups by 2017. It was thus mainly NGO ISIS (60% (but only out of 5 
protests)), IVČRN/BPI/BP Islamization (49%), Festerling/Wagensveld (37%), 
PEGIDA Netherlands (34%), and PEGIDA Germany (21%), which targeted their 
respective national governments in their protests. 
The EU was only targeted directly by IVČRN (IVČRN 2016; IVČRN 2017), BPI 
(Focus Online 2016b), and the Fortress Europe coalition (see further below). This 
limited targeting of the EU is mainly explained by the far right’s limited political and 
discursive opportunities at the EU-level, inferring that their protest actions are more 
likely to be targeted towards the national decision-makers. Moreover, particularly the 
high transaction costs in terms of instigating protests at the EU institutions also made 
the extra-parliamentary FE-groups refrain from demonstrating in front of the EU 
buildings (Interview with For Freedom 2017; Interview with Wagensveld 2017), just 
as they did not approach any EU officials with their claims. While the Czech Dawn 
party’s representative stated that he did have contacts to MEPs and discussed EU 
politics with these actors (Interview with Dawn 2017), both the leader of For Freedom 
and PEGIDA Netherlands stated ‘no’ to this question. As the For Freedom leader 
elaborated, she could not imagine taking the claims to the EU institutions, as “[W]e 
are still such a small group […]. We are still just a street-movement,” indicating the 
problems related to resources and EU contention (Interview with For Freedom 2017). 
PEGIDA Netherlands’ leader, Wagensveld, similarly stated that the lack of resources 
made his group abstain from such a strategy (Interview with Wagensveld 2017), thus 
substantiating the finding in the Europeanization literature that material resources are 
key to taking the claims directly to the EU institutions (see e.g. della Porta & Caiani 
2009).  
The populist and anti-EU proclivities of the FE-members also made it highly unlikely 
that they would seek insider strategies at the EU level (see also Chapter 5). This 
sentiment was expressed, for instance, by Tommy Robinson at a PEGIDA Germany 
demonstration in Dresden on November 30, where he made a clear ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
distinction the people and the elites, when stating that:  
From within our own resources we call forth a European Union of ‘We the 
People.’ We do not rely on the politicians and bureaucrats who brought us 
into this situation in the first place. They have brought Europe close to 
destruction. They are responsible for it and many of them continue to act 
in a way that brings us closer to the edge. (4freedoms 2015) 
A few of the FE-groups also targeted other EU MS, either to request they make policy 
changes (see e.g. Festerling and Wagensveld’s protest in front of the Romanian 
Parliament building (Festerling 2016e), and IVČRN’s open letter to Merkel in 
September 2015 (IVČRN 2015k)), or as a sign of appreciation for their decisions 
during the ‘refugee crisis’. As was the case for the GI groups, the FE-actors saw the 
Visegrad countries’ leaders as the sensible policymakers, and the Western European 
leaders, especially Merkel, as harmful to the interests of the citizens. The German 
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government was thus targeted with calls to change the country’s migration policy or 
to express anger about its decisions during the ‘crisis’ (see e.g. For Freedom FB-post). 
When Merkel travelled through Central and Eastern Europe in August 2016, she was 
met by FE-member protests in both Estonia (EKRE 2016) and the Czech Republic 
(BPI and Dawn (BPI 2016c)). In its call for the protest, BPI wrote “Let's welcome this 
‘lady’, who destroys the peaceful life on our continent, and opens the door to our 
present and future murderers” (Ibid.). On the other hand, some of the actors expressed 
gratitude towards Órban, especially, either through open letters (IVČRN 2015l) or 
through banner-drops (Festerling 2015b), thanking him for his efforts and supporting 
his anti-refugee stance. 
Aside from the mobilization against decision-makers, the protest groups also targeted 
the migrants and refugees plus the (left-wing) establishment more broadly in their 
protest actions. In short, they mainly diagnosed the refugees and Muslim immigrants 
as being prone to radicalization and too culturally averse to integration, the media as 
untrustworthy, the politicians as only obeying self-interests, and the left-wing activists 
as violent. The targeting of these actors is considered in the following paragraphs. 
While the extra-parliamentary FE-actors argue rather similarly to GI about the 
detrimental effects of third-country immigrants and refugees to the European 
civilization, and called for a curbing of their entrance to Europe, the framing of 
opposition towards Islam is fundamentally different than the one employed by 
Generation Identity. Where the GI-groups mainly argued in ethno-pluralist terms, and 
chastised the domestic decision-makers and pro-migrant/refugee associations for their 
multicultural viewpoints (see Chapter 6), the FE-groups focused their criticism much 
more directly on Islam as a religion (if not ideology), and especially its more radical 
adherents (see also Chapter 5). Aside from the more general ‘Anti-Islamization’ 
demonstrations by most of the PEGIDA groups, some of the groups also expressed 
this in similar actions as GI. This involved protests against, for instance, the religion’s 
treatment of women, especially the wearing of the burqa (see e.g. the actions of For 
Freedom (Sjunnesson 2016); IVČRN (IVČRN 2015j); and PEGIDA Netherlands 
(Kuipers 2017)) and radical Islam and terrorism (almost all of For Freedom’s 
demonstrations, and PEGIDA UK (see e.g. Kassam 2016a)). Moreover, a few of the 
groups also targeted Muslim associations in their respective countries (see e.g. 
PEGIDA Netherlands vs. the Turkish DENK Party (PEGIDA Netherlands 2016); For 
Freedom against Islamic Society in Denmark (‘Islamisk Trossamfund’) (For Freedom 
FB-Post)). 
The anti-establishment frames were particularly vocally voiced by PEGIDA 
Germany, BPI, and IVČRN, which all pointed to the shortcomings of the mainstream 
elites and chastised them for not acting in the interest of ‘the people’ (see also 
Vorländer et al. 2018; Císař & Navrátil 2018). Moreover, they also accuse the elites 
of working towards the eradication of the national cultures, in order to replace it with 
societies that favor the demands of the minorities. These sentiments are somewhat 
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comparable to PEGIDA Germany’s derogatory employment of the term ‘do-gooders’ 
(‘Gutmenschen’) (see e.g. Festerling’s speech on September 7, 2015 (Epoch Times 
2015b)), and include references to actors that abide by ‘political correctness’, 
especially when it comes to the mainstream actors’ rejection of Islamophobic 
arguments and activists (see e.g. Blok Against Islamization 2017; For Freedom FB-
Post). Similarly, the ‘defense of the freedom of speech’ is a key frame employed by 
several of the groups (especially For Freedom193 and PEGIDA UK), just as 
particularly For Freedom and PEGIDA Netherlands created victimhood frames 
around left-wing counter-protesters. 
Having now considered the protest developments from a more national perspective in 
terms of the different extra-parliamentary FE-groups’ protest repertoires, issue and 
target scopes, the following two sections will turn the attention towards the levels of 
transnational collective action in the period. This is both measured through protest 
participation by actors from abroad (the scope of participants), and the organization 
of transnational protest events (the scope of events).  
Scope of Participants 
Table 7.9 shows that the largest share of the FE-groups’ protest actions solely involve 
national participants (85%)194. Only 15% (or 54 protests) involve ‘Cross-border’ or 
‘European’ participation,195 and the most frequent transnational exchanges took place 
between groups from neighboring countries (39 protests). The table also reveals that 
most protests with ‘European’ and ‘Cross-border’ participation were in 2016, i.e. 
when the groups started mobilizing transnationally in Fortress Europe, while these 
figures plummeted substantially by 2017 (‘Cross-border’ protests decreased by 68.4% 
and ‘European’ by 77.8% between 2016 and 2017). This is largely ascribable to the 
end of the FE-cooperation (see Chapter 9) and the fact that the height of the ‘refugee 
crisis’ had decreased by 2017. 
                                                          
193 Mainly due to Mohammad Cartoon crisis of 2005, since which the Danish far right scene 
has conglomerated about the right to ‘speak freely’ (especially prominently argued by the Free 
Press Association (‘Trykkefrihedsselskabet’) with which For Freedom cooperates closely). 
194 As a caveat, it is very difficult to deduce the participant-composition of the groups’ protests. 
Research has shown that groups from abroad participate in PEGIDA Germany’s demonstrations 
on and off, but this is very hard to trace empirically. The few quantitative studies, which have 
been conducted at the demonstration sites at the PEGIDA Germany protests, indicate that the 
protesters mainly derive from the local areas (Vorländer et al. 2018). So, unless it is specified 
that a group from abroad participated or that the speaker is from abroad, they are coded as 
‘National’, and otherwise ‘Cross-border’ or ‘European’. 
195 ‘Cross-border’ entails participants from a neighboring country, while ’European’ either 
refers to actors from further afield in Europe (i.e. not a neighbouring country), and/or to 
participation by groups from several European countries, aside from the hosting. 
EUROPEANIZATION OF THE FAR RIGHT 
266
 
Table 7.9: Participant scopes of all FE groups’ protests per year (2015-2017). 
Year National Cross-border European Total 
2015 87.2 (123) 9.9 (14) 2.8 (4) 100.0 (141) 
2016 79.3 (107) 14.1 (19) 6.7 (9) 100.0 (135) 
2017 89.9 (71) 7.6 (6) 2.5 (2) 100.0 (79) 
Total 84.8 (301) 11.0 (39) 4.2 (15) 100.0% (355) 
Note: N: 355. Pct (No. of protests). Cramer’s V = .092 (*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001) 
The protests with ‘European’ participation involved four transnational Fortress 
Europe protest actions in 2016 (more below), while PEGIDA Germany and BPI also 
organized a few demonstrations with participants from across Europe (4 and 3 protests 
respectively)196. The protests with ‘Cross-border’ participation were mainly organized 
by PEGIDA Germany (10), PEGIDA Netherlands (8), For Freedom (8), and PEGIDA 
Austria (7), i.e. all the PEGIDA groups, except for PEGIDA UK. These various types 
of protest-participation by actors from abroad will be considered further in the 
following paragraphs. 
One Person Speaking as ‘Organization and Country Representative’ Abroad  
The speaker exchanges make up most of the FE-protests that include non-domestic 
participants. They mainly act as a means of support and/or endorsement of the given 
group, in attempts to both attract more supporters and media attention. Hence, in terms 
of the protest targets and issues, only a very limited number of the 54 protests actually 
involved a specific policy issue, which made the groups want to join forces 
transnationally in order to exercise European pressure on the decision-makers (see 
more on these in the ‘Scope of Events’ below). Instead, most of the protests with 
foreign participation involved actors from abroad joining an otherwise regularly 
occurring demonstration in order to speak about his or her domestic situation. 
PEGIDA Germany has thus invited both national and European far right actors to 
come and speak at its demonstrations since December 2014 (Druxes 2016). The 
European actors counted leaders of European PEGIDA groups, but also other 
European activists and politicians,197 most prominently Geert Wilders in April 2015 
(Ibid.). As a way of ‘putting his seal of approval’ on newly created PEGIDA-
offshoots, Lutz Bachmann has also given numerous inaugural speeches abroad (e.g. 
for PEGIDA Netherlands (Hopkins 2015), PEGIDA Vlaanderen (HopeNotHate 
                                                          
196 For Freedom, PEGIDA UK, PEGIDA Netherlands, and Festerling and Wagensveld also 
organized one protest action with European participation respectively. 
197 The speakers from abroad have included, amongst others, Geert Wilders (Dutch Party for 
Freedom), Tommy Robinson (from PEGIDA UK and the now defunct English Defense 
League), and Martin Sellner from GI Austria (Eckes 2016).   
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n.d.a.), and PEGIDA UK (Kassam 2016a)) (for more on PEGIDA Germany’s 
transnational ambitions, see Chapter 9). For similar reasons, Tommy Robinson has 
also given frequent speeches around Europe, due to his past leadership of EDL, and 
his continued fame on the far right198. 
Such speeches were also provided in order to support the given group, especially when 
protest numbers were low, and/or the group needed more exposure. In January 2016, 
for instance, Anne Marie Waters, Paul Weston, and Tommy Robinson from PEGIDA 
UK went to Copenhagen to help further the development of the Danish PEGIDA group 
(Bartlett 2017). This trip simultaneously acted as a learning experience for Waters and 
Weston, who were both relatively inexperienced protest organizers (Mulhall 2016). 
Similarly, due to PEGIDA Austria’s problems attracting people to its rallies, 
prominent German and Swiss far right actors gave speeches (see e.g. Kreidfeuer 2015; 
Malarich 2015). These transnational protest speakers are thus also attempts to make 
the group appear bigger than is actually the case (Althof as cited in Lüssi 2015).  
From a more ideational perspective, the speeches were also a way to demonstrate 
‘solidarity’ with the other European groups (Interview with For Freedom 2017; 
Interview with Wagensveld 2017). They also employ them as a means to underline 
that all Europeans face the same threats, and thus ‘are in this together’ (for more on 
this, see Chapter 9). The foreign speakers therefore often describe the (often direly 
portrayed) situation with Muslim immigration and (non-)integration in their home 
countries. The speeches act as a form of direct information diffusion between the 
groups (see e.g.  Bachmann’s speech as cited in Kassam 2016a). This also partly 
explains the line-up of speakers at the February 6, 2016, Fortress Europe 
demonstrations, where most of the groups had at least one speaker from abroad at their 
demonstration, as a means to underline the sentiment of ‘European patriotic unity’.  
‘Delegations’ of Activists Going Abroad to Participate in Protests 
As mentioned above, due to their limited domestic political opportunities, and as a 
means to boost their protest numbers, some of the FE-groups have established close 
links to groups and actors from neighbouring countries, including groups not 
(formally) part of the FE-coalition. These relations are mainly based on the groups’ 
geographical and lingual proximities. Examples include For Freedom and its ties to 
                                                          
198 Robinson has spoken, for instance, at demonstrations in the Czech Republic (see e.g. Blok 
against Islamization 2016c); in Denmark, where he introduced PEGIDA UK in January 2016 
(Mulhall 2016); on numerous occasions for PEGIDA Germany (see e.g. Epoch Times 2015f); 
and for PEGIDA Netherlands (Hopkins 2015). 
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the Swedish anti-Islam scene199, PEGIDA Netherlands and its cooperation with 
German and Belgian extreme right activists (Wagenaar 2019)200, PEGIDA Austria and 
PEGIDA Germany201, and NGO ISIS’ participation in Finnish groups’ 
demonstrations202. Moreover, since the autumn of 2015, PEGIDA Germany and BPI 
also began cooperating (see e.g. Prokupkova 2018b), and this later evolved into the 
Fortress Europe coalition (see Ch. 9).  
Hence, as most border-crossing protest participation only involves one or two people 
from abroad who act as speakers, or take place between actors from neighbouring 
countries, the participant scopes are only ‘European’ to a rather limited extent.  
Scope of Events  
The limited transnational FE-contention took the form of transnational protests (see 
Imig & Tarrow 2000). Only four (1%) of the 355 FE-groups’ protests count as 
‘transnational protests’. The low number has many reasons, including lacking 
resources to instate large-scale events, and the missing incentive to coordinate the 
efforts with actors from abroad, especially after the FE-coalition’s end in June 2016 
(see Chapter 9). 
The first transnational event took place in January 2016. Before this date, none of the 
participating FE-groups had organized any transnational protests, also not with other 
groups aside from the FE-members. Three of the four transnational protests took place 
between January and May 2016, and the last in September 2017. They consisted of a 
joint press conference at the inauguration of Fortress Europe (January 2016), one 
collaborative (February 2016) and two cooperative transnational protests (May 2016), 
plus an attempt to set up a European Citizen’s Initiative. They involved all of the FE-
members, including the parties, and were precipitated by the gradually opening 
discursive opportunities across Europe.  
                                                          
199 Tania Groth both joined Dan Park and Henrik Rönnquist’s attempt at creating PEGIDA 
Sweden in 2015 and spoke at a few of Jan Sjunnesson’s För Frihet rallies (see e.g. För Frihet 
2016). Moreover, activists from both countries frequently attend each other’s demonstrations. 
200 The group joined Vlaams Belang and PEGIDA Vlaanderen protests in Belgium and HoGeSa 
and PEGIDA Germany demonstrations in Germany, while Belgian and German activists have 
attended Dutch PEGIDA demonstrations (for more on these links, see Wagenaar 2019). 
201 Due to the lingual proximity, the two groups had rather frequent speaker exchanges (mainly 
from PEGIDA Germany to PEGIDA Austria), plus German and Austrian new right activists 
spoke at PEGIDA Austria or PEGIDA Germany protests respectively (see e.g. Malarich 2015). 
202 This is again largely due to the lingual proximity between Estonian and Finnish, which 
means that they can join each other’s demonstrations without problems. Kaljuste and Kirsberg 
have thus spoken at a few demonstrations in Finland, once under the banner of Fortress Europe 
(see e.g. The Tundra Tabloids 2016). 
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With the onset of the ‘long summer of migration’ in the autumn of 2015, the FE-
actors’ growing concern about the pan-European effects of the ‘refugee crisis’ and 
their respective states’ intake of refugees, inferred that they perceived a need for 
transnational cooperation (see more in Chapter 9). Simultaneously, the diverging 
stances of the European leaders (especially the Visegrad countries vis-à-vis Merkel), 
plus particularly the Eastern European population’s increasingly hostile view on the 
refugees and migrants (see e.g. Eurobarometer 85 (European Commission 2016b)), 
implied that the discursive opportunities were favorable for exercising transnational 
European pressure. It also became clear that it was the European Council that made 
the decisive decisions, and not the European Commission, despite its attempt to 
introduce quotas. The leaders of the Visegrad countries had quickly ended this 
attempt, just as Western European member states also voiced concerns (see overview 
above). The winter of 2015-2016 was thus considered an opportune moment to 
instigate transnational demonstrations, and this first led to the January FE-meeting in 
Prague, followed by the February 6 parallel Fortress Europe demonstrations across 
Europe (see e.g. Ruptly 2016b). 
On January 23, 2016, the signatories of the Prague Declaration (Appendix 1; Chapter 
9) held a press conference announcing the creation of the Fortress Europe coalition, 
which mobilized against the EU (Ruptly 2016a). Various European far right groups 
(including groups that had not signed the Declaration) organized simultaneous 
protests on February 6, 2016, i.e. a ‘cooperative transnational protest’, mainly 
advertised and framed as a demonstration of ‘solidarity’ towards the other European 
patriots. Demonstrations took place in Germany, the Czech Republic, France, the 
Netherlands, Poland, England203, Ireland, Slovakia, Denmark, Australia, and Estonia 
with rather mixed results (Volk 2016). The rallies were thus based at the domestic 
levels, meaning that the groups could target both the national and the European 
institutions due to the simultaneity of the protests. Yet, the protest suffered from 
several setbacks, such as a low turnout in most countries, governmental suppression 
                                                          
203 PEGIDA UK re-launched its demonstrations on this day, under the new leadership of 
Tommy Robinson, Anne Marie Waters, and Paul Watson (Halliday 2016). Concerning the 
February 6 protest, Hope Not Hate states, “As our video shows there is nothing new about 
PEGIDA UK, it really is just a re-launch of the English Defence League (EDL). […] The 
organisers are the same, most of the speakers are the same, the security team is the same and 
many of the demonstrators are the same” (HopeNotHate n.d.e). 
EUROPEANIZATION OF THE FAR RIGHT 
270
 
attempts, and failing technology in terms of the announced live streaming between the 
protest places204. 
On May 16, 2016, a few days after the second FE-meeting in Prague (see Chapter 9), 
PEGIDA Germany hosted a transnational collective FE-demonstration in Dresden 
with around 2,500 participants. The protest speakers both discussed the unity between 
the European peoples205, but also the ongoing ‘refugee crisis,’ which they especially 
blamed on Merkel (see e.g. Epoch Times 2016). This protest again did not have an 
explicit target nor demand, and instead aimed at fostering closer ties between the 
participating European activists. 
At the meeting a few days prior, the FE-members had discussed the possibility of 
setting up a European Citizen’s Initiative so that the EP would organize a hearing on 
the ‘forced migrant quotas’ (Jonaitis 2016), an issue that especially the Czech 
participating groups had been pushing for domestically (IVČRN 2015d). This was 
thus a form of ‘cooperative transnational protest’ targeted at the EU, as it would 
require the FE-groups to mobilize one million signatories from at least seven EU MS 
(ECI 2019). Yet, due to various circumstances, mainly the lack of funding, this idea 
never materialized (Interview with Wagensveld 2017; see also Chapter 9).  
Due to internal feuds in the leading FE-groups and other organizational difficulties 
(see Chapter 9 for more), the next FE-protest was only organized in September 
2017206. PEGIDA Netherlands hosted a demonstration in Enschede, Netherlands 
(Wagenaar 2019). The demonstration was titled ‘United We Are Strong – United We 
Will Win’207, in reference to HoGeSa and PEGIDA’s motto ‘Gemeinsam sind wir 
                                                          
204 In Dresden and Prague, there were around 8,000 and 3,000 protesters respectively, while the 
Dutch and Swiss protests were cancelled due to safety threats. This was supposed to have been 
the first PEGIDA Netherlands demonstration in Amsterdam, but it was cancelled due to a bomb 
threat hours earlier, leading to an evacuation of the surrounding areas. At the new location, a 
broad coalition of left-wing organizations formed a numerically strong counter-protest, and 
tumult erupted at the demonstration, 20 people were arrested, mainly from the counter-
protesters’ side (Van der Laan 2016). The Swiss demonstration did not get the required 
permission from the authorities and thus did not take place (Stutz 2016). The French protest, 
which took place despite a state ban, led to the arrest of 20 of the about 150 participating 
activists, while the demonstration launching Identity Ireland led to scuffles (Hentschel 2016). 
205 The FE-members had been encouraged by Festerling to talk about “identity, respect, and 
mutual forgiveness for everything that ever stood between us, the European nations” (Tatjana 
Festerling TV 2016b) (for more about the actual speech contents, see Chapter 9). 
206 Festerling did organize an FE-demonstration in Dresden on October 3, 2016, which was 
targeted at Merkel. While the demonstration did have transnational speaker participation, it was 
only Georg Kirsberg from NGO ISIS, who was an ‘official’ FE-member. 
207 It had not been an easy task to organize the Dutch demonstration, as the authorities were 
very opposed to the endeavour and did not give permission for a prior attempt in June 2017. 
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stark / Samen zijn We Sterk’. Yet, none of the original FE-members participated in 
the rally, not even Festerling, the FE-coalition leader. Instead, the participants 
included considerably more extreme right groups and activists208.  
THE FE-GROUPS’ EUROPEANIZATION FORMS 
Similar to the Generation Identity groups, the Fortress Europe (FE) groups mainly 
opted for protest strategies targeted at the domestic decision-makers in the 2015-2017 
period. The groups thus perceived it as more advantageous to exercise pressure on the 
national governments, as most EU MS were either already strengthening the asylum, 
migration, and border legislation, or showing increasing levels of divisions on the 
question (such as Germany (CDU/CSU)). During the winter of 2015-2016, the 
explored groups chose to join forces in the Fortress Europe coalition, and organize 
transnational protests, as a means to both exercise pressure on their own, domestic 
governments and the EU.  
Table 7.10 shows the FE-groups’ forms of Europeanization by considering the protest 
with a ‘European’ issue scope and their scopes of participants and targets. While 
protests targeting ‘Muslims/migrants/refugees’ are not included, the table includes 
those ‘Anti-Islam(ization)’ protests, where it was possible to deduce a political target. 
These caveats of course affect the resulting figures, yet, from the 106 protests with a 
‘European’ issue scope that could be coded as targeting a specified actors (i.e. 29.9% 
of all the FE-protests), ‘Domestication’ is the predominant Europeanization form for 
the FE-groups, while ‘Externalization,’ ‘Transnational pressure,’ and 
‘Supranationalisation’ strategies were only used to a limited extent. This finding 
largely aligns with the research on social movements conducted by other scholars (see 
e.g. della Porta & Caiani 2009; Caiani & Graziano 2018), just as it is rather similar to 
the findings for the GI groups. Conversely, ‘domestic’ protests only make up 17.5% 
of the FE groups’ protests versus more than 50% by the GI groups. This partly relates 
to the fact that it was not possibile to determine the exact issue and target scopes of 
many of the PEGIDA groups’ protests. 
                                                          
Yet, this cancellation was ignored by the organisers and supporters, leading to the arrest of 
Wagensveld (Tubantia 2017).  
208 Including the Austrian Freie Heimatliche Bewegung (Free Homeland Movement) (Gerhard 
Bauer), the Nederlandse Burger Partij (Dutch Citizens Party) (Marco Burghout), the Finnish 
Defence League (Jukka Ketonen), HoGeSa (Alex Kurth), Alternative für Deutschland 
(Alternative for Germany) (Christiane Christen) also took part, while Paul Meijer from Forza! 
Nederland cancelled his participation last minute. The German extreme right hooligan band 
Kategorie C provided the music. 
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Table 7.10: The FE groups’ forms of Europeanization (2015-2017)209.  
Participant/Target Scope National European 
National 
85.8% (91) 
(Domestication) 
1.9% (2) 
(Externalization) 
European 
9.4% (10) 
(Transnational pressure) 
2.8% (3) 
(Supranationalisation) 
Note: N: 106. Pct (No. of protests). 
 THE ROLE OF NATIONAL CONTEXTS AND POLITICAL AND 
DISCURSIVE OPPORTUNITIES  
Based on the observations above, the eleven FE-groups can be broadly divided into 
two categories in terms of their protest strategies, depending on their domestic 
political and discursive opportunities at the outset of the 2015-2017 period, together 
with their political contexts and geographical positions. On the one hand, the Eastern 
European extra-parliamentary groups (IVČRN, BPI, and NGO ISIS) had relatively 
open political and discursive opportunities domestically, and thus were most likely to 
directly target their national decision-makers (see Chapter 3)210. Conversely, except 
for PEGIDA Germany, most of the Western European groups faced closed domestic 
political opportunities, partly due to the prominent role of the far right parties in their 
respective countries. As their discursive opportunities gradually opened, the groups 
largely focused their mobilization around domestic issues and more symbolic protests 
against Islam(ization) as such, as a means to influence the domestic debate (see 
Koopmans & Statham 1999a). 
                                                          
209 The ‘Issue’ scopes include both the protests with ‘European’ and ‘Both (national and 
European)’ scopes. For the ‘Participant’ scopes, the ‘Cross-border’ and ‘European’ are collated 
to ‘European’. For the ‘Target’ scope, the ‘National’ targets only include the national decision-
makers and the ‘European’ targets only the ‘EU’.  
210 This was also the case for the Eastern European parties, as Dawn, National Movement and 
EKRE all mobilized strongly against the quotas in their respective countries. As this is outside 
the scope of this chapter, this will not be considered further here. However, one can mention 
that all of the Eastern European non- and institutional groups largely followed the same paths 
of Europeanization in terms of the scopes of their targets and issues. Therefore, they all mainly 
targeted their national governments in the summer and autumn of 2015, but indirectly targeted 
the EU by demanding that the government said ‘no’ to the EU’s quota proposals (Polish 
National Movement), or maintained its refusal of the quotas (EKRE). 
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As the following section will illustrate, these differences became decisive for the 
groups’ protest actions and strategies in the period (and also partially explains the 
protest frequencies and tactics outlined in the introductory section). Moreover, as the 
political and discursive opportunities at the EU-level remained closed throughout the 
2015-2017 period, the groups instead decided to opt for a strategy of transnational 
contention in end-2015. This transnationalization will also very briefly be touched 
upon in this contextual analysis. The following section will thus examine the protest 
developments of PEGIDA Germany, PEGIDA Netherlands, and the Czech anti-Islam 
groups (IVČRN, BPI, and Blok against Islamization). 
PROTEST DEVELOPMENTS OF PEGIDA GERMANY, PEGIDA 
NETHERLANDS, AND IVČRN/BPI   
Each section begins with a consideration of the group’s domestic political and 
discursive opportunities, followed by an analysis of the group’s protest developments 
in the 2015-2017 period. The analysis also considers organizational and resource-
related aspects, such as leadership changes, infights, and cooperation with other 
domestic actors, which (potentially) hindered or aided the mobilization. 
PEGIDA Germany 
PEGIDA Germany’s first demonstration was on October 17, 2014 (see Ch. 5 for 
more). Especially its placement in the Eastern German city of Dresden in Saxony 
explains its successful mobilization, due to the more open discursive opportunities in 
the region (Minkenberg 2018), and the societal malaise expressed here since German 
reunification in 1991 (see e.g. Virchow 2016a). With the opening discursive 
opportunities in Germany after the publication of Sarrazin’s book in 2014, plus the 
lack of a strong far right party occupying the political space in the country, the 
movement quickly increased its participant rates in Dresden211 (see e.g. Vorländer et 
al. 2018). Yet, the German political opportunities remained closed. 
The German government, most parties, and the mainstream media initially heavily 
criticized PEGIDA Germany (see e.g. Vorländer et al. 2018, Ch. 2). Yet, an opinion 
poll conducted in December 2014 showed that almost half of the German population 
understood why one would mobilize against ‘Islamization’ (Ibid: 33), thus indicating 
a rather accepting population (and rather open discursive opportunities in terms of 
gaining resonance). Yet, PEGIDA’s initial focus on ‘Islamization’ was quickly equal 
with more general anti-establishment expressions, making the protest group perceive 
                                                          
211 It struggled, however, to attract similar figures anywhere else in Germany and Europe (see 
e.g. Vorländer et al. 2018; Virchow 2016a). 
EUROPEANIZATION OF THE FAR RIGHT 
274
 
itself as “the core of a collective German and European movement of the outraged, 
the new ‘enraged citizens’ (Wutbürger)” (Ibid: 2)212.  
By January 2015, around 25,000 people participated in the demonstrations (Spiegel 
2015a). Yet, from February 2015 onwards, the participation rates gradually decreased, 
both due to the group’s initial loss of momentum (Vorländer et al. 2018), but also 
because of the pictures published by the Dresden Morgenpost in January showing 
Bachmann in Hitler attire (Chambers 2015). This revelation led to the first split in the 
PEGIDA organizing team (the so-called ‘Orga-team’), and Tatjana Festerling joined 
the leadership (Vorländer et al. 2018). Despite the internal problems, the weekly 
Monday demonstrations continued as before (see Figure 7.2 below), while the group 
attempted to come up with new strategies to regain support and attract renewed media 
attention (Ibid.)213. For one, Festerling ran as a mayoral candidate for PEGIDA 
Germany at the local elections in Saxony in June, where she won ten percent of the 
votes (Die Welt 2015).  
Yet, as can be seen on Figure 7.2 below, aside from a periodical radicalization of its 
protest repertoire in the autumn of 2015, where it carried out two border blockades 
with BPI and Dawn214, the group never changed its protest form substantially. Instead, 
it continuously aimed at professionalizing the demonstrations (Vorländer et al. 2018), 
while maintaining the same level of protest throughout (p >0.05). Nevertheless, over 
time, several of the speeches, particularly by Festerling, encouraged violent responses 
from the PEGIDA-supporters (for instance, her encouragement of the military and 
police’s use of civil disobedience in September 2015 (Epoch Times 2015c)), 
indicating a discursive radicalization. 
  
                                                          
212 The movement presented its first position paper on December 10, 2014 (see e.g. Söhler 
2014), and Bachmann added six demands at the January 12, 2015, demonstration. Amongst 
other topics, these points involved a stricter immigration policy, a duty of integration for 
immigrants, and the expulsion of Jihadi Islamists (Epoch Times 2015a). Around a month later, 
on February 16, the so-called ‘Dresdner Theses’ were read aloud at a Monday demonstration 
(PEGIDA Official 2015). They had been developed together with the other German PEGIDA 
groups and included PEGIDA Germany’s policy demands (see PEGIDA Germany 2015a). 
213 For one, in April 2015, PEGIDA Germany hosted the Dutch politician Geert Wilders as a 
guest speaker at a demonstration (Jacobsen 2015). 
214 Similar to many other far right groups across Europe, PEGIDA called for a stricter domestic 
border control (see PEGIDA Germany 2015b). As PEGIDA and BPI/Úsvit were calling for 
similar measures in their neighboring countries, they agreed to carry out two joint border 
blockades on the Czech-German border in October (Epoch Times 2015d) and November 2015 
(Sputnik Germany 2015). The latter was organized with a similar heading as the ones employed 
by GI Germany and GI Austria, namely as part of the ‘We are the border’ initiative (‘Wir sind 
die Grenze’) (GI Germany 2015f) (for more on the Czech-German cooperation, see Chapter 9). 
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Figure 7.2: PEGIDA Germany’s protest forms per semester (2015-2017). 
 
Note: N: 132. Cramer’s V = .213 (*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001). 
With the steep rise in refugees crossing the European external borders at the end of 
July 2015, PEGIDA’s participant numbers re-surged (Vorländer et al. 2018). PEGIDA 
Germany now “attempted to position” itself “as the leading platform for protest 
against the refugee policy of the Federal Republic,” and turned into a more explicit 
anti-immigration movement (Ibid: 10)215. Yet, despite this new protest focus, many of 
the protests still did not include the posing of specific demands to the decision-makers. 
This makes it very hard to evaluate the targeting of specific political or societal 
entities. However, when looking at Table 7.11 below, one can see that the German 
group only targeted the national decision-makers, when specifying a target216 (based 
on the speeches by either Bachmann or Festerling).  
  
                                                          
215 These sentiments only developed further after the EU-meeting on September 4, where 
Merkel established the ‘open border’ policy of Germany, and the therefrom-ensuing de facto 
(temporary) removal of the Dublin Conventions. At the following PEGIDA demonstration (on 
September 7), Festerling criticized Merkel’s policy, and instead demanded closed, militarily 
guarded, borders (Epoch Times 2015b). Similarly, in September, the European Commission 
proposed new refugee allocation measures, and this led to strong Visegrad opposition, mainly 
voiced by Órban (see above). Ten days later, Festerling posted a YouTube video of her holding 
a sign saying, ‘Germany says thank you, Mr. Órban,’ to show him that not all Germans agreed 
with Merkel’s policy (Festerling 2015b). 
216 On August 11, 2015, for instance, PEGIDA Germany published an asylum policy paper, 
where it called for a suspension of the Schengen agreement, and a German exit from the EU, 
referring to it as “the useless outfit that oppresses” all member states (PEGIDA Germany 
2015b). 
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Table 7.11: PEGIDA Germany’s protest issue and target scopes (2015-2017). 
Issue/Target National   European   Other Total 
   Nat.Gov   EU   
National 4.5 (6)  3.8 (5) 0.0 (0)  0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 4.5 (6) 
European 3.8 (5)  3.0 (4) 0.0 (0)  0.0 (0) 4.5 (6) 8.3 (11) 
Both 14.4 (19)  14.4 (19) 0.0 (0)  0.0 (0) 72.7 (96) 87.1 (115) 
Total 22.7 (30)  21.2 (28) 0.0 (0)  0.0 (0) 77.3 (102) 100.0 (132) 
Note: N: 132. Pct (No. of protests). Cramer’s V = .445*** (*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001). 
The figures for ‘National government’ and ‘EU’ form part of the ‘National’ and ‘European’ totals 
respectively.   
Particularly in August-December 2015, PEGIDA Germany mobilized strongly against 
the German chancellor due to her role in allowing the refugees’ access to Europe. In 
a sense, their mobilization both targeted the German government, but also the EU, due 
to the role of the German Chancellor in the EU’s decisions. Yet, in terms of the 
framing of the claims, PEGIDA’s criticism of Merkel was mainly regarding her role 
as the national leader of Germany217. The ‘refugee crisis’ remained the main topic for 
the movement’s demonstrations throughout 2015 (Vorländer et al. 2018), and this was 
also the period where PEGIDA Germany and BPI started discussing the creation of 
the Fortress Europe coalition (see Chapter 9). 
After the mass sexual assaults on women in Cologne on New Year’s Eve 2015-2016 
(see Appendix C), the focus shifted back to the domestic setting. As the German media 
started becoming more critical about the refugees, plus Merkel and other prominent 
German mainstream politicians called for tighter migration controls (see e.g. Yardley 
2016), PEGIDA Germany again attempted to exploit the opening in the discursive 
domestic opportunities. The frames employed in the PEGIDA speeches thus became 
even more hostile against refugees and migrants (see e.g. Vorländer et al. 2018: 544; 
Locke & Bender 2016), while the blame attributions were mainly directed at the 
national government. 
Yet, the earlier re-surge in protest participants began decreasing again, implying a 
need for change, in terms of a more militant action repertoire and/or finding other 
means to attract more activists to the cause. Festerling and Wagensveld, who were 
both frequent speakers at the PEGIDA Germany demonstrations from January 2015 
onwards, had, for a longer period, called for more radical protest repertoires and 
activist responses, while Bachmann instead wanted to maintain the structure and 
frequency of the weekly Monday demonstrations (Vorländer et al. 2018). These 
                                                          
217 Festerling, for instance, constantly insinuated that the ‘abolition’ (‘Abschaffung’) of the 
German people was Merkel’s aim from the outset in order to boost the German economy, but 
that it, in fact, just led to the immigration of people who would become dependent on the welfare 
system (Epoch Times 2015c). 
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differing stances, plus Festerling’s radical expression forms, led to her exclusion from 
the Orga-team in May 2016, resulting in a very public feud between she and 
Bachmann during the summer of 2016 (Spiegel 2016b). This public dispute showed a 
very limited degree of professionalism (see also Chapter 5). 
Besides PEGIDA Germany’s own weekly demonstrations in Dresden, from May 2016 
onwards, Bachmann also supported the anti-Merkel demonstrations in Berlin 
(‘Merkel must go’ (‘Merkel muss weg’), and he spoke at some of the demonstrations 
(see e.g. Hasselmann 2016). Simultaneously, PEGIDA Germany was developing 
closer relations with members of the far right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party,218 
which was gaining prominence on the German political scene during the 2016-2017 
period, largely benefitting from the success of the PEGIDA mobilization, with 
adversely decreasing momentum and participation rates (Weisskircher & Berntzen 
2018). By 2017, PEGIDA’s demonstrations only had between 1,000 to 2,000 
participants (Vorländer et al. 2018).  
Throughout 2017, PEGIDA focused on creating a stronger national anti-immigration 
force, especially by expanding the cooperation with AfD, for instance, by co-
organizing demonstrations with the party (from May 8, 2017, onwards) (Bartsch 
2017). At PEGIDA Germany’s 3-year birthday celebration in October 2017, six AfD 
MPs were on stage being celebrated for the good electoral results in September 
(Stürzenberger 2017). Yet, at the same time, this strong electoral outcome for AfD 
also signified a loss of importance for PEGIDA Germany, as the country now had a 
strong far right party, where dissatisfied people could voice their dismay. Scholars 
thus argue that the rise of the AfD in many ways signified the end of PEGIDA’s 
prominence in German politics (see e.g. Vorländer et al. 2018) even though the weekly 
demonstrations still take place. 
PEGIDA Netherlands 
After a failed attempt by the Dutch Defense League to set up a Dutch PEGIDA 
offshoot in early 2015, Edwin Wagensveld, made a renewed attempt in the autumn of 
2015, allegedly due to several requests (Interview with Wagensveld 2017). PEGIDA 
Netherlands’ first demonstration in October 2015 attracted around 200-300 
supporters, making it the largest Dutch far right demonstration that year, with a crowd 
consisting of both newcomers and experienced far right activists (Muis & van Kassel 
2017).  
                                                          
218 The two organizations began cooperating more openly from May 2016 onwards, despite the 
AfD party leadership distancing itself from the movement (Weiland 2016; see also Vorländer 
et al. 2018, Ch. 3; Weisskircher & Berntzen 2018). It was only in 2018 that AfD officially 
permitted its members to participate in PEGIDA Germany demonstrations and speak on the 
stage (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2018).  
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In September 2015, a few weeks prior to PEGIDA Netherlands’ first demonstration, 
the Dutch Parliament had discussed the European Commission’s quota demands 
(Bahceli 2015). Here, Mark Rutte, the Conservative Prime Minister, stated that the 
country would prefer giving money to the near areas instead of accepting refugees 
(Ibid.). Hence, the Dutch government was expressing concerns about the reception of 
refugees, just as the topic led to worries amongst the Dutch population (COB 2015). 
This meant that the discursive opportunities for the expression of similar statements 
were rather open in the second half of 2015. The Dutch context thus had rather open 
DOS for mobilization around anti-Islam frames, further ‘aided’ by the series of 
terrorist attacks that hit Europe in the 2015-2016 period, which strongly increased the 
salience of “anti-foreigner sentiments” in the country (Muis & van Kessel 2017: 1).  
Yet, the strong Dutch far right parties inferred that PEGIDA Netherlands’ mobilizing 
issues were already covered politically (Ibid.). Moreover, the Dutch far right extra-
parliamentary actors were strongly stigmatized (Klandermans & Mayer 2006). The 
group thus quickly became part of the weak, fragmented, and politically irrelevant 
Dutch far right extra-parliamentary scene. It joined other groups’ protest actions as a 
means to increase the combined resources (e.g. by helping each other with 
practicalities surrounding demonstrations) (see e.g. Muis & van Kessel 2017). 
Throughout the 2015-2017 period, PEGIDA Netherlands thus cooperated extensively 
with similar smaller far right groups, both well-established groups and newer 
initiatives219 (see also section 7.1). 
After the initial mobilization success, over time, the participation rates significantly 
decreased. This, however, did not dissuade the PEGIDA activists from continuing to 
organize demonstrations, and as Figure 7.3 shows, PEGIDA Netherlands mainly 
employed demonstrative protest forms (mainly involving demonstrations and rallies). 
Due to the dwindling protest attendance numbers during 2016, PEGIDA Netherlands 
changed its protest frequency to monthly demonstrations in The Hague from 
September 2016 onwards (Wagensveld 2016b), which explained the drop in protests 
in the second half of 2016. September 11, 2016, was thus the first monthly PEGIDA 
Netherlands demonstration in The Hague.  
  
                                                          
219 The established groups involve the extreme right party Dutch People’s Union (Nederlandse 
Volks-Unie, NVU), Voorpost (‘Outpost’), and the Dutch Defense League, while Dutch PEGIDA 
activists also joined the demonstrations of Dutch citizens’ initiatives organizing demonstrations 
against refugee housing, just as Wagensveld spoke at an anti-refugee housing demonstration 
organized by residents of the Ypenburg neighbourhood in The Hague (see Kafka n.d.). 
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Figure 7.3: PEGIDA Netherlands’ protest forms per semester (2015-2017). 
 
Note: N: 50. Cramer’s V = .491* (*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001). 
Moreover, after the break-up of the German PEGIDA Orga-Team in May 2016 (see 
above), which also meant the exclusion of Wagensveld, due to his loyalty to Festerling 
(Meisner 2016), and the decreasing participation rates at PEGIDA Netherlands’ rallies 
in mid-2016, its protest repertoires further radicalized (Tierolf et al. 2018). The 
protests, however, still maintained a demonstrative format (see Figure 7.3), albeit 
increasingly through tactics involving direct actions220 (V = .491). 
The ‘confrontational’ actions in the second half of 2017 (see Figure 7.3 above) mainly 
occurred during the summer of 2017, where the group opposed the announcement of 
Ahmed Marcouch (Labour Party, PvdA) as the mayor of Arnhem through disruptive 
actions. PVV also mobilized on this issue (Reijner 2016),221 yet, this was one of the 
only times PEGIDA Netherlands cooperated with Wilders’ party, which usually 
refused to cooperate with extra-parliamentary Dutch far right groups (Muis & van 
                                                          
220 The group has in general carried out several very derogatory actions against Muslims and 
their faith. This, for example, includes the wearing of hats that look like pig heads, or spreading 
pigs’ blood on the model of a church on the grounds of a planned mosque (Omroep PowNed 
2017), just as the activists focused on Islam’s treatment of women at the demonstration in 
Nijmegen on the International Women’s Day on March 8, 2017 (Kuipers 2017). According to 
Wagensveld, the inspiration to these action repertoires mainly derives from Generation Identity 
(Interview with Wagensveld 2017). 
221 The party’s request for a parliamentary debate about the appointment was not successful, so 
it took the quarrels to the streets, and organized a demonstration on July 5, 2017, which 
PEGIDA Netherlands took part in (Kafka n.d.), just as three PEGIDA activists disturbed 
Marcouch’s instatement proceedings on September 1 (Omroep gld 2016). 
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Kessel 2017)222 223. Moreover, in relation to the Dutch debate about ‘Zwarte Piet’ or 
‘Black Pete,’ Santa’s black-faced helper (see e.g. De Beukelaer 2018), PEGIDA 
activists also carried out street theatres dressed up as the figure (Omroep PowNed 
2016). This indicates a more disruptive strategy than the one of PEGIDA Germany, 
largely due to the closed domestic political opportunities and low protest attendance 
numbers, which made the group carry out similar actions as Generation Identity. 
The majority of PEGIDA Netherlands’ protests focused on domestic issues (e.g. 
regarding ‘Zwarte Piet’, mosque constructions, or refugee housing), and more general 
protests against the ‘Islamization’ of the Netherlands. The group therefore mainly 
targeted national actors, when the protest was directed towards a decision-making 
target. Table 7.12 below shows that in terms of issue scope and targets, aside from the 
‘Anti-Islam(ization)’ protests, PEGIDA Netherlands overwhelmingly mobilized on 
domestic issues against national targets. 32% of the group’s protests targeted the local 
or national government, while, in fact, 46% of the group’s protests can be classified 
as ‘domestic’ protests, entailing a national issue, participant, and target scope. 
Conversely, none of the protests targeted the EU or other EU MS’ governments.   
Table 7.12: PEGIDA Netherlands’ protest issue and target scopes (2015-2017). 
Issue/Target National   European   Other Total 
   Nat.Gov   EU   
National 46.0 (23)  32.0 (16) 2.0 (1)  0.0 (0) 8.0 (4) 56.0 (28) 
European 2.0 (1)  2.0 (1) 0.0 (0)  0.0 (0) 10.0 (5) 12.0 (6) 
Both 0.0 (0)  0.0 (0) 0.0 (0)  0.0 (0) 32.0 (16) 32.0 (16) 
Total 48.0 (24)  34.0 (17) 2.0 (1)  0.0 (0) 50.0 (25) 100.0 (50) 
Note: N: 50. Cramer’s V = .574*** (*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001). The figures for ‘National 
government’ and ‘EU’ form part of the ‘National’ and ‘European’ totals respectively.   
Aside from ‘Anti-Islam(ization)’ demonstrations, PEGIDA Netherlands also 
participated in numerous rallies against planned refugee centers in the first six months 
of 2016. The political decision to erect these centers had led to considerable anxiety 
amongst the general population, leading PEGIDA Netherlands and other Dutch far 
                                                          
222 In an attempt to approach the PVV, PEGIDA Netherlands joined several PVV-related protest 
actions: amongst them, a rally against the court prosecution of Wilders on March 18, 2016 
(Kafka n.d), and a protest against the Turkish Foreign Minister (Festerling 2017b). Yet, these 
support actions for PVV largely remained unanswered by the party, mainly due to legitimacy 
and respectability concerns regarding cooperation with extreme right actors (see Appendix C).  
223 Instead, the relatively new Forum for Democracy (FvD) was much more accommodative. 
Wagensveld stated that FvD would come to the PEGIDA activists in order to discuss policy 
points and topics for debate, indicating an alignment with the far right party (Interview with 
PEGIDA Netherlands 2017), a party that at the same time was part of the explanation for 
PEGIDA Netherlands’ limited success. 
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right groups to mobilize in front of the centres and at information evenings (see e.g. 
Teitsma 2016; Kafka 2016). Yet, aside from these direct actions against refugee 
housing and Muslim practices (see above), most of PEGIDA Netherlands’ 
demonstrations did not have a specified theme or title (Bos 2017), and instead mainly 
targeted Muslims through ‘Anti-Islam(ization)’ protests.  
During 2016, the participation rates continued plummeting, mainly due to the 
diminishing attention given to the group by the media, authorities, and general public, 
as the ‘refugee crisis’ debates began fading out, thereby reducing the salience of the 
refugee issue, and anti-Islam more generally (Wagenaar 2019). Hence, by its 18th 
demonstration on March 5, 2017, “Only the hard core” were “left”, just as the speech 
contents had become extremely radical (Bos 2017).  
Wagensveld argued that the confrontations with counter-protesters and his frequent 
arrests deterred people from joining, as “People are too scared to come” (Feenstra 
2016). PEGIDA Netherlands’ rallies were, in fact, often met by suppression by both 
the Dutch authorities and counter-protesters (Wagenaar 2019). Unrest frequently 
erupted between the PEGIDA activists and left-wing counter-protesters, often leading 
to arrests of protesters from both camps (see e.g. NOS Nieuws 2015; Leijten 2015). 
In fact, during the three-year period, the police made numerous arrests of Wagensveld 
for not abiding to the Dutch demonstration rules (see e.g. NOS Nieuws 2016; DUIC 
2017) 224. Such suppressive acts, together with the personal reputational costs of 
participating in violent far right protests, are often found to be an obstacle for far right 
mobilization, and thus lower the participation rates. 
In the autumn of 2017, an infight between PEGIDA Netherlands’ core members led 
to the creation of the splinter group Right in Resistance (‘Rechts in Verzet’) (Tierolf 
                                                          
224 Unlike the situation in the 1990s, where Dutch extreme right demonstrations largely were 
prohibited, on reasons of disturbance of public order and safety (see e.g. Muis 2015), the local 
Dutch authorities mostly permitted PEGIDA’s demonstrations and public meetings. Yet, in 
2016 alone, Wagensveld was arrested five times, leading him to express that he felt targeted 
and victimized (Bos 2017), and, for instance, referred to the strong police force as “a conscious 
intimidation of the government to ensure that widely supported criticism of immigration and 
Islam cannot be spread” (Feenstra 2016). Moreover, PEGIDA Netherlands activists often 
clashed with counter-protesters, largely made up of Antifa and other left-wing organizations, 
who attempted to dissuade people from participating (see e.g. Ibid.). Finally, PEGIDA 
Netherlands also faced repression online, as Facebook removed its page in early 2016, at a point 
where it had 20,000 ‘Likes’. Wagensveld considered this as part of the reason why the 
participation numbers at the demonstrations were so low, as this led to a more limited message 
reach (Bos 2017). These frequent arrests and legal cases against Wagensveld plus the left-wing 
counter-mobilization permitted the PEGIDA activists to tactically frame themselves as victims, 
just as the arrests gave the protest group more media exposure, making them seek the 
confrontation (Wagenaar 2019). 
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et al. 2018), just as it led to even lower participation rates at the PEGIDA Netherlands 
protests (Wagenaar 2019). However, despite the split, PEGIDA Netherlands 
continues carrying out smaller actions and a few demonstrations, yet, still maintaining 
very low participation rates (to read more about PEGIDA Netherlands’ protest actions 
post-2017, consult Wagenaar 2019). 
IVČRN, Blok Against Islam (BPI), and Blok Against Islamization  
We do not want Islam in the Czech Republic’s (‘Islám v České republice nechceme’, 
IVČRN) website was created in 2009, and the group had a very active online presence, 
posting anti-Islam articles and blog posts. In December 2014, the group took the 
contention to the streets when the Czech Republic was asked to receive 15 ill Syrian 
children and their families, implying a potential for Muslim arrivals to the country225. 
This mobilization increased the group’s visibility, and by January 2015, IVČRN’s 
Facebook page reached 100,000 ‘Likes’ and the group began setting up local 
associations (Prokupkova 2018a). 
Unlike the Netherlands and Germany, both the discursive and political opportunities 
were open for far right anti-Islam mobilization in the Czech Republic in 2015. Even 
though (or exactly because) the country hardly had seen any Muslim immigration in 
the past (Hafez 2018), the population was strongly Islamophobic, and opposed third-
country immigration (Čisár & Navratil 2018), just as did most political parties (Hafez 
2018), especially vocally voiced by the country’s President, Miloš Zéman (Culik 
2015). Furthermore, a political claims analysis by Navrátil and Hrubeš showed that 
the majority (2/3) of the government’s claims about refugees in 2015 were negative, 
mainly portraying migrants as a threat to the country (as cited in Císař & Navrátil 
2018). The Czech media was rather divided in the portrayal of the ‘refugee crisis’ and 
Islam. While the mainstream newspapers were largely impartial, alternative media 
sources and some traditional media outlets instead “framed the debate from the 
perspective of Islamophobic and anti-refugee groups” (Globsec 2016). 
The Czech debates about refugee reception had its onset around January 2015 (Císař 
& Navrátil 2018), and together with the moral shock of the terrorist attack in Paris on 
January 7, IVČRN used the opportunity to organize a demonstration in Prague, 
attracting around 400-600 participants (ČTK 2015). Some days later, the Czech 
government accepted the entry of the refugees due to EU demands, and IVČRN 
mobilized against this by targeting the national government. Hence, the external 
pressure from the EU on the Czech government led the citizens (i.e. IVČRN) to target 
the domestic government, which could choose to either repress the protests, offer 
                                                          
225 In the preceding year, the group had mainly carried out smaller domestic protest actions and 
events against Islam, such as e.g. a petition against the full recognition of Islam in the Czech 
Republic (the Churches Act) (see e.g. IVČRN 2014b) and campaigning against Halal meat 
(IVČRN 2014c). 
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concessions to the citizens, or broker between the citizens and the European institution 
(Tarrow 2005). In this case, the government chose to agree to the EU’s demands, yet, 
by mid-2016, it had only resettled three children and their families (Globsec 2016). 
The Czech group continued mobilizing. Initially, it continued its anti-Islam protests, 
but returned to the anti-refugee mobilization after the European Commission launched 
its quota proposal in May 2015. IVČRN reacted rather similarly as other Eastern 
European far right actors by exploiting the domestic opportunities to target the 
domestic leaders in order to exercise pressure on the EU. Moreover, looking for a 
means to express a stronger response to the EU’s demands, IVČRN co-founded Blok 
against Islam (Blok Proti Islamú) on June 5 (IVČRN 2015e)226. 
As is visible on Figure 7.4, IVČRN’s protest actions began gradually decreasing 
during 2015 after it largely returned to being an online phenomenon. Conversely, BPI 
organized most of its demonstrations in the second half of 2015, i.e. at the height of 
the ‘refugee crisis.’ After the split up of BPI’s group in May 2016 (Novinky 2016), 
BPI’s momentum was largely gone, and by 2017, the three Czech groups’ anti-Islam 
mobilization had largely terminated (more on this below).  
Figure 7.4: IVČRN, BPI, and BA Islamization’s protest frequency per semester 2015-2017. 
 
Note: N: 87. 
                                                          
226 In the inaugural speech, Konvička mentioned several possible strategies for how BPI could 
obtain influence, such as through lobbyism, political analyses, election participation, and the 
establishment of coalitions with political parties. Moreover, he also discussed the proposed EU 
refugee quotas, which he only saw as a starting point for the Muslim immigration to the country. 
He used the current situation in Western Europe as an example of how bad the situation could 
turn (IVČRN 2015f) and emphasized that the IVČRN petition was the means by which the 
government should be ‘pushed’ to stay on the group’s side (Ibid.). 
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Figure 7.5 below, which merges the three groups’ protest actions, shows that from the 
summer of 2015 until the spring of 2016, both IVČRN and BPI organized numerous 
domestic protests against the EU’s quota proposal, using a variety of different protest 
tactics, albeit mainly of a conventional or demonstrative nature. The actions included 
a petition in May 2015, calling for a referendum on the uptake of refugees (IVČRN 
2015d). It had been signed by more than 140,000 people by June 23, where it was 
presented to the Czech Chamber of Deputies by a representative of IVČRN and BPI, 
Martin Konvička, plus the populist radical right party Dawn (Úsvit) (IVČRN 2015g). 
BPI was thus granted access to the Czech parliament, and could present its petition 
directly to the decision-makers, illustrating the more open political opportunities in 
the Czech Republic (Prokupkova 2018a). 
Figure 7.5: IVČRN, BPI, and BA Islamization’s protest forms per semester (2015-2017). 
Note: N: 87. The table shows the three groups’ combined protest events in the period. Cramer’s V = 
.239 (*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001). 
In the April-December 2015 period, IVČRN and BPI’s protest actions thus mainly 
evolved around the objection to the possible reception of refugees to the Czech 
Republic (see also Císař & Navrátil 2018). This meant that IVČRN’s initial 
civilizational ‘anti-Islam’ focus and targeting in the period leading up to 2015 shifted 
to a nation-state focused mobilization in 2015 and early 2016, inferring a rather high 
number of protests targeting the national government (see Table 7.13). This strategy 
was further aided by the Hungarian Prime Minister Órban’s early rejection of the 
European Commission’s plans, which meant that the group could use the Visegrad 
relationship as a way of pressuring the national government. Moreover, when 
demanding a rejection of the refugee quotas, the protests were mostly also framed 
against the domestic decision-makers themselves, who were scolded for obeying the 
EU’s demands without concern for the will of the people (see e.g. BPI’s protest actions 
in June-July 2015 (e.g. BPI 2015a). Hence, even though IVČRN and BPI’s protest 
actions mainly targeted the national government in this period, the groups indirectly 
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targeted the EU, by demanding that the government said ‘no’ to the EU’s quota 
proposals. As an example, a day after the Hungarian government had decided to close 
the national border (Dunai 2015), on June 18, 2015, BPI and Dawn sent locks to Czech 
government representatives, symbolically asking them to lock the borders against 
illegal refugees (Parlamentní Listy 2015). The groups demanded that the Czech 
government “make it clear to the big EU states that we are not afraid of their pressure 
to accept quotas” (Ibid.), clearly employing a domestication strategy. Several of their 
protest actions were thus cases of domestication, as the issue scope was ‘European’, 
while the target scope was ‘domestic,’ and involved clear formulations requesting the 
national government to oppose the EU’s demands. 
Table 7.13: Czech anti-Islam FE groups’ protest issue and target scopes (2015-2017) 
Issue/Target National  European  Other Total 
  Nat.Gov  EU   
National 31.0 (27) 11.5 (10) 1.1 (1) 0.0 (0) 5.7 (5) 37.9 (33) 
European 33.3 (29) 33.3 (29) 10.3 (9) 3.4 (3) 9.2 (8) 52.9 (46) 
Both 4.6 (4) 4.6 (4) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 4.6 (4) 9.2 (8) 
Total 68.9 (60) 49.4 (43) 11.4 (10) 3.4 (3) 19.5 (17) 100.0 (87) 
Note: N: 87. Cramer’s V = .466*** (*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001). The figures for ‘National 
government’ and ‘EU’ form part of the ‘National’ and ‘European’ totals respectively. 
BPI began co-organizing protests with the Czech Dawn party in August 2015 due to 
the party’s aim “to boost attendance and get media attention, and to compensate for 
the lack of their own members” (Císař & Navrátil 2018: 195). During autumn and 
winter of 2015, i.e. at the height of the ‘refugee crisis’ debates in the Czech Republic 
(Ibid.), BPI mobilized strongly against the Czech reception of refugees, together with 
several other Czech far right actors, despite the fact that hardly any refugees entered 
the country from the Balkan route (Globsec 2016). This was very much in line with 
the wishes of the general Czech population, as around 70 percent opposed the entry 
of refugees from the MENA countries to the EU as such (CT24 2015).  
Moreover, in the same period, BPI began cooperating with PEGIDA Germany, a 
movement the Czech activists had admired since 2014 (see e.g. Prokupkova 2018b). 
The two tried to jointly put pressure on their respective governments, for instance 
through two border blockades in the autumn of 2015 (Epoch Times 2015d; Sputnik 
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Germany 2015)227 and by forming the Fortress Europe Coalition in January 2016 (for 
more on this, see Chapter 9). 
BPI and Dawn maintained their coalition throughout 2015, and in January 2016, aside 
from hosting the inaugural Fortress Europe meeting on January 23 (Volk 2016), they 
published a common ‘National Paper’ (‘Narodny listy’) (Kopecký 2016). After the 
relatively successful demonstration on February 6, 2016, the two political groups 
decided to formalize ties two weeks later through a name change of Dawn (which the 
authorities did not permit), and to introduce an election program for the autumn 2016 
regional and senate elections (Hospodářské Noviny 2016). A few weeks later, on 
March 10, the Czech parliament again discussed Dawn and BPI’s referendum petition 
on the refugee quotas (Czech Parliament 2016), yet, again without this leading to any 
results. 
Yet, after an internal struggle about funding (Císař & Navrátil 2018), BPI left the 
Dawn coalition, and split into two groups, a party, Alternative for Czech Republic, 
and a new political association, Blok Against Islamization (Novinky 2016). The new 
BPI decided to continue the support of Dawn, and carry out further anti-Islam 
demonstrations, albeit mainly focusing on the national level. During the summer of 
2016, Blok against Islamization and Dawn organized numerous election debates for 
their joint campaign. Yet, in June, the Czech Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lubomír 
Zaorálek very firmly rejected the refugee quotas (Lehnartz 2016), seeing that the 
strong Czech ‘refugee crisis’ debates had largely terminated (Císař & Navrátil 2018), 
and thus, closed this topic as a mobilization issue, indicating that the momentum was 
largely lost for the anti-Islam mobilization. 
From the fall of 2016 onwards, Blok Against Islamization’s street activism decreased 
(see Figure 7.4). At the October 2016 regional elections, which had anti-immigration 
as one of the main topics of debate, Dawn was unsuccessful (only obtaining 0.1% of 
the votes), while Tomio Okamura’s new party, Freedom and Direct Democracy 
(SPD), which had also mobilized strongly during the ‘crisis,’ won 10.6% of the votes. 
This “showed that a single issue anti-Muslim campaign was not enough to win 
elections” (Globsec 2016). From these elections onwards, Dawn and BPI only carried 
out sporadic protest actions without much public support. Despite their role in 
furthering anti-Islam sentiments amongst the population throughout the ‘refugee 
crisis’ (Basch & Heřmanová 2017), the mainstream parties already catered to the 
                                                          
227 BPI and Dawn organized another border blockade only three days before the Czech 
government was supposed to respond to their refugee quota petition in April 2016 (Focus 
Online 2016b). The protest took place at three points on the Czech-German (2) and Czech-
Austrian (1) borders in April 2016. It was a few days after the Czech government had refused 
the EU’s quota demands (Wirnitzer 2017), and was targeted at the European Commission, 
which was seen as infringing on the sovereign rights of the EU MS, due to the quota demands 
(Focus Online 2016). 
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public’s concerns about third country migration and opposition towards the EU, 
saying that there was hardly any space on the Czech political scene for either IVČRN 
or BPI (Pehe as cited in Lazarová 2016). Moreover, Dawn, practically speaking, 
became obsolete after the 2016 elections, as it did not run in the 2017 elections (Císař 
& Navrátil 2018) and was dissolved as a political party in 2018. 
This section has shown the great importance of both the POS, DOS, and material 
resources for a group’s particular mobilization strategies, choices, and developments, 
as exemplified by the cases of PEGIDA Germany, PEGIDA Netherlands, and 
IVČRN/BPI. While PEGIDA Germany could exploit the open opportunities in 
Dresden and drew huge crowds to its demonstrations in the winter 2014-2015, its 
attempts at regaining momentum only succeeded with the onset of the ‘Long summer 
of migration’ in late summer 2015, as the group seized the discursive opportunities, 
and continued its criticism of the national government. Moreover, the rise of AfD 
simultaneously resulted in a decreasing role to the German movement, as a strong 
domestic far right party tends to diminish the support to extra-parliamentary far right 
actors. This was, in fact, one of the main problems for PEGIDA Netherlands, which 
had closed domestic political opportunities from the beginning, due to the Dutch 
historical view on the far right and the prominence of the far right parties in the 
country. Moreover, the closed EU opportunities plus the group’s lack of resources 
meant that EU-mobilization was not an option. The group thus had problems 
establishing itself as a relevant domestic far right actor, and instead, turned 
increasingly radical in terms of protest repertoires, mainly targeted at the local or 
national government, just as it cooperated closely with other small Dutch far right 
groups as a means to boost the numbers. The Czech groups, on the other hand, had 
both open domestic POS and DOS from January 2015 onwards, and attempted to 
exploit these openings by exerting pressure on the national government in order for it 
to refuse the EU’s quotas. Yet, as soon as the ‘refugee crisis’ debates ended in the 
country, Blok Against Islamization and IVČRN both practically ended their 
mobilization. 
 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The above analysis has shown that the FE-groups almost all mainly organized 
demonstrative protests, frequently around the issue of ‘Anti-Islam(ization)’. Yet, the 
groups had highly varied degrees of success with their mobilization in terms of 
attracting participants. PEGIDA Germany’s name, protest repertoire, main collective 
action frames, and slogans were initially adopted by the European PEGIDA-offshoots, 
which also began organizing silent marches followed by speeches. Yet, none of the 
FE PEGIDA groups managed to attract as proportionally strong numbers as their 
German counterpart did.  
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Prokúpkova (2018b) has similarly analysed how IVČRN and BPI drew on PEGIDA 
Germany’s amassed knowledge in terms of organizing demonstrations, and, in fact, 
managed to attract rather sizeable numbers. Yet, PEGIDA’s repertoire does not work 
in all European domestic settings, mainly due to the averse political opportunities 
(espcially in relation to the role of the radical right parties in the given countries) and 
the groups’ degree of embeddedness in their domestic far right scenes (see also 
Berntzen & Weisskircher 2016). After a certain period, For Freedom thus realized 
that its weekly demonstrations were not as popular as in Dresden, Germany, and 
changed to monthly demonstrations in September 2015. PEGIDA Netherlands took a 
similar decision in September 2016, where it announced the intention to protest 
monthly in The Hague, as a means to make its protests more regularly organized. 
Conversely, both PEGIDA Austria and PEGIDA UK’s endeavors of introducing 
PEGIDA to their domestic settings were very short-lived, as the groups quickly had 
to give up on their endeavors to introduce PEGIDA to the domestic setting.  
The protest repertoire strategies also very much depended on the personal preferences 
and deliberations of the various protest group leaders. Festerling and Wagensveld are 
two prominent examples, due to their insistence on the use of ‘acts of civil 
disobedience’ in order to counter the refugee and migrant ‘threat,’ explaining 
PEGIDA Netherlands’ stronger reliance on direct actions than any of the other 
PEGIDA groups. Conversely, Tania Groth from For Freedom instead highlighted the 
wish to ‘unite the right’ in Denmark through monthly demonstrations (Interview with 
For Freedom 2017), while Bachmann from PEGIDA Germany concentrated on the 
professionalization of the Dresden demonstrations (Vorländer et al. 2018). The extra-
parliamentary FE-groups thus did not draw on each other’s protest tactics in a similar 
way as the GI-groups, but instead either moderated the expression forms to the 
domestic settings or ended the mobilization after a few attempts. 
In terms of the groups’ protest targets, the chapter similarly underlined the high 
relevance of their political and discursive opportunities. Hence, due to their more 
favorable domestic political and discursive opportunities, the Czech anti-Islam groups 
exercised pressure on the national government to refuse the EU’s quota proposal, and 
they exploited their alliance with Dawn for this endeavour. Conversely, only a few of 
the Western European groups’ protests were targeted at the national government in 
order to explicitly pressure the EU. Instead, PEGIDA Netherlands, PEGIDA 
Germany, PEGIDA UK, PEGIDA Austria, and For Freedom mainly targeted the 
national governments with demands regarding domestic issues, or targeted Islam 
and/or its adherents, migrants, and refugees, while voicing blame attributions towards 
the political establishment more broadly (see above), mostly without posing specific 
policy demands. At the height of the ‘refugee crisis’ (i.e. the second half of 2015), the 
Western European groups’ demonstrations did all focus on the topic of anti-refugees, 
yet, again without making explicit policy demands in most cases. The protests 
therefore quickly became routinized rituals, mainly intended to exercise general 
pressure on the national government via the attempt to attract a strong following from 
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the general population. This strategy is rather akin to the one employed by the EDL a 
few years earlier (albeit without the violence) and to extreme right demonstrations 
more generally (see e.g. Caiani et al. 2012). 
Aside from the organization of a high number of protests around ‘European’ issues, 
the exploration of the groups’ collective action Europeanization showed a very limited 
level of ‘European’ target, participant, and event scope, inferring that the majority of 
the protests were cases of ‘domestication’– exactly as was the case for the GI groups. 
As the section on ‘Scope of participants’ showed, there were several protests with 
participants from other European countries, yet, this mostly only surrounded speakers 
from abroad, and was not, as such, co-organized by groups from different European 
countries. Moreover, the analysis also showed that several of the groups participated 
in each other’s protests cross-border, i.e. with geographically close actors, most 
frequently due to language similarity, and as a means to boost each other’s protest 
numbers, and again not to exert a concerted pressure on the decision-makers. All the 
groups instead focused their contention on the domestic level, while it was practically 
only BPI and IVČRN that mobilized explicitly against the EU.  
Hence, as was the case for Generation Identity, none of the FE protest groups took 
their demands to the EU institutions, due to the closed political opportunities at the 
EU-level, and the groups’ lack of symbolic and material resources (see Chapter 5). 
Instead, the groups opted for a joint strategy of transnational contention towards the 
end of 2015 on the initiative of PEGIDA Germany and BPI as a means to exercise 
transnational far right pressure on the EU through an outsider strategy, and, more 
generally, to portray a united European front against Islam and the establishment 
(more on this in Chapter 9). Distinctly from the GI groups, the FE-groups’ 
transnational protests were organized within a specific period of contention (January-
May 2016) and due to an explicit policy issue and target. The scope of FE 
transnational events was thus rather limited, and mainly evolved around a few large-
scale events (i.e. the founding of the coalition in January 2016, the simultaneous 
protests in February, and the demonstration in May). Furthermore, with the FE-
demonstrations only taking place in the spring of 2016, the momentum was almost 
lost before the protests happened. The highest migratory pressure was in the autumn 
and winter of 2015, and most EU MS had introduced border controls and refused the 
quotas by this point (something the FE-actors of course could not anticipate in 
November 2015). 
Moreover, despite the anti-EU sentiments expressed at the initial meeting in January 
2016, the other protests with ‘European’ participation, such as e.g. PEGIDA 
Germany’s anniversaries (see e.g. Häuβler 2015) and the May 2016 FE 
demonstration, were not organized with the explicit aim of countering a policy 
decision or applying pressure on a defined target. Instead, they acted as more symbolic 
events, organized to underline the European groups’ solidarity with each other’s 
domestic anti-Islam, –refugee, and –establishment efforts. 
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Unlike the Generation Identity groups, the Fortress Europe extra-parliamentary 
groups did not coordinate their mobilization in terms of protest repertoires, and they 
did not maintain their transnational protests over time. Instead, the FE-groups 
organized protests rather independently of each other, accommodating the contention 
to the domestic circumstances and the preferences of the respective protest group 
leaders. Yet, at the same time, these protests were all voiced with remarkably similar 
collective action frames, diagnosing Islam, third-country immigrants, and refugees, 
and the political establishment’s ‘political correctness’ as the greatest threats to the 
European population. In this way, they therefore also expressed an alternative vision 
of Europe, albeit not formulated in as congruent of terms as was the case for the GI 
groups. 
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SECTION 2: EUROPEANIZATION OF 
NETWORKS 
This section considers the European networking of the groups partaking in Generation 
Identity and Fortress Europe respectively. The framework is formulated in relatively 
broad terms, as it is the aim to employ the same concepts on both coalitions, which 
have very heterogeneous aims and developments. It is the main aim with the two 
chapters to investigate how and why the far right actors coalesced transnationally and 
which factors further or inhibit their transnational ambitions. As explained in the 
theoretical framework, the theories and concepts employed mainly draw on literature 
developed concerning left-wing trans- and national extra-parliamentary coalitions, 
plus findings by scholars of the far right.  
‘Transnational’ coalitions are conceptualized as coalitions of groups that all retain 
their rooting “in national political contexts, which they transcend in order to 
collaborate with other nationally rooted groups and organizations to form 
transnational networks” (Flesher Fominaya 2014: 40). Both analytical chapters will 
be divided into three main section: one focusing on the ‘Initiation’ of the coalition, 
one on its ‘Maintenance’, and finally, the coalition’s (potential) ‘Survival’. 
As explained in the theoretical framework, groups usually initiate transnational 
coalitions due to changes in the domestic political opportunites, albeit it is a 
contentious issue, whether it is the opening or closing of opportunities, which lead to 
transnational coalition-formation (see e.g. McCammon & Moon 2015; Chang 2008). 
A more established finding is that transnational coalitions tend to be created by groups 
that share a similar worldview (they have value homiphily) or at least the same enemy 
(Di Gregorio 2012). They are often based on pre-existing networks and/or the 
networking ability of movement entrepreneurs, who will organize the initial contacts 
and meetings (Van Dyke 2003). When considering which groups to include in the 
coalition, (particularly far right) movement entrepreneurs must evaluate the 
respectability and legitimacy of the other groups, as an unrespected transnational 
alliance partner may make the group appear illegitimate, for example, in terms of 
degree of extreme right-wingedness (see e.g. Ahrne et al. 2005; Monforte 2014).  
Once the coalition has been created, the groups must determine the level of resources 
they wish to pool. Those who agree to pool most resources (commonly the most 
resourceful) will usually also have the most prominent role in the coalition (see e.g. 
Levi & Murphy 2006). Moreover, in order to maintain the transnational coalition, the 
participating groups are required to remain in relatively frequent contact, something 
the new technological advances have aided substantially (della Porta & Tarrow 2005). 
This can both take place online, usually via social media, Skype, or e-mail, or offline, 
through face-to-face encounters. Particularly the offline meetings and activities are 
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useful for coalitions, which wish to develop closer bonds between the activists, as 
both joint protests and ideational work can be conducive to the development of a 
collective identity (see e.g. della Porta & Caiani 2009; Tarrow 2005). 
Throughout these processes, the groups may also make use of various forms of 
diffusion, for example in the form of movement material, collective action frames, or 
other forms of expression forms, which may further the creation of unity between the 
activists. Such (potential) diffusion processes will also be considered in the analysis, 
if and when applicable. 
Finally, in order for a transnational coalition to survive, prior research has 
demonstrated that there are certain conditions that are conducive to such a survival. 
For one, depending on the ideological ties between the groups, the coalition is likely 
to either be substantive (the members exhibit strong ideological overlaps) or simply 
instrumental and goal-oriented (the members form weak ideological ties) (Di 
Gregorio 2012). Moreover, the coalition is also highly dependent on the cohesion of 
the individual groups. The stronger the organizational and economic capacities of the 
individual organizations, the more likely a coalition will survive. Similarly, if the 
coalition partners have not managed to set up a strong coalition, including in terms of 
having rules and regulations for solving internal conflicts, then the coalition is also 
highly unlikely to survive. At the same time, the contextual differences between the 
various groups may also hinder a coalition survival, for instance if a domestic 
opportunity requires a response that conflicts with the goals of the coalition. 
In terms of data collection, the two chapters draw on the data from Facebook and web 
pages, plus interviews with key informants, and utilise the gathered event data to get 
an overview of the various links and relationships between the different groups 
making up the coalitions. The analyses will show two very different types of coalition 
building between Generation Identity and Fortress Europe, largely due to their 
adverse compositions– GI consisting of similar groupuscular organizations and FE of 
both non- and institutional groups. 
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CHAPTER 8. GENERATION 
IDENTITY’S EUROPEANIZATION OF 
NETWORKS 
The following chapter analyzes Generation Identity’s transnational coalition-building 
process. It explores how, and around what, the national GI groups began collaborating 
transnationally, and how and whether they maintain and sustain this cooperation. The 
chapter focuses on the three main GI-groups, GI France, GI Austria, and GI Germany, 
which are the most resourceful (see Chapter 5), and were among the first GI-groups 
created, played vital roles in setting up the other national GI-groups, and providing 
the ideological output for the coalition. The developments of four other national GI-
groups will also be considered, namely GI Italy, GI Czech Republic, GI Slovenia, and 
GI Hungary, in order to explain how the coalition has developed. The chapter aims to 
explore how the GI coalition has evolved since the first GI France protest action in 
October 2012, and whether and how it has survived over time. It is split into three 
sections, ‘Initiation of the Coalition’; ‘Maintenance of the Coalition’; and ‘Coalition 
Survival,’ in order to analyse the various components of the coalition-building 
process. The analysis will emphasize the great importance of transnational diffusion 
for this particular coalition, as the activists have managed to set up rather congruent 
‘branches’ across Europe (Pierre Larti in Dupin 2017), which largely share the same 
frames, political strategies, types of activities, and protest repertoires. Hence, since GI 
France’s first protest action in 2012, both in- and direct diffusion have been key for 
the creation and survival of the Generation Identity coalition. 
 INITIATION OF THE COALITION (2012-2014): GI FRANCE’S 
‘DECLARATION OF WAR’  
The following section considers the creation of the GI coalition from October 2012 
onwards. It considers GI France’s aim of creating a transnational network, and 
explains how and why GI Austria, GI Germany, GI Italy, and GI Czech Republic 
became its first four transnational coalition-partners in the period 2012-2013. A few 
years later, GI Hungary, GI Slovenia, and GI Poland also joined the coalition. 
In September 2012, the newly established Génération Identitaire (GI France) 
launched a YouTube video titled ‘Declaration of War’ (Génération Identitaire 2013a). 
It quickly diffused across Europe, where it was translated into several other European 
languages. Within a short period, numerous European extreme right activists created 
Facebook pages and websites, adopting the GI logo and language (see Eckes 2016). 
As GI France’s spokesperson at the time, Alban Ferrari, explained, the video 
promotion led to “individual initiatives from people we didn’t know. We have 
EUROPEANIZATION OF THE FAR RIGHT 
294
 
contacted some of them and we hope for great collaborations in the future” (as cited 
in Musson 2012). 
In the same interview, Ferrari mentioned that GI France ‘felt close’ to the youth 
sections of the Flemish Interest (Vlaams Belang), the Spanish Platform for Catalonia 
(Plataforma per Catalunya), and the Italian Northern League (Lega Nord), but also, 
and more importantly, for the future coalition, they “look[ed] with interest at what 
new organizations do, like W.I.R228  of Vienna” (Ibid.). W.I.R. also mobilized on a 
New Right platform, and a few weeks later, in November 2012, W.I.R representatives 
participated in Identitarian Blok’s conference in Orange, France229, and this became 
the initiation of the future European Generation Identity coalition. 
Around the same time, an Italian far right activist, Lorenzo Fiato, “saw the promo-
videos and the first action,” where after he contacted GI France, and expressed his 
wish to set up an Identitarian group in Italy. He then discovered that GI France had 
received “a similar mail from Austria, and then from Germany” (Interview with GI 
Italy 2017). Moreover, in September 2013, a Czech YouTube video appeared, 
showing young Czech activists making very similar statements as those of GI France 
in its ‘Declaration of War’ (Generace Identity 2013).  
In order to explain this strong interest in GI France’s ideology, organization, strategy, 
and expression form, the following section considers why the other national GI groups 
wanted to establish contacts, based on their political and discursive opportunities at 
the time. 
                                                          
228 WIR or Wiener Identitäre Richtung (Viennese Identitarian Direction) was an intellectual 
debate club that later turned into GI Austria after fusing with other, smaller, street active 
subcultural groups. It became an official Austrian association in 2012, referring to itself as an 
“Association for the preservation and promotion of cultural identity” (i24NEWS 2019). 
229 The ‘Identitarian Convention’ (Convention Identitaire) was, at the same time, the 10th 
anniversary of Identitarian Bloc. GI France participated at the Young Europeans’ Forum, 
together with representatives from various far right youth parties and student associations, 
including Alexander Markovics and Martin Sellner from W.I.R (Convention Identitaire 2012), 
who both later became leaders of GI Austria. 
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POLITICAL AND DISCURSIVE OPPORTUNITIES: LOOKING FOR NEW 
EXPRESSION FORMS230 
As explained in the theoretical framework, domestic political opportunities tend to 
guide movement activists, when searching inspiration and alliances abroad (see e.g. 
McCammon & Moon 2015). This is also the case for the various European activists, 
who adopted GI France’s ‘corporate identity’ (Eckes 2016). In order to understand 
this great interest in GI France and its ideology and political organization-form, one 
needs to consider the given groups’ national contexts, particularly concerning 
repression. The national GI group initiators all come from diverse political 
backgrounds, yet, most derive from neo-Fascist or neo-Nazi subcultural 
organizations. This is the case for the activists from GI Germany (NPD and neo-Nazi 
subcultural groups) (see e.g. Bruns et al. 2017), GI Austria (neo-Nazis and 
Burschenschaften) (DOEW n.d), and GI Czech Republic (Autonomous Nationalists 
and neo-Nazis) (Dlouhý 2016a). GI Italy’s leader, Lorenzo Fiato, derives from the 
Northern League milieu (Bruns et al. 2017). They all had an interest in making a 
similar (symbolic) break with their own, or national scenes’, neo-Nazi and -fascist 
pasts, just as Identitarian Bloc231 and the later GI France had (attempted) to do.  This 
involved changing the supply-side of their appearance by distancing themselves from 
the ‘old’ far right, moderating their discourses, and refraining from employing 
violence as part of their protest repertoires232. 
                                                          
230 This section focuses on GI Germany, GI Austria, GI Czech Republic and GI Italy, due to 
their earlier creations than the other GI groups. It was not possible to find much information 
about the origins of GI Hungary and GI Slovenia. We do know, however, that the leader of GI 
Hungary, Bódi Ábel, is a prior member of the Hungarian Jobbik party (Jobbik Magyarországért 
Mozgalom, or Movement for a Better Hungary) (see e.g. Tamás 2019). Journalists and anti-
racist organizations have not been ablo to find much data about the Slovenian GI-activists, 
neither in terms of leadership, internal structure, or membership. Yet, it is known that the group 
has close links to the Slovenian hooligan milieu, especially the Green Dragons from Ljubliana 
(see e.g. Cirman & Vuković 2018). 
231 After the dissolution of Unité Radicale, its leaders, Robert and Vardon, reflected about the 
usefulness of political violence for agitation (Camus & François 2011). Robert had, for instance, 
earlier spoken about his activities in Troisieme Voie (Third Way), where he had lost several 
friends, who were either killed or incarcerated, but also that he feared for his own future. With 
Identitarian Bloc, they changed the action repertoire to non-violent protests, but still with a 
focus on combat, for instance by the creation of local boxing studios (Ibid.). 
232 Despite the portrayal of being more ‘moderate’, there are several instances of GI leaders and 
activists showing their ‘backstage faces’, either by expressing themselves in explicitly racist, 
revisionist, or violent terms (see e.g. Rees et al. 2018). Hence, one should not accept this 
‘moderation’ at face value, of course. 
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In the Austrian and Czech cases, the leading activists were looking for more moderate 
expression forms in the face of repression. In Austria, during the period 2007-2012, 
the Austrian Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Verfassungsschutz) 
repressed numerous extreme right extra-parliamentary actors, especially neo-Nazi 
activists. The most prominent group was the Alpen-Donau group around Gottfried 
Küssel, which mainly had a virtual presence (DOEW 2014a). After the closure of its 
page, some of the neo-Nazis, including Martin Sellner, re-formed, and founded the 
Austrian Identitarians in 2012, together with other far-right activists (Peham as cited 
in ORF.at 2016). When explaining their prior participation in neo-Nazi groups, most 
Austrian GI members talk about this as an aberration, or wrong path, which they have 
now replaced with the more ‘correct’ or ‘moderate’ GI Austria (DOEW 2014b). In 
the Czech Republic, the state’s forced dissolution of Dělnická strana (Workers Party, 
DS) in 2010, together with a heightened police crackdown on neo-Nazi structures 
(Mareš 2011), entailed a similar need for more moderate expression forms. 
In the German case, the remnants of the neo-Nazi Autonomous Nationalists were 
looking for a new impetus for the mobilization. Prior to GI Germany, the German neo-
Nazi scene had made continued attempts of renewal, and of ideological moderation, 
in order to become more socially acceptable (Sieber 2012). In 2010, for instance, 
several neo-Nazis set up different ‘identity’-inspired groups233, just as German Neue 
Rechte intellectuals, especially Götz Kubitschek, encouraged a reenergizing of 
völkisch nationalism, and made several attempts at fostering a sustainable new right 
mobilization (see e.g. Weiß 2017 for more) 234.  
Conversely, GI Italy’s leadership does not derive from the extreme right scene. Its 
creator and spokesperson, Lorenzo Fiato, was working for Lega Nord prior to the 
creation of the group. He explains that the more moderate look and expression form 
of GI France was very appealing. To him, the French activists “were saying real things 
[…] they were keeping everything very concrete, and they were all looking very good 
and normal,” unlike extreme and ‘old-fashioned’ nationalist organizations, such as 
CasaPound (Interview with GI Italy 2017). In the Italian case, it was thus not the fear 
                                                          
233 In Frankfurt, the National-Socialists Rhine-Main initiated the Identitarian Group Frankfurt 
(‘Identitäre Gruppe Frankfurt’). Another group, the Sarrazin Movement (‘Sarrazin-
Bewegung’), arose as a cultural-racist splitter-group that mobilized around the book published 
by the SPD-member Thilo Sarrazin in 2010, Germany Abolishes Itself (Deutschland schafft 
sich ab). The Facebook-page of the group was called “Identitarian Movement ‘100% 
Identitarian – 0% xenophobic’”, a name very akin to the current GI-motto “100% identity – 0% 
racism” (Sieber 2012). In March 2011, ‘Block Identität’ appeared on Facebook as a German 
namesake of the French Identitarian Bloc (Ibid.). 
234 For instance, the 2008 Konservativen-Subversiven Aktion, which attempted to carry out the 
same form of happenings as the French Identitarian Bloc (Kellershohn 2009). 
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of repression that motivated Fiato to set up GI Italy, but rather the appeal of GI 
France’s modernized far right mobilization form. 
The action repertoire moderation and ‘normal’ appearance of the GI activists is a 
recurring theme in the GI-groups’ texts and interviews and aligns with the New Right 
ambition of countering liberalism at the meta-political level, i.e. through arguments 
and discourse instead of fists. All groups thus strongly emphasize the more moderate 
stance of GI compared to other extreme right currents in Europe. As GI Germany’s 
spokesperson states, “We have a clear rule, we have a clear position that we are 
patriots and not Nazis, and the NPD, or movements like the Free Nationalists, are not 
an opportunity for us” (Interview with GI Germany 2017).  
This distancing to the extreme right must also be considered in relation to the more 
open discursive opportunities for the far right in Europe, especially since 9/11, 2001, 
plus the European economic crisis of 2008 (for more on this, see Chapter 1). These 
events have led to strong electoral gains for the European populist radical right, just 
as the mainstream parties have shifted their discourses rightwards (see e.g. Joon Han 
2015). Hence, with the gradual openings of both the discursive space and political 
system, an ensuing moderation of both the frames and protest repertoires is to be 
expected (Kriesi 2004). One can thus consider the European GI groups’ adoption and 
adaptation of the French GI ‘model’ as a combination of their aim of an extreme right 
moderation, mainly based on repression fears, plus the more open discursive 
opportunities in terms of far right anti-immigration and -system frames. The national 
GI groups thus all looked elsewhere for alternative expression forms of extreme right 
frames and protest strategies, using GI France’s new, modern, and professional 
‘model’ or ‘formula’ as a blueprint, plus drawing on New Right ideologues. This then 
entailed a discarding of neo-fascism and neo-Nazism as ‘old and traditional’ 
ideologies, and the ability to present themselves as modern ‘Ibsters’ on the right side 
of the law (Speit 2017). 
Considering the initial GI coalition-building period more closely, the following 
section will show that the adoption of GI France’s New Right frames and its action 
repertoire both was based on prior networks, but mainly the networking and strategical 
abilities of key movement entrepreneurs. 
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ESTABLISHING CONTACTS: MOVEMENT ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND 
NETWORK TIES 
Beginning with the Identitarian Bloc’s conference in Orange, France, in October 
2012, the transnational GI-coalition gradually developed. This transnationalization 
was an explicit aim of GI France, as: 
Génération Identitaire wants to establish durable relations with all youth 
communities that share our vision all over Europe. We attach a lot [of] 
importance to the European dimension of our fight. From Paris to 
Bucharest and from Stockholm to Athens, the youth, who are heirs of a 
great common civilisation, have to look in the same direction. It’s simply 
a matter of survival. (Alban Ferrrari, GI France spokesperson, October 
2012 as cited in Musson 2012). 
One of the first transnational GI events took place in July 2013, where GI France 
invited European activists to France for the ‘First European Forum of Generation 
Identity’ (GI Austria/Germany 2013). It was a four-day coordination meeting with 
seminars on various topics, ranging from ‘Cultural revolution’ to ‘Management’. 
Moreover, the activists also discussed the prospects of a “strengthened pan-European 
cooperation in the future” (Ibid.). This event later became an annually recurring event, 
as Identitarian Bloc incorporated the European participants in their Summer 
University in 2014 (see below for more on the Summer University). 
Being the main actors behind the Summer University, and generally providing much 
GI-material to the other national GI groups (more on this below), one can consider 
Phillippe Vardon, Fabrice Robert, and Jean-David Cattin from Les Identitaires (the 
earlier Identitarian Bloc) as the main movement entrepreneurs of the GI coalition. At 
the same time, GI Austria and GI Germany have been important for the Italian and 
Central and Eastern European GI groups, and particularly the Austrian activist Martin 
Sellner has been crucial for GI Germany’s development. Drawing on his acquired 
knowledge from the German New Right scene, Sellner was key to setting up the 
German GI group, and he played an important role in the 2014-2015 period, where GI 
Germany further professionalized themselves (Interview with GI Germany 2017; 
ORF.at 2016). This involvement by Sellner is mainly ascribable to GI Austria’s great 
interest in ensuring that Germany was represented in the GI network, as the Austrian 
branch adhered to völkisch (‘Folkish’) and, in some cases, pan-German nationalism 
(Winkler 2017), shared the German language and was already somewhat embedded 
in the German Neue Rechte scene (see Daniel 2019). From the start, the two national 
groups thus had “close links”, and considering their many on- and offline exchanges 
and the diffusion of protest strategies, campaigns, and frames from Austria to 
Germany, GI Germany appears to see GI Austria “as a role model” (German 
Bundestag 2017). 
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Sellner, in fact, quickly turned into one of the main GI movement entrepreneurs in 
terms of cross-border (online) activities. As a full-time activist, he is a highly mobile 
transnational activist, speaks fluent English and French, and generally spends much 
time abroad; introducing the movement to new members, and giving seminars and 
lectures about the new right ideas, plus networking with other far right actors in 
Europe and the U.S. (see e.g. Cox & Meisel 2018). Moreover, with a strong online 
YouTube and social media presence, he disseminates information about GI events, 
ideational deliberations, but also presentations of the various other European GI 
groups making up the coalition (such as his interview with GI Hungary’s leader in 
2017 (Sellner 2017b)). In this way, he links up the online with the offline GI presence.  
GI Germany and GI Austria both aided the Italian235 and Central and Eastern European 
groups assembling (first the Czech group, then the Hungarian, Slovenian, and Polish). 
Having already established good links to fellow European ER activists (especially 
from Germany and Italy), during their time as Autonomous Nationalists (see e.g. 
Schlembach 2013), the Czech GI group received a lot of foreign assistance when 
setting up its organization in 2013-2014. After the Czech activists had been in contact 
with GI France regarding the possible creation of a Czech GI branch, GI Austria came 
to the Czech Republic in December 2013, giving lessons about non-violent activism 
and graphics techniques (Interview with GI Czech Republic 2018). On April 5, 2014, 
a more formal introductory meeting took place in Prague, attended by 60 GI activists 
from France, Austria, Italy, and Poland, and with speeches by French BI and GI 
leaders (Phillipe Vardon and Jean-David Cattin) (Czech Ministry of the Interior 2015: 
14). In the same month, April 2014, GI Germany and GI Italy also held their annual 
National Assemblies, with participation by GI France and/or GI Austria (GI Italy FB-
Post236; Majic 2017). Here, they established their organisational and strategical 
frameworks, and in both the German and Italian cases, the assembly was considered 
foundational for both the national GI group, and in terms of their acceptance into the 
European GI network, together with the Czech GI group.  
The Czech group sees itself vital for GI as the ‘gateway’ between Eastern and Western 
Europe (Interview with GI Czech Republic 2018). The group assisted the founding 
activists of GI Hungary and GI Poland in setting up their groups, providing them with 
advice on the aim of the overall movement (for instance, at a visit to GI Hungary in 
October 2016 (GI Hungary FB-post) and a joint meeting with GI Poland in Prague in 
March 2017 (GI Czech Republic 2017a)). GI Germany has also helped these groups 
                                                          
235 Sellner, for instance, took part in GI Italy’s National Assemblies in Milan in the spring of 
2013 and 2014, and GI Italy’s leadership particularly found the one in April 2014 to be an 
“important step forward” for the organization (GI Italy FB-Post).  
236 As all of the Generation Identity Facebook-pages were closed down in April 2018, the 
Facebook links no longer work, which is why there no references to the posts in the Literature 
List, just as there is not for the Fortress Europe posts. If one wishes to see the collected datasets, 
please consult the author. 
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organise. This is both due to its geographical proximity to Poland, but also because 
GI Germany had Polish members who knew of some interested activists in Poland, 
who “wanted to join the Identitarian Movement. Then we decided that ‘okay, if they 
want to join, first of all we have to build up a movement in Poland’” (Interview with 
GI Germany 2017). GI Germany’s spokesperson further explains that the already 
established groups “don't influence the political direction of these groups. We only 
give them knowledge and support in structure-building; how I build a group, how I 
talk with people, demonstration organising, campaign organising, it's not so much 
about the topics, who or what they target, that they have to decide for themselves” 
(Ibid.). Moreover, GI Italy has also cooperated rather closely with the Slovenian 
activists, both in terms of protests (see Chapter 6), and social events, such as joint 
summer camps (GI Italy Facebook-post 28.8.2017), again due to the geographical 
proximity of the two countries, plus the Slovenian minority living in the Italian Friuli-
Venezia Giulia region.  
Leaders and high-ranking activists of the more established GI groups thus acted as 
transnational movement entrepreneurs and both responded to messages from far right 
activists abroad, who were interested in setting up their own GI-branch, and utilized 
their prior networks to create new GI groups across Europe. The leaders thus helped 
the newly created national GI groups in their founding periods (Bruns et al. 2017), in 
order to ensure that the GI ‘brand’ was implemented correctly (GI France’s 
spokesperson Pierre Larti in Dupin 2017). This involved the setting up of their 
organizational structure, and the dissemination of knowledge about the history and 
intellectual output of the New Right and Generation Identity itself (Interview with GI 
Germany 2017; Interview with GI Czech Republic 2018). Hence, when looking at 
these initial steps from a coalition-building perspective, then their transnational 
networking activities ultimately provided “the basis for the convergence and 
harmonisation of ideological aims and strategic practice as a precursor to the 
formation of political alliances” (Macklin 2013: 177). This happened largely before 
in the case of the other national GI groups237, as they based their features on GI 
France’s ideological and organizational set-up, which they learned about through both 
                                                          
237 It was a similar case for GI UK & Ireland and GI Denmark, which became part of the GI 
coalition in 2017 and 2018 respectively. Their admittance into GI was rather similar to that of 
the other national GI groups and will not be analysed further in the chapter, aside from these 
short remarks: The GI leadership welcomed GI UK & Ireland’s creation, as this meant a better 
‘bridge’ to the U.S. (Ebner as cited in Dearden 2017). Moreover, in the interview with GI 
Denmark’s spokesperson, she talked about their inclusion into the coalition in 2018: “Well, we 
made the initial contact […] and said ‘We are here now’ [laughter] […] I can't actually 
remember who we wrote first, but all the other official countries at that time had to say yes to 
a cooperation, and the same for ourselves. We also had to decide whether we would be an 
independent group or whether we would like to join the community and use the symbol and so 
on […] They looked at what we were doing and met up with us” (Interview with GI Denmark 
2018). 
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direct (face-to-face encounters) and in-direct (the ‘Declaration of War’ video) 
channels of diffusion. The following section explains these diffusion mechanisms, as 
it considers how the different European groups adopted GI France’s main frames and 
viewpoints, and thus, developed similar worldviews around which to mobilize. 
SIMILARITY IN WORLDVIEW AND ENEMIES: THROUGH IN- AND 
DIRECT DIFFUSION 
Research indicates that actors who either share the same beliefs and worldviews, or at 
least have a common enemy, create the majority of transnational movement coalitions 
(see e.g. Shawki 2013). The movement leaders have similarly been found to produce 
the majority of such frames, as a means to garner support (see e.g. Noakes & Johnston 
2005). In the case of Generation Identity, besides the Austrian W.I.R., the other GI 
groups did not adhere to, or employ, GI France’s explicit worldview or frames prior 
to the initial networking. Instead, they largely adopted GI France’s frames, values, 
and mobilization strategies through various diffusion processes. 
As part of the French The Identitarians, GI France draws on the ideological output of 
New Right writers from France, Germany, and Italy (see e.g. Bruns et al. 2017; Weiß 
2017; Dlouhý 2016b for more on this). The French New Right, which arose in the 
late-1960s, drew heavily on the ideological output of the German Conservative 
Revolution from the pre-World War II era. Yet, it also developed close links to 
numerous other European far right intellectuals, who were trying to develop new far 
right impetus, and there was a lot of cross-border diffusion of literature at the time, 
with de Benoist as one of the key actors (see e.g. Bar-On 2008; Minkenberg 2000; 
Camus & Lebourg 2017 for more). Ideological exchanges and elaborations of new 
right material across Europe is thus by far nothing new historically speaking, and there 
are numerous ideological New Right overlaps between the various countries. Hence, 
the German and Austrian groups could largely draw on their national New Right 
output, while particularly the Eastern European groups were heavily dependent on the 
French and German-speaking groups in terms of obtaining literature. 
Ensuring Initial Worldview Similarity by Making New Right Literature Accessible  
GI France employed both in- and direct diffusion channels in order to disseminate the 
ideological material, mainly in the shape of online media and face-to-face meetings 
and seminars. For one, beginning with the ‘Declaration of War’ video in 2012, GI 
France wished to ensure that the group’s viewpoints were properly understood and 
implemented by the other European GI groups employing its logo. GI France’s then-
spokesperson, Ferrari, explained that the translations of the video to other European 
languages “took up a lot of our time,” as the French group had to “ensure that our 
ideas are properly understood across the entire continent; in German; Spanish; 
English; Italian; and Greek” (as cited in Musson 2012). 
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In terms of New Right literature, then the two German New Right actors Kubitschek 
and Lichtmesz translated the key French GI literature in their Antaios publishing 
house (Antaios Verlag). This included Renaud Camus’ The Great Replacement 
(Revolte gegen den grossen Austausch), Dominique Venner’s The Rebellious Heart 
(Das rebellische Herz), and Jean Raspail’s 1973 novel The Camp of the Saints (Das 
Heerlager der Heiligen). According to Weiβ (2017), this “amalgamation of economic 
and political interests made Kubitschek the movement entrepreneur of the 
Identitarians” (2017: 104). Conversely, GI Italy’s spokesperson deplores that neither 
Venner nor Camus’ work have Italian translations (Interview with GI Italy 2017). 
Similarly, GI Czech Republic’s spokesperson explains that the group has been trying 
to get some of the New Right texts translated into Czech, as there is not much readily 
available literature in the language. This was, in fact, an inhibiting factor for the 
group’s initial development (Interview with GI Czech Republic 2018). Yet, the French 
and Austrian GI groups provided the group with the most basic material, and the year 
2013 was thus mainly used to form the ideological profile of the Czech group, based 
on new right ideology and GI France’s strategical framework (Dlouhý 2016b).  
Moreover, in February 2013, the Austrian GI activist Markus Willinger published the 
book Generation Identity – A Declaration of War against the 68’ers (Willinger 2013), 
which, in large part, outlines the GI coalition’s main arguments (Vardon in Willinger 
2013). By April the same year, it had been translated to English, and, albeit not being 
officially recognised as GI’s manifesto by neither GI Austria nor GI France, the 
Italian and Czech translations of the book were highly advertised on their respective 
web pages (see e.g. GI Czech Republic 2017b)238. 
Shared Worldview around ‘European Identity’, Ethnopluralism, and Anti-Liberalism 
In the interviews, the spokespersons of GI Germany, GI Italy, and GI Denmark 
emphasize that the GI activists do not share a unitary ideology, neither domestically 
nor at the European level, as they all have different perceptions of society and its 
organisation. They do, however, unite around certain key concepts and viewpoints 
                                                          
238 The GI groups utilized Willinger’s book for other purposes as well, besides from internal 
dissemination. For one, it provided GI with a great networking opportunity with other European 
far right actors, such as e.g. at the Zwischentag book fair in Germany in 2013, where the leaders 
of GI France, GI Germany, and GI Austria represented the ‘movement’ at separate stalls and 
talks (see e.g. Menzel 2013). Moreover, Willinger also presented the book at several far right 
conferences around Europe and the U.S., including Identitär Idé in Stockholm, Sweden, hosted 
by Daniel Friberg (Lilleby 2013). 
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when mobilizing on the streets and posting contents online239. Hence, even though 
there are certain context-specific differences across the local and national GI groups, 
entailing a focus on different issues, they all:  
 Consider their identities as consisting of three layers, a local, a national, and 
a European, which are all perceived as organic and static;  
 Diagnose liberalist and universalist values as the greatest threats to the 
European societies; 
 Diagnose third-country immigration as the key immediate problem to solve; 
 Adhere to an ethno-pluralist conception of society (with the prognosis that 
each ‘civilization’ should stay in its own part of the world, and there should 
be no interracial mixing (miscegenation)); 
 Utilise the same key concepts, albeit to various extents (e.g. the diagnosis of 
a ‘great replacement’ taking place, and the prognosis of ‘remigration’) (for 
more on their frames, see Chapter 5) 
Aside from creating a clear ‘us’ and ‘them’ division between ‘Europeans’ and the 
‘others,’ GI’s three-layered identity-conception also permits the groups to place their 
focus differently in terms of regionalism, nationalism, and Europeanism, while still 
distinguishing between different local and national identities. The national GI groups 
thus emphasize different facets of their identity. In the German-speaking countries, 
the national identity is highlighted (for instance through the slogan ‘Homeland, 
Freedom, Tradition’ (‘Heimat240, Freiheit, Tradition’), while the French and Italian 
groups focus more on the regional and European aspects of their identity (Bruns et al. 
2017). Moreover, this neo-fascist proclivity to maintain the transnational cooperation 
at the level of a ‘Europe of Nations’ instead of a ‘Nation Europe’ (i.e. a united Europe) 
also means that the GI activists can participate in shared European events, without this 
conflicting with their nationalist prevalence (as also shown by Schlembach 2011). 
Hence, unlike many other transnational coalitions, the Generation Identity coalition 
did not arise due to activists from different countries wanting to pool the resources 
around a shared purpose or enemy (see e.g. Levi & Murphy 2006). Instead, the GI 
coalition arose due to the movement entrepreneurship of GI France, which Poitiers 
and ‘war declaration’ videos diffused across Europe, leading to the initiation of 
numerous online and a few offline national GI groups (Eckes 2016). These groups 
adopted GI France’s main frames, symbols, and action forms, acquired through both 
                                                          
239 As GI Italy’s spokesperson, for instance, states: “In fact, it's also very difficult to say that 
our movement is very, how can I say, ideological, because there are many political points of 
view inside, regarding many issues. We are very critical towards mass immigration, but for the 
rest, there is no, how can I say… [Interviewer: “Ideological core?”] Yeah, exactly, exactly” 
(Interview with GI Italy 2017). 
240 The German word ‘Heimat’ can refer to both the home country and town though, so it serves 
a dual purpose. 
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direct and indirect diffusion processes. The following section will first describe the 
coalition’s European network structure, and then consider the inter-group activities, 
which ensure the coalition’s maintenance.  
 COALITION-MAINTENANCE 
In terms of GI’s European structure, GI France refers to GI as a “French movement 
with European branches” (Larti as cited in Dupin 2017). One of GI Hungary’s 
spokespersons, Bence Szabó, similarly refers to the network as “a franchise, like 
McDonald’s, we just do not sell the same hamburger, but we are representing the same 
ideas […], we are in touch, but we are completely independent of each other” (GI 
Hungary 2016). Moreover, all of the national spokespersons interviewed emphasized 
the loose structure of the coalition, and the great level of autonomy of each regional 
and national group (Interview with GI Germany 2017; Interview with GI Italy 2017; 
Interview with GI Denmark 2018; Interview with GI Czech Republic 2018). The 
coalition is thus built up around an overarching ‘GI brand’ or ‘corporate identity’ 
(Eckes 2016), shared by all the groups, including the Lambda symbol as their logo, 
and the use of the same key concepts and values, plus professional social media 
strategies (Zúquete 2018). The GI groups have thus together developed a ‘short hand 
label’, which is also recognisable for people outside the group, who can easily identify 
the activists as partaking in the same European network (Flesher Fominaya 2010). As 
already indicated, most of the contents of this ‘corporate identity’ derive from the 
French The Identitarians, which, as the following section will show, disseminates 
their strategy to European GI activists at the annual Summer University (Université 
d’Été) in France. 
POOLING OF CULTURAL RESOURCES  
Being the originators of the GI ‘brand’, The Identitarians and GI France are the main 
providers of GI’s collective action frames and the specialized knowledge regarding 
the groups’ organizational features, the planning of protest events, and online 
marketing and communication. The leaders of The Identitarians emphasize the 
necessity to have a professional online appearance (Castelli Gattinara & Froio 2018; 
Cahuzac & François 2013), and, together with GI France, they diffuse most of this 
knowledge during training sessions at the Summer University (for more on its 
contents, see Bouron 2014). They have organized this annually recurring GI event 
since 2003. Yet, it is only since August 2014 that it has been open to GI activists from 
Europe. It hosts around 140 participants each year241. According to Martin Sellner, the 
                                                          
241 The German new right intellectual Götz Kubitschek arranges similar training sessions, or 
‘academies,’ in his home in Schnellroda, Germany, for German-speaking Identitarians from 
Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. This is organized through his Institute for State Policy 
(‘Institut für Staatspolitik’, IfS) (Kellershohn 2016). 
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sessions are not open to all GI activists, but require one year of prior GI activism, plus 
“above average performance in the regional section,” in order to ensure the 
participation of a “certain elite” (Sellner 2015). 
During the sessions, the French leaders attempt to ensure that the methods, symbols, 
and frames (the GI ‘corporate identity’) largely align across state borders, and that 
new European GI activists are properly introduced to the movement and its strategy. 
The university usually contains courses on: New Right ideology; current politics; 
marketing (such as branding, graphics, photography, and the creation of donor 
networks); political communication (interview techniques and media strategies); 
activism (protest repertoire practice, organization of demonstrations, legal 
frameworks); plus combat training (see e.g. GI France FB-post; GI Italy FB-post; 
Clément Gallant as cited in Laffont 2018). These ‘university sessions’ can thus be 
seen as activities, in which the “leaders help to socialize and politicize members into 
a culture of resistance” (DeCesare 2013: 241), thereby fostering shared transnational 
GI ideals, symbols, and norms (Greer & Hauptmeier 2012). Ultimately, it is a means 
to foster a closer GI transnational unity, or congruency, both at the movement and 
individual activist level, leading to the “emergence of a political style and type” 
(Sellner 2015). 
Both GI Italy and GI Denmark’s spokespeople emphasize the significance of this 
training for their groups, highlighting the formation of the activists, as it “is organised 
by professionals that studied political science, they read a lot of books about it, so they 
actually know their job” (Interview with GI Italy 2017). Moreover, GI Denmark’s 
spokesperson states that:  
We take a lot home [from the summer university] […] It's like sending 
someone on a course […] they bring both knowledge, energy, experience, 
and networks with them, and [the summer university] is certainly one of 
the things that makes it possible to build this collaboration […]. It is also 
a good way for new activists to get into it, for example, understand things 
like political strategy or communication and ideology, and how the 
community is […] It is an experience, you cannot really describe it. You 
have to just go and meet the others (Interview with GI Denmark 2018, 
author’s translation). 
In conjunction with the Summer University, some of the national GI groups employ 
the transnational protests as means of learning organizational skills (Interview with 
GI Czech Republic 2018; Interview with GI Italy 2017). As GI Czech Republic’s 
spokesperson states: “In countries like France, Austria or Germany, their activism and 
events are on a much more professional level with regards to their potential, with 
bigger counts of activists and better resources,” making it beneficial to observe these 
groups’ protest actions (Interview with GI Czech Republic 2018). The GI groups thus 
pool their resources through direct diffusion by the larger national GI-groups. 
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ONLINE COMMUNICATION: NETWORKING AND ORGANIZATION OF 
EVENTS 
Similar as other far right transnational networks (see e.g. Caiani & Parenti 2013), most 
of GI’s transnational cooperation, coordination, and information dissemination takes 
place online. Online networking facilitators are particularly important for 
domestically marginalized political groups (della Porta & Tarrow 2005), just as it 
provides an alternative to avoid the constraints faced during street activism (Caiani et 
al. 2012: 10). The groups have thus adopted Identitarian Bloc’s hybrid strategy of on- 
and offline dissemination of political communication and activism (Cahuzac & 
François 2013), and both the local and national GI groups are highly active on 
different online social media platforms, especially Facebook and Twitter. Several of 
the leading GI activists also produce YouTube vlogs, blog entries, radio shows, and 
entries for other new right media (e.g. Fabrice Robert’s NovoPress in France or 
Kubitschek’s Sezession in Germany). Until June 2018, where Facebook closed down 
all European GI Facebook pages (Bailey 2018), the groups employed these platforms 
for both inter-group GI communication, networking, and for spreading news and 
political viewpoints to their supporters across Europe.  
According to the interviewed GI leaders, most communication amongst the national 
groups takes place online. The groups mainly use Skype or TeamSpeak to discuss 
upcoming transnational campaigns and bigger demonstrations, hold informal debates, 
provide advice, and deliberate on “strategy questions of ideology positions” 
(Interview with GI Germany 2017). The main language employed is usually English, 
or in some cases German (Interview with GI Czech Republic 2018)242. Moreover, the 
leaders also share viewpoints about organizational and strategical matters, account for 
the progress in each country, and provide information about local or national GI 
protest events, which the other groups can use for inspiration, and to post on their 
various social media accounts (Interview with GI Czech Republic 2018). Conversely, 
they deal with smaller protest events and organizational issues at the local or national 
level, as the specificities of the national contexts makes it difficult for the other 
European GI actors to advise a given group about its national setting (Interview with 
GI Denmark 2018). 
There is, therefore, a rather frequent online contact between the leadership of the 
various national groups, while “an average activist will probably have less contact” 
(Interview with GI Italy 2017). According to GI Germany’s spokesperson, the 
communication between the European GI groups has in fact increased in frequency 
and importance since 2014-2015, due to the growth of all of the national GI groups. 
This has brought them to “a point where it's getting more and more important to be 
professional, to have clear ideological positions, […] because […] when something 
                                                          
242 As Fiato states, “As long as someone speaks English, there are very few problems with the 
organization” of events (Interview with GI Italy 2017). 
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happens in Austria or France, that also has implications for Germany or Italy” 
(Interview with GI Germany 2017). These briefings are thus, to some extent, used to 
ensure that the groups more or less align in terms of activities and statements. 
Online National GI Inter-Group Expressions of Recognition and Solidarity 
Aside from the use of the online platforms for inter-group communication, the GI 
activists also employ it for pan-European promotional means and for underlining their 
transnational GI links. When their Facebook accounts were still active, many of the 
posts on the national GI groups’ Facebook pages thus involved activity notifications 
about other GI groups’ more spectacular protest actions. This sharing endeavour 
forms part of the GI leaders’ aim of appearing as a close European movement. The 
Facebook posts thus included mentions of spectacular protest events243, solidarity 
actions, and statements of disapproval against repressive steps towards fellow 
European GI activists.  
Particularly the latter point is interesting in terms of fostering transnational solidarity 
bonds. As Macklin (2013) argues, far-right transnational networking can act as moral 
support for groups carrying out more ‘intolerant’ actions. GI’s national groups thus 
frequently refer to the repressive measures taken against their fellow European 
‘fighters’. As an example, the other GI groups strongly condemned the court-case 
against the so-called ‘4 from Poitiers’ arrested after the mosque occupation in October 
2012 (Génération Identitaire 2013b). The same occurs if left-wing organizations, such 
as Antifa, have attacked a GI activist or damaged GI infrastructure. Particularly the 
Czech and Slovenian GI groups post a remarkable amount about Antifa, considering 
the limited presence of the organisation in their countries.  
Hence, even though the other European GI groups are mentioned to a more limited 
extent than the local national GI groups, such links can be considered as a means to 
both sustain the coalition, but also to demonstrate that the battle against the ‘others’ 
reaches beyond the national borders. This attempted construction of close 
transnational coalition ties does not only take place online. As the following section 
will demonstrate, the European GI activists similarly pursue the aim of constructing a 
collective European GI identity through their shared frames, protest actions, and 
symbols. 
                                                          
243 Such as GI France’s occupation of the European Commission’s Office in Paris in May 2015. 
This was posted on the Facebook walls of GI Italy, GI Austria and GI Germany (There are 
numerous similar cases of cross-postings, most frequently by the national GI groups that do not 
organize many protest actions themselves). 
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CO-CONSTRUCTING THE ‘US’ AT TRANSNATIONAL EVENTS244  
As a means to sustain the GI coalition and to highlight its European identitarian 
aspects, aside from the aforementioned Summer University, the GI groups have 
organized various joint cross-border meetings, seminars, and weekend camps, 
involving ideological and strategical debates plus social activities. These events are 
most commonly organised by geographically close national GI groups. Several cross-
border encounters have, for instance, taken place between GI Austria and GI Germany 
(e.g. a ‘Winter walk’ in Bavaria in 2014 (GI Austria FB-post) and IfS conferences (see 
e.g. GI Germany 2015d), and GI Italy and GI France (e.g. in Cannes, France in 
September 2014 (GI Italy FB-post)). Moreover, from 2014 onwards, already 
established GI groups have organised several meetings with ‘applicant’ groups (e.g. 
GI Italy and GI Austria’s trip to Maribor in Slovenia in October 2016 (GI Austria FB-
post), just as GI Czech Republic and GI Poland have held joint seminars (see e.g. GI 
Czech Republic 2017a)).  
Many of these meetings and gatherings involve bonfires and songs, which aim at 
inducing a community feeling amongst the activists, rather akin to the more general 
scout’s ethos, which GI attempts to foster, both through these shared activities, but 
also through the many direct social actions carried out by the various local groups (see 
Chapter 7; Froio & Castelli Gattinara 2016). This again refers back to the 
communitarian ties, which GI wishes to revive, protect, and further at the more general 
local, national, and European levels (See e.g. Bouron 2014), and which requires pan-
European cooperation (Interview with GI Czech Republic 2018). According to the GI 
activists, these ties are currently dissipating, making them develop a diagnostic frame 
around being part of the ‘Last generation of Europeans,’ if they do not revolt (see e.g. 
Lilleby 2013). It is around these sentiments that the GI coalition frames its 
transnational collective identity. 
European Collective Identity: Around Battle Frames and the Need to ‘Defend Europe’ 
Conscious of the challenges forced upon us, we do not decline any battle. 
Proud of our heritage and confident in our destiny, we have only one 
command: do not retreat! We are a generation that has been sacrificed, but 
not a lost generation, for we are launching a war against all who want to 
tear our roots from us and make us forget who we are. Our ideal is 
Reconquest, and we will see it through to the end. Generation Identity is 
the barricade upon which our youth are mounting in order to fight for their 
identity (GI France in Morgan 2013: 12f). 
                                                          
244 This section largely draws on my forthcoming book chapter ‘The Transnational Mobilization 
of Generation Identity’. In: A. Hellström, O.C. Norocel & M.B. Jørgensen (eds.), Hope and 
Nostalgia at the Intersection between Culture and Welfare, Springer. 
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Employing strong battle frames, the GI leadership and spokespeople mainly construct 
the GI groups’ transnational collective identity around the need to ‘defend Europe’, 
both in a figurative and literal sense245. Inspired by the German writer and war veteran 
Ernst Jünger and his idealisation of the military (see e.g. Weiß 2017), and similarly as 
prior BI-related associations, such as Groupe Sparte (created 2005) and Groupe 
Thucydide (2008), GI France has adopted several discursive and symbolic references 
to wartime and fighting. In fact, all of the GI groups frequently refer to masculine 
warriors and portray themselves as heroic knights, who will come to the rescue of 
Europe (Ibid.). For one, in 2013, the French groupuscule introduced itself as a 
‘fighting community’ on its website (Morgan 2013: 12). Its logo mirrors this 
sentiment, as the Greek letter Lambda refers to the shields of the outnumbered Spartan 
soldiers, as depicted in the movie 300. Moreover, a document from a 2018 court case 
against GI Austria shows a hierarchical relationship between the Austrian GI leaders 
(the ‘hoplites’) and the activists (the ‘Spartans’) (Böhmer 2019), mirroring the far 
right ambition of authoritarianism. 
While the GI groups mainly employ frames that depict women as having the role of 
“traditional homemaker”, the coalition maintains a masculinity ideal based on 
classical conceptions of heterosexual, strong, warrior-like men (Blum 2017: 329) (For 
more on the GI groupuscules’ views on women’s roles, see e.g. Blum 2017; Bruns et 
al. 2017). This becomes visible, for instance, in the frequent depictions of, and 
participation in, combat sports, as both the male and female activists are offered to 
learn combat skills, for instance at GI camps or conferences, or in local boxing 
studios246. Moreover, at the annual Summer Universities in France, the participants 
wear the same clothes, symbolising uniformity and order (Dupin 2017), just as they 
are organized in a hierarchical and military fashion, where uniformity, control, and 
discipline are some of the core principles (Bouron 2014). According to GI France, 
these Summer schools are run with the motto ‘Learn to vanquish’ (‘s’instruire pour 
vaincre’) (GI France FB-post), which is also the motto of the French national military 
academy L’École Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr.  
The use of these symbols, practices, and frames should be seen in relation to GI 
France’s stated prognostic ambition “to prevent the civil war” in Europe (Larti as 
cited in Dupin 2017: 45), and the groupuscule’s self-presentation as the “barricade 
upon which our youth are mounting in order to fight for their identity” (Morgan 2013: 
12). GI France thereby conjures an apocalyptic sentiment, portraying itself as the last 
                                                          
245 Consider e.g. the use of slogans, such as “Defend yourselves because it is our country!” 
(“Wehrt euch denn es ist unser Land!”), “Defend your Church” (“Défend ton église”), and “We 
are the front line” (“Nous sommes la prémiere ligne”). 
246 See also Palladino 2018a, where GI Rome’s leader states that the newly founded group’s 
focus is on physical training: “We find ourselves in a situation of extreme danger: flocks of 
refugees, scum, who come to Italy to make their own comforts. We have decided that 
Generation Identity will be based on physical preparation” (author’s translation). 
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bastion in the defence of the autochthonous ethnically ‘pure’ European population, 
fighting against egalitarianism, Islam, and mass immigration (see Chapter 5). As the 
German scholar Sieber (2016) states: “In terms of content, it amounts to this simple, 
brief and concise message: ‘What matters to us will die out if we do not defend 
ourselves now’” (2016: 366). 
Aside from the attributes outlined above, a lot of the European GI groups’ collective 
identity construction revolves around references to the shared history of battling 
Islam, in the shape of the Ottomans, as a joint European venture. Through the 
“embellishment and reconstitution of relevant aspects of the past” (Hunt et al. 1994: 
195), the GI groups employ the glorification of the European past for a dual purpose. 
The coalition provides a pan-European narrative for the ongoing battle against the 
culturally foreign oppressor, but also grounds this narrative in actual historical 
occurrences, albeit with some ‘artistic’ modifications, to make it align better with the 
GI groups’ frames regarding Islam. GI France’s frequent mention of Charles Martel 
and his Poitiers victory is one example among many others (see e.g. GI France in 
Morgan 2013: 18), and each GI group refers to its own country’s historical figures 
and events. GI Italy’s spokesperson, for instance, sees the Poitiers mosque as ‘a 
symbolic place,’ due to the European victory against the Ottomans, which meant that 
“The Islamic community in France decided, because of that, to build the biggest 
mosque in Europe like in a way to say ‘Okay, after some centuries, we are winning’” 
(Interview with GI Italy 2017).  
The historical battles are also discussed at the transnational GI level, for instance at 
the 2016 Summer University, which was entitled ‘From Covadonga to Calais’, in 
reference to the site of the first Christian victory over the Islamic Umuyyad Caliphate 
on the Iberian Peninsula in 722 AD (See table below). At the same time, the frequent 
referencing to European history at these summer universities is an attempt to “create 
an emotional identification with Western Occidental culture” (Leggewie 2016: 392). 
Table 9.1: Titles of GI France’s annual Summer Universities. 
Year Title of Summer University 
2013  ‘On the Road to Ithaca’ (En route pour Ithaque)247  
2014 ‘A Myth for a New Chivalry, from Excalibur to the Grail’  
(Un mythe pour une nouvelle chevalerie, d’Excalibur au Graal)  
2015 ‘From Charles Martel to Charles de Gaulle – The French Insubordination’ 
(De Charles Martel à Charles de Gaulle - l’insoumission française!) 
2016 ‘From Covadonga to Calais’ (De Covadonga à Calais) 
2017 ‘Defenders of Europe’ (Défenseurs de l'Europe) 
                                                          
247 The 2013 Summer University focused on the works of Homer and the adventures of Ulysses, 
“in parallel with the militant formation” (GI Lyon 2013). 
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The symbolic ‘battle frame’ also becomes visible in GI’s demonstrations, processions, 
and other protests commemorating historical European victories over the Ottomans. 
As examples, GI Hungary and GI Austria both organised a commemorative 
procession in the autumn of 2017, with participation by GI activists from abroad. Both 
marches referred to battles, where an army of soldiers from across Europe had won 
over the Ottomans (Battle of Buda in 1686 and Battle of Vienna248 in 1683 
respectively) (GI Hungary 2017b; GI Austria 2017a)249. One should see these 
historical references by GI as an attempt to “give its racist orientation a cultural-
historical touch” (Häusler as cited in Janzen 2013). Moreover, very similar to more 
focused nationalist discourse, GI’s highlighting of these battles can be considered 
allusions to a European “mythical Golden Age”, where the continent “allegedly 
experienced unity and glory, fullness and greatness” (Forchtner 2016: 275), a period 
to which Europe should return. These marches are also somewhat similar to the 
processions organized by German neo-Nazis in commemoration of Nazi-leaders, as a 
means to create intergroup unity amongst international neo-Nazis (Schlembach 2011). 
Moreover, by referring to clashes that took place in one European country, but led to 
the liberation of several states, the defence of Europe is not only a national matter. 
Rather, it becomes a pan-European project, in order to underline the diagnostic frame 
that ‘if one state falls, the next ones will follow.’  
The reason behind this pan-European unity at the discursive level derives from the GI 
groups’ perception of ‘Europe’ as consisting of a shared ‘community of fate’ that 
implies a predestined need to defend the continent together against external threats 
(Bruns et al. 2017: 236). Yet, while they believe that a pan-European alliance is the 
best means to protect their identity and civilization, the further characterisation of the 
‘European civilisation’ is remarkably vague, and the description does not reach much 
beyond it consisting of a shared culture and traditions. Instead, the groups refer to 
themselves as ‘patriotic Europeans,’ thus permitting the activists to both draw on their 
shared European heritage, while also highlighting the uniqueness of their nations. This 
is visible, for instance, in certain statements made by the national leaders who on the 
one side praise the GI’s achievements as a pan-European movement, but on the other, 
point to the distinctions between the various countries (e.g. Interview with GI 
Germany 2017). This open framing of being ‘European’ not only entails a very 
inclusive stance on the in-group, i.e. the autochthonous Europeans, but also, and most 
importantly, it permits a strict demarcation between the European people and the out-
                                                          
248 GI Hungary’s procession took place on September 2, 2017, under the heading ‘Freedom 
Day’ with participation by GI activists from Austria, Germany, Czech Republic, Poland, 
Slovenia and Italy. GI Austria’s procession was on September 9, 2017, with the slogan 
“Liberation of Vienna 1683 – Defense of Europe!’, and had participants from GI Hungary, GI 
France, GI Germany, GI Poland and from other European countries. 
249 GI Nice has also organized annual processions on September 3rd, in commemoration of 
Catherine Segurane, who played a role in the resistance against the Turkish raid of Nice in 1543. 
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group, i.e. the foreign ‘others’, who are depicted as a constant threat (Mense 2017). 
The framing strategy is also employed when the GI leaders explain the Eastern 
European GI groups’ strong mobilisation against Islam, despite the comparatively low 
numbers of Muslims in that part of Europe (see e.g. Hucek 2014)250.  
Similarly, but to a minor extent, uprisings against the communist regime are also 
commemorated. GI Czech Republic for instance praises the student Jan Palach, who 
immolated himself in protest against the Prague Spring of 1968 (GI Czech Republic 
2014), while GI’s annual transnational demonstration of 2017 coincided with the date 
of an anti-communist rebellion in the then GDR (June 17, 1953). These attempts to 
create collective European memories of the past by referring to ‘freedom fighters’ 
who heroically struggled for the liberation of Europe from foreign oppressors, can 
then be considered as part of the construction of a transnational collective identity 
through the symbolic use of frames referring to historical events.   
Overcoming the European History of National(ist) Conflicts and Divergences 
In a similar vein, the various GI leaders also underline the need for showing pan-
European solidarity, especially between the different national GI groups and activists 
(see e.g. above for the groups’ online solidarity expressions). In February 2015, GI 
Austria, for instance, organized a ‘Forum for European Diversity’ in Vienna, which 
was joined by GI Czech Republic and GI Slovenia (Identitäre Bewegung Österreich 
2015a). It aimed at providing more insights about the Eastern European countries, by 
discussing “our history and identity, what unites us and how we can shape our shared 
Europe, in order to preserve it in its diversity” (Ibid, author’s translation). This 
cooperation between Austrian and Slovenian far right activists is a rather new 
development, as prior cooperation was hindered by historical problems related to the 
border construction, both between Austria and Slovenia, but also with Italy 
(Weidinger 2016), just as FPÖ for decades has opposed the Slovenian minority living 
in Kärnten (see e.g. Hödl 2014). Yet, the GI leaders downplay this and other old far 
right border conflicts, and do not problematize all of these prior intra-European 
history-based animosities. Instead, the activists call for a sentiment of ‘letting bygones 
be bygones’ in terms of these historical nationalist struggles. As Bercik from GI Czech 
Republic states: “In our opinion, a key to European cooperation and to save Europe 
as a unity, [is that] we need to let go of all animosities, which were there historically. 
                                                          
250 As Bercik from GI Czech Republic explains, “Even though the Czech Republic has not been 
impacted by mass immigration, Europe has opened its borders, and it is possible that 
mechanisms will be developed, which makes the Czech Republic more attractive for the 
immigrants. For example, if it comes to a comparison of social benefits or approval of Dublin 
4” (Interview with GI Czech Republic 2018). 
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Currently, we see them as overcome, and we think that it is not important anymore” 
(Interview with GI Czech Republic 2018). 
Similarly, there are hardly any mentions of the European history of inter- and intra-
state wars. The Second World War is only mentioned in statements serving to distance 
the movement from the ideologies of fascism and Nazism, and to underline that such 
a European war must never occur again, while “Next time we fight, it’s side by side” 
(in reference to WWI) (Zúquete 2018)251. Instead, GI Germany and GI Austria point 
to the need to move beyond the “cultic policy of guilt,” absolving contemporary 
Europeans, and especially Germans, from responsibility for the actions of their 
ancestors (GI Germany n.d.d). With this stance, they align themselves with the general 
German-speaking far right. GI Italy’s spokesperson also expresses this sentiment, 
when discussing transnational protests, which he not only sees as a means to “foster 
co-operation, but also to mobilise through a sense of pan-European identity” 
(Schlembach 2011: 1347). He thus states that a transnational GI demonstration: 
[…] shows unity. Europe [has been] marked by internal wars for centuries 
and it is very important to go there and show that now we are united in 
especially some occasions. Like, for example, I remember I went to an 
Austrian manifestation once, and I spoke about the difference between the 
start of the century with the First World War and now. We were all united 
in the same square. So we also want to give this kind of message to the 
public (Interview with GI Italy 2017). 
In sum, the GI activists frame themselves as the heroic and strong defenders of the 
European continent, who unitedly will act as the prognostic bulwark against the 
current threats, just like their European ancestors. At the same time, the European 
autochthonous ‘silent majority’ (white) population forms GI’s constituency (the ‘us’), 
whose ethnicity-based identity should be preserved at all cost. This explains GI’s use 
of collective action frames, as the movement continuously highlights itself as the 
solution to the European population’s problems, by highlighting its own role as the 
main defender of the continent, including through the employment of combative 
terms, as shown above. The European GI activists thus frame themselves either as the 
guardians of the European identity, culture, and general population, the only actors 
caring for the vulnerable autochthonous citizens, and the protectors against the 
‘violent’ Muslim male immigrants. Through this, they develop their own version of 
an ‘alternative Europe,’ built up around an autochthonous (and thus white) European 
‘community of destiny’ based around a shared culture and identity, united in a ‘Europe 
                                                          
251 GI Denmark’s spokesperson, for instance, states “We have, of course, spent a long time 
arguing with each other and so on, and also in some rather violent ways in Europe. But now 
that people come from a completely different culture with completely different values, which 
we cannot recognize at all in Europe, […] the different countries find out how close we really 
are to each other” (Interview with GI Denmark 2018). 
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of nations’, and protected from the diagnostic threats of both liberalism and the 
Muslim ‘invaders’. 
 GENERATION IDENTITY COALITION-SURVIVAL?  
The above analysis has shown that the various national GI groups have managed to 
establish and (so far) ensure the survival of their transnational coalition, by aligning 
their frames through various in- and direct diffusion processes, such as the 
dissemination of ideological material, joint seminars, and training sessions at the 
annual Summer University, and by coordinating their activities online. 
‘European Movement’ versus Reality? 
Yet, while the GI groups depict themselves as a “political youth movement that brings 
together boys and girls across Europe” (GI France n.d.), the infrequent joint 
transnational meetings and protests (see Chapter 6) and the rather small network size 
in terms of actual core members indicates that this self-portrayal as a ‘movement’ is 
rather flawed in reality. The ‘movement’ construction thus mainly takes place at the 
frame level, as there are, in fact, few transnational face-to-face exchanges. Instead, 
the groups focus on the employment of a strong (online) media communication 
strategy and other tools that make the GI groups’ actions and transnational ties appear 
larger than they actually are (see e.g. Froio 2018). The ideational and the network 
levels are thus only intertwined to a limited extent, albeit the attempt to construct an 
alternative reality through framing and media techniques.  
Conversely, the rather loose, yet sustained, ties between the local, national, and 
European GI-groups, which are especially maintained through their frequent online 
contacts, and advertisement of the other groups’ events, at the same time indicate a 
well-coordinated European coalition, whose coherence is ensured by constant shared 
deliberation. However, simultaneously, the vast majority of both the face-to-face and 
the online transnational encounters only appear to take place between the GI 
leadership, again insinuating the constructed nature of this European ‘movement’ 
sentiment, as the ‘basic’ activists do not appear to be in frequent contact with each 
other (Interview with GI Italy 2017). Throughout the 2012-2017 coalition-building 
period, it has thus been the same 4-7 key movement entrepreneurs, who have pushed 
the transnationalization forward through more formal European partnerships, while 
the individual GI-activists do not appear to have strong border-crossing connections. 
This implies that the GI coalition is run like something akin to a multinational 
movement of groupuscules with different ‘branches’ across Europe, whose activists 
refer to the same New Right material and protest repertoires and advocate for the same 
key political changes, albeit with different levels of resources and contextual 
opportunities, and a limited level of cross-border unity. 
GI Coalition Survival through Hierarchical Organization 
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Moreover, the prior assertion that GI France, GI Austria, and GI Germany are, by far, 
the strongest GI groups, while particularly the Eastern European groups are weak in 
terms of both cultural, human, and material resources (see Chapter 5), has 
repercussions for the transnational cooperation and activity levels (see Chapter 6), 
plus the prominence placed on the different groups. Yet, despite this skewed resource-
relationship, the GI-groups insist on portraying their transnational organization as 
non-hierarchical and loosely organized, and that GI France does not exercise any form 
of top-down management on the other national groups, despite its role as coalition 
initiator (Interviews with GI Italy, GI Denmark, GI Germany, and GI Czech 
Republic). Instead, so Lorenzo Fiato from GI Italy explains, “We have a European 
leadership […] with some members from every country” (Interview with GI Italy 
2017), which coordinate upcoming events.  
Yet, the data reveals another story, as the French Identitarians and Sellner from 
Austria more or less establish the ground rules for GI membership, just as they are in 
charge of welcoming new groups, training activists, and providing the main 
ideological guidelines for the other members. Moreover, the little information that has 
been unearthed about GI France, GI Austria and GI Germany’s252 internal workings 
at the national levels testifies to a highly hierarchical network structure, with a clear 
role division between the activists (Böhmer 2019; Bouron 2014). The leaders thus 
exercise a certain degree of control over the basic activists, especially in terms of their 
public behaviour (non-violent and non-racist), the contents of their publications (Lipp 
2017), and only a select few are allowed to speak publically on behalf of the GI groups 
or to the press. Infights and internal GI disagreements are also not discussed or even 
mentioned publically (contrary to e.g. the dispute between Lutz Bachmann and 
Tatjana Festerling from Pegida Germany’s ORGA-team in May-August 2016, see 
Chapter 9). In this way, GI attempts (and largely succeeds) to present a more 
‘polished’ frontstage appearance, especially in the German, Austrian and French 
contexts, where state repression measures and counter-mobilizations are likely to be 
stronger (Minkenberg 2018). Similarly, at the transnational level, GI Denmark’s 
spokesperson explains that there is no overarching ‘ruleset’ for the various national 
GI-groups, solely that they are obliged to not overstep the boundaries in terms of 
extremeness (Interview with GI Denmark 2018) 253.  
  
                                                          
252 This has either consisted of covert ethnographic studies (Bouron 2014, who analysed 
Identitarian Bloc), internal documents (such as those left behind by a regional German GI group 
in 2017 (see e.g. Lipp 2017), or documents displayed for public view during court trials (e.g. 
during the ongoing GI Austria investigation (Böhmer 2019)). 
253 Consider in this regard Martin Sellner’s recent exclusion of GI UK & Ireland from the 
European GI-network, due to its open relationship to anti-Semitic and similar extreme right 
ideology representatives (Townsend 2019). 
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Hence, the GI-groups’ groupuscular features, such as their small sizes, revolutionary 
and meta-political aims, network-natures, and “ultimate goal of overcoming the 
decadence of the existing liberal democratic system” (Griffin 2003: 30), are 
intertwined with a leadership ensuring transnational conformity to the, more polished, 
‘party-line,’ and a search for public attention. While such features are abnormal for 
groupuscules (see Ibid.), the Western European GI-leaders’ prior experiences with 
domestic repression, and the aim to find new ways to express far right ideology, infer 
a wish to partly escape the subcultural sphere, at least in terms of visibility and ‘front-
stage’ activities. This also partly explains the small size of the circle of core members, 
as this makes it easier to prevent dissidence and fallouts. All these factors thus mainly 
relate to the wish to appear as legitimate and moderate actors, and has been witnessed 
by extreme right parties as well (see e.g. Feldman 2015 on the British National Party).  
Respectability Concerns: Eastern European GI-Groups Not Official GI-Members?  
This legitimacy and moderation quest also explains the hesitation by the four Western 
European ‘core-groups’ to refer to the Eastern European GI-groups as ‘full members’ 
of the GI ‘movement’, due to their need for caution in terms of not ‘slipping up’ by 
being associated with more extreme actors abroad. This membership denial thus refers 
back to the political and cultural opportunities discussed above, as most of the Eastern 
European groups can be considered as clearly more ‘extreme’ in their expression 
forms than their Western counterparts (a common trait for Eastern versus Western 
European far right actors (Minkenberg 2018)). Hence, even though the GI groups 
want to portray themselves as sharing a pan-European identity, then this does not 
outweigh respectability concerns in terms of more extreme national GI groups, 
indicating the rather porous nature of the transnational ties.  
While GI Czech Republic was established in 2013 and was quickly linked to the other 
national GI groups, GI Hungary, GI Slovenia and GI Poland began participating in 
transnational events with the other national GI groups in the period 2014-2017. All of 
these Eastern European GI groups openly declare their membership of the European 
GI ‘movement’, yet, certain of the Western European GI groups do not recognize the 
Eastern European groups as ‘full’ GI members. Instead, the groups are said to be in 
the ‘admittance process’ (Interview with GI Denmark 2018), as they are still 
establishing their groups, aided by the already established GI groups (Interview with 
GI Italy 2017). GI Italy’s spokesperson, for instance, explains that while there are 
well-established GI groups in Italy, France, Germany, and Austria: 
[…] there are several groups […] in Central, in Western Europe, and in 
Eastern Europe, that would like to open chapters of the movement in their 
country. It is very important to us to meet them, teach them how we do 
politics, maybe give them some books to read, bring them to our actions 
to learn [from us], and so on. It's very important to us” (Interview with GI 
Italy 2017). 
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Similarly, on GI Austria’s website, only the French, Austrian, German, and Italian GI 
groups are considered as ‘official’ GI groups, while they are ‘represented’ in other 
countries (GI Austria n.d.), including the Czech Republic, despite the Czech group’s 
longer existence, and comparatively rather well-established organization by now (see 
e.g. Berlekamp & Opielka 2018). This becomes visible, for instance, on their websites 
and Facebook pages, where they share(d) links to neo-fascist and neo-Nazi pages, 
such as Motpol (GI Czech Republic) and the Hungarian neo-Nazi website kuruc.info 
(GI Hungary). Thus, the Western European groups cannot officially state that these 
groups take part in the GI-network, as this will make it too easy for Western European 
state authorities and anti-racist counterdemonstrators to point out the extreme nature 
of the GI groups, due to their transnational relations (see e.g. DOEW 2017).  
Nevertheless, despite this denial of close links to the Central and Eastern European 
GI groups, in the autumn of 2017, particularly GI Austria and GI France appeared to 
make concerted efforts to enhance GI Hungary’s role in the GI coalition. This took 
place via both transnational protest actions in Hungary (see GI Austria. 2017b; GI 
Hungary 2017b), but also a joint press conference in Budapest involving 
representatives from GI Hungary, GI France, and GI Austria, presenting GI Hungary 
and its goals (GI Hungary FB-post). Austrian observers of the far right saw this 
networking activity as occurring due to the “stagnation” experienced by the Austrian 
GI group in terms of media attention, which made them drop their inhibitions 
concerning cooperation with more openly neo-fascist and revisionist actors (DOEW 
2017). This again underlines the role of the political and discursive opportunities, as 
when extra-parliamentary actors perceive their mobilization opportunities as closed, 
they tend to radicalize their contention254. 
 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The analysis of the GI groups’ coalition-building process reveals that the various 
national GI groups have managed to create and sustain their coalition since its creation 
in 2012. The initial members of the coalition mainly coalesced around the need for 
new ways to express their ideology and gain societal influence in the face of domestic 
repression, while at the same time exploiting the opening European discursive 
opportunities, due to the salience of the anti-immigration issue. The groups have thus 
built up the transnational cooperation around the creation of an ideational cohesion 
and unity, rather than responding to a specific political situation or event (such as e.g. 
the onset of the ‘refugee crisis’, as in the case of Fortress Europe). This has meant 
that the GI groups emphasised the construction of shared collective identity frames 
around which to organize their mobilization, in an attempt to appear as a collective 
European actor. They thus all draw attention to the joint pan-European past, 
                                                          
254 Currently, GI Austria is also under renewed investigation, risking a ban by the authorities, 
due to the links between the organization and Brenton Tarrant, the man behind the New Zealand 
terrorist attack on two mosques (BBC 2019a). 
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particularly in terms of battling the Muslim Ottomans, and portray themselves as the 
defenders of European culture and identity against both liberalism and third-country 
immigration, while simultaneously all refraining from utilizing explicitly racist or 
derogatory language.  
The main organizational framework has been set up by a small group of movement 
entrepreneurs (mainly Jean-David Cattin, Phillippe Vardon, and Fabrice Robert from 
The Identitarians, and Martin Sellner from GI Austria). These actors all “influence 
the structures, strategies, and goals” of the various GI groups (Staggenborg 2013: 2), 
utilising very professional, systematic, and military style educational means (see 
Sellner 2015; Bouron 2014), ensuring that the other GI activists obtained the required 
skills to initiate and maintain a national GI group. In this way, the GI-leaders have set 
up a hierarchical coalition, which is top-managed by the Austrian and French leaders, 
who set up the rules for appropriate activist behaviour, both in terms of frames, 
communication strategies, and degrees of acceptable extremism. 
These entrepreneurs have thus directly diffused the organizational pointers to the 
given domestic or local contexts, where the national and local GI-leaders adapted 
them to the domestic settings. This is done by taking the national protest-culture and 
legislative frameworks into account (Interview with GI Denmark 2018), and focusing 
more on certain GI-topics rather than others, depending on the political contexts 
(Interview with GI Czech Republic 2018), while also moderating the GI-worldviews 
according to the domestic settings. The groups thus adopt and appropriate the main 
GI collective action frames to their national settings, while drawing on the same 
overarching literature. They thus all attempt to influence the general domestic societal 
discourse (especially through attempts to influence the media), plus the key national 
far right political parties (see Lipp 2017; Böhmer 2019), by disseminating New Right 
thoughts about Islam, mainstream liberalism, and the pending ‘white genocide’ 
through the ‘Great Replacement’. 
The different national groups thus have strong overlaps in their expressed worldviews 
and frames, plus employment of protest repertoires (see also Chapters 5 and 6), and 
act as a supranational network of actors that mainly are active domestically. This 
means that the various national GI-groups have not organized a large amount of joint 
transnational protests and meetings and do not interact face-to-face transnationally to 
a high degree. Moreover, the cooperative links mainly exist between the national GI-
leaders, who communicate rather frequently in order to discuss past and upcoming 
events, and agree on future joint actions. Hence, as the same core group of leading 
members mainly has sustained the transnational ties, it is hard to talk about an actual 
transnational movement. Instead, the groups form national GI ‘branches,’ which are 
united around the same organizational framework and collective action frames, but 
otherwise organize independently domestically, thereby disseminating and 
appropriating the GI-worldview to the distinct national contexts. 
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CHAPTER 9. FORTRESS EUROPE’S 
EUROPEANIZATION OF NETWORKS  
On January 23, 2016, the Czech party Dawn – National Coalition (Úsvit – Národní 
Koalice) hosted a meeting in Prague for representatives of several PEGIDA branches 
and other European anti-Islam actors, together with the Czech anti-Islam protest group 
Blok against Islam (BPI) and PEGIDA Germany. The event led to the formation of 
the Fortress Europe coalition, including the signing of the so-called Prague 
Declaration by the following groups: 
 Five protest groups (PEGIDA Austria, PEGIDA Bulgaria, PEGIDA 
Germany, PEGIDA Netherlands, and the Czech Blok Against Islam) 
 Five political parties (the Italian Lega Nord (Now Lega), the Slovakian 
Ódvaha (Courage), the Polish Ruch Narodowy (National Movement), the 
Czech Úsvit – Národní Koalice (Dawn – National Coalition), and the Eesti 
Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond (Conservative People’s Party of Estonia, 
EKRE)255   
The majority of the groups (6 out of 10) came from Central and Eastern Europe. 
Besides the signatories, the Swiss Direktdemokratische Partei Schweiz (Direct 
Democratic Party Switzerland) and the French Résistance Républicaine (Republican 
Resistance) also participated in the meeting (Festerling FB-post). A few days later, 
PEGIDA UK and the Danish For Freedom (ex-PEGIDA DK) also signed the 
declaration at a PEGIDA Germany demonstration (Bartlett 2017).  
This chapter focuses on the transnational coalition Fortress Europe and analyses its 
emergence, maintenance, and (possible) survival. The chapter sets out by explaining 
the coalition’s chronological development, from the creation of PEGIDA Germany in 
October 2014, its beginning cooperation with the Czech Blok against Islam in the 
second half of 2015, and finally, the formation of Fortress Europe in January 2016. 
The ensuing analysis considers the development of the FE-coalition, i.e. how and why 
the groups wished to cooperate transnationally, their (potential) pooling of resources, 
communicative links, plus their creation of transnational collective identity frames. 
The chapter mainly focuses on PEGIDA Germany (especially Tatjana Festerling), 
Blok against Islam, Tommy Robinson, and PEGIDA Netherlands’ leader, Edwin 
Wagensveld, due to their important roles in the coalition.  
                                                          
255 EKRE was represented by Maria Kaljuste, who had set up the NGO ISIS political association 
in 2015 together with Georg Kirsberg. NGO Isis propagates a strong anti-Islam agenda. EKRE’s 
participation in Fortress Europe was thus mainly led by Kaljuste, and her participation should 
not be considered representative for the whole party (Expert interview with Kasekamp 2018). 
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As it is the aim to analyse the various components of the coalition-building process, 
the chapter consists of three sections, ‘Initiation of Coalition’; ‘Maintenance of 
Coalition’; and ‘Coalition Survival?’ The analysis will underline the heterogeneity of 
the participating groups’ organization, worldviews, and political ambitions, which 
eventually led to the dissolution of the coalition. At the same time, the internal splits 
of PEGIDA Germany and BPI/Dawn, i.e. the groups initiating the coalition, were also 
a strong factor in Fortress Europe’s relatively short existence. 
 INITIATION OF THE FE-COALITION (2014-2015)  
The first paragraphs will briefly recount the immediate period before the creation of 
the transnational Fortress Europe coalition in January 2016. This includes PEGIDA 
Germany’s initial (failed) attempt at creating a European PEGIDA movement in 2015, 
and its cooperation with the Czech anti-Islam group Blok Against Islam, which 
eventually led to the creation of Fortress Europe. 
PEGIDA Germany’s Initial Transnationalisation Ambitions  
The 20.10.2014 was like a long-awaited starting shot, was a signal, was an 
act of release and unleashed unimagined powers for hundreds of thousands 
of patriots throughout Europe, even around the world, in the fight against 
the obviously insane political establishment (PEGIDA Germany 2017c, 
author’s translation). 
On Monday, October 20, 2014, PEGIDA Germany held its first demonstration in 
Dresden, and this quickly became a weekly event. Originally, PEGIDA Germany’s 
leaders intended to only focus on German nationalism, and on ‘being German’. Yet, 
after deliberating that including the term ‘Europeans’ could lead to more support from 
abroad, the ORGA-team chose the name ‘Patriotic Europeans against the 
Islamization of the Occident’ (‘Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des 
Abendlandes’) (Coury 2016). There was thus a clear transnational ambition from the 
beginning, together with an implicit invitation to other European actors to imitate its 
name. Combined with the soaring numbers of PEGIDA’s protest participants by 
December 2014 (see Chapter 7), this European ambition led to the diffusion of 
PEGIDA’s name, key collective action frames, and protest repertoire across Europe, 
in a form of symbol and ideology ‘branding’ (Druxes 2016) very akin to Generation 
Identity (see Chapter 6). Particularly “radical right activists in Western Europe [took] 
the opportunity to use [PEGIDA’s] prominence to mobilise their own support” 
(Berntzen & Weisskircher 2016: 559), initially predominantly online. This then led to 
the creation of around 200 local256, national, and European PEGIDA Facebook groups 
from late 2014 onwards, who all adopted PEGIDA Germany’s main symbols and 
                                                          
256 Including groups such as Bagida (Bavaria), Bärgida (Berlin), Kargida (Karlsruhe), Mügida 
(Munich), Bragida (Braunschweig), and, the most successful German offshoot, Legida 
(Leipzig).  
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positions (Epoch Times 2015a), mainly through in-direct diffusion, and thus without 
the same ‘top-down management’ as by GI France (see Chapter 8).  
Utilizing the discursive opportunities deriving from the Islamist terrorist attack on 
Charlie Hebdo in Paris, France, on January 7, 2015, several European PEGIDA-
branches began organizing demonstrations (see e.g. Berntzen & Weisskircher 2016). 
PEGIDA groups thus mobilized in Denmark, France, the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Hungary, Finland, Estonia, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, Norway, and Austria (see e.g. Epoch Times 2015a; HopeNotHate, 
n.d.a), albeit with highly varied degrees of success. Yet, similar to the European 
Defence League offshoots that never attracted as many protest participants as EDL, 
none of the PEGIDA offshoots, neither in Germany,257 nor abroad, managed to reach 
the same numbers as PEGIDA in Dresden. Moreover, a high number of the PEGIDAs 
remained online phenomena258. 
Initially, PEGIDA Germany attempted to lead these various PEGIDA offshoots, and 
establish a European PEGIDA movement. It required new groups to obtain its consent 
before utilizing the PEGIDA name, and thus wanted to decide which local German 
and European groups to consider ‘authentic’ or ‘true’ PEGIDA groups (Vorländer et 
al. 2018)259. Yet, this attempted pan-European PEGIDA leadership largely failed. 
Instead, the various offshoots had complete autonomy over their protest forms and 
activities. PEGIDA Germany thus did not help set up, nor coordinate the actions of, 
any of the other PEGIDA groups, and there was never any shared pooling of resources.  
  
                                                          
257 Korsch explains that despite having similar numbers of PEGIDA-offshoots and rallies in 
both parts of Germany, in the first 2 months of mobilization, “the average number of 
participants is very disproportionate, with 1780 (East) and 170 (West) people taking part per 
meeting. The vast majority (198,000 people equal to 80 per cent) gathered at events in Saxony 
and a total of 175,000 (73 per cent) showed up in Dresden alone during this time” (Korsch as 
cited in Virchow 2016a: 546). 
258 Many of these groups did obtain a rather strong online following, but as demonstrated by 
Berntzen and Weisskircher (2016), many of their Facebook ‘likers’ and ‘followers’ came from 
abroad, especially Germany, as a means to boost the numbers. 
259 Pegida UK, for instance, initially “did not appear to have the full blessing and cooperation 
of the German parent organisation” (HopeNotHate n.d.a). In Germany, Bachmann managed 
some of the other local PEGIDA groups, while others, such as DÜGIDA, refused such top-
down management. After some internal debates and disagreements, Frank Ingo Friedemann 
wrote to the other Germany-Orga team members that, “From our perspective, the direction 
should be that all willing GIDA's support our positions and see them as their own [...]. If a 
GIDA thinks it has to go its own way, then it should do that, but not with support and approval 
of PEGIDA Dresden” (Antifa Infoblatt 2016, author’s translation). 
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Regardless of these lacking close cooperational ties, the European PEGIDA groups 
did support each other, for instance, by giving speeches at each other’s demonstrations 
(see more in Chapter 7). PEGIDA Germany also held several organizational meetings 
for the various -IDA leaders, albeit with rather mixed attendance (see e.g. Antifa 
Infoblatt 2016)260. In fact, in April 2016, Lutz Bachmann discussed the PEGIDA 
network, which at the time consisted of (mainly online) groups in 27 countries. He 
acknowledged that he did not “manage them all. It’s almost a franchise now and he 
freely admits that he doesn’t know, and certainly doesn’t seem sure of all the people 
leading the different groups around the world” (Kassam 2016b). Hence, there was not 
a strong social base between the various PEGIDA groups (as opposed to the 
Generation Identity coalition, see Chapter 8). 
Spring 2015: PEGIDA Germany’s Alliance-Attempts with Radical Right Parties  
From early on, Bachmann tried to network with European radical right extra-
parliamentary organizations and parties, aiming to position PEGIDA Germany as their 
“German counterpart” (Vorländer et al. 2018: 66). In February 2015, Götz Kubitschek 
thus represented PEGIDA Germany at a Lega Nord ‘Identity’ conference and 
demonstration in Milan (Kubitschek 2015). Yet, aside from Lega Nord, none of the 
larger European radical right parties showed interest in closer cooperation. While 
Geert Wilders for instance did speak at a PEGIDA Germany demonstration in April 
2015, it had also been the plan to include speakers from Front National, but this did 
not materialize (Birschel & Fischer 2015). Hence, besides some sporadic exchanges, 
the links to the Western European radical right parties were rather unsubstantiated, 
just as PEGIDA Germany’s participation rates were falling (see Chapter 7). 
Autumn-Winter 2015-2016: PEGIDA and BPI Develop Transnational Coalition Ideas 
With the onset of the ‘long summer of migration’ in August 2015 (della Porta 2018), 
PEGIDA Germany’s participation levels started rising again (Durchgezählt n.d), just 
as the anti-Islam group Blok against Islam (BPI) was very active in the Czech 
Republic (see Chapter 7). Prodded by the urgency of the ‘refugee crisis,’ BPI hoped 
to learn from PEGIDA’s demonstration experiences and expertise, while PEGIDA still 
was looking for European networking opportunities. BPI and PEGIDA Germany thus 
                                                          
260 On July 4, 2015, for instance, PEGIDA Germany organized a meeting in Kassel, Germany, 
with representatives from PEGIDA groups from Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, 
Belgium and Austria (PEGIDA Germany FB-Post). 
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began cooperating in October 2015261 (Epoch Times 2015d; for an analysis of the BPI-
PEGIDA Germany relations, see Prokupkova 2018b).  
A few weeks later, on October 19, 2015, PEGIDA Germany invited European far-
right actors to speak at its one-year anniversary,262 including representatives from the 
Czech Dawn – National Coalition, Lega Nord, PEGIDA Poland, plus Tommy 
Robinson (ex-EDL leader) (Epoch Times 2015e). In October and November, PEGIDA 
Germany representatives and Robinson joined two BPI protests in Prague263. At the 
latter, Robinson aired the idea of simultaneous anti-Islam demonstrations across 
Europe to the PEGIDA Germany and BPI representatives. He saw this as a means to 
“coordinate our efforts”, because “[w]e are more powerful if we all do it together at 
the same time” (Bartlett 2017). On November 30, he presented the idea in a speech at 
a PEGIDA Germany demonstration, encouraging all European ‘patriots’ to unite for 
a simultaneous protest on February 6, entitled “Save our culture, save our country, 
save our future,” in reference to the ‘dangers’ of Islam (See Epoch Times 2015f). 
Having now recounted the events in the immediate period before the creation of the 
transnational Fortress Europe (FE) coalition in January 2016, the following analysis 
will consider how and why FE was established more thoroughly. This will involve an 
analysis of the coalition members’ political and discursive opportunities, the various 
groups’ invitations to join the coalition, the potential legitimacy deliberations behind 
the choice to participate in FE, and the groups’ shared worldviews and/or enemy 
constructions around which they could jointly mobilize. 
                                                          
261 Due to both the proximity of Dresden to the Czech Republic and PEGIDA Germany’s many 
participants, already at its first protests in early 2015, IVČRN had set up the Czech PEGIDA 
Facebook ‘Page’ and expressed the wish to cooperate with PEGIDA Dresden (Kovner 2017). 
Yet, IVČRN’s initial attempts to forge ties did not succeed. However, on October 4, 2015, 
PEGIDA Germany invited BPI and Dawn to join them on the Czech-German border by Sebnitz 
in Saxony, in order to form a symbolic human chain, and demand the introduction of border 
controls (Epoch Times 2015d). 
262 Bachmann had hoped to convince Marine Le Pen (Front National), Victor Órban (Fidesz), 
and Heinz-Christian Strache (Freedom Party of Austria) to come and speak, yet, these requests 
were rejected (Zeit Online 2015). Marine Le Pen stated that she did not receive an invitation, 
and that she would not participate in such a demonstration (Ibid.). 
263 On October 28, Festerling and Bachmann from PEGIDA Germany and Jerzy Kenig from 
the Polish National Movement participated in an anti-immigration demonstration across the 
Czech Republic (four simultaneous protests in four Czech cities) (Jahn 2015). On November 
17, PEGIDA Germany representatives and Tommy Robinson went to Prague to join Dawn and 
BPI in their support protest for the Czech President Zéman (Bartlett 2017). 
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POLITICAL AND DISCURSIVE OPPORTUNITIES: SEARCHING FOR 
EUROPEAN PARTNERS 
The groups, which decided to take part in Fortress Europe, wanted to exploit the 
opening European discursive opportunities, brought along with the onset of the 
‘refugee crisis’. As described above, the idea of FE was developed during the height 
of the so-called ‘crisis’ (autumn 2015), i.e. during a period in which the EU member 
states struggled to find joint solutions to the problem of accommodating the many 
refugees and asylum seekers entering Europe. Instead, the various states implemented 
protectionist measures such as border controls, and particularly the Visegrad countries 
(Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland) obstructed the EU’s aim of 
introducing refugee quotas (see Section 1).  
In fact, already from spring 2015 onwards, many (mainly Eastern) European far right 
groups mobilized against their states’ reception of refugees, including protests to 
oppose the EU’s refugee policy (see e.g. Hafez 2018). From August 2015 onwards, 
PEGIDA Germany also mobilized more explicitly against the refugees, and 
experienced a resurgence of support because of the perceived threats related to the 
rise in migrants reaching Europe (see e.g. Vorländer et al. 2018). Due to the pan-
European scope of the issue, the movement sought support abroad in order to exercise 
further pressure on the European decision-makers, especially the German Chancellor 
Merkel. As PEGIDA Germany stated in its ‘10 Demands to the German Asylum 
Policy’ on August 11, 2015: 
We, the people of the European nations, must join forces to defend and 
preserve our values, our culture, and our freedom. We must unite against 
the self-proclaimed kings and queens in Brussels. We, the German people, 
need international support against our own politicians in our German 
parliaments. (PEGIDA Germany 2015b, author’s translation) 
Merkel’s ‘We can do it’ (‘Wir schaffen das’) announcement on August 31 only further 
strengthened this sentiment, as it meant that she maintained the German pro-refugee 
stance. Conversely, the Eastern European parties and extra-parliamentary actors 
taking part in the later FE-coalition had been protesting the EU’s measures since the 
quota proposal was voiced in April 2015. With Merkel’s ‘open border’ policy, which 
led their countries to become transit countries, they perceived a further need for pan-
European cooperation, as a means to exercise pressure on both the national and the 
EU politicians. As a Dawn representative explained, even though most Eastern 
European governments were already opposing the EU’s demands, and the ‘refugee 
crisis’ “concerned [Germany] the most, then France and Western Europe as such,” 
then it would also affect Eastern Europe, if the problems related to the borders were 
not solved (Interview with Dawn 2017).  
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The unprecedented ‘refugee crisis’ and the ensuing disagreements between the 
various European leaders thus led to an opening in the European discursive 
opportunities, which the different anti-refugee and –immigration protest groups and 
parties could attempt to exploit. Particularly after the big increase in refugee numbers 
in the autumn, the issue’s saliency had grown across Europe, especially at the political 
and media levels, inferring good discursive opportunities. While the EU-level 
opportunities remained closed (see Chapter 5), the groups could instead cooperate at 
the transnational level as a means to target multiple decision-makers at the same time 
and attempt to influence public opinion. The groups thus considered a united 
European response advantageous, as it was a means to exercise pressure on all levels 
of decision-making, and to show a united opposition to Merkel and the EU’s policy-
suggestions. As Festerling stated to a German newspaper, the demonstration on 
February 6 should be “a demonstration of the strength against an increasingly trust-
losing policy” (Focus Online 2016a, author’s translation). Hence, unlike Generation 
Identity, the FE-coalition was created in response to an ongoing political situation, 
which the groups wanted to mobilize against unitedly, somewhat similar to the 
European mobilization against the TTIP (see e.g. Caiani & Graziano 2018). 
INVITING ACTORS: MOVEMENT ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND 
NETWORK TIES  
The future FE-members were mainly recruited based on the initiators’ pre-existing 
networks and their ability to ‘sell the idea’ to similar-minded anti-Islam groups and 
activists across Europe. From October 2015 onwards, Tommy Robinson began 
announcing at various PEGIDA demonstrations that a transnational protest would take 
place in the near future264. Robinson’s prior leadership of EDL, participation in the 
Counter-Jihad movement, and general experience with transnational cooperation, 
provided him with strong cultural resources, including contacts to numerous far right 
actors across the continent. He thus spent most of the second half of 2015 recruiting 
European anti-Islam actors. In fact, already on October 11, at the launch of PEGIDA 
Netherlands in Utrecht, he stated that he was in contact with activists in the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Russia, Poland, France, and Sweden265, and that “A date 
is coming” for the uniting of the groups “under one banner” (Hopkins 2015). Both 
Bachmann and he repeated such statements before the November 17 meeting in 
                                                          
264 First in Utrecht at the launch of PEGIDA Netherlands on October 11, 2015 (Hopkins 2015), 
then in Dresden at PEGIDA Germany’s one-year anniversary (Calderwood 2015), and finally 
on November 30 in Dresden (Epoch Times 2015f). 
265 Riposte Laïque, for instance, notes that Robinson “[…] asked us to organize the European 
initiative planned for February 6 in France” (Riposte Laïque 2015). As the French political blog 
found itself to be “totally in the spirit” of his plans, it intended to “quickly contact all the French 
forces, which refuse the Great Replacement and the Islamisation of our country,” so that they 
had time to prepare for the protest (Ibid.). 
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Prague, where Robinson, Konvička, and Däbritz decided on a date for the 
demonstration (Bartlett 2017). 
Pegida Germany’s Orga-team thus also began mobilizing transnational support 
around the same time. In a blog entry in October, Festerling stated that: “Now it is 
time to expand the European network and join forces with the patriotic parties and 
citizen’s movements” (Festerling 2015c). BPI and PEGIDA Germany thus also began 
contacting groups in their respective networks, and inviting them to attend the 
inaugural FE-meeting in January (Prokupkova 2018b; Interview with Ingrid Carlqvist 
2018). Moreover, BPI had approached Maria Kaljuste (member of EKRE and NGO 
ISIS) at an earlier stage, and she joined the recruitment team (Prokupkova 2018b). 
According to Prokupkova’s (2018b) interview data, Kaljuste thus contacted Finnish, 
Estonian, and Latvian organizations, BPI contacted Bulgarian groups, and Tatjana 
Festerling Dutch and Danish groups (Interview with For Freedom 2017). As National 
Movement and Lega Nord representatives had given speeches at earlier protests in the 
Czech Republic and Germany respectively (see above), the contacts to these two 
parties had already been established.  
The contacting of potential coalition-partners was thus very much based on the pre- 
established networks of both Robinson, PEGIDA Germany (especially Festerling), 
Kaljuste, and BPI, plus their networking abilities, which led to the recruitment of 
several interested organizations. As was explained in the coalition-building 
framework, these are some of the predominant methods for setting up transnational 
extra-parliamentary coalitions (see e.g. Van Dyke 2003; Staggenborg 2013). 
RESPECTABILITY OF THE FE-PARTICIPANTS: CAUSE FOR 
LEGITIMACY CONCERNS? 
Research on transnational coalitions has found certain factors inhibiting cooperation; 
including deliberations about the other members’ respectability and legitimacy (see 
e.g. Monforte 2014). According to Levi and Murphy (2006), “Ethical commitments 
of the organizational representatives may prevent an organization from allying with 
certain other groups, despite possible material benefits. Participation may not be worth 
the loss of […] credibility” (2006: 656). In the case of Fortress Europe, especially the 
political parties had to consider these legitimacy criteria, due to their electoral 
pursuits, which entailed a necessity to appear relatively moderate. Moreover, as both 
the PEGIDA groups and the BPI/Dawn coalition were ethically committed to employ 
non-violent means and refrain from explicitly racist and/or revisionist statements, 
their leaders also had to evaluate which actors to include or exclude from the coalition. 
Most of the participating groups saw an opportunity for publicity and reputational 
boosts by joining forces with the German nationalist anti-establishment movement 
PEGIDA, as it attracted strong crowds and represented the ‘voice of the people’ (see 
e.g. Aslanidis 2017). Several of the FE members thus highlighted PEGIDA Germany 
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as their co-actor in FE, strongly indicating its ‘pull-factor’. Hampl from BPI, for 
instance, stated at a joint PEGIDA-BPI/Dawn demonstration that PEGIDA was “doing 
a great job and […] you are very, very important. Not just for Germany, but for the 
entire Europe. Because now, most people in Europe see that Mrs. Merkel has to be 
stopped, and you are the one, who can do it. We rely on you” (Patriot für unsere 
Zukunft 2015). Robinson also referred to PEGIDA as the “salvation of Europe”, when 
he spoke at a PEGIDA demonstration in Dresden in October (Dearden 2015b). 
Moreover, due to the rather strong repression and/or de-legitimization at home, 
particularly the participating PEGIDA offshoots could be argued to see the 
transnational coalition as a ‘support system abroad,’ boosting their morals in the face 
of low attendance numbers (see e.g. Macklin 2013; see also Chapter 7). 
Pegida Germany also obtained legitimization from electorally strong Western 
European far right elite allies (including in the EP through the ENF group). Hence, 
even though some of the largest Western European radical right parties, i.e. FN, PVV, 
and FPÖ, did not join the coalition, most likely due to their worry of bad media 
exposure by being associated with a movement considered ‘extreme,’ they still 
discussed PEGIDA in favourable terms266. At the same time, the positive responses to 
the invitation by parties from Eastern Europe and Italy for one relates to the more 
open POS in these countries, especially in terms of the public perception of the far 
right and the bigger preponderance of party-movement ties and overlaps (see e.g. 
Minkenberg 2018 for Eastern Europe; Castelli Gattinara 2018 for Italy). These actors 
thus did not need to consider the respectability of FE’s coordinators to the same extent, 
also not in terms of the ‘extreme’ nature of PEGIDA Germany and Blok Against Islam. 
Additionally, the positive responses to the invitation by these particular five parties 
also relates to their worldviews, sizes, and electoral results at the time. In terms of 
their worldviews, far right parties’ ideological proclivities meant that they 
“continuously engage in ‘contentious politics’” (Minkenberg 2018: 2). Many 
European far right parties thus participate in both electoral and protest politics (see 
e.g. Minkenberg 2018; Hutter 2014a; Pirro & Castelli Gattinara 2018). This strategy 
is often due to their fringe status, which needed to find other ways to gain attention, 
just as far right movement parties tended to continue their street activism, when 
pursuing electoral seats (see e.g. Caiani & Císař 2018). 
                                                          
266 Most of the parties expressed sympathy with PEGIDA Germany but more to state the need 
for a German counter-voice to Angela Merkel and the political mainstream than to engage in 
closer collaboration with PEGIDA as such. One should also mainly consider Wilders’ visit more 
as part of his agenda of promoting anti-Islam sentiments across the world (see also Zúquete 
2015). Strache from FPÖ was supportive of PEGIDA from very early on, and even equated his 
party with the protest movement (Steinlechner 2015). Moreover, Festerling atttended the 
Akademikerball in Austria as a PEGIDA Germany representative in 2016 (Lachmann 2016). 
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Yet, as parties such as Front National also carry out demonstrative actions, this aspect 
does not suffice to explain these particular parties’ FE-participation. Another, stronger 
explanation is the fact that all of the five parties were rather weak electorally and did 
not form part of any government coalitions in 2015. Four of the five parties also had 
rather recent founding dates, indicating that they were not yet well-established 
political organizations, and that they had weak material resources267. They thus did 
not play a decisive role in the domestic decision-making processes, and only Lega 
Nord had seats in the EP (see Table 9.1 below). They were thus looking for other 
means to put pressure on their respective governments and obtain media attention.  
Table 9.1: FE member parties’ domestic electoral gains (2013-2016). 
Party Country Created National elections EP 2014 
Lega Nord Italy 1991 18 (4.09%) (2013) 6 (6.0%) 
EKRE Estonia 2012 7 (8.1%) (2015) 0 (4.0%) 
National Movement Poland 2012 5268 (2015) 0 (1.4%) 
Dawn Czech Republic 2013 14269 (6.9%) (2013) 0 (3.12%) 
Courage (O2H) Slovakia 2015 Only ran in 2016 Did not run 
The previous sections considered the contextual features leading to the transnational 
cooperation between the FE-members. It showed that the FE-members were recruited 
based on pre-established networks and the movement entrepreneurship of British, 
German, Czech and Estonian far right activists. It also explained that the actors 
accepting the invitation mainly did so due to the perceived opening in the European 
political and discursive opportunities, just as they saw the transnational cooperation 
as a means to underline their own anti-establishment views by cooperating with 
PEGIDA Germany. The following section will now turn towards the worldview 
overlaps and perceptions of shared enemies that explains their more ideological 
rationale and propensity for mobilization. 
                                                          
267 Due to their relatively recent transformation from Communist rule to democracies, the 
political systems in Central and Eastern Europe are still developing. This can, for instance, be 
seen in the fact that the far right is in constant renewal here vis-à-vis in Western Europe 
(Minkenberg 2018). 
268 Alliance with Kukiz'15. In the 2015 national elections, National Movement made an electoral 
alliance with Kukiz'15. This led National Movement to obtain five of 42 Kukiz’15’s seats.  
269 Before breaking up into two fractions. Tomio Okamura left Dawn in 2014, and Miroslav 
Lidinský became the new party leader. 
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SHARED WORLDVIEWS AND/OR ENEMIES  
Even though all the FE-members belong to the European far right, the 12 groups 
signing the Prague Declaration in January 2016 have several conflicting ideological 
viewpoints, largely divisible between the extra-parliamentary actors on the one side, 
and the political parties on the other. As shown in Chapter 5, the different extra-
parliamentary groups largely align in their overarching worldview and collective 
action frames. Conversely, the parties are all rather hard to place ideologically270, but 
they share the features of populism, authoritarianism, and anti-immigration and -
Islam. Moreover, while some (mainly the parties) belong to the more ‘traditional’ far 
right, espousing nationalist and conservative notions of society, the others (mainly the 
PEGIDA groups and BPI) construct their frames around anti-Islam on cultural 
grounds, fearing the erosion of Western civilization’s values and superiority. They 
often frame this on a liberal basis, especially concerning the treatment of women and 
the LGBTQ community by adherents of Islam (see e.g. Mondon & Winter 2018).  
Notwithstanding, these divergent standpoints did not prevent the groups from 
formulating and signing the joint Prague Declaration on January 23, 2016, in the 
Czech Republic (see Appendix 1 for the document)271. As the declaration explains the 
groups’ ideational rationales for participating in the coalition, the following section 
will consider their main collective action frames in relation to the wording of the text, 
in order to deduce the aims with the coalition. 
Prague Declaration: Uniting Anti-Islam, -Establishment, and -EU Frames and 
Avoiding Issues with Conflicting Viewpoints 
The Prague Declaration mainly targets Islam as a religion and the EU as a political 
institution. It sets out by establishing that Western civilization is under threat from 
“Islam conquering Europe,” and blames this on “the political elites” who “have 
betrayed us.” The document is thus framed around a strong anti-elite sentiment, 
together with the opposition towards Islam and immigration. As a response, or 
prognosis, the signatories express their form of ‘resistance’, involving a refusal to 
“surrender Europe to our enemies,” and a willingness “to risk our freedoms […] and 
maybe even to put our lives at stakes” in the defence of Europe (see Appendix 1). In 
the words of one of the coalition organizers, Edwin Wagensveld, it outlines “the main 
                                                          
270 Consider e.g. the debates about whether Lega Nord can be considered a populist radical 
right party or not (see e.g. Newth 2019), and whether one can even place any Eastern European 
far right party in the category ‘populist radical right’ (Buštíková 2018). 
271 BPI’s Vice-President Petr Hampl had drafted the text for the declaration (Prokupkova 
2018b), and the attending groups discussed its wording prior to its signing (Interview with 
Edwin Wagensveld 2017). 
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topics” for the FE-coalition’s members, namely opposition to “Islamization, migration 
and […] the EU” (Interview with Wagensveld 2017). 
While all the FE-members share an aversion to the establishment, most of the extra-
parliamentary actors construct their threat perceptions around various aspects of 
Islam, while the parties diagnose general third-country immigration as the largest 
danger to the national societal cohesion. Yet, as the ‘refugee crisis’ meant that a high 
number of Muslim refugees and immigrants reached the European shores, it combined 
these two threat perceptions, whilst also increasing the salience of the issue in the 
Eastern European context (see e.g. Císař & Navrátil 2018). The FE-members thus all 
diagnosed various threats to the national and European cultural cohesion, in terms of 
culturally foreign immigrants, ‘Islamization,’ and Islamist terrorism272. 
Previously, the anti-Islam/third-country immigration topic had mainly been a key 
discussion point in Western European political debates. Yet, the pan-European nature 
of the ‘refugee crisis’ caused a growing concern about Islam in Eastern Europe (see 
e.g. Hafez 2018). Several of the Eastern European FE-groups thus alluded to the 
problems experienced in Western Europe as part of the rationale behind their own 
opposition to the religion. Konvička, for example, stated that: “The experience of 
Western Europe shows that immigration from Islamic countries brings with it 
increased crime, the formation of ghettos, gangsters and the gradual decomposition of 
society” (IVČRN 2015d, author’s translation). The National Movement similarly 
argued that the “Western European countries are beginning to suffer the consequences 
of their multiculturalism policy and the acquisition of cheap labour from Africa and 
Arab countries,” just as the party asserted that, “Muslim immigrants are statistically 
more difficult to assimilate and more often hostile towards their hosts” (Ruch 
Narodowy 2016c), author’s translation). The Eastern European groups thus 
constructed their enemy perceptions around very similar frames as those employed by 
the Western European far right, often utilizing ‘horror scenarios’ (particularly drawing 
on Swedish, British, and German examples) as part of their aversion towards Islam273 
(see e.g. Kirsberg 2016a). As Kallis (2013) explains, this is possible due to a 
translation of “local and national discourses on migrants […] into a cross-
                                                          
272 The combination of anti-immigration and –Islam also meant that the groups could emphasize 
various aspects of the cooperation, depending on their own political viewpoints and national 
contexts. Hence, when explaining FE’s ambitions, For Freedom’s spokesperson highlighted 
the groups’ shared desire to quench the role of Islam and Sharia in Europe (Interview with For 
Freedom 2017). EKRE’s representative, Maria Kaljuste, instead stated that the groups joined 
forces around subjects uniting them, namely mass-immigration and the rights of small peoples 
(like the Estonians) (Vaikmaa 2016). 
273 Several of the groups post news from other European countries on their websites and 
Facebook pages as a means of supporting their arguments. This entails, for instance, articles 
about rapes or violent attacks perpetrated by a third-country immigrant, often taking place in 
Sweden, the UK, and Germany, three countries with large migrant populations. 
FORTRESS EUROPE’S EUROPEANIZATION OF NETWORKS 
331 
national/European schema, appealing to a deep-rooted sense of European nativism,” 
which makes “national experiences and responses putatively relevant to other 
countries” (2013: 229). 
Opposition to the EU: Preferring to Cooperate in a ‘Europe of Nations’  
In addition to this strong criticism of Islam, the Prague Declaration is highly critical 
towards the EU, and includes the refusal “to submit to the European central 
government,” which, together with the “global elites,” is accused of having brought 
“only poverty, unemployment, corruption, chaos and moral collapse” (Appendix 1). 
This wording derives from the fact that all of the FE-members express concern about 
the liberal elites and proponents of multiculturalism, frequently employing a populist 
framing of the citizens versus the elites. Moreover, through the statement: “We respect 
the sovereignty of the peoples of Europe and the right of all people in Europe to decide 
on their own affairs as they see fit” (Ibid.), the declaration unites nationalism with a 
more European vision. Hence, in the FE-members’ views, the Fortress ‘walls’ should 
not only be constructed on the EU’s external borders, but also internally, between the 
European states. They thusly all mainly construct their Euroscepticism around the call 
for more national sovereignty, as is the case for most European far right actors (see 
e.g. Vasilopoulou 2011).  
Yet, while a few of the groups call for a national EU-departure (Interview with 
Wagensveld 2017; Interview with For Freedom 2017; Ruch Narodowy 2016b), others 
have a ‘softer’ Eurosceptic attitude. They instead demand fundamental changes to the 
EU’s setup (see e.g. EKRE 2014; Lega Nord 2013; Ódvaha’s leader as cited in Hlávne 
Správy 2016), if they voice a specific EU-policy at all. The majority of the 
organizations call for a ‘Europe of Nations’, a historically oft voiced far right vision 
(Mammone et al. 2013; Schlembach 2011), which still entails friendly and peaceful 
cooperation between fully sovereign states (see e.g. EKRE 2014; Odvaha n.d.). They 
do not want any supranational structures imposed on them, but still wish to participate 
in intergovernmental cooperation (Ruch Narodowy as cited in CEE Identity 2013; 
PEGIDA Netherlands n.d.b; Interview with For Freedom 2017)274. Hence, instead of 
further federalization, some of the groups call for a cooperation rather akin to the 
European Communities prior to 1992 and Maastricht, mainly concerning trade 
agreements (see e.g. Kaljuste as cited in Kärmas 2016); Interview with Wagensveld 
2017; Interview with For Freedom 2017). Other alternatives proposed involve 
National Movement’s own European project, wanting to revive the Central European 
                                                          
274 At a PEGIDA demonstration in January 2015, one of the speakers, Frank Ingo, proposed a 
‘United States of Europe’ or ‘Europe of Fatherlands’ instead, entailing a confederation of 
nations, in which each country maintains its identity and self-determination (i.e. sovereignty) 
(Epoch Times 2015a). 
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confederation project, which is essentially a “return to the ‘Great Poland’ concept – a 
vision of ‘cultural imperialism’” (Jajecznik 2015: 48).  
These negative perceptions of the EU institutions and European cooperation by the 
FE-members inferred a rather combative, conflictual, and oppositional FE-stance 
towards the EU. Furthermore, Festerling’s later assertion that Fortress Europe was 
going to be the future “counter-movement to the EU of bureaucrats” (Nová buržoazie 
NEWS 2016) further excluded the likelihood of FE pursuing insider strategies at the 
EU-level (see more in Chapter 7; see also Monforte 2014). 
In an attempt to construct a shared European belonging, the final paragraph of the 
Prague Declaration references “our common European roots, traditions and values as 
well as the historic alliances of our nations. We are determined to protect Europe, the 
freedom of speech and other civic freedoms as well as our way to live together” 
(Appendix 1). The Declaration thus serves the purpose of both showing resistance and 
dissidence against especially the EU leaders, plus, as Festerling states, “[…] to 
preserve our Europe as we know it and love it” and to obtain a better “inter-national 
understanding” (‘Völkerverständigung’) (Festerling 2016b, author’s translation). All 
of the participating groups thus agree on the key point that Europe should only be for 
the Europeans (for similar accounts, see Liang 2007), i.e. without third-country 
nationals, particularly if they adhere to Islam.  
Main Topics of Disagreement: The Role of Russia in Europe and Views on Jews  
According to Edwin Wagensveld, there were a few issues, in which the groups had 
too disparate viewpoints to reach an agreement. They were thus not included in the 
Declaration. The role of Russia in Europe was a key issue of disagreement for 
especially the Eastern European coalition members (Interview with Wagensveld 
2017). Some of the groups are strongly in favour of Russia, and they would like to see 
more EU-Russia cooperation (Odvaha n.d.; Lega Nord (Political Capital Institute 
2014); PEGIDA Germany 2015a)). Odvaha even refers to itself as a ‘Pro-Russian 
coalition’ (Odvaha n.d). Conversely, other FE-members reject giving the country 
influence, and rather promote a more ‘pragmatic’ and cautious relationship, due to 
their countries’ USSR-histories (see e.g. EKRE 2014, NGO ISIS (as cited in DS 
2016); Ruch Narodowy (CEE Identity 2013)). EKRE, for instance, wants to limit the 
rights given to the Russian minority in Estonia and voices strong concern regarding 
the Border Treaty between the two countries (see e.g. EKRE 2014). Hence, due to 
several groups’ objections, the country was not mentioned in the Prague Declaration, 
and no Russian groups were allowed to join the FE-coalition (Kaljuste as cited in 
Vaikmaa 2016), even though Robinson mentioned in October 2015 that he was in 
contact with Russian actors regarding the February 2016 demonstrations (Hopkins 
2015). 
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Wagensveld also explained that the name ‘PEGIDA’ had caused some divisions, as it 
refers to the Christian and Jewish occident, “[A]nd you know that on the right wing, 
you will always have some movements, which have problems with this” (Interview 
with Wagensveld 2017), alluding to far right anti-Semitism. He further stated that he 
had been surprised in general about the level of anti-Semitism still present in some of 
the Eastern European groups’ statements, without further specifying to which actors 
he referred (Interview with Wagensveld 2017). The (public) use of anti-Semitic 
frames was not a common trait of all FE-groups though, and the topic was not part of 
the Prague Declaration, nor mentioned in any documents related to the meeting. 
The issues of which the groups had diverging and conflictual viewpoints were thus 
omitted mention in the declaration. As Wagensveld explained, the higher the number 
of key issues the groups would have to agree upon, the harder it would be to cooperate 
(Interview with Wagensveld 2017). The limited issue scope of the declaration also 
meant that the groups could defend their choices of cooperating with organizations 
expressing conflicting viewpoints. Mats Helme from EKRE, for instance, explained 
the choice to cooperate with pro-Russian actors by referring to FE as solely being “a 
pan-European network with a common platform for anti-immigration,” and not 
necessarily having other ideological overlaps (Randla 2016, author’s translation).  
The Declaration thus only included opposition to Islam, immigration, the EU, and the 
elites. The FE-groups’ ability to find common ground around these issues aligns with 
Peham’s observation regarding radical right party cooperation in the EP. He states that 
these shared enemy perceptions make it possible for the far right actors to cooperate 
transnationally, as they “superimpose” the previously foregrounded ‘national 
particularities’ (as cited in Maan & Schmid 2017, author’s translation; see also 
Zúquete 2015). 
Fortress Europe: A European (Online) ‘Network’ of Anti-Islam, -Immigration, and –
EU Actors 
Several of the participants shared Helme’s above-mentioned reference to Fortress 
Europe as a ‘network’. Unlike Generation Identity, it was thus not the key objective 
for (at least not all of) the Fortress Europe participants to create something akin to a 
movement. Hence, while on the one hand, certain Dawn representatives wanted to set 
up an EP-faction with the participating parties to exercise pressure on the EU275 
(Interview with Dawn 2017), the other actors saw FE as a much looser coalition. In 
2017, Wagensveld, for instance, referred to Fortress Europe as a loose “network,” 
and explained that most of the activity and networking took place ad hoc in the 
                                                          
275 As Dawn’s chair until 2017, Marek Černoch stated, the coalition was about “[…] power. If 
more of you are involved, then people who are more competent take you seriously. If you come 
as a faction to the European Parliament, then you have a much bigger opportunity to change 
something than if you are there as a single person” (Interview with Černoch 2017). 
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background, and that it was not an outright movement with frequent meetings 
(Interview with Wagensveld 2017).  
The initiative was instead more driven by the need to create contacts to anti-Islam 
activists abroad, because, as Wagensveld argues, “Together we are strong, alone we 
will not make it” (Interview with Wagensveld 2017). Festerling similarly voiced the 
ambition to “connect and support” far right actors, (Festerling as cited in BPI 2016a), 
while For Freedom’s spokesperson stated that she signed the Declaration as a sign of:  
…solidarity. The solidarity that we stand together and […] we can call 
each other, and we can help each other. So it is a network that we have 
agreed to join. We have said yes to some promises that we want to keep. 
That we fight for our countries, both individually and together. (Interview 
with For Freedom 2017)  
The extra-parliamentary actors thus aimed to unite around cross-border online 
diffusion of information (Kaljuste as cited in Kärmas 2016), and to support each other 
both morally and face-to-face, for instance at demonstrations (see also Macklin 2013). 
Nevertheless, despite the rather loose nature of the FE-groups’ cooperative ties, they 
did not manage to ensure the coalition’s survival, and the following section considers 
the reasons for this.  
 COALITION-MAINTENANCE 
The initial part recounts the further developments of the Fortress Europe coalition 
from February 2016 to early 2017. This is followed by an exploration of the groups’ 
pooling of resources, online communication, and attempts at creating a collective 
coalition identity. The analysis will reveal that despite ardent efforts, especially by 
Festerling, Wagensveld, and the Czech groups, the endeavours to organize collective 
activities largely failed, mainly due to lacking impetus for the political parties, and 
organizational splits among the groups leading the coalition. 
Spring 2016: Joint FE-Meeting and Demonstration 
After the February 6, 2016, simultaneous FE-demonstrations across Europe (see 
Chapter 7), the FE-members again met in the Czech Chamber of Deputies in Prague 
on May 13, exactly six months after the Paris terrorist attacks on Bataclan and Stade 
de France. The list of participants had changed substantially since the first meeting in 
January. For one, PEGIDA Germany’s leader, Lutz Bachmann, was not present at the 
FORTRESS EUROPE’S EUROPEANIZATION OF NETWORKS 
335 
event, Blok against Islamization had replaced BPI276, and the meeting involved a 
higher number of groups and activists277 (Jonaitis 2016), including the new Spanish 
Respeto party, which Festerling had helped to set up (Las Voces del Pueblo 2016)278. 
At the meeting, besides Respeto, four other groups also signed the Declaration, 
namely the Lithuanian political association Nacionalnis Interesas (National Interest), 
the Identity Ireland party, the Czech Okstrana – Civic Conservative Party, and the 
French Résistance Républicaine, raising the number of signatures to seventeen. Aside 
from brief statements by the delegates, the participants agreed to set up a joint 
European Citizen’s Initiative, with the aim of ending the ‘forced distribution quotas’ 
of refugees (Epoch Times 2016). The idea of the petition came from BPI and Dawn, 
which had been collecting Czech signatures prior to the joint FE-meetings (see 
Chapter 7). Moreover, the FE-members also elected a three-person co-chairmanship, 
namely Tatjana Festerling (PEGIDA Germany, leader and spokesperson of Fortress 
Europe), Maria Kaljuste (EKRE and NGO ISIS, co-chair), and Miroslav Lidínsky 
(Dawn, co-chair)). 
A few days after the meeting, PEGIDA Germany hosted a transnational collective FE-
demonstration in Dresden, attracting around 2,500 supporters (Epoch Times 2016). 
Yet, most of the FE-members did not highlight the event on their websites. Prior to 
the demonstration, Festerling announced that the demonstration was organized as a 
means to move beyond Germany’s ‘guilt-question,’ and its perpetual necessity to 
                                                          
276 In April 2016, BPI and Dawn broke off their cooperation, due to infights between Konvička 
and Dawn (iDNEZ.cz 2016). A few days later, BPI was dissolved at their National Assembly, 
and replaced by a new party, Alternative for the Czech Republic (headed by Konvička), and 
Blok against Islamization (led by Jana Volfová). Blok against Islamization continued 
supporting Dawn, just as it remained part of FE (see Prokupkova 2018b for more details). 
277 The representative from Riposte Laïque estimated that around 150 people participated 
(Interview with Riposte Laïque 2018). According to Nacionalnis Interesas, there were 
representatives from Germany, England, France, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Ireland, Poland, 
Hungary (a Fidesz representative), the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Estonia, Israel, and Lithuania 
(Jonaitis 2016).  
278 Respeto is a party-coalition between Partido por Catalonia (PxC) (‘Party for Catalonia’), 
España 2000 (‘Spain 2000’) and Partido por la Libertad (‘Party for Freedom’). One of Respeto’s 
future member organizations, PxC, had participated in a PEGIDA Germany demonstration in 
February (Suso 2016). 
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apologize for the happenings during WWII279 (Tatjana Festerling TV 2016b). She thus 
encouraged the speakers to talk about “identity, respect, and mutual forgiveness for 
everything that ever stood between us, the European nations” (Ibid.).  
Several of the FE-members spoke at the demonstration, including Barranco (from 
Respeto), Karim Ouchikh (from the French party SIEL), Tanja Groth (For Freedom) 
and Robert Winnicki (National Movement). In their speeches, Winnicki highlighted 
the German refugee policy and its relationship to Christianity and emphasized that 
Germany should “wake up” and Europe should show “courage” (Ruch Narodowy 
2016a). Barranco instead highlighted the European history, and the need to look 
beyond the happenings of the past, and to erase the European self-hatred, which made 
the people defenceless against “other cultures that do not have these complexes,” 
ultimately leading to submission (España 2000 2016). Tania Groth from For Freedom 
instead discussed the ‘political correctness’ of today, and how “We are being 
brainwashed to think that our cultures are racist, bigoted – we are taught to be self-
hating and have white guilt” (Rembrandt Clancy 2016). The speeches thus largely 
focused on a European (and white) ‘us’, united around a common history, reference 
points, and culture, and whose society is under threat from Islam and third-country 
immigration. 
Summer and Autumn 2016: Break-Up of PEGIDA Orga-Team  
In June 2016, a fight between Festerling and Bachmann280 led to the exclusion of 
Festerling from PEGIDA Germany’s ORGA-team, only one month after the Prague 
meeting and Dresden protest (Welt 2016a). Despite her PEGIDA-exclusion, 
Festerling kept her role as spokesperson and leader of Fortress Europe, mainly due to 
her earlier role as contact person between PEGIDA Germany and BPI, which meant 
that she had established strong connections to the group (Prokupkova 2018b). 
                                                          
279 In the words of Festerling, “Fortress Europe needs a strong, solid foundation. This 
foundation can only be moulded with free and self-confident Germans. […] Yet, this overdue 
release from the collective guilt feelings imposed on us cannot only happen in the mind. It is 
also about the liberation of the degraded German soul. This is why on May 16 it will be about 
identity, appreciation and mutual forgiveness for everything that ever stood between us, the 
European peoples. We will be the starting point for true cohesion, for a European sense of 
community and a strong, European corps spirit - to fight together as united Europeans for the 
preservation of our continent” (Festerling 2016d, author’s translation). 
280 The disagreement had several causes, but was mainly due to opposing views on the future 
direction of PEGIDA (see e.g. Vorländer et al. 2018). According to Wagensveld, Bachmann 
had, in fact, already excluded Festerling from speaking at PEGIDA demonstrations in April 
2016, due to ‘PEGIDA damage’ (Wagensveld 2016a). The infighting was very public over the 
summer of 2016, where the two activists constantly bad-mouthed each other, both at 
demonstrations and online. 
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Conversely, PEGIDA Germany de facto discontinued the participation in the 
coalition, even though it never officially left.  
This internal break-up of PEGIDA’s Orga-team signalled the end of FE. The coalition 
thus largely became a short-lived “flop” (Interview with Riposte Laïque 2018), as 
several FE-members either left the coalition, or at least stopped reporting about 
Fortress Europe on their websites and Facebook accounts. Hence, the departure of 
PEGIDA Germany meant that one of the key reasons for the other groups to participate 
had now left, i.e. FE had lost its ‘pull-power’ (see above). FE as a coalition thus 
became rather inactive, despite subsequent attempts to continue the use of the FE 
‘brand’ by Festerling, especially, but also Wagensveld, Kaljuste, and the Dawn party. 
Dawn, for instance, tried to organize an FE-meeting in September 2016, with the plan 
to create a joint European political party, plus “prepare further protests against Angela 
Merkel and the pro-immigration policy in Brussels” (Dawn FB-post). Yet, for various 
reasons, only three people turned up for the meeting,281 leading to anger by the Dawn 
party (Interview with Dawn 2017). 
Festerling was by far the main FE-movement entrepreneur in the period of May 2016 
to June 2017. She very actively pursued international contacts abroad, both before and 
after the creation of Fortress Europe in early 2016. As a PEGIDA Orga-team member, 
she had participated in numerous official events, conferences, and demonstrations 
abroad, speaking on behalf of PEGIDA Germany (see e.g. Buschmann et al. 2016). 
These activities continued after the founding of FE, as she travelled across Europe to 
attract new members to the coalition (such as Respeto, see above), and to visit some 
of the FE-members, such as For Freedom in Denmark in March 2017 (Festerling 
2017a)282. From May 2016 onwards, it was thus practically only her, Wagensveld, and 
Kaljuste, who sporadically made use of the Fortress Europe sign and flag at protests, 
as well as mentioned the coalition in the media or online. Wagensveld and Festerling 
thus jointly travelled around Europe and organized and/or participated in various 
                                                          
281 The party wrote that both Festerling, National Movement (Poland), and other FE-groups 
were going to take part in the meeting. Yet, some participants had been given the wrong date 
by the person organizing the event, and others replied that they did not have time to attend. 
282 During these endeavours, Festerling networked employing “a professional staging” strategy, 
due to her higher education and “foreign language skills, a serious clothing style and rhetorical 
abilities” (Buschmann et al. 2016: 25), which she combined with a vulgar, emotional, and 
pathological language that placed her rather far to the right on the political spectrum (see also 
Vorländer et al. 2018). 
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demonstrations related to the ‘refugee crisis’283. Moreover, they began cooperating 
with extreme right actors and groups in Germany (see e.g. Wagenaar 2019). 
Regardless, Fortress Europe’s momentum was lost. Festerling did try to organize a 
FE-demonstration in Dresden on October 3, 2016, the German Day of Reunification 
(Pontius & Steffen 2016). Yet, none of the original Prague Declaration signatories 
participated in the FE-demonstration284. Moreover, as the rally clashed with a 
PEGIDA Germany demonstration, their feud became the focus of the newspaper 
articles, just as it only attracted around 200 protesters (Ibid.). On November 11, the 
Fortress Europe representatives were invited to join National Movement’s annual 
‘Polish Independence March’, and Festerling was supposed to give a speech. Yet, just 
before going on stage, she was told that only one foreign guest would be allowed to 
speak, namely Roberto Fiore from the Italian Forza Nuova party (Festerling 2016i). 
This was another huge blow to Festerling and the FE-coalition as such. 
After this protest failure, the Fortress Europe name was not employed to organize 
further events before the FE-demonstration in Enschede, Netherlands, in September 
2017. It again involved groups not earlier mentioned in connection to Fortress 
Europe, and which mainly belonged to the extreme right (for more about this protest, 
see Chapter 7). Moreover, Festerling did not participate. This demonstration was the 
last official Fortress Europe protest recorded. 
Aside from some sporadic appearances abroad in the spring of 2017285, the ardent 
attempt by Festerling to re-boost the Fortress Europe coalition failed, as she instead 
                                                          
283 Throughout the summer of 2016, Wagensveld and Festerling travelled to Southern and 
Eastern Europe to observe and report about the situation at the EU’s external borders (see e.g. 
Festerling 2016f). On June 28, for instance, the two placed the FE and PEGIDA Netherlands 
banner in front of the Romanian Parliament in Bucharest, in order to encourage the Romanian 
government to close the border, followed by a visit to the Bulgarian border vigilantes a few 
days later (Festerling 2016e). Another trip went to Sicily and Catania in Italy, where Festerling 
reported very negatively about FRONTEX, which she accused of serving the wishes of big 
business and being behind the European ‘infiltration’ (Festerling 2016g). They also gave 
speeches at various anti-refugee and –migration demonstrations in Germany and organized their 
own protest actions, e.g. on July 29, where they carried out Guerilla-actions in Berlin in front 
of the German Bundestag, the Tagesspiegel offices, the Chancellor Residence, and 
Brandenburger Tor, to make the German government close the borders (Festerling 2016h). 
284 The speakers instead included a regional AfD-member, Petra Federau, and two Bulgarian 
extreme right vigilante ‘border protectors’ (Pontius & Steffen 2016), which Festerling and 
Wagensveld had visited earlier that year (Festerling 2016e). In August 2016, at a PEGIDA 
Munich demonstration, Festerling similarly encouraged German men to set up similar armed 
initiatives in Germany (TZ 2016). 
285 E.g. speaking as a FE-representative at a For Freedom demonstration in March 2017 
(Festerling 2017a) and again at its summer conference in June (Festerling 2017c) and giving a 
speech for Riposte Laïque’s 10 Year Anniversary (Festerling 2017d). 
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suffered continuous setbacks in her endeavours. Over time, she thus became 
increasingly disheartened and disgruntled with the situation in Germany and the 
authorities’ prosecution of her, due to her protest activities (Interview with For 
Freedom 2017). Moreover, the high stigmatization and personal risk involved were 
also likely to have taken a toll, as political opponents were threatening her with violent 
retaliations (Locke & Bender 2016). She thus became gradually more rhetorically 
radical, and in the winter of 2017, she relocated to Bulgaria, where she started working 
for a group of vigilante border patrollers (Meisner 2018). 
After having now outlined the FE-events from June 2016 to December 2017, the 
following section will explain the factors that led to Fortress Europe’s end. Aside 
from the internal split of PEGIDA Germany, they largely relate to the too large 
disparities between the participating actors in terms of commitment to, and 
expectations of, the coalition. The first section considers the attempt at constructing 
collective identity frames around the protection of Europe. In both the Prague 
Declaration and at the joint events in February and May 2016, the FE-members 
portrayed themselves as part of a united European ‘resistance’ or opposition, to the 
proponents of migration, particularly the EU elites. The protest groups frequently 
employed these frames, also aside from at the FE-events. However, as the following 
section will argue, this was not a concerted effort by all members of the FE-coalition, 
as they were highly divided in terms of views on European unity and solidarity, 
coalition-goals, and attention given to the coalition. Thus, despite some of the actors’ 
attempts at creating pan-European FE-unity, only some of the groups shared the 
collective identity, and there was no shared pooling of resources. 
(ATTEMPTED) CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE 
FE IDENTITY 
“Together We Are Strong”: The Extra-Parliamentary Actors’ ‘European Patriotism’ 
Despite the FE-groups’ nationalist proclivities, the Prague Declaration consists of 
European identitarian terms, and concentrates on the safeguarding of the entire 
continent vis-à-vis the threats of Islam and the supranational decision-making powers 
of the EU and the ‘global elites.’ As alluded to in the section on ‘Shared Worldviews’ 
above, the FE-members thus attempt to create unity around shared notions of ‘Europe’ 
and being ‘European,’ in order to formulate a joint opposition to Islam and third-
country immigration. This means that the move to a ‘European’ focus requires a 
departure from ‘pure’ ethnic nationalism.  
One could observe this discursive move in Tommy Robinson’s speech on November 
30, 2015, for example. Here, he spoke about the need to show European unity against 
the common enemy, as “Our connections by geography, history and culture, urge us 
to work together on this crisis” (4freedoms 2015). Yet, aside from similar vague 
formulations around a shared culture, value set, and history (as also seen in the Prague 
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Declaration), the groups do not elaborate further on this notion of ‘Europe’. Instead, 
the various leaders’ mainly use the notion of ‘Europe’ as a means to delineate a border 
between a superior European ‘us,’ and a Muslim ‘them,’ who (allegedly) wish to push 
their religious and cultural practices upon ‘us’. The actors thus create a very 
exclusionary conception of the ‘European’ in-group, yet, without going into depth 
with the factors that actually unite the Europeans as such. 
Instead, the various extra-parliamentary FE-members emphasize their shared 
patriotism, i.e. love of their countries, and underline the need for European patriotic 
cooperation. As the Danish For Freedom’s spokesperson explains: 
We cannot exist in a vacuum in such a small country as ours, and we are a 
very, very small country. We should preferably be able to co-exist with the 
countries around us. We respect all countries and their sovereignty. […] 
PEGIDA in Germany, they fight for the Germans and for their culture, and 
[…] For Freedom in Denmark, we fight for Denmark and our Danish 
culture. At the same time, we agree that all our European countries can 
keep their culture, that we help them keep their culture (Interview with For 
Freedom 2017)286. 
Similarly, underlining the need to defend one’s own country, Robinson emphasized 
the need for a pan-European response, as “one country in Europe cannot stand alone 
and win” (4freedoms 2015; Hopkins 2015). He thus worked from the idea that “Our 
voice becomes so much stronger if we place ourselves side-by-side with each other 
across national borders and together show the threat that Islam poses to our countries” 
(Robinson in Dispatch International 2016a). In a rather comparable speech, 
Bachmann stated, “It is more important than anything else that the patriots in Europe 
connect and cooperate to fight this menace” (Romea.cz 2015). Festerling instead 
underlined that “We […] have to join forces in Europe, being alone and nationally 
isolated in this struggle reduces our chances of effectively fighting the Islamization of 
Europe” (as cited in BPI 2016a). Moreover, adopting PEGIDA Germany’s motto 
“Together we are strong” (‘Gemeinsam sind wir stark’)287, PEGIDA Netherlands and 
For Freedom called for both national and European far right cooperation (Interview 
with Wagensveld 2017; Interview with For Freedom 2017). 
The extra-parliamentary FE-groups’ leaders thus jointly formulate a sort of symbolic 
unity around ‘European patriotism’, as they take part in the joint, European, battle, 
and call for pan-European prognoses to the crisis. It is thus not so much a matter of 
creating the same collective identity that draws on the same history and context, but 
                                                          
286 Riposte Laïque’s spokesperson similarly states, “I love France first. I am first French before 
being European, but I recognize that for me, the European civilization is without equal in the 
world” (Interview with Riposte Laïque 2018). 
287 HoGeSa also used this football-motto during its protests, and it became the title of the so-
called PEGIDA-hymn, published in December 2015. 
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rather a collectivity through being distinct from each other, yet united around a 
common cause, i.e. patriotic Europeanism. Referring to themselves as people who 
love their country, the employment of the term ‘patriot,’ thus infers that the fight 
against Islam and third-country immigration is not considered a joint European 
struggle as such. There is therefore hardly any mention of European ‘unity’ and ‘us’ 
as a movement at the transnational level. Instead, the battle consists of individual 
struggles in each nation state, against both (Muslim) immigrants, but also the national 
liberal elites, against whom the other groups offer their solidarity (see e.g. For 
Freedom FB-Post 2016). 
This therefore highlights two intertwined battlegrounds, the national and the 
European, and the aim becomes to protect Europe in order to protect the nation. As 
Kaljuste emphasized, the pan-European FE-coalition aimed at preserving the 
differences between the European nations and ensuring their sovereign rights, 
including those of the smaller EU MS (as cited in Vaikmaa 2016). This partially 
explains the FE-slogan “Freedom, identity and sovereignty”. Hence, the actors unite 
at the European level around diagnostic frames expressing that what happens in one 
place in Europe is also bound to happen elsewhere on the continent (see e.g. Kaljuste 
as cited in Ibid.), and that while some (Western) countries already have been ‘lost’ to 
Islam, others (especially in Eastern Europe) can still be saved. Conversely, Eastern 
Europe (especially the Visegrad countries) is portrayed as a role model for the 
Western European patriots, due to their resistance to “the suicidal asylum politics” 
(Festerling as cited in Nová buržoazie NEWS 2016).  
A European ‘Resistance’ Movement, Willing to Sacrifice Everything for the 
Safeguarding of Europe 
By the employment of a very pathos-driven language, the main uniting factor for the 
protest groups is thus the urgency to create a European opposition in the face of the 
pending catastrophe of ‘Islam conquering Europe’. In the words of Robinson, “Time 
is running” (as cited in 4freedoms 2015). Tanja Groth, the leader of For Freedom, 
argues that at some point it will become “[…] so stressful and fatal that we put 
everything else aside and agree, because we have a common goal. And it's about our 
western culture surviving” (Dispatch International 2016b; see also Kaljuste (Svensk 
Webbtelevision 2016)).  
All the PEGIDA groups, NGO ISIS, and BPI thus insist on their right to speak freely 
against Islam, in opposition to the ‘political correctness’ of the political establishment 
(see e.g. Groth’s speech on April 24, 2016 (För Frihet 2016). They constantly feel that 
this right is under threat by the cultural elite (or the ‘cultural Marxists’), who repress 
and prosecute the ‘patriots’ for speaking what for them is the truth. Simultaneously, 
some of the groups insinuate that the authorities treat the Muslims and left-wing 
extremists preferentially, while PEGIDA Germany refers to its followers as the ‘silent 
majority’, who are not given a voice in the debate (see Vorländer et al. 2018: 25). The 
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extra-parliamentary PEGIDA groups thus construct themselves as actors, who 
heroically dare to take up the battle against both the establishment and Islam, despite 
the suppressive actions against them. 
The voicing of these sentiments permits the extra-parliamentary groups to unite 
around the frame of ‘we, the persecuted’, who are willing to continue the fight, despite 
opposition, prosecution, and suppression attempts, particularly concerning freedom of 
speech (see e.g. Robinson (4freedoms 2015); O’Loughlin (as cited in Healy 2016); 
Festerling (as cited in Locke & Bender 2016); Wagensveld (as cited in Feenstra 
2016)). They thus provide the solidarity and support in order to resist both Islam and 
the ‘open border’ governmental policies, but also particularly the repressive 
authorities and condemning media. The groups therefore forge a moral ‘support 
network’ of kindred spirits, who show that the defiance is European, not just national. 
In this way, the extra-parliamentary groups construct an “action-mobilizing collective 
identity” through “epics of overcoming” (Poletta & Jasper 2001: 291), while 
identifying themselves as victims (see also Oaten 2014 for a similar account of the 
EDL). 
The heroic sentiment is also visible in the actors’ expressed need to form a European 
‘resistance’ movement. The term is employed, for example, by PEGIDA Germany 
(‘We are the resistance’ (‘Wir sind der Widerstand’)) and For Freedom (Dispatch 
International 2016b), just as Maria Kaljuste refers to herself as a European ‘freedom 
fighter’ (Svensk Webbtelevision 2016). The later accessions to the coalition, Riposte 
Laïque/Résistance Républicaine and Identity Ireland use the term similarly. While 
some of the groups directly refer to the resistance movement against the Nazis and 
fascists during WWII (such as Riposte Laïque), most of the groups do not discuss this 
connotation. Yet, by considering Islam as being an ‘ideology’, perceiving of Muslims 
as ‘invading’ their countries, plus “fighting for our freedom, our culture, our very 
lives” (Groth as cited in För Frihet n.d.), the allusions to war become rather evident. 
Hence, despite the portrayal of themselves and their movements as ‘peaceful and non-
violent’,288 the language employed is less neutral. As Festerling stated the day after 
the first FE-meeting: “The peoples of Europe have only two options: submission or 
rebellion” (Festerling 2016b), undoubtedly inspired by Michelle Houellebecq’s book 
Submission. 
  
                                                          
288 Interestingly, the ‘P’ in PEGIDA Germany actually initially stood for ‘peaceful’, yet, this 
was very quickly changed to ‘patriotic’ (Vorländer et al. 2018).  
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Searching for Joint European Narratives: The Preservation of Europe through ‘War’  
A few of the anti-Islam actors draw on the shared European history of battling the 
Ottomans as part of the narrative of forming a European ‘resistance’ against the 
Muslim threat (rather akin to Generation Identity, see Chapter 8). At a joint PEGIDA 
Germany and BPI protest, Hampl from BPI for instance stated: 
When Islamic armies were standing in front of Vienna, Czech soldiers and 
Saxonian soldiers were in the same armies, fighting shoulder to shoulder 
against Turks and against Islam. And I think it’s time to renew this 
coalition, it’s time to renew this community. (Patriot für unsere Zukunft 
2015) 
Robinson similarly likened the refugees’ entry to Europe with the Crusades, 
explaining that it had taken six centuries for the Europeans to expel the Muslim 
invaders (Dearden 2015b). Others employed the same type of battle frames but 
without employing the Ottomans as reference point. At a demonstration, Konvička, 
for instance, stated that “We are soldiers, we are at war, but we will win it” (iDNEZ.cz 
2015), just as Kaljuste argued, “We are in the middle of a war. It is absolutely sure, 
and it’s only a matter of time [before] people will really, really notice it” (Svensk 
Webbtelevision 2016). For Freedom’s spokesperson went even further, when stating 
that the EU countries should have deployed soldiers to defend the EU’s external 
borders, “whether with barbed wire, whether with ‘shoot to kill’, whether with… 
Whatever. […] that is how it is in a war, when one wants to defend one’s country” 
(Interview with For Freedom 2017).  
Since the summer of 2016, this ‘resistance’ aspect was physically expressed through 
the support of, and visits to, the Bulgarian vigilante border patrollers Vassil Levski 
Association that received a lot of (mainly negative) European media attention for its 
refugee ‘hunts’ on the external Bulgarian borders (see e.g. Lake Smith 2016). Both 
Festerling, Wagensveld, Kaljuste, BPI, and For Freedom expressed great admiration 
for their endeavour, and Festerling, Wagensveld, and Kaljuste even went to Bulgaria 
to follow their work (Locke 2016; Kärmas 2016)289. Festerling also encouraged 
European men, “preferably veterans from the military and police,” to go to Bulgaria 
and join the vigilantes (Locke 2016), just as representatives from the group were 
invited to speak at demonstrations in Germany (see e.g. Pontius & Steffen 2016). 
These different ‘resistance,’ and ‘war’ frames are very much in continuation of the 
rationales expressed in relation to previous far right anti-Islam networking endeavours 
(see e.g. Melagrou-Hitchens & Brun 2013), just as they largely align with those 
expressed by Generation Identity (See Chapter 9). At their core, they revolve around 
                                                          
289 During the summer of 2015, Festerling had made a similar visit to Hungary and the mayor 
Gyöngösi, who became known for his vigilante approach to the refugee crisis, chasing and 
detaining illegal immigrants crossing the border into Hungary (Festerling 2015b). 
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the idea that European unity and solidarity, plus the willingness to sacrifice 
everything, is the key to a successful ‘defence’ against the pending ‘Islamization’ of 
Europe, and the therefrom-ensuing attack on universal human rights, freedom of 
speech, and democratic values. The groups thus construct a shared collective identity 
around a ‘we’ consisting of brave and persecuted patriotic Europeans, who still will 
fight for the maintenance of the European continent, despite all the threats facing 
them, especially from the left-wing upholders of ‘political correctness’.  
Yet, as will be further explained below, it was only the extra-parliamentary FE-actors 
that ascribed to the identity of ‘patriotic Europeanism’. This indicates that there was 
a rather large discrepancy between the goals and self-understanding of the two types 
of political actors. As the following analysis of the FE-coalitions’ resource 
mobilization and inter-group communication will show, there was, in fact, a general 
lack of commitment by the political parties to maintain the cooperation, inhibiting the 
survival of the FE coalition. 
RESOURCE MOBILIZATION AND (LACKING) RESOURCE POOLING  
While the different protest groups shared cultural and human resources (see Chapter 
7; see also e.g. Prokupkova 2018b on the diffusion of organizational knowledge from 
PEGIDA Germany to BPI), there was not a strong level of material resource pooling 
between the FE coalition-partners. This is largely ascribable to the more symbolic and 
loose nature of the coalition, where particularly the political parties’ lacking 
incentives for a deeper commitment (in terms of political and electoral benefits, plus 
ideological overlaps), made them refrain from using resources on the coalition, 
especially after the break-up of PEGIDA Germany’s leadership in May 2016.  
Conversely, the extra-parliamentary groups were more committed to the coalition, yet, 
none of them had strong financial resources. Instead, BPI’s cooperation with the 
Czech Dawn party ensured initial financing, as the party received a substantial subsidy 
from the state budget as part of the state funding scheme” (Císař & Navrátil 2018: 
191). It thus hosted the two FE-meetings in Prague, and funded the participating 
actors’ hotel, food, and transport around Prague (according to the Lithuanian National 
Interest association, see Jonaitis 2016).  
The choice of Prague as a meeting place was also due to its less suppressive efforts 
against far right groups compared to e.g. Germany, demonstrated by the fact that the 
groups could use the parliamentary buildings for the meeting, an access that would be 
considerably harder to gain in most Western European countries (see e.g. Berntzen et 
al. 2017). The Czech facility also provided the groups with simultaneous translation 
options, a key asset in a meeting between actors from across Europe, who do not all 
speak English or German at a high level (Interview with Černoch 2017; Interview 
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with For Freedom 2017)290. Furthermore, due to PEGIDA Germany’s rather 
professional demonstration equipment, technical expertise, security provisions, plus 
space to host an anticipated large group of people, the protest group hosted the May 
2016 demonstration. The Czech and German FE-initiators thus provided most of the 
FE-resources, and there is no indication that any of the other groups provided material 
resources to the coalition. This also partly explains why the departure of PEGIDA 
Germany from the coalition was so problematic, as it caused both a symbolic and 
organizational resource loss (i.e. in terms of media attention, number of activists and 
protest participants, the network’s size, organisational expertise, and protest capacity). 
Nevertheless, the FE-groups did attempt to pool their resources in one instance, 
namely when deliberating to instigate a European Citizen’s Initiative (ECI) at the EU-
level against the EU’s quotas (see Chapter 7). A citizen’s committee consisting of at 
least seven citizens from seven EU MS must lead such a petition, and they have to 
collect one million signatures by citizens from at least seven MS (ECI 2019). Hence, 
it requires a high amount of material resources, both in terms of mobilizing support 
through advertising, but especially the actual collection of the signatures. Some of the 
groups got the task of distributing the petition in their domestic settings. Others, like 
the Lithuanian National Interest association, were not asked for their assistance, as 
the actors believed it would be sufficient if the representatives of the big states 
gathered signatures (Jonaitis 2016). Yet, the FE-members never instigated this 
European petition, as the coalition more or less dissolved after the May meeting, and 
Dawn more or less gave up on the endeavour (Interview with Dawn 2017; Interview 
with Wagensveld 2017). 
The lacking pooling of resources was, in fact, one of the biggest general problems for 
the transnational coalition. The limited financial means meant that Festerling had to 
pay her own travels, making it hard to uphold close transnational relations, due to the 
limited travel opportunities to visit the other FE-members (Interview with 
Wagensveld 2017). The distinct groups did try to mobilize money for transport 
through online calls for contributions. Yet, this was insufficient, and according to 
some of the interviewees, by the autumn of 2017, Festerling’s mental and financial 
resources were so drained that she no longer wished to be too involved in Fortress 
Europe (Interview with For Freedom 2017; Interview with Ingrid Carlqvist 2018).  
                                                          
290 Černoch also explained that at some events, such translation was not available, and he once 
asked a fellow listener to let him know, if the PEGIDA Germany speaker, “who looked strict,” 
was saying something out of bounds. She told him that the contents were “almost the same as 
what we were saying. Just that in that language [German] it sounded more radical in intonation 
and dynamics of voice” (Interview with Černoch 2017). This quote gives a rather good idea 
about the problems related to border-crossing demonstrations with actors that do not share the 
same language. 
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The above section has thus shown that the lacking pooling of resources was one of the 
coalition’s largest problems. With the lacking resource contribution by the political 
parties, and the loss of one of the main FE-resource providers, i.e. PEGIDA Germany, 
in June 2016, the room for manoeuvring for FE’s leadership gradually dissipated. Due 
to the lacking financial means, it became increasingly difficult for Festerling to travel 
across the continent, and to organize joint events. Moreover, as the following section 
explores further, there was also not much communication between the groups, 
indicating the very loose structure of the coalition. 
ON- AND OFFLINE COMMUNICATION291  
As PEGIDA Germany’s protests began diffusing across Europe in early 2015, the 
protest group initially attempted to establish links between the various PEGIDA 
groups, both offline (through protest participation), and online, for instance through 
mentions of the other groups on PEGIDA Germany’s Facebook page and/or website. 
The organizers thus both networked virtually and face-to-face (Druxes & Simpson 
2016), cross-posting information about upcoming events on the various PEGIDA 
pages, and generally maintaining contact. Yet, as explained above, Bachmann had 
already lost contact to most of the PEGIDA offshoots by 2016 (Kassam 2016b). 
This lacking communication was also a problem for the FE-coalition, something that 
is particularly visible on the joint Fortress Europe Facebook pages. As mentioned in 
Chapter 2, it was not possible to gain access to the private ‘Fortress Europe’ Facebook 
group, thus inhibiting the possibility of analyzing the communication between the 
participating groups. However, the two public groups ‘Fortress Europe’ and ‘Festung 
Europa,’ plus accompanying observations from participating members, give a good 
indication of the cooperative problems and lacking participation by the majority of 
the FE-members. According to Respeto, FE was supposed to be a “platform that will 
serve to coordinate the activity of all member parties and associations, and facilitate 
their participation in all calls and demonstrations against Islamization that are 
developed” (Respeto 2016). Yet, when looking at the publically available online data, 
this did not seem to materialize. 
Neither the English nor the German Fortress Europe Facebook page involved many 
posts from actors aside from the FE-coalition leaders, despite the encouragements to 
contribute. The ‘Fortress Europe’ Facebook page was created on January 25, 2016, 
by Maria Kaljuste (EKRE and NGO ISIS representative), and currently consists of 
1,128 members (October 14, 2019). Initially, Maria Kaljuste wrote the majority of the 
posts, for instance inviting the FE-members to join an anti-mosque protest in Helsinki 
                                                          
291 This section is based on the publically accessible data from the group’s members, and hence 
not e.g. closed social media groups, and other potential sources that could shed more light on 
the actual occurrences. However, combined with the interview data from Wagensveld, Groth, 
and Černoch, this assessment should be considered reliable. 
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(Fortress Europe FB-post). Moreover, the Lithuanian political association National 
Interest also frequently posted about its political activities, for instance the petition 
collection, it was undertaking at home (Fortress Europe FB-post). However, in a post 
on the group’s own webpage in 2016, the association mentioned the lacking 
contributions from the other participants in the FE-network, except for themselves and 
Kaljuste (Jonaitis 2016). In fact, the Facebook page very quickly became a place for 
‘ordinary’ activists to post anti-Islam and -Merkel slander, instead of invitations to 
protests and meetings. The German ‘Festung Europa’ Facebook page has a very 
similar structure as the English. It was founded on January 7, 2016, and currently has 
1,853 ‘followers’ (October 14, 2019). Tatjana Festerling administers the ‘page’, and 
the contents largely correlate with those on Festerling’s own blog 
(www.tatjanafesterling.de). Again, there was no sharing of information from the other 
participating groups on this ‘page’.   
Furthermore, none of the FE-groups placed much emphasis on the other participating 
groups’ actions, nor diffused knowledge from the other members’ pages. In a 
September 2016 interview about Fortress Europe, Kaljuste stated that one of the 
reasons for forming the coalition was to disseminate information and news from the 
domestic scenes between the participating groups (Kärmas 2016). The For Freedom 
representative similarly underlined the great importance of online networking for the 
participating FE-members (Interview with For Freedom 2017). However, when 
examining the Fortress Europe members’ websites and Facebook pages, hardly any 
of them refer to other FE-members aside from the January-May 2016 period, and one 
would expect such mentions between groups that cooperate (see e.g. Caiani & Parenti 
2013). So unlike Generation Identity and PEGIDA Germany in early 2015, besides 
the short period around the two transnational protest events (January-May 2016), there 
are hardly any mentions of the other FE-groups on either the participating groups’ 
websites or Facebook pages292, indicating a very loose transnational cooperative 
relationship between the groups, including online. Instead, the transnational FE-
efforts were mainly driven by individual movement entrepreneurs (especially 
Festerling and Kaljuste), who attempted to drive the coalition forwards, but largely 
failed in this attempt. 
  
                                                          
292 Yet, there are several indications that particularly the protest groups are in contact with, or 
at least ‘follow’, numerous different European (and in certain cases American or Russian) far 
right actors online, whose news articles and other types of information they disseminate on their 
own pages. 
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 FORTRESS EUROPE COALITION-SURVIVAL?  
Despite ardent efforts by especially Tatjana Festerling, Edwin Wagensveld, and 
Dawn, the Fortress Europe coalition never amounted to more than weak cooperative 
and protest links between the members. After May 16, 2016, the transnational 
coalition-building endeavour more or less terminated, mainly due to Festerling’s 
exclusion from PEGIDA Germany (Interview with Riposte Laïque 2018; Prokupkova 
2018b), and the cancelled FE-meeting in Prague in September 2016 further 
demonstrated the de facto end of the coalition (Interview with Dawn 2017). 
Whether intended or not, FE’s offline mobilization thus ended up being a short-term 
and instrumental ‘event’ coalition (Levi & Murphy 2006), as a means to counter their 
shared enemies, and aims of curbing third-country, especially Muslim, immigration 
to Europe. This outcome was mainly due to the groups’ differing ambitions with the 
coalition, and the lack of efforts to foster stronger bonds between the coalition 
partners. Hence, unlike the Generation Identity groups, aside from very sporadic 
attempts to organise transnational protests and meetings, the FE-leaders did not 
organize any FE-training sessions, conferences, or social gatherings around which the 
members could base their commitment (see e.g. Greer & Hauptmeier 2012), just as 
the leaders were not in frequent contact (Interview with Wagensveld 2017).   
The FE-Members’ Discrepant Coalition Expectations  
This network-type event-specific arrangement of the FE-coalition is rather akin to 
other far right initiatives, such as Cities against Islamization (see e.g. Hafez 2014). 
However, unlike the rationale behind FE, these mobilizations were more deliberately 
temporary and loosely organized; whereas the transnational FE cooperation was 
largely inhibited due to infights at the domestic levels, just as the groups all appear to 
have based their commitments on averse expectations.  
Hence, from the outset, Festerling and the Dawn/BPI leadership seemingly had much 
higher ambitions with Fortress Europe than did the remaining actors, considering 
their efforts to continue the European cooperation after June 2016. This was mainly 
due to their own domestic problems. Dawn, for one, did not stand strong in the Czech 
opinion polls at the time, and received limited domestic media attention, which instead 
largely went to Okamura, the party’s previous leader. It hoped to fare better at the 
European level by creating an EP faction with the other participating parties 
(Interview with Černoch 2017). On the other hand, Festerling’s exclusion from Pegida 
Germany in June meant that she only led Fortress Europe, and thus had great interest 
in ensuring the coalition’s survival. 
Conversely, two of the other key FE-organizers, Maria Kaljuste and Edwin 
Wagensveld, both defined the cooperation as a loose ‘network’ of European far right 
actors. Yet, while Kaljuste mainly attempted to further this networking online, and 
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joined a few protests in Finland (see e.g. Jaakola 2016), Wagensveld also attempted 
to continue the coalition’s street activism, and had ambitions for making political 
changes. Hence, from the interview with Wagensveld, it was his aim to form a 
network of anti-Islamic voices that could be mobilized for joint protests, plus work 
together around shared political goals such as the ECI-petition, as “with such political 
powers [as the political parties], you would have the opportunity to achieve 
something” (Interview with Wagensveld 2017).  
The FE-initiators thus had various goals with the coalition, which required quite 
different levels of commitment from the participating groups. Yet, all of the four 
actors aimed for the survival of the transnational mobilization. 
Political Parties: Not Prioritizing Fortress Europe in their Political Activities or 
Communication 
Conversely, while the extra-parliamentary actors saw the transnational coalition as 
vital for gaining influence and ‘voice’, the parties instead considered it mainly as a 
means to gain media attention and to establish loose far right contacts across Europe. 
The parties’ limited electoral results and anti-establishment discourse thus acted as 
incitement to join the coalition, especially in order to grab media attention and thus 
potentially conjure support. Winnicki from National Movement for instance stated that 
“If [the February 6 demonstration] goes well, we will probably want to repeat it” 
(Nałęcz 2016), indicating that National Movement could at least initially see potential 
in the transnational protests. Yet, the February 6 protests did not really meet these 
expectations, especially not in terms of participant numbers (around 1,500 
participants) (Ibid.).  
Moreover, according to Černoch from Dawn, the coalition also faced hindrances in 
terms of the groups’ averse political viewpoints. FE thus:   
…did not have any result. Maybe if it had led to specific cooperation for a 
longer period, and we had made a faction, then we could maybe have had 
a chance to influence something in the European Parliament. Yet, because 
people were not able to agree, we just ended up doing a few events. We 
did some work in terms of legislation, and took the topic into a public 
space to show it to people. Aside from that, it had no result. I do not think 
that anybody expected that it would lead to big results, big consequences. 
(Interview with Černoch, 2017, author’s translation) 
It thus appears more likely that the larger participating parties, i.e. National 
Movement, Lega Nord, and EKRE, saw it as a simple act of resistance, in the form of 
a show of unity through a common declaration and a one-off protest event. This is 
further evidenced by the fact that while the various extra-parliamentary FE-actors 
developed shared collective identity frames around the safe-guarding of Europe 
against Islam, this was less the case for the political parties. Despite the groups’ 
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general overlaps and rationales for European far right cooperation, i.e. seeing a need 
to ‘gather the counter-Islamic forces’, the parties did not express a strong need for 
transnational unity, but rather used the European experiences as a means to underline 
the need for action domestically, and otherwise maintained the focus on a nationally 
based ‘us’. Hence, the parties mainly considered the cooperation in symbolic terms. 
They thus mainly saw it as a means to show their wish to safeguard the nation-states 
against third-country immigration and EU-impositions, and thereby exert implicit 
pressure on the EU decision-makers.  
None of the larger parties thus placed much emphasis on their participation in Fortress 
Europe, neither in terms of sending their most prominent politicians, nor concerning 
the advertisement of upcoming events and general mentions of the coalition and its 
work. Hence, neither Lega Nord, National Movement, nor EKRE sent their leaders or 
main spokespeople to any of the FE-meetings and –demonstrations293. At the same 
time, the coalition did not feature prominently on the parties’ websites, nor did they 
exchange information on the shared FE-Facebook ‘pages’. Instead, the parties wrote 
about their relations to similar-minded parties abroad, such as National Movement and 
its cooperation with the Hungarian Jobbik party (Ruch Narodowy 2017), EKRE and 
two far right Latvian and Lithuanian parties (All Latvia! and League of Nationalists 
respectively) (see e.g. EKRE FB-post), and Lega and Front National (see e.g. 
Scammel 2015). Respeto was similarly constantly looking for transnational partners, 
aside from the FE members294. Hence, judging from the parties’ closest allies abroad, 
they found it more relevant to liaise with political parties, for one to be part of a party 
group at the EP-level (Lega Nord and Respeto strategy)295, but also to partner with 
actors from neighbouring countries with similar contexts and issue foci (EKRE and 
RN). 
Moreover, particularly the parties’ quest for electoral gains and ideological focus 
points placed their foci squarely on the national level, both in terms of frames (‘us’ as 
national citizens) and activity levels. Their strategic deliberations about transnational 
cooperation were thus of a completely different type than e.g. those of the PEGIDA 
                                                          
293 Lega Nord sent Vincenzo Sofo (Il Talebano), EKRE sent Kaljuste, a regional leader, but not 
a prominent EKRE member (Expert Interview with Kasekamp), and National Movement sent 
Jerzy Kenig, a prominent member due to his fame prior to joining the party, but not a top party 
member (Expert Interview with Jajecznik).  
294 The Spanish Respeto party was strongly networking at the European (EU) level, aside from 
the links to PEGIDA, in an attempt to set up cooperation with radical and extreme right parties. 
Even the signing of the Prague Declaration was discussed with a focus on the participating 
parties in the coalition. Moreover, in April 2017, a party representative went to the Europe of 
Nations and Freedom (ENF) meeting in Germany, hosted by AfD (Respeto 2017b), and a few 
months later, a delegation visited the extreme right Alliance of European National Movements 
(AENM) EP-party group (Respeto 2017a). 
295 ENF had had its inaugural meeting in January 2016. 
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groups, which could express themselves more freely and less constrained, due to their 
extra-parliamentary characters. Furthermore, by the time of the initiation of the FE-
coalition, the ‘height’ of the ‘refugee crisis’ had been reached, and most of the national 
governments around Europe had created policies during the winter of 2015-2016 to 
curb the immigration and asylum-seeking in their countries. This meant that the need 
for transnational far right pressure on the EU also dwindled, at least temporarily.  
Hence, particularly after the failure to launch the European Citizen’s Initiative in May 
2016, there was no indication of strong links between the FE-members, either in terms 
of organisation type, protest goals, ideology, collective identity, or shared political 
institutions they could attempt to influence (such as the European Parliament, etc.). 
The dividing line between the parties and the extra-parliamentary organizations thus 
not only consisted of their organizational set-ups, but also their worldviews, policy 
proposals, and ambitions writ large. All of these factors combined meant that Fortress 
Europe ended up being a short-term, instrumental event coalition. 
Fortress Europe’s Loose Network-Structure  
Fortress Europe’s fluid membership base also indicates its loose network nature. Any 
group sharing FE’s overall agenda could join, and the list of participants continuously 
changed throughout the 2016-2017 period, gradually involving a rather high share of 
extreme right extra-parliamentary actors. In August 2017, Wagensveld, in fact, 
problematized the looseness of the contacts, as he could not say for sure which groups 
were still active members of Fortress Europe, just as he complained that the support 
from certain countries was too limited to sustain the coalition (Interview with 
Wagensveld 2017).  
Yet, as the creation of contacts and networking was one of the main thoughts behind 
FE, its loose structures and membership requirements could also be part of the appeal 
for some of the participating actors. In fact, in September 2017, For Freedom’s 
spokesperson stated that the FE-network was still active “underground” (Interview 
with For Freedom 2017). By now, it mainly consisted of her “knowing someone, who 
knows someone, who knows someone” across Europe (Ibid.), making the network 
appear rather loosely structured. Moreover, she also revealed that most of this 
transnationalization was taking place in the online far right sphere. Hence, according 
to her, the (remaining) FE-groups (she did not reveal which groups, but it is most 
likely mainly the extra-parliamentary groups) had daily contact. She referred to the 
network participants as ‘information channels,’ who assisted each other with speech 
contents, or discussed ongoing events and news across Europe. The members thus 
neither carried out joint public activities, nor intended to arrange further 
demonstrations for the time being, but rather sought other, unspecified, avenues of 
mobilization. Hence, the European networking still continued, albeit for the time 
being only in the online arena, making it possible to reunite swiftly at the street level, 
if another ‘crisis’ was to erupt. 
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Hence, from the outset, the FE-cooperation did not have a very strong foundation, 
other than the felt need to unite against Islam and the EU – a slim basis for the survival 
of a coalition. This led it to have a similar faith as the ‘Counter-Jihad’ network and 
SIOE, which, however, maintained online links. The looseness of these ties can also 
be beneficial in the long run, as it both ensures maintenance of legitimacy and 
respectability, while also upholding a long-term mobilization potential, which can be 
re-ignited should another ‘crisis’ occur.  
 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Unlike Generation Identity, Fortress Europe never amounted to more than a short-
term event coalition between a diverse range of actors, who solely united around their 
antipathy towards the external threats of Islam, third-country immigration, and the 
EU, plus the internal adversaries in the form of the liberal elite. The members pushed 
aside their national(ist) divergences due to the perceived imminence of these threats, 
spurred on by the European ‘refugee crisis’. They thus all attempted to exploit the 
opening discursive opportunities across Europe as a means to exercise pressure on 
both the domestic and European decision-makers. 
Yet, the coalition only existed for five months, as the exclusion of Festerling from 
PEGIDA Germany and the dissolution of BPI entailed the break-up of the two leading 
FE-organizers, who had also been the sole providers of resources to the coalition. 
Despite ardent efforts by especially Festerling to ensure the coalition’s survival over 
the following year, the lacking incentives for, and thus commitment of, the parties, 
and absence of a shared agenda between the participants, meant that the coalition 
could solely be characterised as an event-coalition. 
Aside from the coalition’s leadership, it was thus never the aim for all of the FE-
members to create a cohesive group of activists fighting under exactly the same 
banner. On the one hand, particularly the protest groups united around the ability to 
express pan-European unity without breaking with their own nationhood, and instead 
propagate a form of ‘European patriotism’. They thus portrayed themselves as 
forming a joint European force in the defence of their respective nation-states, and 
through the expression of ‘solidarity’ towards each other in their respective domestic 
battles against the liberal and ‘politically correct’ elites. On the other hand, the 
political parties did not appear to have long-term ambitions with the coalition, but 
rather perceived it as a networking opportunity, and a means to gain media attention. 
Hence, the groups’ transnational pressure on the EU and the domestic decision-
makers was only of a short time period, and did not lead to any substantial policy 
changes. In the words of the editor of Riposte Laïque, who joined the coalition in May 
2016, “The idea [behind Fortress Europe] was good, but in any case, it did not work. 
One does not win every time!” (Interview with Riposte Laïque 2018). 
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CHAPTER 10. CONCLUSION 
The thesis analyzed the Europeanization of collective action and networks of the 
members of the two transnational far right coalitions Fortress Europe (FE) and 
Generation Identity (GI) as cases of far right mobilization during the ‘refugee crisis’ 
(2015-2017). 
The case study of the two transnational coalitions is unlike many other studies of 
extra-parliamentary organizations’ Europeanization. Instead of focusing on one-two 
national cases (as e.g. done by Bourne & Chatzopoulou 2015; Monforte 2014), the 
two cases were chosen based on their transnational nature, and the focus was thus 
transnational, i.e. European. Thereby, the study attempted to move away from the 
methodological nationalism often inherent in political analyses (see e.g. Chernilo 
2011). Yet, the pre-determined selection of actors known to cooperate transnationally 
infers certain limitations as to the findings’ generalizability. Conversely, as both the 
FE and GI coalitions have members that adopted their organization, action repertoire, 
and collective action frame (CAF) blueprints from another European actor, there was 
also an inherent expectation that at least the national GI and PEGIDA groups would 
mobilize, argue, and act rather similarly across Europe. As shown in the analyses, this 
was also largely the case, making this a promising test case for the relevance of 
domestic contexts for far right mobilization.  
Moreover, the study focused on the height of the European ‘refugee crisis,’ a period 
that inferred an increased focus on third country immigration, Islam, and the EU’s 
supranational role, three of the key mobilizing issues for the European far right. As 
other far right actors including parties, protest groups, vigilantes, and citizens’ 
initiatives (see e.g. Castelli Gattinara 2018; Císař & Navrátil 2018), the FE and GI 
groups mobilized against the reception and integration of refugees and migrants. 
During this period, they all Europeanized their contention, as they “collaborate[d], or 
ma[d]e horizontal communicative linkages with movements in other countries, 
contest[ed] authorities beyond the state, frame[d] issues as European and claim[ed] an 
European identity” (Bourne & Chatzopoulou 2015: 34). Yet, as established in the 
analysis, and further elaborated below, these Europeanization processes both differed 
between the two transnational coalitions and across the different states. 
This concluding chapter compares the findings between and across the two coalitions, 
while extending the discussion towards the general Europeanization and far right 
literature. The thesis aimed to create an empirical basis from which to construct 
theoretical expectations. While taking this initial step (together with e.g. Hutter 2014a; 
Denes 2012), more research is required before any certain theoretical deductions can 
be extrapolated. Yet, it is still possible to make a tentative framework for far right 
Europeanization based on the FE and GI analyses. 
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The first section of the conclusion presents the study’s key findings, where after I 
outline a model for far right extra-parliamentary Europeanization, based on the 
analysis of the two cases. Then the groups’ ‘domestic mobilization,’ ‘Europeanization 
of collective action,’ and ‘Europeanization of networks’ are examined in more detail. 
This section ends with a reflection about the groups’ similar European collective 
identity constructions, leading into a discussion about avenues for further research. 
 KEY FINDINGS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
Europeanization of Collective Action 
 Limited degree of Europeanization of collective action for far right extra-
parliamentary actors (with regards to all scopes,  except ‘issue’). They mainly 
utilize the strategy of ‘domestication’. 
 Significance of the roles of the political opportunity structures (POS), the 
discursive opportunity structures (DOS), and the material and symbolic resources 
for an extra-parliamentary actor’s Europeanization. 
 Despite mobilizing with the same main collective action frames (CAFs), the 
groups’ domestic protest forms and issue foci differ, depending on their POS and 
DOS, the ongoing domestic debates, and the focus of the domestic far right scene. 
 Confirmation of the role of national far right parties as indicative for the 
frequency and success of Western European far right extra-parliamentary actors’ 
domestic mobilization (hydraulic relationship). 
 Diverse mobilization strategies for the Western and Eastern European groups 
around EU-related issues, due to their different antagonist constructions. While 
the Western European groups tend to focus on the domestic establishment, the 
Eastern European (and Italian) target and/or criticize the EU to a larger degree. 
Europeanization of Networks 
 The far right transnational mobilization potential is strong, due to the ability of 
(some, but not all) far right actors to bridge ideological disagreements around 
anti-Islam positions. 
 The extra-parliamentary far right unites in ‘transnational movements’ at the 
European level. They protest in the transnational space, yet, they do not approach 
the EU. Instead, they focus on mobilizing and influencing the domestic public. 
 Skilled and experienced leaders and ‘movement intellectuals’ are important for 
far right coalition survival, due to their ability to create inter-group unity at the 
ideational and strategical level. 
 The importance of social media for far right communication, networking, support 
mobilization, and for transnational organization and coordination 
 The extra-parliamentary far right constructs transnational collective identities 
around the need for nationalists (or patriots) to heroically defend Europe as a 
means to safeguard the European civilization, and thus the various nation-states, 
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despite facing strong opposition (they create identities around victimhood and 
battle frames). 
 EUROPEANIZATION MODEL FOR FAR RIGHT EXTRA-
PARLIAMENTARY ACTORS 
Recounting the theoretical expectations from Europeanization literature, it assumes 
that collective actors increasingly will target the EU institutions (either directly or 
indirectly) in attempts to exploit the available opportunities at the European level (see 
e.g. della Porta & Caiani 2009). Yet, due to several known obstacles for extra-
parliamentary groups’ access to the EU institutions, it was expected that the political 
and discursive opportunity structures plus the groups’ material and symbolic 
resources would act as independent variables influencing far right Europeanization 
(see e.g. Ibid.). In order to analyze these assumptions empirically, the thesis focused 
on the ‘refugee crisis’ (2015-2017), as this critical juncture was expected to be the 
most likely period for far right Europeanization. The global nature of the ‘crisis’ made 
it an EU priority, requiring pan-European responses, inferring a similar pan-European 
mobilization potential at the extra-parliamentary far right level. 
The study found that the extra-parliamentary far right’s Europeanization is similar to 
that of most left wing CSOs and SMOs, as it faces the same obstacles for 
Europeanization, especially regarding political opportunities and material and 
symbolic resources. Hence, due to the GI and FE groups’ limited material resources, 
focus on diffuse and politicized issues, prevalent use of demonstrative and, in some 
cases, disruptive protest forms, and views on the EU (Eurosceptic and conflictual), 
they were not expected to seek EU institutional access. Besides, the EU’s liberal 
democratic ethos conflicts with the one of the far right, indicating that even if they 
pursued such a strategy, the access would be denied. The gathered data confirmed 
these assumptions, as none of the extra-parliamentary FE nor GI groups took their 
claims to Brussels or Strasbourg, confirming the importance of having material and 
symbolic resources that align with the EU ‘norms’. 
Instead, as the revised Europeanization model shows (Figure 10.1 below), for their 
collective action, far right groups mainly use domestic and outsider strategies for 
targeting both the EU, but mainly the domestic decision-makers. The groups thus in 
deed pose an ‘inconvenient solidarity’ for the EU (Caiani & Pavan 2017), albeit not 
in the sense of directly targeting the EU institutions. Hence, none of the GI nor FE 
groups ‘Europeanized’ their collective action to a high extent, except for the 
mobilization around European issues. Similar to previous findings (see e.g. Hutter 
2014a; Bourne & Chatzopoulou 2015), while they did hold a few joint ‘transnational 
protests,’ most of their protests remained at the domestic level, either in the form of 
domestic protests or domestication, despite the European scope of the ‘crisis’. There 
were thus only limited instances of externalization, transnational pressure, and 
supranationalisation, underlining the strong role of the domestic setting for far right 
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collective action. The groups thus mainly organize domestic protests to attract media 
attention and mobilize the domestic constituencies (Beyers et al. 2008) as means to 
exercise pressure on the decision-makers, but mainly to influence the public’s 
perceptions of the groups’ causes296. 
The two transnational coalitions organize very similarly as transnational movements 
(Monforte 2014), which conflictual view on the EU and lack of resources infer that 
they mobilize outside of the EU-setting, albeit still organizing joint transnational 
protests. The far right groups thus (to varying degrees) coordinated their domestic 
efforts and co-created joint responses to the European decision-makers, again mainly 
via the use of outsider strategies. The extra-parliamentary networking and frame 
construction thus largely occurs externally from the EU institutions, and instead 
involves the transnational space, i.e. both the domestic and European. Yet, similar as 
the two left-wing transnational coalitions DiEM25 and Plan B (see Agustín 2017), the 
groups Europeanized their networks in highly differing ways, both in terms of the time 
of initiation, the rationale, ambitions, and organizational constellations, leading to two 
very different coalition outcomes, one enduring (GI), and one an event coalition (FE) 
(see Figure 10.1). 
  
                                                          
296 The gathered data on EKRE, National Movement, Northern League, and Courage suggests 
that their collective action Europeanization is rather similar to that of the extra-parliamentary 
groups. Yet, more research should be conducted on both far right and far left fringe parties and 
their maneuvering in the transnational sphere, particularly with extra-parliamentary 
organizations. 
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DOMESTIC MOBILIZATION 
Unlike the political opportunities, the domestic discursive opportunities were open for 
all the groups. Notably in the years 2015-2016,297 issues related to third country 
immigration, Islam, and asylum seekers obtained increased salience, while the EU and 
European decision-makers disagreed about how to accommodate the refugees and 
migrants arriving to Europe. At the same time, the closed POS for several of the 
Western European GI and FE groups did not dissuade them from mobilizing. As 
Jasper and Poletta (2001) explain, ‘identity-based’ actors often mobilize despite (or 
exactly because of) closed opportunities, especially if they pursue societal rather than 
political changes (see also Kriesi 2004). Certain of the groups instead appropriated 
their protest forms to the domestic POS. In countries with nearly open opportunities, 
the groups used more moderate tactics, while closed opportunities inferred more 
radical/disruptive protests. This was, for instance, visible in the cases of GI France 
(open POS) versus GI Germany and GI Austria (closed POS), just as PEGIDA 
Netherlands (closed) also organized a high degree of confrontational actions. Yet, 
there were, in fact, also a few countries, where the domestic POS differed for the 
groups. In the Czech case, for example, BPI’s cooperation with Dawn provided it with 
better resources, including access to the Czech parliament, while GI Czech Republic, 
conversely, struggled to amass the required resources, partly due to its lack of such an 
elite alliance. 
The national extra-parliamentary GI and FE groups broadly united around the same 
respective non-violentprotest repertoires298 and CAFs. GI France’s range of protest 
tactics, mainly in the form of direct (social) actions, were relatively easy to diffuse 
abroad, as they required few activists and limited material resources, leading the GI 
offshoots to employ very similar protest tactics. Numerous PEGIDA offshoots 
similarly adopted PEGIDA Germany’s weekly rallies. Yet, due to low turnout and/or 
police interventions, most of their protests quickly seized, and only PEGIDA 
                                                          
297 These topics had already been agenda setting for several Western European governments 
since the early 2000s (see e.g. Joon Han 2015), and the ‘refugee crisis’ only increased their 
highly politicized nature, leading to an even more polarized debate. 
298 The groups’ more moderate appearance is partly an effect of the long-term shifts in European 
attitudes, visible in the rise in public Islamophobia and the mainstreaming of the far right, 
largely ongoing since September 11, 2001 (see e.g. Berntzen 2018). Due to this society-wide 
hostile discourse against Islam in many European countries, actors mobilizing against Islam 
can moderate their expression forms, due to the increased likelihood of gaining resonance. 
Hence, the GI and FE actors form part of a new, more moderate, far right extra-parliamentary 
mobilization, existing since the early 2000s (see Ibid.; Fielitz & Laloire 2016), and (re-)gaining 
visibility during the ‘refugee crisis’. Despite often crossing the legal lines of ‘acceptable’ 
behaviour and expression forms, the movement denounces totalitarian worldviews and racism, 
and mainly draws on demonstrative protest forms. 
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Netherlands appropriated its protest repertoire accordingly. As a more general 
observation, this infers that the PEGIDA groups’ limited protest repertoire inhibited 
their mobilization potential over time, just as Wagensveld’s choice to adjust PEGIDA 
Netherlands’ protest repertoire highlights the relevance of the leaders’ own 
convictions, together with the structuralist and rationalist variables. 
Despite the varied levels of mobilization, I argue that the extra-parliamentary FE and 
GI groups fulfilled different far right ‘roles’ during the ‘crisis’ (see also Önnerfors 
2019). While both coalitions’ groups use non-violent means, they appeal to adverse 
supporters (e.g. in terms of age and education level), and their protest tactics 
underlines their different mobilization goals. For example, the GI representatives are 
constantly cautious not to overstep the discursive extremism boundaries,299 while the 
FE extra-parliamentary groups all had leading members that made extreme and racist 
statements, both in speeches and online. The PEGIDA groups thus present themselves 
as part of ‘the people,’ and mobilize the public in a more ‘classical’ form, by trying 
to draw huge crowds in order to portray the ‘size’ of the public disquiet against the 
elites. Conversely, the GI groups portray themselves as an ‘educated elite,’ expressing 
a renewal or modernization of the far right extra-parliamentary scene. They mainly 
organize their protests to create a media ‘buzz,’ ultimately aiming to influence the 
societal discourse through a ‘mainstreaming’ of the new right worldview (Bouron 
2014). Despite these diverging strategies, both coalitions’ members wished to 
“challenge and undermine the dominant idea that underpins the policy monopoly,” 
mainly at the domestic levels (Beyers et al. 2008: 1121). Yet, while most of the 
PEGIDA groups failed to mobilize the masses, the GI groups’ reliance on smaller 
scale protest actions, together with their subcultural groupuscular features, infers an 
increased sustainment potential, due to the larger focus on the creation of viable 
organizational structures, together with the frequent street mobilization.  
Returning to the collective action frames (CAF), as the ‘refugee crisis’ advanced, and 
it began gaining continent-wide salience, all the groups conflated their anti-Islam 
frames with frames against the refugees and asylum seekers. This inferred a further 
‘bridging’ of the European far right frames, as they “transcend[ed] national 
specificities” (Monforte 2014: 223), even in (Eastern European) countries unaffected 
by Muslim immigration and the reception of refugees. Especially the ‘terrorism threat’ 
diagnosis was oft voiced across the continent, due to its potential occurrence in any 
European country at any time, making it an apt frame for transnational adaptation (see 
e.g. Druxes 2016). Hence, the CAFs are border crossing, inferring that it is not (only) 
the national context, which pre-determines a far right group’s expression form. 
  
                                                          
299 Consider e.g. the hesitance to admit the Eastern European groups as ‘full’ GI members. 
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Yet, at the same time, the protest event analysis showed that the national particularities 
entailed varied protest targets, frequencies, and specific issue foci and claims (see 
Monforte 2014 for a similar finding). The domestic contextual factors relate to the 
groups’ different domestic POS, material resources300, worldview alignments with, 
and embeddedness in, the established domestic far right, and, in most cases, the role 
of the radical right parties (Western Europe) and/or the position of the mainstream 
parties (Eastern Europe)301. Hence, the analysis largely confirms prior findings on far 
right mobilization (see e.g. Caiani et al. 2012; Minkenberg 2018). 
The groups thus appropriate the New Right (GI) or anti-Islam (FE) worldviews to 
those prevalent on the domestic far right scene, and often align the exact protest issues 
with the dominant topics in the domestic news. This again testifies to the continued 
relevance of the domestic setting for far right mobilization, despite the respective 
PEGIDA and GI groups’ overlapping worldviews, organization forms, and protest 
repertoires. In this way, the national groups simultaneously draw on European 
blueprints for their mobilization, while attempting to become accepted, and thus 
embedded, in their domestic far right scenes. In this regard, the New Right 
ethnopluralist worldview proved hard to adapt to all domestic contexts. The Eastern 
European and Italian GI groups thus struggled to gain acceptance domestically, as 
their reading of the ideology conflicted with the prevalent domestic far right frames. 
Hence, while these groups may have succeeded in setting up national GI groups and 
in networking with GI groups abroad, they did not actually obtain domestic 
embeddedness, a factor that influences their resources and thus mobilization potential. 
EUROPEANIZATION OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 
As the overview in Table 10.1 shows, none of the GI nor FE groups ‘Europeanized’ 
their collective action to a high degree, except for the mobilization around European 
issues. The section below further explains these low protest scopes.  
                                                          
300 For the GI groups, the three most resource-strong groups, GI Germany, GI Austria, and GI 
France, organized most protests in the period, including the ones requiring the highest levels 
of resources (e.g. building occupations). For FE, BPI and PEGIDA Germany’s comparatively 
stronger human resources (especially in terms of protest supporters) meant that they could 
continue their mobilization for a longer period, together with For Freedom and PEGIDA 
Netherlands, which, in fact, continued mobilizing despite low turnout. 
301 Some cases speak against this correlation though. In France (Front National and GI France) 
and Austria (Austrian Freedom Party and GI Austria), the two GI groups were highly active 
and amassed comparatively strong resources over time, despite the parties’ strong role. In 
France, this relates to the symbiotic nature of Front National and the French extra-
parliamentary New Right. In Austria, GI Austria has built its organization up around the 
Burschenschaften and has obtained the approval of FPÖ, unlike PEGIDA Austria, which 
struggled to find legitimacy by both the party and the domestic extra-parliamentary far right 
scene (Ajanovic et al. 2016). 
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Table 10.1: Overview of the GI and FE groups’ collective action scopes (2015-2017). 
 Generation Identity Fortress Europe 
Issue Scope 
Around 50% national,  
50% European 
Mainly ‘European’  
(albeit ‘Both’ to high degree) 
Target Scope 
Mainly national government – very limited EU targeting 
(Eastern European and Italian groups most focus on the EU) 
Participant 
Scope 
Limited ‘European’ and ‘Cross-border’ participation 
Event Scope Very low number of transnational events (both <10)) 
Main form of 
Europeanization 
Domestication (followed by transnational pressure) 
 
Throughout the three-year period, both coalitions’ groups mainly organized protests 
against immigration, ‘Islamization,’ and refugee/asylum policies, frequently with a 
European issue scope. The groups’ strong focus on the overarching topics of ‘Anti-
immigration’ and ‘Anti-Islam(ization)’ is, in fact, a key explanation for their 
transnational collaborative links. As I argued throughout, due to the pan-European 
‘threat’, the activists felt a need for continent-wide support, if they were going to 
‘defend Europe’ successfully. Hence, the GI groups’ emphasis on European identity 
and PEGIDA’s ‘patriotic Europeanism,’ and both groups’ focus on civilizational 
distinctions, explains their desire to unite with fellow (white) Europeans against the 
‘pending Islamization’ of the European continent. The ideological focus on the 
expulsion of the external ‘others’ is thus a partial explanation for the 
transnationalization of nationalists.  
As explained above, the far right groups mainly organized their protests at the 
domestic level and mainly targeted the domestic decision-makers. This domestic 
focus is partly explained by their lacking EU-level POS. Moreover, the EU member 
states’ strong role in devising the EU migration and asylum policy (Monforte 2014) 
also infers a more limited need to direct the demands at the EU, just as the ‘refugee 
crisis’ from early on led to a ‘re-nationalisation’ of immigration and asylum policies 
and rights by the EU MS. The far right groups were thus likely to be most successful 
targeting the national government, and more so, if the government was open to the 
actors’ demands (i.e. willing to enforce a strict immigration policy). 
Considering all the groups’ nationalist predispositions and therewith-related distrust 
and dislike, if not outright disdain, for the EU, this domestic target focus is rather 
interesting, considering the expected mobilization potential in EU-criticism, 
especially as the European’s trust in the EU was low in the period, albeit increasing 
(see e.g. European Commission 2016b). Chabanet (2011) anticipated that as time 
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advances and “the role of EU institutions is judged more and more on their 
effectiveness, conflict about European integration in general can be expected to 
increase” (2011: 97). Yet, despite the FE and GI groups’ Eurosceptic worldviews, 
they predominantly focused on domestic actors, rather than targeting the EU for any 
wrongdoing. The EU’s role was, in fact, limited for almost all the Western European 
groups, except the Italian that, together with the Visegrad country groups, frequently 
criticized the EU institutions in the protests, in alignment with their domestic far right 
scenes (see also Hafez 2018). The groups from the Visegrad countries targeted their 
governments with demands to refuse the EU’s quota proposal. The Czech case 
illustrates this well. Here, the combination of the government’s anti-immigration 
stance, its Visegrad membership, and the public’s opposition to both Islam and the 
EU, meant that the Czech groups could exert more policy-oriented pressure on the 
government, as the mainstream parties already largely were on the far right’s side 
(Císař & Navrátil 2018; see also Hafez 2018). The Italian group organized a few 
explicit anti-EU protests, albeit without demands related to the quotas. Conversely, 
the other Western European groups mainly targeted the domestic mainstream 
establishment, only in some cases explicitly demanding policy changes. They instead 
often organized expressive protests, aimed just as much at the general population as 
the national government, and without an explicit focus on the EU’s policy output. As 
Hafez (2018) explains, this is because the groups’ populist frame foci differ. On the 
one hand, “in Western Europe, Islamophobia is often part of a horizontal antagonism 
that stands next to a vertical antagonism against the ruling elite,” while in the Visegrad 
countries, this vertical antagonism instead consists of the EU, somewhat similar as the 
Italian case (2018: 447). This thus partially explains the Western European FE and GI 
groups’ focus on the domestic rulers, media, and advocates of liberalism vis-a-vis the 
Eastern European and Italian expressed aversion towards the EU. 
Despite these divergent antagonist frame constructions, all groups thus still mainly 
targeted national actors, be it the national government, other (mainly left wing) 
political parties, or proponents of multiculturalism in various organizational forms, 
who particularly the GI groups often targeted through acts of intimidation. Hence, if 
the groups targeted a political decision-maker, then most commonly the national 
government (see e.g. Hutter 2014a; della Porta & Caiani 2009 for similar findings). 
In the very limited instances of EU-targeting, the groups approached the EU in a 
conflictual manner, expressing strong criticism and anti-elite sentiments. Similarly, 
they also mainly targeted other EU MS’ leaders for more symbolic reasons, and rarely 
with explicit demands for policy changes. Instead, the far right groups jointly 
constructed Merkel as the enemy, epitomizing both the European elites and the EU, 
and the targeting of Merkel thus became an implicit targeting of the EU. Conversely, 
the Visegrad leaders were portrayed as heroes, symbolising the hope for Europe.  
In terms of ‘participant scopes,’ the groups only joined protests abroad on limited 
occasions, and mainly as instances of ‘cross-border’ participation. This shows the 
(more or less natural) role of geographical proximity, often explainable by resource-
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considerations, lingual overlaps, and border-crossing worldviews and references, 
which may foster closer relations between neighbouring countries’ far right scenes302. 
From an ideological perspective, the dominance of local and domestic protests aligns 
with the groups’ constructions of their European linkages. The GI groups’ three-tiered 
identity construction around a local, national, and European identity places most 
emphasis on the domestic ‘Heimat’ and regional level in terms of identity 
‘uniqueness’ and preservation (see e.g. Zúquete 2018). The FE groups instead 
underline their patriotic and nationalist sentiments, but around the need to preserve 
the continent to preserve themselves. Hence, both coalitions’ members mainly 
organize domestic protests, but with the use of the same main CAFs, as means to 
safeguard the continent together. 
Similarly, both coalitions also only planned a few transnational protests. The 
authorities cancelled some of these, due to the far right groups’ contentious natures, 
inferring that at least in terms of the Europeanization of collective action, the groups’ 
disruptive natures and anti-liberal viewpoints may act as hindrances for transnational 
far right protest cooperation. Those permitted were organized with highly varied 
strategies and goals. The FE coalition held two transnational protests within a rather 
confined period, the first to exercise pressure on the national and European decision-
makers, and the second to forge closer border-crossing bonds between the activists. 
Conversely, the GI groups organize annual transnational GI demonstrations in order 
to uphold the inter-group cohesion, and symbolically construct the coalition as a unit. 
This brings us to a closer consideration of the two coalitions. 
EUROPEANIZATION OF NETWORKS: ENDURING VS. EVENT 
COALITIONS 
Table 10.2 provides an overview of the two coalitions’ main differences and 
similarities, explained further below.  
  
                                                          
302 This is, for instance, visible for the German-speaking New Right scene (of Germany, 
Switzerland, and Austria), the Estonian and Finnish far right’s lingual overlaps and shared 
aversion towards Russia, plus the Danish and Swedish national-conservative movement around 
‘freedom of speech’. 
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Table 10.2 Organizational and ideational differences between the GI and FE coalitions. 
Coalition Generation Identity Fortress Europe 
Worldview 
(Largely) Homogeneous 
(New Right, but national 
differences) 
Heterogeneous 
(Mix of anti-Islam and 
populist radical right) 
Denounce fascism, Nazism, and racism 
Types of 
organisations 
Homogeneous  
(Groupuscules with  
SMO features) 
Heterogeneous  
(Parties, protest groups, 
and political associations) 
Timing of coalition 
initiation 
2012  Continuous 
growth 
No clear ‘catalyst,’ but 
aim of expression form 
moderation) 
Midst of ‘refugee crisis’ 
‘Refugee crisis’ as catalyst 
(Autumn/winter 2015) 
Reason for 
transnationalization 
‘European identity’ 
inherent in New Right 
worldview 
Opposition to EU’s 
handling of ‘refugee crisis’  
Coalition initiation 
In-direct diffusion of 
material abroad  
establishing contacts  
Movement leaders 
contacting European 
network 
Coalition aim? 
Homogeneous 
Sustained coalition 
(groupuscule aim of 
Meta-political changes)  
Heterogeneous 
One-off event (parties) 
Sustained network (some 
extra-parliamentary 
groups) 
Coalition-
maintenance? 
Building social basis 
Skilled leadership; 
Diffusion of GI material; 
Activist training; Regular 
communication; Annual 
transnational protests 
No shared commitment 
Scant leadership; No 
shared aims; Limited 
communication; Few 
transnational events 
Collective identity? 
‘Defenders of Europe’ 
against Islam(ization) 
(military jargon) 
‘Patriotic Europeans’ 
protecting Europe vs. 
Islam (only extra-
parliamentary groups) 
Transnational ties 
Strong and sustained 
(frequent cooperation 
across borders; 
transnational activities; 
shared rules of non-
extremism) 
Weak and instrumental 
(loose network of actors; 
no sustained contact nor 
activities; membership on 
loose basis) 
Type of Coalition Enduring coalition Event coalition 
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Guiraudon (2011) poses the question whether “the ‘Europeanization’ of mobilization” 
is “part of a process whereby activism has become globalized, or are mobilized groups 
migrating from the national to the European level to follow the shift in policy 
competence in the EU?” (2011: 130). In this case, it appears to be a mix of both. On 
the one hand, the GI and FE extra-parliamentary actors’ predecessors (i.e. Identitarian 
Bloc and the Counter-Jihad Movement) already ‘Europeanized’ their CAFs and 
networks prior to the creation of the GI and FE groups, without the aim of approaching 
the EU. GI France and PEGIDA Germany continued this trajectory, albeit with 
different aims. GI France shared the New Right ambition of transnational European 
cooperation, pursued since the late 1960s (see e.g. Bar-On 2011), again without any 
focus on the EU. The GI coalition was thus founded prior to the ‘crisis’ with the aim 
of creating a European ‘movement’ of (more or less) heterogeneous New Right 
groupuscules, jointly advocating for European meta-political changes, mainly 
coalescing due to broader transnationalization processes on the far right. A similar 
picture emerges regarding PEGIDA and its offshoots that all mainly were set up due 
to far right worldview change processes, spurred on by the shift to a civilizational anti-
Islam focus in the early 2000s (see e.g. Berntzen 2018). Globalization thus plays a 
strong role in terms of ‘uniting the right’ at the transnational European level. Yet, at 
the same time, the FE coalition united in response to the high inflow of refugees in 
autumn 2015 and the EU’s role in determining their continental division. Perceiving 
an opening in the European discursive opportunities, the FE coalition was founded in 
an attempt to influence the EU’s policy output.  
In both coalitions, it was the more resource-strong groups (i.e. GI France and GI 
Austria for GI and PEGIDA Germany and BPI/Dawn for FE), which had the 
leadership roles (as also expected in the transnational coalition literature, see e.g. 
Bandy & Smith 2005). Yet, their roles were very different. GI France, and later also 
GI Austria and, to a lesser extent, GI Germany, directly diffused their worldviews, 
groupuscular features, and protest repertoires abroad at various forms of meetings, 
thereby ensuring European GI homogeneity in terms of worldview, framing, 
mobilization skills, and tactics. The educational focus relates to their embeddedness 
in the French and German New Right scenes303. The GI leadership has thus ensured 
the coalition’s survival since 2012, based on top-down hierarchical and quasi-
militaristic management, (initial) diffusion of GI material, fostering of strong human 
and organizational resources, and rather frequent transnational communication, 
ensuring the ‘franchising’ of the ‘corporate identity’ (Eckes 2016). Moreover, to 
ensure conformity and abeyance of the law, the GI leaders monitor the other GI groups 
                                                          
303 Especially the leaders of The Identitarians (ex-Identitarian Bloc) and the German New Right 
actors, Götz Kubitschek and Martin Lichtmesz, have been crucial for the GI activists in terms 
of teaching the required skills for mobilization. 
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to ensure European adherence to the ‘party-line,’304 in order to both prevent 
persecution and to appear ‘respectable’. The GI groups’ resulting similar organization 
forms, worldviews, and joint activities make them appear as a coherent mobilization, 
even though it can be speculated exactly how close the individual activists’ 
transnational ties are, something that requires further investigation. Yet, one can say 
that the national groups unite around the same protest tactics and media 
communication strategies at their domestic levels, in this way Europeanizing the 
mobilization form and constructing a longer-term, substantive ideological alliance. 
The annual ‘Summer University’ and transnational GI-demonstration ensure 
conformity and maintain the coalition’s transnational scope, both in terms of 
collective action and identity, together with processions in remembrance of European 
battles against Muslim Ottoman ‘invaders’. 
Conversely, when the European PEGIDA offshoots started mobilizing, PEGIDA 
Germany’s leader, Bachmann, initially tried to enforce their adherence to PEGIDA 
Germany’s framework and leadership. Yet, this did not materialize, most likely due 
to the quick diffusion of the PEGIDA blueprint, which left no time to prepare a 
transnational set-up akin to that of GI. PEGIDA Germany was thus not involved in 
the offshoots’ management from the start, inferring that it could not exercise any kind 
of control over the groups’ actions. Aside from a few transnational PEGIDA meetings, 
there was thus no similar diffusion of strategies and mobilization forms as by the GI 
groups, leading the PEGIDA network to ally on a much looser basis,305 solely united 
around a strong opposition to Islam and the establishment and the use of the same 
protest repertoire. 
The Fortress Europe coalition had a similar problem. Unlike GI, FE consisted of 
heterogeneous organization types with varied worldviews (especially about Russia) 
and mobilization aims, just as particularly the parties’ ideational basis for 
transnationalization had a much more nation-centric foundation. Due to these 
differences, the FE leaders solely aspired to set up a loose transnational solidarity 
network of anti-Islam and -EU organizations (Interview with Wagensveld 2017). They 
thus formed it on a very informal basis, without frequent contact and activities, nor 
ambitions to align the participants’ worldviews, mobilization strategies, 
organizational set-ups, nor conduct. Instead, FE was an instrumental coalition, 
targeting the European decision-makers. Despite the hope by some of its members 
that it “would be able to spur a kind of European coordination” (Interview with 
                                                          
304 Consider for example the revelation in 2019 that GI UK & Ireland had hosted a meeting 
with an anti-Semitic speaker. This later led to the exclusion of the British group from the entire 
GI-coalition by Sellner (Townsend 2019). 
305 Albeit, there were some notable, and mainly geographically based, exceptions (e.g. PEGIDA 
Germany with PEGIDA Austria and PEGIDA Netherlands with PEGIDA Vlaanderen). 
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Riposte Laïque 2018), FE dissolved after a few months of activity, falling victim to 
the persisting far right problem of internal splits and strategic divergences.  
The thesis thus identified two important factors for a transnational far right coalition’s 
maintenance and survival, including the members’ mobilization at the domestic 
levels, namely the roles of skilled coalition leadership and the pooling of cultural 
resources, as the two coalitions’ adverse transnational resource exchanges affected 
their mobilization. The FE groups largely did not share relational resources in terms 
of “resource and knowledge exchange” (Rucht as cited in Caiani & Graziano 2018: 
1050), due to the lacking commitment and/or low resources of the members, inferring 
that the FE members never established strong inter-group ties. Conversely, the GI 
groups’ continued skill development focus inferred an “increase” in “their 
effectiveness” (Ibid: 1050). Hence, the GI groups were more capable at exploiting 
their domestic and European opportunities, due to the pooling of cognitive and 
symbolic resources, as exemplified by their diffusion of protest tactics. 
FE was thus a short-term event coalition, comparable to coalitions such as Cities 
Against Islamization from 2008, which also was a short-term coalition consisting of a 
mix of parties and extra-parliamentary groups, uniting around the fear of 
‘Islamization’ (see e.g. Krake 2008). Yet, as demonstrated, FE’s short lifespan was 
more due to organizational problems than lacking POS/DOS. The example of Fortress 
Europe thus displays a more worrying trend, namely (certain) far right actors’ ability 
to bridge all other ideological disagreements in their joint battle against Islam and 
third-country immigration. This indicates the strong mobilization potential for far 
right anti-Islam groups, which, despite their fractured compositions, can coordinate 
transnationally to both counter Islam and reclaim the cultural hegemony from the 
liberal left, as observed in the GI and FE groups’ shared collective identity frames. 
EUROPEANIZATION OF COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES 
Both the extra-parliamentary FE and GI groups constructed joint collective identity 
frames around the perceived need to ‘protect Europe and its civilization’ against both 
the external, mainly Muslim, ‘other,’ and the internal, consisting of the left wing and 
mainstream establishment. Both the PEGIDA and GI groups voiced the European 
collective identity from the outset of their transnational mobilization, inferring that it 
did not develop via the Europeanization of networks, but it already formed part of 
their worldview, as also explained above in relation to Guiraudon’s (2011) question. 
Thus, it was not the EU policy objections that aligned their collective identities, but 
rather their ideological bases in New Right ‘Europeanism’ (GI) and the anti-Islam 
groups’ ‘civilizational’ focus (FE). Hence, the ‘refugee crisis’ was not as such the 
catalyst for this identity construction – an important fact to underline. 
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Heavily relying on military jargon and symbolism, the GI groups constructed, and 
continue fostering, European identity frames around a heroic ‘we’ that ‘defends’ the 
European ‘community of destiny’ against Islam(ization). The extra-parliamentary FE 
actors (together with the German-speaking GI groups) instead mainly construct their 
identity around victimhood frames, voicing the sensed bravery of daring to speak up 
about the evident problems, despite this act being politically incorrect and leading to 
suppression. They thus express the sentiment that ‘we protest because nobody else 
dares to,’ a powerful frame during a time of societal and media polarization, like 
during the ‘refugee crisis’. Hence, both coalitions highlight their heroism in the face 
of both external and internal opposition. The ‘defense’ frames thus accentuate the ‘us’ 
and ‘them’ sentiments, as they underline that ‘we’ need to keep the foreign ‘them’ out 
of Europe by any means possible, while the domestic ‘them’ must start opening their 
eyes to the dangers of Islam and third-country immigration, as ‘our’ existence is at 
stake. The battle frames similarly emphasize the perceived urgency to fight back, as 
otherwise, ‘they’ will conquer the continent. 
While all the far right groups refer to a shared belonging to an European civilization, 
they still maintain their national and/or regional adherence as the most crucial aspect 
of their identities, either as part of the GI groups’ three-tiered identity construction, or 
the FE extra-parliamentary groups’ notions of ‘patriotism’. Yet, all groups struggle to 
define both their national singularities, and especially the European. These instead 
become more implied constructions with continuous references to a shared European 
culture and history. Hence, the hierarchical ethnic identity construction permits this 
otherwise paradoxical Europeanization of the ‘us,’ as it allows the national groups to 
keep their focus on the domestic levels. The transnationalization of the efforts instead 
becomes a matter of uniting the national forces in the defense of the continent with 
the ultimate goal of defending the nation-states. The self-identification as ‘patriotic 
Europeans’ by groups from both coalitions thus infers that they align themselves with 
fellow Europeans, albeit still holding their own nationality above all else. 
 TOPICS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH  
BRIDGING OF THE WESTERN AND EASTERN EUROPEAN FAR RIGHT 
Related to the aspect of a shared European collective identity, it was also a partial aim 
to explore the potential bridging of the Western and Eastern European far right, as this 
has not received much scholarly attention so far. There has been sporadic cooperation 
between Eastern and Western European extreme right groups in the past (see e.g. 
Mareš 2006). Yet, these stronger (and in GI’s case, enduring) cross-border relations 
are relatively new developments (see e.g. Berntzen 2018). The ‘refugee crisis’ played 
a big role in this ‘bridging’. PEGIDA Germany began cooperating with Eastern 
European actors in the autumn of 2015, and the FE-coalition consisted of groups from 
both Western and Eastern Europe. Festerling and the Czech groups developed a rather 
close relationship (see e.g. Prokupkova 2018b), just as she decided to work for a group 
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of Bulgarian border vigilantes in 2017. Moreover, the Northern League (now The 
League) and EKRE maintained the contact after FE’s dissolution, and EKRE joined 
The League’s newly created Identity and Democracy political group in the European 
Parliament in 2019, together with the Czech SPD party, led by Okamura. For GI, GI 
Czech Republic became a GI member in 2013, while GI Slovenia and GI Hungary 
followed in 2015 and 2016 respectively. GI Slovenia co-organized protests with GI 
Italy and GI Austria from 2015 onwards, just as the Hungarian group increasingly 
gained coalition prominence, especially in the autumn of 2017.  
The onset of the ‘refugee crisis’ can thus to some extent be seen as a determining 
factor in terms of ‘bridging’ the two far right parts of Europe, also ideologically, as 
the Eastern European groups’ anti-Islam frames draw on those developed by Western 
European (and US) ‘movement intellectuals’. The ‘crisis’ thus provided the actors 
with common internal (Merkel and the EU) and external ((Muslim) refugees) enemies 
around which they could unite and create shared collective action frames cross-
continentally. Furthermore, the Visegrad countries’ role as main opposition to the 
infringing and ‘dictatorial’ EU, and the Western European political leaders’ perceived 
imposition on the Visegrad countries’ sovereign rights, gave a somewhat ‘unusual’ 
heroic role to the Eastern part of Europe. 
In the past, the WWII history and vindications has inhibited the bridging of the two 
‘scenes’, especially regarding the role of Germany. Yet, the GI and FE actors saw the 
Islamic threat as too critical to uphold old strives. However, other domestic far right 
groups voiced dismay about the alignment with historical enemies. In Poland, for 
example, an extreme right group threatened PEGIDA Poland with repercussions, if it 
rallied on February 6, 2016 (DNN 2016). Conversely, the GI groups easily brush over 
the Eastern and Western European contextual and historical divergences. In fact, both 
GI Germany and GI Austria assisted in establishing the Eastern European groups’ 
organizational set-up and links to the other GI groups. Their role is both due to the 
geographical position of the two countries, but it is also more symbolic, as it underlines 
the ability and necessity to forget the old fights and instead unite as ‘brothers in arms’. 
In other words, “Due to the finding of a „common enemy,” and with the prospect of 
mutual help and inspiration, they could easily overcome their mutual antipathy and 
unite for the common joint fight” (Czech Ministry Report 2016: 44). 
Nevertheless, the Western European GI groups are hesitant to acknowledge the 
Eastern European groups as full GI members, due to their respectability concerns. In 
fact, in both transnational coalitions, the Eastern European members use a more 
‘extreme’ discourse, a common distinction between the Western and Eastern 
European far right (see e.g. Pytlas 2018; Mudde 2004). This makes it hard to ‘trust’ 
that the other groups’ behaviour aligns with the overall coalition rules. Here, the 
language differences also become crucial, as demonstrated by the Dawn 
representative’s worry about the German actors’ statements, as he did not understand 
the language. 
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Hence, there are indications of both a continent-wide far right alignment, but also 
continued obstacles for closer pan-European far right relations. There is, however, 
still need for further investigation into the cooperative links between the Western and 
Eastern European far right, in order to uncover more substantial findings about the 
transferability of far right frames and the networking between Eastern and Western 
European far right groups.   
COALITION LEADERS: ‘EUROPEANIZED’ MOVEMENT 
ENTREPRENEURS? 
The thesis underlined the importance of the coalition leadership for the sustainment 
of a transnational coalition (see also Staggenborg 2013). Generation Identity relied on 
the management skills of the French and Austrian GI leaders, particularly Cattin and 
Robert (The Identitarians), and Sellner (from GI Austria). These movement 
entrepreneurs played a decisive role in terms of distributing GI material, setting up 
the other national GI groups, and ensuring the abidance to the same GI ruleset. 
Conversely, none of the FE leaders had the necessary skills and experience to maintain 
a transnational coalition. The loose network structures of both the European PEGIDA 
network and the FE-coalition were thus the partial reasons for their short 
temporalities, as there were no strong inter-group ties forged. 
Yet, interestingly, some of both the GI and FE leaders gradually became 
‘Europeanized’ through their activities, as they travelled extensively across the 
continent, both to join other groups’ protests and to disseminate information and 
expertise abroad. In FE, Festerling and Wagensveld travelled across Europe to uphold 
the coalition and to visit some of the key sites of the ‘refugee crisis,’ and report back 
home and to the FE coalition about their experiences (see e.g. Festerling 2016g). Yet, 
their lacking financial resources hindered these transnationalization endeavours’ 
continuation. Similarly, GI Austria’s Martin Sellner quickly became a main European 
GI coordinator, partly due to his language skills. He travelled across Europe as a GI 
representative, speaking at conferences and protests and visiting GI groups abroad, 
assisting them in setting up their organizations. He also has a strong online presence, 
in this way linking the online with the offline sphere. Tommy Robinson also played a 
critical role for both the FE-coalition, but in fact also the extra-parliamentary anti-
Islam scene as a whole. He played a key part in creating FE, yet, never took on a 
leadership position. Instead, he mobilized on his own causes, travelling around Europe 
to network with far right activists, and reporting for far right media outlets. In this 
way, he networked more broadly with actors from the scene. 
As Trilling (2018) states about Tommy Robinson, these figureheads form part of a 
new ‘breed’ of far right ‘entrepreneurial activists’. These transnational movement 
leaders count many other far right activists from both Europe and the U.S. (such as 
e.g. Richard B. Spencer (American alt-right) and more recently, Steve Bannon and his 
attempt to set up The Movement (see e.g. de la Baume & Sciorilli Borrelli 2019). These 
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actors have been apt at bridging the on- and offline transnational mobilization spheres 
and their endeavours require further scholarly exploration. It would be relevant to 
explore how they use these networking activities and their prominence on the far right 
to further their aims, plus how actors across the far right scene receive their advances. 
EUROPEANIZATION OF THE FAR RIGHT (ONLINE) PUBLIC SPHERE? 
Many European far right actors network transnationally, especially around opposition 
to Islam and its adherents. As Rosenberger and Hadj-Abdou argue, “Islamophobia is 
now used as a sort of (white) European flag: it creates an opportunity for like-minded 
parties [and extra-parliamentary actors] to cooperate across state boundaries, and to 
‘discuss’ the existence of some core European values within a common European 
space” (as cited in Mammone et al 2013: 6). This cooperation is exemplified by the 
overlapping protest participations by the GI and PEGIDA groups, plus the PEGIDA 
group leaders’ admiration for Generation Identity’s youthful expression forms and 
types of actions306, showing the thin borders between the different groups. In fact, GI 
draw support from international far right actors as well, including from the U.S. and 
Russia, thus widening the transnationalization scope. These links still need further 
investigation, especially the Russian connections, due to Russia’s increased influences 
on the European far right parties and extra-parliamentary groups (see e.g. Political 
Capital Institute 2014). 
During the interview, For Freedom’s spokesperson revealed that she was in contact 
with Breitbart, Gates of Vienna, Vlad Tepes Blog, and similar actors with whom she 
“knowledge-share[s] all the time,” just as she translates video subtitles and articles for 
the pages (Interview with For Freedom 2017). Hence, much of the group’s 
transnational networking takes place online. In fact, as a growing literature illustrates, 
the interlinkages and networking in the online sphere have been continuously 
expanding (see e.g. Berntzen 2018; Caiani & Parenti 2013), just as the actors’ websites 
and social media accounts are crucial for their mobilization, due to the recruitment 
potential. 
The far rights’ strong reliance on the blogosphere, social media, and other online 
channels infers that frames, ideas, and images cross borders much more easily, 
together with negative news stories about immigrants, Muslims, or the elites, thereby 
influencing the European public sphere (see also Denes 2012). Such sites often 
become echo chambers for the readers, who can access the pages with ease, due to the 
low thresholds and risks involved, unlike participation in far right street mobilization. 
                                                          
306 During the interviews, for instance, both the representatives from Sweden, Denmark, France, 
and the Netherlands highlighted the refreshing nature of Generation Identity. For Freedom’s 
spokesperson stated that she found it good they had set up a group in Denmark as it is important 
to get the youth involved, as it is them who “have to inherit the earth,” while For Freedom has 
struggled to mobilize the youth (Interview with For Freedom 2017). 
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This makes it increasingly relevant to explore the forms of online and horizontal 
Europeanization occurring, i.e. the “communicative linkages between different 
European countries” (Koopmans & Erbe as cited in Bourne & Chatzopoulou 2015: 
40), especially in terms of (alternative) news dissemination and other types of far right 
exchanges, and the extent to which it involves exclusionary Europeanism (Denes 
2012; Risse 2018). 
The German and Austrian GI-branches are good examples related to this, as they very 
actively attempt to influence the ‘hearts and minds’ online. For one, they have 
published an ‘online handbook’ (‘Informationskrieg-Manual’) in 2017 that draws on 
many of the American alt-right’s strategies, like the ‘red-pilling’ of potential 
supporters307 (Köhler & Ebner 2018). Activists from the two groups, including 
Sellner, also joined a German ‘keyboard warrior’ network, Reconquista Germanica, 
which trolled political opponents and ethnic minorities (see e.g. Gensing 2018). 
Considering e.g. the revelations about Russia’s influence on European elections, such 
trolling networks might also exist at the transnational European level, inferring the 
need to understand the dynamics of such networks better. 
Moreover, due to the evidenced strong role of the online sphere for far right 
mobilization, we also need to learn more about the effects of the blocking of e.g. far 
right Facebook pages and accounts. It could for instance be highly relevant to analyse 
how the far right actors react to such suppressive actions. For instance, one could 
investigate how the GI network manoeuvred after Facebook closed their accounts, just 
as happened for the PEGIDA Orga-team and a number of English far right sites, 
including that of Tommy Robinson. 
Aside from PEGIDA Germany, none of the GI or FE extra-parliamentary groups 
amassed much public support, at least not for their rallies, but especially their online 
presence can pose a threat to the Union’s cohesion, combined with the general rise of 
protectionist measures by the various governments. Currently, with the public and 
political focus on climate change, it appears as if the ‘nationalist moment’ largely has 
lost momentum, yet, the far right transnational structures have been moulded, ready 
to re-form, when and if a new European crisis emerges.
                                                          
307 In reference to the pill consumed by Neo, the lead character in The Matrix, where after he 
saw the world as it really looks. 
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Wording of the Document 
Being aware of the fact that the thousand-year history of Western civilization could 
soon come to an end through Islam conquering Europe, and the fact that the political 
elites have betrayed us, we, representatives of different European nations, declare the 
following: 
We will not surrender Europe to our enemies. We are prepared to stand up and 
oppose political Islam, extreme Islamic regimes, and their European 
collaborators. 
We are prepared to risk our freedoms, properties, jobs and careers, and maybe 
even to put our lives at stakes, as it was done by the generations before us. It 
is our duty to future generations. 
We refuse to submit to the Central European government. The rules of the 
global elites have brought only poverty, unemployment, corruption, chaos and 
moral collapse. It is about time to end this. 
We fully respect the sovereignty of European nations and the right of the 
people of every European country to govern their matters as they see fit. 
We esteem as sacred the right of the citizens of every European country to 
protect the borders of their country and their right to decide which immigrants 
to accept and which not to accept into their country. 
We refer to our common European roots, traditions and values as well as the 
historic alliances of our nations. We are determined to protect Europe, the 
freedom of speech and other civic freedoms as well as our way to life together. 
We will manifest this determination by our participation in a joint demonstration 
which will take place in many European cities on February 6, 2016. 
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Appendix B. Protest Event Codebook 
What constitutes a ’European’ event, issue or participant, and how should this be 
distinguished from other forms of cross-border relations? In this research, I 
distinguish between the different scopes of the issues, targets, participants, and events 
based on the works by Imig and Tarrow (2001a), Bourne and Chatzopoulou 2015, and 
della Porta and Caiani (2009). 
Explaining the Terms for the Protest Event Coding 
It is a rather difficult task to determine the exact concepts and contents of the different 
coding categories, in order to find the best ways to conceptualize ‘Collective action 
Europeanization’. This task is further aggravated by the fact that scholars employ 
different terms for the various coding categories (see e.g. Bourne & Chatzopoulou 
2015; Hutter 2014a; Caiani & Graziano 2018; della Porta & Caiani 2009; Uba & 
Uggla 2011).  
This study employs the terms ‘national’ and ‘European’ (participants from various EU 
MS/issue with a Europe-wide span) in order to establish the four various ‘scopes’. 
Moreover, for the GI groups, a ‘local’ scope is also included for the ‘participants,’ due 
to the many local GI groups, just as the category ‘cross-border’ (groups and actors 
from neighbouring countries) is added to both coalitions’ participant scopes. The 
‘cross-border’ category was included, as it is the aim to explore the geographical scope 
of the cooperation between the groups, i.e. the distances between those groups that 
take part in each other’s demonstrations. Moreover, as I did not expect to find many 
activities at the supranational EU-level, I did not initially establish any coding 
categories for such instances. 
In terms of the four scopes, the following deliberations are behind the coding: 
Scope of Issues 
The PEA codes an issue scope as ‘domestic,’ if it can be “specifically linked to a 
domestic decision or a domestic political arena,” ‘European’ if it relates to the 
European or EU political arena, or a “combination of both,” if both levels are involved 
(Bourne & Chatzopoulou 2015: 50). Even though Hutter (2014a) distinguishes 
between ‘local,’ ‘domestic,’ and ‘transnational’ issue scopes, his conceptualization is 
still rather similar. He exemplifies it by looking at migration policies, stating that 
issues related to the entry of foreigners to a country are ‘transnational’ problems (i.e. 
‘European’), while issues related to the integration of the immigrants are ‘domestic’ 
in scope (Hutter 2014a), including, for example, the housing of refugees. This implies 
that if a demonstration, for instance, both involves demands around the immi- and 
integration of third country immigrants and refugees, it involves a combination of 
European and national issue scopes. 
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Scope of Targets 
The target can be very difficult to discern, as this is not always clear from the gathered 
data. The study employs Bourne & Chatzopoulou’s conceptualization, and codes it 
according to which actor one can discern as being “either implicitly or explicitly the 
subject of contentious action” (Bourne & Chatzopoulou 2015: 48). Thus, it can both 
involve decision-making institutions or actors, who are “held responsible for 
implementing” the demand (Ibid.). This could for instance involve calls for the 
national government to reinstate domestic border controls. Yet, the protests can also 
be directed at an actor or group of people, in the form of “criticism or support” (Ibid.). 
The prior can for instance involve adherents of Islam, who are criticized for their 
religious practices (e.g. treatment of women), while an example of the latter could be 
the support to the Visegrad leaders during the ‘refugee crisis’. 
 
Scope of Participants 
Unlike certain studies, which consider the composition of the ‘hosting actors,’ i.e. “the 
organizational extension of the organization and/or institution”, and whether it is a 
national, transnational or supranational actor carrying out the event (see e.g. Caiani & 
Graziano 2018), this study instead codes the participating groups and organizations, 
i.e. besides from the hosting organization. This involves the categories of ‘local’ (only 
for the GI groups, as it was specified by some of the actions that they were carried out 
by a local group), ‘national’, ‘cross-border,’ and ‘European’. 
Hence, as an example: if PEGIDA Germany hosts a demonstration in Dresden, and it 
states that BPI joined the event, I code the participant scope as ‘cross-border’. 
Moreover, if it is only specified that an actor from abroad came to give a speech at the 
event, the participant scope is further specified to ‘speaker’. The reasons for this 
decision are numerous. For one, the national groups were known from the outset, due 
to my research design, so the hosting group would almost exclusively be either local 
or national. Moreover, as it is also a partial aim to explore far right contention more 
broadly, I decided to include the ‘cross-border’ scope, to discover the geographical 
extent of the protests, i.e. how far actors travel to join protests abroad. The ‘European’ 
participant scope instead refers to protests where actors from several European 
countries participated and/or they came from further afield than the neighbouring 
country. 
Scope of Events 
The events were coded as ‘transnational’ if they included actors from more than one 
European country, and either was carried out simultaneously in several countries, or 
involved a joint European protest around an issue related to the EU (see Imig & 
Tarrow’s (2000) conceptualization of ‘cooperative transnationalism’ and ‘collective 
transnationalism’).   
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Examples: 
Scope Issue  Targets Participants Events 
Local   Activists from 
local GI-branch 
 
National Issues related to 
integration, such 
as Burqa-ban; 
construction of 
Mosques; 
refugee/migrant 
housing 
National and/or 
local 
government; 
political 
parties; CSOs, 
etc.   
National 
activists and 
supporters 
Occuring in one 
domestic 
setting, and not 
advertised as a 
transnational 
event 
Cross-border   From e.g. 
Denmark and 
Germany 
 
European Issues related to 
immigration, 
like EU quota; 
EU internal or 
external border 
securitisation 
EU; Other EU 
member states 
E.g. from 
Denmark, 
France, and the 
Czech Republic 
Occurring in 
one domestic 
setting with 
transnational 
participation, 
and/or 
simultaneously 
protests in 
numerous 
countries 
 
Codebook 
The protest event data was inserted into two distinct datasets in Excel, one for the FE 
groups and one for the GI groups, and these were later exported to SPSS. The 
following information was retrieved about each event:  
1. Date: full date (format: d.m.year) 
2. Day: day of the month (1-31) 
3. Month: Month of the year (1-12) 
4. Quarter: Quarter of the year (1-4) 
5. Semester: Semester of the year (1-2) 
6. Year: Year (2012-2017) 
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Either: 
7. GI Group: Main national GI group involved/organizing the event (Joint actions 
with other national GI groups are coded according to the place where it was 
held, i.e. if GI France and GI Italy co-organized an event, it is coded as ‘GI 
France’ if held in France and vice versa) 
1. GI France (including events by GI France and Bloc Identitaire/Les 
Identitaires) 
2. GI Austria 
3. GI Germany  
4. GI Italy  
5. GI Czech Republic  
6. GI Slovenia  
7. GI Hungary  
8. GI Poland 
9. GI UK & Ireland 
10. GI Switzerland 
11. GI Denmark  
12. GI Europe (3 or more GI groups taking part – Including ‘Defend Europe’ 
mission)  
Or: 
7. Fortress Europe Extra-Parliamentary Group:  
1. PEGIDA Germany 
2. PEGIDA Austria 
3. PEGIDA DK 
4. For Freedom 
5. PEGIDA Netherlands 
6. PEGIDA UK 
7. IVČRN 
8. Blok Against Islam 
9. Blok Against Islamization 
10. NGO ISIS 
11. Festerling 
12. Festerling and Wagensveld 
13. Fortress Europe (if entire coalition involved) 
 
8. Participants (written notes) 
(Mentions of speakers, other (far right) actors taking part, local GI group 
involved, etc.) 
9. Number of participants (quantitative) (if specified) 
1. If numbers of GI/FE activists mentioned, write figure 
2. If demonstration figures mentioned, write figure (and source) 
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10. Number of participants (qualitative) (if specified or according to protest 
tactic) 
1. Few (1-10 participants) (incl. Banner-drops, press releases, etc.)  
2. Moderate (10-50 participants) 
3. Small demonstration (50-250 participants) 
4. Moderate demonstration (250-1000) 
5. Big demonstration (1000+) 
 
11. Main organizer (if not GI/FE groups) (Paris Fierté and Lugdunum Suum V 
are coded as GI events) 
1. Other far right or anti-Islam/immigration group/organization  
2. Far right party  
3. Other group or person, not far right or explicitly anti-immigration 
(often other civil societal organizations or political parties)  
4. Left-wing group/CSO/NGO/party– immigration/asylum policy related 
(GI or FE group making counter-protest) 
5. Muslim and/or Turkish association/actor (e.g. imam)  
(GI or FE group making counter-protest) 
6. Left-wing group/CSO/NGO/party– gender/LGBT related  
(GI or FE group making counter-protest) 
7. Pro-traditional family associations (incl. ‘Demo für Alle’, Manif pour 
tous, etcetera) 
8. Local/national government  
(counter-protests such as anti-Merkel protests, asylum information 
evenings) 
9. Unspecified, ‘other’ 
 
12. City of protest event (If more than one city involved, all cities mentioned) 
13. Country of protest event (If no cities mentioned, write only country (e.g. 
petitions/campaign initiations/press releases) 
 
14. Activity explained (Text accounting for event, as detailed as possible) 
 
15. Type of event 
1. Instructive (including teaching, seminars, training, conferences, etc.) 
2. Organizational  
3. Solidarity action 
4. Protest event 
 
16. Event specified 
For ‘Instructive’ event: 
1. Seminar/Meeting (1-5 hours, with ideological/strategical contents)  
2. National assembly 
3. Conference (1-3 day event) 
4. Summer University (GI) 
5. Camp (several days) 
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6. Book fair 
7. Research trips (abroad) (e.g. to ghettos, refugee camps, EU external 
borders, etc.) 
8. Social event (incl. networking) 
 
For ‘Organizational’ event: 
1. New group created 
2. New leader 
3. Merger of groups (into new formation) 
4. Running for elections 
5. Indictment for hate-speech/hate-crime 
6. Party/Non-inst. Alliance (discursive sign of approval from party/formal 
alliance) 
7. End of cooperation (of alliance, party, etc.) 
8. Expulsion of member(s) 
 
For ‘Solidarity action’: 
1. Food collection 
2. Donation of food, clothes, gifts to less fortunate 
3. Assisting homeless people with warm clothes and food 
 
For ‘Protest event’ type: 
1. Conventional 
2. Demonstrative 
3. Confrontational  
4. Violent 
 
17. Protest event tactics further specified 
‘Conventional’ tactics: 
1. Open letter 
2. Press release 
3. Press conference 
4. Lobbyism 
5. Campaign 
 
‘Demonstrative’ tactics: 
1. Petition/signature collection  
2. Launching of referendum 
3. Collecting signatures for referendum  
4. Handing over signatures for referendum/petition 
5. Video message 
6. Demonstration   
7. Demonstration on border 
8. Picketing 
9. Procession  
10. Commemorative march (for historical event) 
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11. Solidarity rally (actions to support activists or actors accused of wrong-
doing, e.g. ‘4 of Poitiers’ or Visegrad countries vs. the EU) 
12. Vigil (e.g. after terrorist attacks) 
13. Flash mob 
14. Street theatre  
15. Silent protest (e.g. at pro-asylum event) 
16. Banner-drop 
17. Christian symbol restauration 
18. Dressing up statues 
19. Fake blood (in water, smoke) 
20. Putting up crosses 
21. Putting up signs 
22. Sign-change (e.g. city-signs) 
23. Stickers on walls 
24. Writing (on floor, on wall) 
25. ‘Other’ similar types of symbolic actions 
 
‘Confrontational’ protest tactics: 
1. Counter-protest  
2. Illegal demonstration (non-violent) 
3. Blockade (border, ship, entrance to building, railway, road) 
4. Occupation (building, street, ship, stage, etc.) 
5. Objects in front of building 
6. Disruption/disturbance (of meeting, play, etc.) 
7. Hard-bass 
8. Protest camp 
9. Patrolling/Security (to protect autochthonous population) 
 
‘Violent’ protest tactics: 
1. Flag desecration  
 
18. ‘Issue’ of the protest event (For this variable, up to two different issues could 
be chosen in two separate variables, to make it possible to code protest events 
addressing multiple issues. The most encompassing categorization was chosen 
first). The issues were first coded into more specific categories (e.g. ‘Great 
replacement’ (1d below) or ‘Anti-LGBT’ (4b)), as they emerged from the data 
set. This list of categories was then conglomerated into 9 overarching key issues 
(1-9 below). The initial list were then listed as the sub-categories of each key 
issue. As an example ‘Secure borders’ (2c) was part of the initial issues to emerge, 
and as this frame mainly was voiced in relation to opposition against the reception 
of refugees and asylum seekers, it was later placed as part of the category ‘Anti-
refugee/asylum (policy)’. 
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Alternatives: 
1. Anti-immigration 
a) Anti-immigration 
b) Anti-illegal immigration 
c) Anti-immigrant crime 
d) Great replacement (Explicit statement of ‘großer Austausch’ etc. + 
becoming ‘minority’ at home) 
e) Protection of women 
f) Anti-multiculturalism 
g) Anti-Roma 
 
2. Anti-refugee/asylum (policy) 
a) Anti-refugee/asylum policy 
b) Anti-refugee quotas 
c) Secure borders 
d) Against asylum/refugee/migrant centre/camp 
e) Against human trafficking 
f) Against pro-refugee NGOs 
 
3. Anti-Islam(ization) 
a. Anti-Islam (historical references to warriors having fought against 
Ottomans, aligning Islamic symbols, such as mosques, with e.g. 
violence, or when Islam is targeted as a religion as such) 
b. Anti-Islamisation (Show incomparability of Islam and European 
culture - If Islamisation is specified; against mosque-building; burka-
clad women) 
c. Protection of Muslim women  
d. Anti-terrorism/radicalism 
e. Anti-Turkey (Incl. protests against ‘Turkish’ immigrants) 
 
4. Gender-related issues 
a. Traditional family values 
b. Anti-LGBT 
c. Anti-gender ideology 
 
5. Identity preservation 
a. Commemorating historical events (wars, death of person (e.g. 
Fortuyn), etc.) 
b. (Preservation of) local identity 
c. (Preservation of) national identity 
d. (Preservation of) European identity 
e. (Preservation of) identity 
f. Anti-EU 
g. Historical question 
h. Minority issues (e.g. helping Serbian schools) 
i. Anti-national racism 
j. Nature preservation 
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6. Opposing suppression  
a. State Repression 
b. Anti-media (Media misrepresenting group and the far right) 
c. Anti-political correctness 
d. Defense of freedom of speech 
e. Pro-V4 
f. Anti-censorship 
g. Anti-surveillance 
 
7. Pro/Vs political actor 
a. Anti-government 
b. Anti-national politician 
c. Anti-left-wing (party) 
d. Anti-left-wing violence 
e. Anti-liberal values 
f. Anti-cultural Marxism 
g. Anti-EU 
h. Anti-Erdoğan 
i. Anti-US 
j. Pro-national government 
k. Pro-Trump 
 
8. Welfare protectionism 
a. Social assistance 
b. Our own people first 
c. Ethnic solidarity 
 
9. Other 
a. Democracy question 
b. Promotion of group (e.g. writing name on banner) 
c. Animal welfare 
d. European solidarity 
e. Anti-consumerism 
f. Police force 
g. Economic policy 
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19. Participant Scope: Actors participating  
1. Local (If it is specified that only local activists/supporters took part) 
2. National (for demonstrations, etcetera, where the participant composition is 
not specified further) 
3. Cross-border (Activists from neighbouring GI/FE national groups (e.g. GI 
Germany and GI Austria)  
4. European (Activists from several (3+) European countries (including if 
activists not part of a GI or FE group)  
5. International (Participation by actors from other parts of world than 
Europe) 
 
20. Issue Scope: (Claim/frame’s scope in terms of policy perspective) 
1. National (e.g. asylum policy, prohibition of Muslim practices (e.g. against 
mosque/minaret construction, female headwear, halal meat, etc.), housing of 
refugees, specific ethnic group in country (like Algerians in France), de-
radicalization, protests against local or national government/political 
actor/authorities, etc.) 
2. European (e.g. third-country immigration, internal and external EU border 
security, terrorism, refugee quotas, solidarity for activists/citizens abroad, 
actions against the EU and Turkey etc.) 
 
21. Target scope (actor, group, decision-making body, or institution addressed in the 
protest event) (In some cases, this is determined on the basis of the place of the 
protest event (e.g. in front of national government then national government 
coded)  
1. National government (incl. all levels – local (mayors, prefects), regional, 
federal, state and legal authorities, also including explicit targeting of the 
President/leader of the country – e.g. Hollande, Merkel, etc., and national 
ministers) 
2. National politician (e.g. candidate in elections, such as van der Bellen in 
Austria) 
3. European governments 
4. Other MS’ government  
5. EU 
6. Other (Left-wing actors, Pro-refugee/migrant NGOs, left-wing 
parties/politicians, universities, Turkish association, Turkish government, 
national train service, trade unions, national business, multi-national 
business, pro-LGBT actor, feminists, poor people, proponents of EU, church, 
media, victims of natural disasters, animals, USA, other) 
7. Migrants/refugees/Muslims 
8. Far right/‘Us’ 
9. Public 
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Appendix C. German, French, Dutch, 
and Czech Contexts 2015-2017 
Each of the short sections below first considers the role of, and political and discursive 
opportunities for, far right extra-parliamentary actors in the respective country, 
including the country’s experience with third-country immigration, and then it 
outlines the 2015-2017 political and societal developments in relation to the ‘refugee 
crisis’.  
Germany: Far Right Repression, but Open DOS during ‘Refugee 
Crisis’ 
Germany’s history with Nazism implies that the German mainstream has a 
constrained relationship to the far right, and it broadly condemns and stigmatizes the 
expression of such political worldviews (Kersten as cited in Caiani et al. 2012). The 
mainstream parties also refuse to cooperate with the far right in parliament, and have 
thus imposed a cordon sanitaire. Moreover, the German government monitors 
extreme right organizations through the Federal Office for the Protection of the 
Constitution (‘Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz’). The stringent surveillance and 
suppression of the far right, together with the mainstream’s rejection of its claims, 
means that the POS are nearly closed for this type of extra-parliamentary actor (see 
e.g. Caiani et al. 2012; Rucht 2018; Caiani & Parenti 2013). Scholars argue that it is 
due to the closed political opportunities that the German far right has made use of 
comparatively violent expression forms. Beginning in the early 1990s, the country 
experienced, for instance, several extreme right attacks on refugees and migrants (see 
e.g. Rucht 2018). 
Yet, the previous division of Germany into an allied-led Western and a Communist 
Eastern German part (BRD and GDR respectively), resulted in the two sides of the 
country developing rather differently and demonstrating substantial differences on 
various accounts. Due to the East’s communist history, there are several “political-
cultural lines of conflict,” for instance, between the two parts of the country, together 
with a sentiment in Eastern Germany of being economically and socially 
disadvantaged (Vorländer et al. 2018: 169). This also partly explains why the 
populations of the two geographical entities consider immigration and Islam very 
differently, the most negative sentiments being expressed in Eastern Germany (Ibid; 
see also Kober 2017). 
With regards to anti-Islam mobilization, similarly as elsewhere in Europe and the 
U.S., single-issue anti-Islam groups started appearing in Germany in the mid-2000s 
(Rucht 2018; see also Berntzen 2018a). Moreover, in the immediate years leading up 
to the ‘refugee crisis’, Germany witnessed a growing tide of anti-systemic critique, 
which mainly evolved around the German immigration policy (Vorländer et al. 2018). 
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For one, in 2010, the SPD-member (and thus mainstream-politician) Thilo Sarrazin 
published the book Germany Abolishes Itself (‘Deutschland schafft sich ab’), which 
heavily criticizes the German migration policy since World War II. The book led to 
much debate, and together with other factors, such as the German recuperation from 
the economic crisis, it thus aided in opening the discursive opportunities for systemic 
critique (see e.g. Bader 2018). This became very evident in the mid-2010s, where the 
populist far right party Alternative for Germany entered the German political scene. 
It quickly rose electorally, particularly after it turned its focus towards anti-
immigration in 2015, and Germany now has the first far right party represented in 
parliament since the 1950s (Minkenberg 2018). Earlier, the 5% electoral threshold 
ensured that parties such as NPD could not enter the Bundestag. The rise of AfD was 
further aided by its exploitation (or “leveraging”) of the salience of the ‘refugee crisis’ 
in the media and public debate since 2015 (Berning 2017: 18).  
In terms of migration policy, due to its experiences with Nazism, Germany has a very 
acquiescent policy towards refugees and immigrants, based on moral and ethical 
frames. This has made Germany one of the biggest European recipients of asylum 
seekers since the 1950s (Monforte 2014), and the country received many guest 
workers from Turkey, Spain, and Greece in the 1970s (Ibid.). At the same time, the 
German migration policy is built up around jus sanguinis (i.e. citizenship based on 
blood relations), somewhat conflicting with the moral ‘open doors’ obligations, and 
instead suggesting that asylum “became an exceptional right” (Ibid: 19).  
The German Political Context in the 2015-2017 Period 
During 2014, Germany accepted more than 200,000 asylum seekers, a substantial rise 
from 2013 (by almost 60%) (Statista 2019b). The rise led to a renewed increase in far 
right mobilization and violent attacks from 2014 onwards, an occurrence further 
prodded by the quick rise of PEGIDA in Dresden (Rucht 2018). Most of the anti-
refugee demonstrations took place in Nord-Rhein Westphalia (Western Germany) and 
Saxony (Eastern Germany) (for more on the reasons for this, see Rucht 2018; Virchow 
2016a) 308. 
In late-August 2015, Merkel established the German ‘open border’ policy and the 
therefrom-ensuing (temporary) removal of the Dublin Regulation (Bannas 2015), plus 
pushed for the implementation of EU-wide refugee quotas. This led to strong 
condemnation, both from some German mainstream media outlets (see e.g. Schwarz 
2015), but also from parts of her own government. Especially CSU’s leader, Horst 
                                                          
308 It was expressed, for instance, in NPD protests in Brandenburg and Saxony, the 
Mahnwachen or Monday Demonstrations, which began in March 2014, the HoGeSa (Hooligans 
against Salafists) demonstrations in 2014 (see Chapter 5), and demonstrations against the 
accommodation of refugees in Schneeberg and Bautzen in Saxony (Virchow 2016a). 
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Seehofer, condemned Merkel’s decision to permit refugees’ entrance to Germany 
from Hungary (Spiegel 2015c)309, just as the federal states (‘Bundesländer’) struggled 
to accommodate the refugees (Wendler 2015). This indicated the beginning of a split 
in German elite alignments, which the German extra-parliamentary far right actors 
could attempt to exploit. 
Germany reintroduced temporary border-controls on the Austrian border on 
September 13, due to the strong migratory pressure in the period. Yet, it was only after 
the sexual assaults in Cologne and other German cities on New Year’s Eve 2016 that 
Merkel and the German government made changes to the open-border position. The 
assaults were mainly perpetrated by asylum seekers (18 out of 31 accused), and 
changed the German media reporting about refugees and migrants (Braun-Klöpper as 
cited in Consterdine 2018). The German authorities were heavily criticized for the 
way they handled the situation. For one, the police and media had been very hesitant 
to reveal anything about the perpetrators’ identities, further adding to the public 
malaise and distrust (Ibid.). Mainstream media also voiced criticism against the 
authorities, while Seehofer continued his criticism of the Chancellor, for instance by 
employing the term ‘Reign of injustice’ (‘Herrschaft des Unrechts,’ which had 
connotations to GDR) about her immigration policy (Spiegel 2016a). 
During the same period, Alternative for Germany (AfD) was slowly beginning to gain 
prominence on the German political scene, having turned its focus towards anti-
immigration after a leadership change in July 2015 (Paterson 2015), and now taking 
advantage of the salience of the issue (see e.g. Berning 2017). Campaigning against 
mass immigration and the German government's ‘open door’ asylum policy, AfD 
obtained strong electoral gains in the March 13, 2016 state elections in Baden-
Württemberg, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Saxony-Anhalt, even becoming the second 
strongest force in the Saxony-Anhalt Landtag (with 24.2% of the votes) (Gathmann 
& Wittrock 2016). This result indicated a further opening in the discursive 
opportunities for the extra-parliamentary far right, due to the AfD’s focus on anti-
immigration and nationalism, these topics remained high on the political agenda. 
In July 2016, two terrorist attacks in Southern Germany further increased the salience 
of Islam as a topic in the media and public opinion (see e.g. Decker 2017). Shortly 
after the attacks, Merkel presented a 9-point anti-terror plan, and repeated the words 
“Wir schaffen das,” to renewed consternation by the public. In September, in response 
to the criticism, she said that she would no longer be using the phrase (Meckel & 
Schtmitz 2016). At the same time, Seehofer stated that he would only support her 
2017 CDU leadership bid if she restricted the intake of refugees (Ibid.), further 
underlining the elite alignment splits. A few months later, an ISIS terrorist drove a 
truck into a crowd attending a Christmas market in Berlin, killing 12 people, and thus, 
                                                          
309 In an act of defiance, he even invited Órban to come to the upcoming CSU-meeting to 
discuss the situation (Spiegel 2015c). 
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perpetrating the biggest Jihadi terrorist attack on German ground as of yet (Decker 
2017). 
On September 24, 2017, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) became the first 
nationalist party to enter the German Bundestag since World War II, as the third 
largest German party (with 12.6% of the votes), and single largest party of opposition. 
This victory meant that the far right extra-parliamentary actors now had the possibility 
of forging alliances with the radical right party in the parliament, just as it was likely 
to mean a more limited support to far right extra-parliamentary protests. 
Table AC.1: POS/DOS for the German.Far Right 
 January 2015 Change over time? 
STABLE POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES 
Electoral system (high 
thresholds, etc.)310 
Mixed 
Proportional and 
uninominal (5% 
threshold) 
(No Change) 
Degree of centralization 
(Federal/central gov)311 
Favourable  
Regional division in 
Bundesländer (three 
levels to approach) 
(No change) 
Separation of powers 
(legislature, executive 
and judicial separation) 
Favourable  (No change) 
Repression (strong legal 
regulations against 
extreme right) 
Unfavourable (High 
level of repression)  
Monitoring and 
restrictions 
(Bleich & Lambert 2013) 
(No change) 
  
                                                          
310 The information about the four countries’ electoral systems was retrieved from International 
IDEA’s (n.d.) database. 
311 The information about the four countries’ electoral systems was located in a presentation by 
a senior project manager for the OECD (Allain-Dupré n.d.). 
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DYNAMIC POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES 
Elite allies (centre-right 
party in power) 
Unfavourable  
(CDU against, CSU more 
in alignment with far 
right demands, but no 
cooperation likely due to 
cordon sanitaire) 
Unfavourable 
(Seehofer (CSU) 
increasingly hostile 
towards Merkel’s 
decisions in ‘refugee 
crisis,’ but still no chance 
of gaining legitimacy by 
governing party) 
Elite allies (main far 
right party) 
Unfavourable AfD 
Strong FR party (in 
parliament)? 
Favourable (No strong 
FR party in parliament in 
2015) 
 
Unfavorable  
After AfD’s electoral 
gains in March 2016 at 
the regional level and 
September 2017 at 
national 
DISCURSIVE OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES 
Media  Favourable  
Highly salient topic from 
2014 onwards  
Mixed  
Some newspapers 
became increasingly 
hostile towards refugees, 
particularly post-Cologne 
New Year’s 2016 
Mainstream parties’ 
position on refugees and 
third-country 
immigration 
Unfavourable Mixed  
Especially CSU was 
expressing concern about 
the reception of refugees 
from August 2015 
onwards, just as CDU 
tightened the policies 
after New Year’s Eve in 
Cologne 2016. 
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Public opinion 
(Eurobarometer) 
(diffusion of xenophobic 
attitudes in society 
(Rydgren 2005)) 
Favourable 
Spring 2016:  
35% positive  
58% negative 
 
Favourable 
2018: 
37% positive,  
57% negative 
Authoritarian 
past/Nostalgic views on 
fascism 
Unfavourable Unfavourable 
OTHER FACTORS  
Prior inclusion in far 
right networks 
GI Germany: Most derive from neo-Nazi scene, 
Autonomous Nationalists, Burschenschaften  
PEGIDA: Links to Hooligan scene and some were 
prior members of far right parties (see Ch. 5)  
Current inclusion in 
network 
Both groups: German New Right scene around 
Kubitschek 
 
France: Symbiotic Relations with FN, (Near) Open POS, and Open 
DOS  
Compared to Germany, the POS are more open in the French setting,312 even though 
the access to parliament is more restricted, due to France’s electoral system, and the 
cordon sanitaire imposed on the far right in parliament. The French authorities are 
less repressive than is the case for their German counterparts, but they have also 
established stricter policies against the extreme right (Caiani & Parenti 2013). 
Conversely, the country’s anti-racist organizations do not obtain much valid 
information from the authorities, and as Camus states, the “public institutions have 
been fearful of building lasting relationships with the anti-far right NGOs” (as cited 
in Caiani & Parenti 2013: 48), entailing that there is not much monitoring of the far 
right’s activities. Moreover, unlike Germany, the French extreme right’s history is 
distinguishable from Nazism, being a more heroic, and, in some sense, nostalgic, take 
on the past (similar to the Italian and Belgian context) (Klandermans 2013). 
The long-lasting role of Front National on the French political scene is also an 
important factor. Since 2002, it has made strong electoral gains, and today, a broad 
segment of the French far right extra-parliamentary actors are clustered around the 
                                                          
312 Caiani & Parenti (2013) classify the political opportunities as “Intermediate (nearly open)” 
(2013: 51). 
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party, forming a tight network (Minkenberg as cited in Caiani & Parenti 2013; see 
also Benveniste & Pingaud 2016). In most other (Western) European countries, an 
electorally strong political far right party diminishes the capacities for mobilization 
for protest groups. Yet, the strong role of the French New Right since the late 1960s 
and its reliance on the extra-parliamentary scene indicates “a neat distinction between 
institutional and street politics” in France (Mammone as cited in Castelli Gattinara 
2018: 277). In fact, the extra-parliamentary actors draw on many of FN’s frames and 
its agenda as a means to avoid prosecution for discrimination (Ibid.), just as it can use 
the FN’s parliamentary position as “channel access to the political system” (Caiani & 
Parenti 2013: 35). Nevertheless, based on “estimates of mobilization capacities as well 
as frequency and size of protest events based on country-specific research literature,” 
Minkenberg (2018) assesses the French extra-parliamentary scene to be weak 
(2018:8), despite its nearly open political opportunities. 
As a former colonial power in Africa, France houses a big Northern African diaspora 
(Bisson et al. 2019). It is considered a traditional country of immigration. Ever since 
the signing of the First French Constitution in 1798, the French citizenship has been 
based on jus soli (‘right of the soil,’ birthright citizenship) (Monforte 2014). The 
country thus has a more inclusive policy than e.g. Germany, yet, due to the French 
“assimilative conception of citizenship and the Jacobin tradition,” scholars deem the 
far right’s cultural opportunities as potentially favourable in the country (Mudde and 
Eatwell as cited in Caiani & Parenti 2013: 44). Its basis on a ‘republican model’ thus 
infers “a ‘universalistic’ understanding of integration which stigmatises cultural 
specificity” (Scrinzi as cited in Castelli Gattinara 2018: 276). This partially explains 
the strong focus on religious symbols, such as the headscarf, in political debates, as 
was, for instance, witnessed during Sarkozy’s second term (2007-2011), which also 
included a ‘debate’ on immigration and nationality (see e.g. Goodliffe 2013).  
In fact, the French discursive opportunities have gradually expanded since the early 
2000s, especially prodded on by the rise of a conservative, or ‘reactionary,’ movement 
alongside, but independent from, Front National (Frigoli & Ivaldi 2018). The 
movement consists of numerous well-known cultural elites (such as journalists, 
essayists, and philosophers), who have been influential in the mainstream media and 
public debates on socio-economic and cultural issues, just as the French fachosphère 
(extreme right activists) has been influential online (Ibid.). Many of the discussions 
have involved criticism of “left-wing progressivism” (Ibid: 73), and other topics close 
to the French far right, giving its issues a higher level of salience at public and media 
levels. At the same time, one can observe a mainstreaming of the far right’s claims at 
the party political level, as a means to win votes (Mudde 2007). The extra-
parliamentary groups’ room for manoeuvring is thus rather good.  
Moreover, another extenuating factor can be found in the French economic crisis 
ongoing at the time, which “intensified the structural and cultural crises that fuelled 
the FN’s rise in the first place” (Betz 2015: 96), and thus also the space for the extra-
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parliamentary far right. Hence, as Caiani and Parenti (2013) argue about the French 
DOS, they are “open” as the country shows “diffuse anti-immigration attitudes both 
at the elite and population levels, high degrees of public acceptance of the extreme 
right as a legitimate political actor, and a weak anti-racist and anti-fascist 
organizational context” (2013: 52). 
The French Political Context in the 2015-2017 Period 
Being a big recipient of asylum seekers to Europe, the refugee issue had been high on 
the media and political agenda in France for several years (Monforte 2014). In fact, 
the country actively attempted to instate EU-wide policies to diminish the numbers of 
refugees even before the ‘refugee crisis’ set in (Ibid.)313.  
The 2015-2017 period started out with a terrorist attack in the French capital. On 
January 7, 2015, Jihadist terrorists attacked the satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo’s 
headquarters in Paris. The attack came seven months after an attack perpetrated by a 
French citizen on a Jewish Museum in Belgium (Almasy & Erdman 2014) and led to 
renewed strong French debates about the place of Islam in the country. 
When the European Commission proposed the refugee quota scheme in May 2015, 
France initially refused to accept the provisional 40,000 refugees, French President 
Hollande stating that the country had already taken its part of the ‘burden,’ and that 
rules and policies were already in place for controlling the immigration (The Local 
France 2015). Yet, in September, the government changed its opinion on the matter, 
and agreed to accept asylum applicants from Germany. At the same time, the media 
mainly focused its attention on security measures, rather than expressing compassion 
for the refugees (see e.g. Georgiou & Zaborowski 2017). In fact, two of the largest 
French newspapers, Le Monde and Figaro, were rather divided in their portrayal, the 
former expressing empathy, while the latter instead mainly framed the articles around 
fear conceptions, especially portraying the migrants as perpetrators (Ibid.). 
On September 5, 2015, the death of Alan Kurdi spurred on numerous pro-migrant 
demonstrations across France, opposing the ‘repressive policies’ of the French 
government, and supporting the refugees (France24 2015). However, a public opinion 
poll published a few days prior (September 2) at the same time showed that 56% of 
the population were against France’s reception of migrants and refugees (Ibid.). 
Nevertheless, two days later, Hollande announced that the country would allow 
24,000 refugees currently in the EU to come to France within the next two years, 
                                                          
313 Already in 2008, for instance, the French government had called to create a ‘European Pact 
on Immigration’, which would counter illegal migrants, plus work to reinforce the external 
borders of Europe (Monforte 2014: 2). As a means to sway the other MS to agree to the pact, 
the French made “references to uncontrolled flows of migrants at the Southern borders of 
Europe,” which also became a claim voiced by mainstream media (Ibid: 2). 
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calling for a “united EU effort” to ‘share the burden’ of the refugees arriving to the 
EU (Samuel 2015; see also above). This was part of Hollande’s efforts to ensure the 
maintenance of the Schengen agreement, as he deemed a joint EU response as the 
only viable solution, in order to avoid the reintroduction of national borders (Ibid.). 
The decision did not lead to strong political or media uproars. Yet, in October 2015, 
the French Interior Minister held a meeting with mayors of towns, which were going 
to house refugees. Particularly the FN mayors were hostile to the idea, and in a 
statement, Steeve Briois (FN), announced “No Front National or Rassemblement Bleu 
Marine town hall will welcome any illegal immigrants” (Le Parisien 2015). Moreover, 
other mayors were also hesitant to welcome refugees to their cities (Ibid.).  
During the three-year period, France had numerous problems at its borders to both the 
UK and Italy, just as it experienced problems related to the housing of the refugees, 
due to a “lack of appropriate structures to accommodate asylum seekers,” especially 
in Paris (Castelli Gattinara 2018: 278). Together with the growing migratory pressure 
on the French-British border crossing in Calais, France, where migrants and refugees 
had created a camp, the ‘Calais Jungle,’ the debate about its future received much 
political and societal attention in France in the 2015-2016 period (see e.g. Samuel 
2015). For one, throughout the period, the French authorities had difficulties 
monitoring the refugees and migrants at Calais, who were attempting to cross the 
channel to the UK. In the first half of 2015, more than 18,000 migrants had been 
detained (Taylor et al. 2015). Yet, at the end of June 2015, the problems reached a 
new height, as ferry workers began striking; leading to traffic jams (see e.g. Grierson 
& Gayle 2015). This led hundreds of migrants to attempt to break into lorries heading 
for the UK—, in some cases threatening the drivers with knifes. The police came and 
interfered, and closed the ferry port plus the Channel Tunnel temporarily. The British 
PM, David Cameron, reacted with consternation, and referred to the migrants as a 
‘swarm of people’ (Taylor et al. 2015), further fuelling the growing discontent both 
in the UK and France. In September, problems again erupted at Calais, where French 
police carried out forced evacuations of the migrant camps, evicting around 400 
migrants, who were mainly Syrian refugees (McPartland 2015b). Yet, the problems 
ensued, and on February 29, 2016, the French authorities started demolishing the site, 
leading to clashes between the migrants and pro-migrant activists (Chrisafis et al. 
2016). A similar occurrence found place in October the same year, leading to a full 
destruction of the camp (see e.g. Jones 2016). 
Throughout the 2015-2017 period, there was thus strong debate in France about 
migrant camp problems, especially in Calais (Castelli Gattinara 2018), but also Paris, 
and as the public felt that the government was not able to deal with these problems, 
the anger grew (Atlantico 2016). In the summer of 2016 onwards, the authorities 
began dismantling Parisian refugee camps, and created the temporary reception centre 
Porte de la Chapelle, due to “an influx perceived as out of control” (Ibid.).  
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The border to Italy was equally problematic, as many migrants sought to enter France 
through this route, especially by the town of Ventimiglia. A 1997 agreement between 
France and Italy ensured that France could send back migrants to Italy (Papoutsi 
2014), and the French government re-instated border controls in November 2015, after 
the Bataclan terrorist attack (Foster 2015). Reports indicated that the humanitarian 
situation around the crossing was getting increasingly dire (Atlantico 2016), and the 
government was prosecuted by three pro-migrant organizations, who spoke on behalf 
of mainly African migrants, who had waited at the border by Ventimiglia since mid-
June (The Local 2015). However, the court rejected the complaint in June 2015, 
stating that France was not in breach with the Schengen agreement.  
In April 2016, the French population was almost split 50/50 on the question of 
refugees. Around half feared that domestic terrorism would rise and that the refugees 
would affect the economy negatively (Pew Research Center as cited in Castelli 
Gattinara 2018). However, by September 2016, a public opinion poll showed that 62% 
of the population was opposed to the reception of refugees. This was a new high since 
the peak of the ‘crisis’ in the summer of 2015. According to the political analyst 
Jerome Fourquet, this was related to the problems of the migrant camps around 
France, plus the many terrorist attacks during the summer (as cited in Atlantico 2016).   
The 2015-2017 period thus also involved several terrorist attacks, beginning with 
Charlie Hebdo in January, and followed by the attack on the concert hall Bataclan in 
November 2015, killing 130 people. In the summer of 2016, the series of attacks 
continued, first with the killing of a police officer and his partner in Paris in June, 
perpetrated by a Frenchman of Moroccan origin. This was followed by an attack in 
Nice on Bastille Day (July 14), where a Tunisian-born Frenchman drove a truck into 
a big crowd of people, killing 86. Only 12 days later, a priest was killed with a blade 
in a small French church, while another person was wounded (Willsher 2016). All 
three attacks were carried out in the name of ISIS. In the aftermath of each of these 
attacks, French debates regarding Islam mainly evolved around the issue of 
‘integration’ and “the place of Islam in French society,” rather than a sole focus on 
‘security’ (Fourquet as cited in Atlantico 2016). Hence, throughout the period, but 
especially in 2015-2016, the ‘refugee crisis’ was a highly salient topic, affecting the 
media, public opinion, and the politicians, and ensuring open discursive opportunities 
for the far right. 
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Table AC.2: POS/DOS for the French Far Right 
 January 2015 Change over time? 
STABLE POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES 
Electoral system (high 
thresholds, etc.) 
Unfavourable 
(Plurality/Majority) 
(No Change) 
Degree of centralization 
(Federal/central gov) 
Unfavourable 
 
(No change) 
Separation of powers 
(legislature, executive 
and judicial separation) 
Favourable  
(Tri-partite) 
(No change) 
Repression (strong legal 
regulations against 
extreme right) 
Medium  
(Authorities can ban 
groups) (Bleich & 
Lambert as cited in 
Minkenberg 2018) 
(No change) 
DYNAMIC POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES 
Elite allies (centre-right 
party in power) 
Unfavourable 
(Socialists (Hollande) 
2012-2017, and cordon 
sanitaire against Front 
National, but more 
favourable at certain local 
levels (Caiani & Parenti 
2013) 
(No change) 
Elite allies (main far 
right party) 
Favourable 
Front National 
(No change) 
Strong FR party (in 
parliament)? 
Favourable  
Front National 
(Not unfavourable in 
French case, due to 
symbiotic relationship) 
(No change) 
  
EUROPEANIZATION OF THE FAR RIGHT 
472
 
DISCURSIVE OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES 
Media  Favourable 
‘Refugee crisis’ was a 
salient topic 
2015: Divided 
mainstream media.  
Defensive measures 
dominated over caring 
measures (Georgiou & 
Zaborowski 2017).  
Mixed 
Salient topic throughout 
period, but diminishing 
mid-2016 onwards 
Mainstream parties’ 
position on refugees and 
third-country 
immigration 
Favourable 
Mainstreaming of the far 
right’s frames  
Hollande initially 
rejected refugee quotas  
Mixed (Sept. 2015 ) 
Hollande agrees to accept 
refugees, but also crack-
down on migrant camps 
Public opinion 
(Eurobarometer) 
(diffusion of xenophobic 
attitudes in society 
(Rydgren 2005)) 
Favourable 
Spring 2016:  
34% positive 
57% negative 
Favourable 
2018: 
36% positive 
55% negative  
Authoritarian 
past/Nostalgic views on 
fascism 
Favourable 
More heroic, and in some 
sense nostalgic, take on 
the past (Klandermans 
2013) 
(No change) 
OTHER FACTORS  
Prior inclusion in far 
right networks 
GI FRANCE: Included in New Right scene around 
The Identitarians and Front National. 
Current inclusion in 
network 
Included in New Right scene around The Identitarians 
and Front National. 
 
-  
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Czech Republic: Fractured Far Right, but (Nearly) Open POS and 
Open DOS  
Being part of the post-Soviet Eastern European states, the Czech Republic’s far right 
has developed like similar-minded groups across the region and also expresses itself 
in more ideologically extreme forms than its Western European counterparts 
(Minkenberg 2015). This can mainly be explained by the fact that there have been no 
mainstream parties that have co-opted the far right’s frames and thus led to its ‘taming’ 
(as is the case in e.g. Austria) (Ibid.). Moreover, many of the far right’s frames are 
already part of the mainstream parties’ programmes, especially regarding nationalism 
and national identity (see e.g. Minkenberg 2015; Buštíková 2018). This means that 
the political space for such claims is already occupied, explaining the considerably 
more extreme ideological viewpoints voiced by the far right in the country 
(Minkenberg 2015). 
Since the end of the Soviet regime in the 1990s, the country has witnessed the 
development of an extreme right scene, which currently mainly consists of groups 
expressing post-communist worldviews (including neo-Nazis, skinheads, and groups 
such as Blood & Honour) (Minkenberg 2015). During the 2000s, the extra-
parliamentary scene was weak (Mareš 2011), but by 2015, Minkenberg evaluated the 
movement sector as having a ‘medium’ level of strength (Ibid.). Conversely, the far 
right parties have generally obtained a low level of electoral support, indicating a low 
party strength, and often of an extremist type (Ibid.).  
In terms of establishing the political opportunities for the far right in Eastern Europe, 
the state’s strength cannot be used as an explanatory factor, as they are all centrally 
organized (Minkenberg 2015). Instead, the level of state repression is a good indicator 
of the far right’s mobilization opportunities in the region (Ibid.). Unlike most of the 
other Eastern European countries, there is a cordon sanitaire imposed on the Czech 
far right parties, potentially due to the survival of “a legacy – or memory – of the 
interwar experience of democracy” (Capoccia as cited in Minkenberg 2015: 37; see 
also Mareš 2011). 
The Czech far right is also monitored by the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech 
Republic, which publishes an annual report about incidents and new developments on 
the scene. Moreover, the Bezpečnostní informační služby (‘Security Information 
Service’), the Czech internal intelligence service (Mareš 2012), also monitors more 
extreme right groups. The Czech state has several options available for suppressing 
parties that espouse authoritarian or totalitarian worldviews. It can thus be categorized 
as a ‘militant democracy,’ or, in other words:  
…a democratic regime that takes active steps to defend its constitutional 
and political values through the use of repressive legal instruments and 
other measures. It opposes free activity and the influence of movements 
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that wish to replace the democratic constitutional regime with another type 
of regime (authoritarian or totalitarian) and also the ideologies connected 
with these movements. (Mareš 2011: 34). 
The country thus has the option of banning political parties, if they are considered a 
threat to the constitution. One example of the use of this option was in 2010, where 
the extreme right Worker’s Party (DS) was dissolved for ‘ideological reasons’ (Mareš 
2011). In this period, the CEE extreme right activities were on the rise, and one way 
to stop this development was through the employment of militant democracy (Ibid.). 
Yet, this is not a very frequently employed option, and the Czech extreme right extra-
parliamentary actors are given rather much freedom to express their sentiments.  
For one, due to the Soviet history of suppressing free political speech, there are not 
very strict legislations against hate speech in the country, not even if it directly incites 
violence (Pejchal 2018). There has, thus, hardly been any prosecution of actors 
expressing such views, and instead, the legal framework is more geared towards the 
outlawing of extremism (Ibid.). Hence, groups expressing more ‘moderate’ far right 
viewpoints have relatively free reign in terms of their activities. 
Regarding the political system, the Czech political system has been in a period of 
consolidation since the end of the Soviet regime, entailing a high fluctuation of parties 
in the Czech Parliament, including on the far right (Minkenberg 2015). New far right 
parties thus constantly enter the scene, making it “disconcertingly fluid,” and the 
borders between the far right movements and parties more “permeable” (Minkenberg 
2015: 34). 
However, after having become more or less consolidated by 2010, the Czech party 
system underwent a major realignment in the 2013-2017 period (Císař & Navratil 
2018), indicating an opening in the political opportunities (Ibid.), especially regarding 
alliances with far right parties (Dawn). Already in 2010, a new development occurred, 
as a newly created party joined the centre-right cabinet, something that had not 
occurred since 1993 (Ibid.). The party, the ultra-conservative Public Affairs Party 
(VV), expressed xenophobic worldviews, together with the mainstream parties, 
leading to public debates about their legitimacy (Ibid.). With the entrance of the party 
to the Czech parliament, the country began a period of deconsolidation of its party 
system, which, until 2010, had been dominated by two main right and left parties 
(Ibid.). This led to the rise of several protest parties, who could exploit various 
corruption scandals and a general “dissatisfaction with post-1989 party politics” in the 
run-up to the Czech national elections of 2013, which had led to a plummet of public 
distrust in the mainstream parties (Ibid: 189). The elections thus led to strong electoral 
gains for the ANO protest party, while the radical right party Dawn obtained almost 
seven percent of the votes (Ibid.). Yet, no extreme right parties entered the scene. For 
one, according to Jiří Pehe, the Communist Party in the Czech Republic “plays the 
role of a protest party, so anyone who wants to protest against foreigners, migration, 
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EU, or Germans has the Communists to vote for” making the party play “a sanitary 
role,” as it takes away votes from more extreme right parties (as cited in Lazarová 
2016).  
Moreover, as Císař and Navratil (2018) explain, Dawn crowded out the extreme right 
parties such as the Worker’s Party of Social Justice, and its youth organization, 
National Democracy. These parties mobilized rather frequently on the streets in the 
2015-2017 period, but did not react quickly enough to the immigration issue to benefit 
from it electorally (Ibid.). This is hugely relevant in relation to the two Czech groups 
explored in this study. It thus meant that while IVČRN and BPI were comparatively 
close with Dawn ideologically, and thus could seek an alliance with the party, GI 
Czech Republic instead remained without a parliamentary ally, as National 
Democracy and the Worker’s Party of Social Justice (DSSS) did not gain access. Yet, 
at the same time, Tomio Okamura, who had recently established the new party 
Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD), did not refuse to cooperate with the extreme 
right (Slačálek & Svobodová 2018). Together with National Democracy, GI Czech 
Republic could thus benefit from this cooperation with SPD, particularly after the 
elections of 2017, where the party received 10.6% of the votes.   
Hence, due to the fundamental changes to the political system that led to a party 
realignment, plus the looser legislative framework to combat far right extremism in 
the country, the political opportunities for the far right in the Czech Republic were 
rather open in 2015, especially for groups and actors that do not explicitly express 
authoritarian or totalitarian viewpoints.  
Immigration 
In terms of immigration then, the Czech Republic hardly has any Muslim population, 
nor has it received many migrants from the MENA countries more generally. The 
‘othering’ has instead usually been directed against the national Roma minority. The 
few Muslims in the country arrived as refugees in the early 1990s from the Balkans 
and Caucasus, but they were seen as ethnically similar and thus not controversial 
(Bonansinga 2015). Yet, due to 9/11 and the growing terrorist threat in Europe, Czech 
Islamophobia began appearing and partly explains why the Czech population mainly 
met the Muslim refugees arriving from Arab countries with hostility (Ibid.). In fact, 
already in the late 2000s, there was a high level of xenophobia in the Czech Republic 
(around 45% in 2008-2009, a rise from 29% in 1999-2000) (Minkenberg 2015).  
The Czech Political Context in the 2015-2017 Period 
Up until 2015, immigration had not been a strong political issue in the entire Eastern 
European region (Barnickel & Beichelt as cited in Minkenberg 2015), even though 
Islam was mainly discussed using securitization frames since 9/11 (Slačálek & 
Svobodová 2018). Yet, with the onset of the ‘refugee crisis,’ the topic came high on 
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the political agenda, just as it “became a topic of public debate” in the country 
(Globsec 2016).  
In December 2014, the Social Democratic-led government (headed by Bohuslav 
Sobotka) postponed the decision to allocate 15 sick Syrian children and their families 
to the country, as the EU had requested (Globsec 2016). The Czech government 
finally decided to accept the 15 families in January 2015, and together with the 
terrorist attack on Charlie Hebdo in France, it set off a heated political discussion 
about the refugees and asylum seekers, and opened the discursive opportunities for 
the far right (Císař & Navrátil 2018).  
The mainstream political elites and the media “converged on a rather restrictive stance 
towards refugees” (Ibid: 185). Several Czech mainstream politicians, including the 
President of the country since 2013, Miloš Zeman, were vocal about the ‘dangers’ of 
Islam (see e.g. Culik 2015; Císař & Navrátil 2018), and the majority of the political 
parties, including the government, opposed Muslim immigration (Globsec 2016; 
Hafez 2018). In fact, “No parliamentary party adopted a pro-refugee stance, with 
quotas being firmly rejected even by many representatives of the liberal-conservative 
TOP 09” (Slačálek & Svobodová 2018: 483). The media tended to have a 
sensationalist spin on Muslims, mainly highlighting stories such as terrorist attacks 
(Bonansinga 2015), and securitized and dehumanized the refugees (Slačálek & 
Svobodová 2018). Especially alternative media sources and some traditional media 
outlets “framed the debate from the perspective of Islamophobic and anti-refugee 
groups”314 (Globsec 2016). While the public was polarized on the issue, the majority 
opposed the reception of refugees. Hence, despite the fact that the country had hardly 
experienced any Muslim immigration in the past, the population still expressed strong 
Islamophobic sentiments, and opposed third-country immigration from Muslim 
countries, fearing terrorism and the perceived detrimental effects on Czech culture 
(Bonansinga 2015). The 2015 Eurobarometer survey revealed that more than 70% of 
the population were against the reception of refugees and immigrants (European 
Commission 2015b). Hence, the discursive opportunities were very favourable in the 
period, due to the high salience of the issue, and the media, the political mainstream, 
and the population aligned their views on the refugees with the far right’s demands315. 
Due to this strong opposition to third country immigration and asylum seeking, the 
Czech government was quick to reject the European Commission’s quota proposal. 
When the idea was launched in May 2015, the Czechs refused to comply, together 
                                                          
314 Consider e.g. the leaked documents, which showed that TVPrima’s editors and executives 
demanded of the journalists only to report negatively about the refugees (Globsec 2016). 
315 As stated by the Czech Foreign Ministry in its annual report on Extremism, “Other typical 
topics of the extreme right receded into the background, which was certainly aided by the fact 
that as regards the issues of immigration and Islam the extreme right entities felt considerable 
support from the wider public in 2015” (Czech Ministry of the Interior 2016: 42). 
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with the other Visegrad countries (Borger et al. 2015). Initially, the Czech PM was 
more cautious in his manoeuvring, attempting to balance between the Visegrad 
countries and the EU, especially Germany, with which he wanted to remain on good 
terms (Globsec 2016). Yet, in the end, the Czech government built its responses 
“around security as the primary consideration” (Ibid.), and in early September 2015, 
together with the other three Visegrad states, the country again firmly rejected the 
quota idea. The Czech Secretary for European Affairs argued that it was unfair 
towards the refugees to allocate them to the Czech Republic if they did not want to be 
in the country (in reference to the country’s role as a transit country to Germany). 
The country was, in fact, not very strongly affected by the ‘refugee crisis’ in terms of 
illegal immigration, and as the Czech Secretary for European Affairs pointed out, 
most refugees were seeking to travel onwards to Germany (Globsec 2016). In both 
2015 and 2016, the country thus only received around 1,500 applications for asylum 
(Basch & Heřmanová n.d.). Yet, it still experienced some problems related to the 
detention facilities that housed refugees detained by the Czech police and military at 
the borders to Austria or Hungary (Globsec 2016). 
Despite these low asylum seeker figures, the Czech government continued its refusal 
of the EU’s demands. In June 2016, the Czech Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lubomír 
Zaorálek again very firmly rejected the refugee quotas, explaining the rejection with 
the (alleged) Western European experiences with Muslim non-integration, and the fact 
that most refugees wanted to go to Germany rather than stay in the Czech Republic 
(Lehnartz 2016). Similarly, after the terrorist attacks in several European cities over 
the summer of 2016, President Zeman announced that the Czech Republic refused any 
Czech reception of immigrants due to the terrorist threat, going up against PM 
Sobotka’s promise of accepting 2,700 refugees before the end of 2016 through the 
relocation scheme (Ouest-France 2016).  
At the October 2016 regional elections, the issues of third country immigration and 
European integration were big on the campaign agenda, despite the regions’ limited 
capacity to take decisions on these issues (Vít 2017). This again underlines the high 
salience of the topic in the Czech Republic. Moreover, in the fall of 2017, the populist 
protest party ANO won the national elections, leading Andrej Babiš to become the 
new PM. He took an equally strong stance against the refugees (see e.g. Drbohlav & 
Janurová 2019). 
In terms of far right mobilization during the ‘refugee crisis,’ Mareš and Petlák (2019) 
explain that while several paramilitary and vigilante groups were created, there was a 
more limited use of violence by the Czech extreme right compared to other European 
countries, such as Germany, Austria, and Poland. Yet, at the same time, the level of 
hate speech rose substantially during the period (Ibid.). 
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Table AC.3: POS/DOS for the Czech Far Right 
 January 2015 Change over time? 
STABLE POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES 
Electoral system (high 
thresholds, etc.) 
Favourable 
(Proportional) 
(No Change) 
Degree of centralization 
(Federal/central gov) 
Unfavourable (No change) 
Separation of powers 
(legislature, executive 
and judicial separation) 
Favourable  
(Tri-partite) 
(No change) 
Repression (strong legal 
regulations against 
extreme right) 
Medium 
State repression, and 
containment of the far 
right through cordon 
sanitaire (Minkenberg 
2015) 
(No change) 
DYNAMIC POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES 
Elite allies (centre-right 
party in power) 
Mixed 
Government coalition of 
Social Democrats 
(centre-left) (ČSSD), 
ANO (centre-right), and 
the Communist Party (far 
left) (KSČM)  
President Zeman strongly 
anti-immigration and –
Islam 
Favourable 
2017: Gov-Coalition of 
ANO (centre-right), Civic 
Democratic Party 
(centre-right) (ODS), and 
Pirates (centre-left) 
Elite allies (main far 
right party) 
Favourable 
Dawn  
Favourable 
Dawn (for BPI) 
Freedom and Direct 
Democracy (SPD) (for GI 
CR) 
Strong FR party (in 
parliament)? 
Not relevant in the Eastern European case, due to their 
symbiotic natures compared to the hydraulic 
relationship in Western Europe (Minkenberg 2015) 
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DISCURSIVE OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES 
Media  Favourable 
‘Refugee crisis’ highly 
salient issue, refugees 
mainly portrayed around 
securitization frames 
(Georgiou & Zaborowski 
2017) 
Mixed 
By June 2016, the issue’s 
salience decreased (Císař 
& Navrátil 2018) 
Mainstream parties’ 
position on refugees and 
third-country 
immigration 
Favourable 
A high segment of the 
political mainstream 
opposed the reception of 
refugees (Císař & 
Navrátil 2018) 
Favourable 
2017: ANO also 
increasingly expressing 
anti-immigration 
sentiments  
Public opinion 
(Eurobarometer) 
(diffusion of xenophobic 
attitudes in society 
(Rydgren 2005)) 
Favourable 
Spring 2016:  
17% positive 
77% negative 
Favourable 
2018 
80% negative 
Authoritarian past/ 
Nostalgic views on 
fascism 
Not relevant in Eastern European case, but Communist 
past affects views on the far right. 
OTHER FACTORS  
Prior inclusion in far 
right networks 
GI Czech Republic: Autonomous Nationalists and 
neo-Nazis. 
IVČRN/BPI: Czech Defense League 
Current inclusion in 
network 
GI Czech Republic: Cooperation with National 
Democracy 
IVČRN/BPI: IVČRN alliance with other anti-Islam 
associations  creation of BPI  BPI alliance with 
radical right Dawn party.  
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The Netherlands: (Nearly) Close POS, and Open DOS 
The political opportunities in the Netherlands are almost closed. While the populist 
radical right parties have had a strong standing in the Netherlands since the early 
1990s and the rise of Pim Fortuyn, the Dutch extra-parliamentary far right actors are 
stigmatised (Klandermans & Mayer 2006), due to the country’s “dark past” of Nazism 
(Klandermans 2013: 239). The far right extra-parliamentary groups have thus had 
difficulties establishing themselves in the 2000s, mainly because of the electoral wins 
of the party equivalents, which hinders public support (see e.g. Muis & van Kessel 
2017), yet, at the same time, an imposed cordon sanitaire ensures that far right parties 
have not become part of the government thus far. Moreover, the country has several 
very active ‘watchdog’ civil societal organizations, which monitor the scene, 
including groups such as Kafka and the Anne Frank House. As argued by della Porta 
and Diani (2006), such groups may influence both the mobilization success and 
strategies of far right activists. The Dutch extra-parliamentary far right scene is thus 
rather radical, fragmented, and weak, consisting of smaller, largely irrelevant, 
groupings (Muis & van Kessel 2017).  
The country currently has two prominent and electorally strong far right parties. On 
the one hand, Geert Wilders’ populist radical right Party for Freedom (PVV). As it 
“articulate[d] the main grievances of a part of the population without being associated 
with the contested historical background of right-wing extremist actors,” the party 
quickly rose electorally (van Buuren 2015). PVV has also been rather hesitant to 
cooperate with the Dutch extra-parliamentary far right, making alliances with the 
party unlikely. Yet, in recent years, the relatively new Forum for Democracy (FvD) 
has risen to prominence. While disassociating itself from an extreme right worldview, 
it has an “authoritarian streak” (Lucassen as cited in Faber 2018), and the party has 
been much more accommodative towards the political associations at the street level 
(see e.g. de Jong 2019). Yet, it was only at the elections from 2018 onwards that it has 
gained a strong position in Dutch politics. 
In terms of the country’s discursive opportunities, there has been a gradual 
mainstreaming of the far right frames (see e.g. Muis & van Kessel 2017). Moreover, 
instead of objecting to the frames employed by Wilders, “[j]ournalists and mainstream 
politicians have been hesitant to condemn [him] for his xenophobia and racist 
utterances” (Ibid.), providing space for actors voicing similar concerns. 
The Dutch migration regime has undergone substantial changes, particularly after the 
rise of the populist far right parties in the country. Having historically been a 
“forefront of multiculturalism,” with a “reputation as a humanitarian haven,” the 
country increasingly began enforcing rather restrictive policies (see e.g. van Selm 
2019). Since 1945, migration rose from the Dutch colonies, especially from Indonesia, 
just as the country recruited many guest workers from abroad up until the mid-1970s 
(Ibid). The country is very densely populated, and continues being so, due to relatively 
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high levels of both immi- and emigration. Particularly the high level of emigration 
compared to other European countries has led to worries at both the political and the 
media level (Ibid.). Moreover, in 2018, people with a migration background (i.e. 
immigrants and children of at least one non-Dutch parent) amounted to 23.1% of the 
population, 50% of which had a non-Western background (Ibid.). 
The country’s citizenship is based on both jus sanguinis and “a limited form of jus 
soli” for children of parents born in the country, but which do not have a Dutch 
citizenship (Ibid.). This policy has been part of heated debates regarding dual 
citizenship. The law proscribes that such a dual nationality is not permitted, and this 
has been a rather contentious issue, especially regarding migrants from African 
countries, and their (allegedly) lacking ‘loyalty’ towards the Netherlands, if they have 
dual nationality (Ibid.). Moreover, another key point of debate involves the role of 
Islam in the country, a topic strongly spurred on by the Dutch far right (Ibid.). 
Dutch Political Context in 2015-2017 Period 
During 2015, the Netherlands received almost 60,000 asylum applications, the highest 
annual number ever recorded in the country (Klaver 2016). The country quickly 
developed one of the toughest refugee and asylum policies in Europe, especially in 
terms of residence permits (WODC as cited in Dutch News.nl 2016), and the 
mainstream parties adopted a rather restrictive view on the arrivals. On September 10, 
2015, for instance, the Dutch Parliament discussed the Commission’s quota demands 
(Bahceli 2015). Here, Rutte, the Conservative leader of the Netherlands, stated that 
the country would prefer giving money to the near areas, while Wilders spoke about 
a pending ‘Islamic invasion’ (Ibid.). Hence, the Dutch government was already 
expressing concerns about receiving high numbers of refugees, something that also 
correlates with the general anti-Islam sentiment amongst the Dutch population, which 
has been visible in the high electoral success of Wilders’ Party for Freedom since 
2010.   
In the autumn of 2015, the Dutch government decided to erect numerous asylum 
centres across the country (like in other EU MS), leading to anxiety amongst the Dutch 
population, and a polarized debate. The Dutch far right and local initiatives mobilized 
strongly on this topic, leading to the cancellation of several planned centres (Klaver 
2016). Yet, at the same time, despite tensions “in some communities, with people 
living near (proposed) reception centers sometimes expressing frustration about their 
fears for public safety,” the Dutch public opinion generally remained rather positive 
throughout the ‘crisis,’ and supported the reception of recognized refugees (van Selm 
2019). 
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The salience of the issue thus rose amongst the population, who was rather split on 
the topic. In late 2015, 44% of the Dutch citizens saw ‘immigration and integration’ 
as the most important domestic problem, a substantial rise compared to the 2008-2014 
figures, which had fluctuated between 7 and 14% (COB 2015). The main concerns 
related to the numbers of refugees, the (potentially) growing societal tensions, the 
refugees’ use of welfare benefits to the detriment of the population, and the potential 
of terrorists being among the refugees (Ibid.). A Pew Research Center survey in 2016 
similarly showed that 61% feared that the rise in refugees would lead to more 
terrorism in the country (Connor 2016). Moreover, the ‘refugee crisis’ also came 
about at a time when the Dutch welfare system was undergoing changes, and as van 
Buuren (2015) states, this led to a sentiment of “they do not listen to us” amongst the 
population. This sentiment was further aided by the media, which gave 
disproportionate space to Wilders. Research thus showed that PVV had issue-
ownership of the ‘refugee crisis’ in the mainstream media, being the most frequently 
mentioned party in articles related to the ‘crisis’ (van Teeffelen 2016). 
The series of terrorist attacks that hit Europe in the 2015-2016 period and the 
simultaneously ongoing ‘refugee crisis’ thus strongly increased the salience of “anti-
foreigner sentiments” in the Netherlands (Muis & van Kessel 2017: 1). Especially the 
terrorist attack on Bataclan in Paris in November 2015 led to a further Dutch 
discussion about the security threats related to the refugees and asylum seekers, 
particularly as one of the suspects initially was thought to have come as a refugee (see 
e.g. Alberts 2015). It also led to an introduction of refugee and immigrant screening 
upon arrival to the Netherlands (Ibid.). 
The Netherlands played a vital role in negotiating the terms of the EU-Turkey 
agreement in the spring of 2016, due to the Dutch presidency of the European Council 
at the time (Broer 2016). With the introduction of the deal, and the therefrom ensuring 
the lowering of the refugee numbers, by the end of 2016, the ‘refugee crisis’ debates 
began fading out, and its salience thus decreased (Wagenaar 2019). Yet, instead, 
Turkey became a topic of much debate in the beginning of 2017, due to the Turkish 
referendum campaign, which Erdoğan also decided to run in countries across Europe. 
In March, the Turkish Foreign Minister visited the Netherlands, planning to speak at 
a campaign meeting for the Turkish referendum, in order to attract votes in favour of 
the President. Yet, the Dutch government banned him from campaigning for Turkish 
issues on foreign grounds, leading to a minor diplomatic crisis between the Dutch and 
Turkish governments, where Erdoğan accused the Dutch of employing ‘Nazi’ 
measures (see e.g. Henley 2017). 
At the March 2017 Dutch general elections, Wilders’ PVV party did not do as well as 
anticipated by the opinion polls, but still obtained 13.2% of the votes, the second 
highest amount. Forum for Democracy only received 1.8% and was thus still not a 
serious Dutch electoral contender in 2017. 
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Table AC.4: POS/DOS for the Dutch Far Right. 
 January 2015 Change over time? 
STABLE POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES 
Electoral system (high 
thresholds, etc.) 
Favourable 
(Proportional) 
(No Change) 
Degree of centralization 
(Federal/central gov) 
Unfavourable (No change) 
Separation of powers 
(legislature, executive 
and judicial separation) 
Favourable (No change) 
Repression (strong legal 
regulations against 
extreme right) 
High 
(State can ban parties 
and demos, if they pose 
“unacceptable public 
order risk” (Bleich & 
Lambert 2013) 
(No change) 
DYNAMIC POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES  
Elite allies (centre-right 
party in power) 
Unfavourable 
Rutte II 2012-now 
VVP/PvDA Centre 
(Liberal-Social Dem.) 
Favourable 
2017 elections: Rutte 
stays in power (coalition 
between VVD, D66, 
CDA and CU (centre-
right) only agreed upon 
after 208 days of 
negotiations) 
Elite allies (main far 
right party) 
Unfavourable 
Party for Freedom (but 
not interested in 
cooperation) 
Increasingly favourable 
Forum for Democracy 
beginning to gain 
resonance amongst 
electorate 
Strong FR party (in 
parliament)? 
Unfavourable 
Party for Freedom 
Unfavourable  
Party for Freedom 
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DISCURSIVE OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES 
Media  Favourable  
High on the media 
agenda 
Mixed 
‘Refugee crisis’ losing 
salience in 2017 
Mainstream parties’ 
position on refugees and 
third-country 
immigration 
Favourable 
Governing parties was 
hostile to the reception of 
refugees 
Favourable 
Public opinion 
(Eurobarometer) 
(diffusion of xenophobic 
attitudes in society 
(Rydgren 2005)) 
Mixed 
Spring 2016: 
43% positive 
51% negative 
Mixed 
2018 
49% positive  
48% negative 
Authoritarian 
past/Nostalgic views on 
fascism 
Unfavourable  Unfavourable 
OTHER FACTORS  
Prior inclusion in far 
right networks 
PEGIDA Netherlands: HoGeSa, Dutch Defense 
League 
Current inclusion in 
network 
DDL, PDV, and other small Dutch FR groups 
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Appendix D. Overview of the FE 
Member Parties 
National Movement316 (Poland) 
The National Movement (Ruch Narodowy) party was created in 2012, initially as an 
electoral alliance between the three far right organizations National Radical Camp 
(ONR) (neo-fascist), the All-Polish Youth (neo-fascist) and the Real Politics Union 
party (centre-right). The party understands itself as a ‘social movement from the 
right,’ gathering various political and ideological Polish far right currents in one party 
(Spanka & Kahrs 2014), and is associated with the Polish hooligan scene (see e.g. 
Wolf & Alexe 2016). It shares its name with a Polish anti-Semitic organization from 
the 1930s. 
The Eastern European far right parties are hard to categorize in terms of their exact 
ideological placement vis-à-vis their Western counter-parts (Buštíková 2018). Yet, 
even Polish scholars also disagree on where to position National Movement on the far 
right scale. Some argue that it is radical right (see e.g. Jajecznik 2015), while others 
place it amongst the extreme right. This is mainly due to its very radical nature, and 
its questioning of the basic democratic values of society, just as some of its members 
have voiced anti-Semitic and overtly racist positions (Pankowski as cited in Nigdy 
Więcej 2016). Yet, the party leadership has recently attempted to moderate the 
language in order to gain legitimacy (Interview with Jajecznik 2018).  
The party focuses on the issues of sovereignty and national identity (Kasprowicz 
2015), and holds that the nation-state is key (i.e. it opposes regionalist movements) 
(see e.g. CEE Identity 2013). In terms of Muslim immigration, the party worries about 
the threat to the ethnocultural cohesion of Poland, and wants to preserve the ‘Latin’ 
civilization in Europe (Nałęcz, 2016). Similarly as the anti-Islam actors, RN blames 
the problems on the European left, proponents of multiculturalism, and ‘political 
correctness,’ and the party opposes “importing leftist ideologies, such as gender 
ideology, ideology of LGBT, socialism etc., to Poland” (CEE Identity 2013). Hence, 
the party “identif[ies] liberalism as being at the heart of both the European and 
national identity crises” (Jajecznik 2015:49). Robert Winnicki, the party leader and 
speaker for All-Polish Youth, has stated, for instance, that he aims at building a force 
“which left-wing radicals and gay people should very much fear” (Wolf & Alexe 
2016). 
Since 2008, ONR and All-Polish Youth organize the annual Polish Independence 
March in Warsaw (‘Marsz Niepodległości’), an event that has continuously expanded 
                                                          
316 ‘National Movement’ is the most commonly used English translation of its name, yet, 
Jejecznik argues it would be more correct to translate it with Nationalist Movement. 
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its participant numbers, and has even been supported by the Polish government (see 
e.g. Davies 2018). In 2015, the demonstration, which was entitled ‘Poland for the 
Poles’, drew around 35,000 participants, among which several came from abroad 
(especially from parties involved in the European party-group AENM). 
During an interview in 2013, a party representative stated that the party cooperates 
closely with Jobbik, while the party “definitely do[es] not have close relations” with 
German nationalists, as “they have strong anti-Polish tendencies. Apart from that, 
German nationalism is marginal. We do not seek contacts there” (CEE Identity 2013). 
Conservative People’s Party of Estonia (EKRE) 
The Conservative People’s Party of Estonia (Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond, 
EKRE) was created in 2012, as a merger of the People’s Party (Rahvaliit) and the 
Estonian Nationalist Movement (Eesti Rahvuslik Liikumine). The former was an 
agrarian centrist party that collapsed in 2011, and the latter a remnant of the Estonian 
ethno-nationalist camp (Auers & Kasekamp 2015). The party leadership consists of 
the father and son Mart and Martin Helme, who form a ‘charismatic’ team, as they are 
both “very able and media-savvy demagogues” (Ibid: 145). Like Dawn, EKRE “shook 
up the Estonian political scene (which had been in a period of consolidation) in March 
2015,” as it gained 8% of the votes and thus seven seats in parliament (Kasekamp et 
al. 2018: 1). 
The party is conservative, nationalist, and populist, and it has a particularly 
antagonistic view on Russia (see e.g. Kasekamp et al. 2018). Its logo depicts the 
Estonian national flower cornflower (Centaurea cyanus), which symbolizes its 
fundamental values - national interests and traditions (EKRE n.d.). Together with its 
youth party, Blue Awakening, the party organizes numerous annual nationalist 
celebrations, such as the Estonian Day of Statehood, armistices, and the signing of the 
Estonian Independence Declaration. 
In terms of immigration, similar to National Movement, EKRE fears for the erosion 
of the Estonian traditions, language, and culture, if too many immigrants enter the 
country, and worry about a pending ‘Islamization’ of Estonia (Kasekamp et al. 2018). 
The party’s leader has, for instance, voiced the phrase: ‘If he’s black, send him back’ 
(Teder 2013). During the ‘refugee crisis,’ many of the party’s frames revolved around 
the security threat of Muslim immigrants, especially voiced in the aftermath of 
terrorist attacks (Kasekamp et al. 2018). 
Moreover, like National Movement, the party also wishes to uphold the traditional 
family constellation (Auer & Kasekamp 2015), and opposes liberalism and 1968 (see 
e.g. Bauska Declaration as cited in National Alliance n.d.). Thus, based on an analysis 
of the party’s social media content, Kasekamp and colleagues (2018) find the 
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following four issues to be prevalent: “an anti-Russian stance, Euroskepticism, 
promotion of family values, and an anti-refugee discourse” (2018: 1). 
In terms of the EU, the party mainly opposes its sovereignty infringement, yet, it does 
not specifically call for an Estonian EU departure (Wierenga 2017). EKRE has 
opposed several of the EU’s policy initiatives, such as the European Stability 
Mechanism and EU aid to Greece in 2015 (Auers & Kasekamp 2015). In terms of 
Russia, the party worries about the Russian influence on Estonia, and it has gained 
media attention for its staunch stance on the Estonian-Russian border treaty and its 
refusal to ‘give away’ land to Russia (Auers & Kasekamp 2015).  
At the European level, the party is closely associated with two other Baltic far right 
parties, National Alliance - All for Latvia! and the Lithuanian Nationalist Union, with 
which EKRE signed the Bauska Declaration in 2013. The Declaration was worded in 
strongly anti-liberal terms (see National Alliance n.d.). After the 2019 EP-elections, 
the party joined Lega’s Europe of Nations and Freedom group. 
The League (ex-Northern League) (Italy)  
Umberto Bossi created the Northern League in 1991. The party began as a movement 
party, uniting several Northern Italian autonomist associations under the name 
Lombard League (Lega Lombarda), and under Bossi’s leadership, it acquired a ‘mass-
party’ organizational form (Albertazzi as cited in Albertazzi et al. 2018). 
Due to Bossi’s involvement in a fraud scandal in 2012, Matteo Salvini took over the 
leadership of the party in 2013. Thereafter, the party abandoned its prior focus on 
Northern Italian regionalism (in the shape of a Padania) to now encompass the entire 
country (see e.g. Ibid.). This has garnered more votes, also from regions that were 
previous left-wing strongholds, plus the south, with which the party had earlier 
strongly conflictual relations (Ibid.). In the past, this regional focus made it a rather 
contested question, whether the party belonged among the populist radical right 
parties or not. Yet, the party currently shares the nativism, authoritarianism, and 
populism with the PRR parties, making Albertazzi and colleagues (2018) argue that 
there is no reason not to place it among those parties. 
In terms of ideology, the party has been voicing an anti-Islam discourse for several 
decades by now. Betz (2003b) has shown, for instance, how Northern League Nord 
gradually became more and more vocal about anti-Islam since the early 1990s. In the 
late 1990s, the party began arguing along a civilizational Kulturkampf discourse akin 
to Huntington’s (1993) argument (Ibid.). It has thus protested efforts at ‘Islamization’ 
ever since, e.g. by opposing mosque constructions (Ibid.). In this way:  
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[…] 9/11 was a godsend for the Lega, as it helped justify radicalizing the 
party’s position from being critical of how immigration had been managed 
by successive governments, to framing it as an existential threat to the very 
survival of the identities and cultures of northern Italians. (Albertazzi et al. 
2018: 648)  
Regarding the EU, until the leadership change, the party mainly targeted the national 
government with its anti-elite frames, due to the sentiment that the Southern Italians 
were receiving preferential treatment. Yet, currently, “the EU has taken Rome’s place 
as the people’s ‘enemy’” (Ibid: 646f). The party’s main problems with the EU relate 
to the Euro and the Union’s infringement on Italian sovereignty (Ibid.). Conversely, 
the party has been increasingly forging ties with actors close to the Russian 
government, and Salvini promotes political cooperation, while denouncing the 
sanctions imposed on the country (BBC 2019).  
At the European level, Northern League has cooperated with Front National for 
several years, especially through the Italian MEP, Mario Borghezio, who both 
networks with the French party, but also the French Identitarian Movement (i.e. 
Identitarian Bloc and GI France) (see e.g. Barrontini & Palladino 2017). 
Courage – Great National and Pro-Russian Coalition (Slovakia) 
Stanislav Martinčko created the Courage – Great National and Pro-Russian Coalition 
(Odváha) in 2012, and it was dissolved in 2018. It is very hard to find information 
about the party, due to its small size and short life span.  
The party focused on Slovakia’s security policy, calling for the Slovak departure from 
NATO, and that the country should instead create closer links with Russia. The party 
thus called for closer economic and political cooperation between Slovakia and the 
EU with Russia and the Euro-Asian Union, with the ultimate goal of a common 
economy and security area “from Lisbon to Vladivostok” (Pavliš as cited in Rajská 
2015). Moreover, Courage called for the immediate abandonment of the sanctions 
imposed on Russia, a re-evaluation of the country’s NATO membership, and the 
removal of the NATO base in Slovakia (Ibid.). 
In terms of the EU, Courage kept referring to the pending disintegration of the EU 
due to the Euro. Moreover, being a pro-Russian party, Odvaha argues that the security 
threat posed by Islam has been brought upon Europe by actors such as NATO and the 
U.S., due to their wars in the Middle East (WebNoviny 2016; HN Online 2016). The 
party’s website, which now been closed down, is full of conspiracy theories that 
mainly portray the US as the villain (for example by claiming that the US created 
ISIS), while Russia is depicted in very positive terms. 
Besides its strong focus on Slovakian security policy, the party called for more direct 
democracy, promoted traditional family values, and called for more direct democracy. 
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